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Abstract 
A Relational Defence of Surrogate Motherhood 
Pauline Everett 
This thesis explores surrogate motherhood using Christian ethics within a 
relational framework.  A surrogate mother is a woman who has a child for a 
commissioning couple who are usually infertile.  Chapter one explores how 
surrogacy is presented in three secular and three Church reports by focusing 
upon the surrogate, the commissioning couple and the child.  The key 
theological and ethical objections to surrogacy are briefly explored: that it 
undermines motherhood, involves baby selling, coercion, exploitation and 
commodification.  Chapter two analyses motherhood according to three 
secular feminists and three theologians.  The secular feminists are criticised for 
not recognising the complexity of motherhood.  By contrast, motherhood in 
Christianity is presented as multidimensional.  Chapter three analyses whether 
paid surrogacy commodifies, exploits and coerces the participants.  
Theologically the chapter explores human beings as created in the image of 
God and as having dignity, which can mean that payment does not always 
have to lead to commodification, exploitation or coercion.  Chapter four 
explores whether paid surrogacy involves baby selling.  Theologically the 
chapter explores the concepts of the self and other in Augustine and Aquinas.  
It also explores agape in Anders Nygren and Gene Outka, arguing that self-
interest and altruism can co-exist with care for the self and the other in a 
relational framework without detriment.  Comparisons are made with blood 
donation to suggest that paid and unpaid surrogacy can operate together 
without paid surrogacy being regarded as baby selling or the purchase of 
parenthood.  Finally, chapter five outlines three models towards surrogacy: a 
contract model, an adoption model and my relational approach, influenced by 
Louis Janssens’ personalism.  My relationalism aims for a more sophisticated 
ontology of the relationship between the self and the other and calls for various 
solutions in a surrogacy custody dispute.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A Relational Defence of Surrogate Motherhood 
 
1. Definitions 
 
The aim of this thesis is to defend surrogate motherhood by using a relational 
framework.  The thesis will explore some of the key major ethical issues in 
surrogacy within a Christian theological context.  A surrogate mother is a 
woman who agrees to have a child for a (usually infertile) commissioning 
couple, married or unmarried, with the intention that they will raise it.  
Surrogacy has also been used, though less frequently, by single people, and is 
starting to become more frequent among same-sex couples.1  There are two 
main types of surrogates.  A genetic surrogate is a woman who is inseminated 
with the sperm of the commissioning father or with the sperm of a donor (who 
is usually anonymous, though may not be).  In genetic surrogacy, the surrogate 
provides her own ovum and is typically inseminated either in her own home 
by herself, the commissioning mother or in a registered fertility clinic by 
medical personnel.  Genetic surrogacy is sometimes called straight surrogacy, 
traditional surrogacy or partial surrogacy.  The second type of surrogacy is 
called gestational surrogacy where a surrogate is inseminated with the embryo 
of the commissioning couple or a donated embryo using in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) in an infertility clinic.  If the embryo is donated, it can be deliberately 
created using the gametes of separate donors or it could be a ‘spare embryo’, 
left over from the IVF treatment of another couple.  With IVF the surrogate has 
to undergo invasive medical treatment to ensure that the procedure is a 
success.  Gestational surrogacy is sometimes known as full surrogacy, host 
surrogacy or complete surrogacy.   
                                                 
1
 The thesis will assume, for the sake of argument that the commissioning couple are married 
and their surrogate is too. 
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Surrogates are expected to hand the child over to the commissioning couple as 
soon as possible after the birth - indeed couples are often present at the birth.  
The majority of surrogacy cases involve frequent contact between the surrogate 
and the commissioning couple, with both parties residing in the same country.  
However, surrogacy has been known to occur anonymously without the 
surrogate or the commissioning couple meeting, with the child being handed 
over through a third party such a surrogacy agency worker.  Due to the 
difficulties of finding a surrogate - for example surrogacy is illegal in France - 
some commissioning couples turn to international surrogacy.  In international 
surrogacy a couple from one country will arrange to use a surrogate from 
another country.  Sometimes the commissioning couple may only meet the 
surrogate a few times or not at all, while others decide to live in the surrogate’s 
country in the expectation that this will give them domicile status.  However, 
there can be great problems regarding the child gaining the citizenship of the 
commissioning couple, due to surrogacy laws clashing between countries.  For 
example Ukrainian surrogacy law regards the commissioning couple as the 
legal parents, whereas English law regards the surrogate and her husband as 
the legal parents, thus leaving the child stateless because both laws cancel each 
other out and there are no international agreements on surrogacy. 
 
2. Surrogacy Background 
 
In the UK, under the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 and the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, the surrogate is the legal mother for 
giving birth to the child and her husband is regarded as the child’s father.  If 
the surrogate is single, usually the commissioning father is listed as the father 
3 
 
on the birth certificate.2  The commissioning couple, if one of them is 
genetically related to the child, can apply for a Parental Order within six 
months of the child being born if the surrogate agrees to hand the child over.  If 
the commissioning couple are not related to the child, then they can apply to 
adopt it.  If the surrogate refuses to hand the child over the commissioning 
couple will probably take her to court and seek custody based upon the best 
interests of the child.  Courts usually though grant custody to the surrogate as 
the birth mother, taking into account the bonding she may have experienced to 
the child and the fact that she is probably already looking after the child.  
However, if courts believe the child would be better off with the 
commissioning couple, especially if the surrogate has deceived them, then 
custody will go to the commissioning couple. 
 
Most surrogacy arrangements in the UK occur through a surrogacy agency 
such as Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS) or Surrogacy UK.  
A surrogate will approach the agency, who will give her a selection of 
commissioning couples to pick one from.  It is illegal to advertise for a 
surrogate in the UK and if a commissioning couple do not use an agency they 
might approach a family or friend to act as a surrogate for them.  Legally, 
surrogacy is a void contract and cannot be enforced.  Most surrogacy 
arrangements involve the surrogate handing over the child to the 
commissioning couple, with about 2% of cases involving the surrogate keeping 
the child, because she may have changed her mind and wants to keep it, 
sometimes due to bonding to the child.  Most commissioning couples tell or 
plan to tell the child of the arrangement, thus reducing the sense of the child 
being ‘abandoned’ by their birth mother.  Often the surrogate will keep a type 
                                                 
2 If a single genetic surrogate is injected with donor sperm the commissioning couple are 
unable to gain a Parental Order as the child is not genetically related to them.  However, if a 
single gestational surrogate gestates an egg of the commissioning mother ‘through a HFEA 
licensed clinic’, the surrogate can ‘elect’ the commissioning father or the commissioning mother 
as the second parent, before applying for a Parental Order (email correspondence with Nicola 
Scott at Natalie Gamble Associates, 19 and 28 July 2011).   
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of contact with the commissioning couple after the birth and be informed of the 
child’s development.  For example, a child born of surrogacy later prayed for 
her surrogate and the surrogate intends to provide a sibling for her.3 
 
Traditionally the Christian churches have been opposed to surrogacy, for 
reasons we will explore.  Similarly, most governments and legislatures have 
been reluctant to have specific surrogacy laws which would force the surrogate 
to hand the child over against her will.  However, in the UK at least, public 
opinion over the years has become more accepting of surrogacy as the practice 
has increased.  The five chapters of this thesis will explore some of the key 
ethical and theological objections to surrogacy.  It will suggest that the current 
paradigms – whether a contractarian model, an adoption model, or a best 
interests of the child model – are inadequate.  It will propose that an alternative 
framework needs to be developed to ensure justice for the surrogate, the 
commissioning couple and the child.  One of the reasons why an alternative 
model is needed, I will argue, is because motherhood is multidimensional.  The 
main ethical issue which has been selected to focus upon is that of payment in 
surrogacy.  This is often regarded as baby selling and involving exploitation, 
commodification and coercion of the surrogate.  However it will be suggested 
that self-interest is important and can operate alongside altruistic motivations 
for another thus allowing for paid surrogacy without commercialisation. 
 
3. Thesis Overview 
 
Before outlining each particular chapter in greater detail, the five chapters of 
the thesis can be summarised as follows.  Chapter one explores the three main 
British secular government reports and three church reports regarding 
surrogacy.  Chapter two analyses the concept of motherhood, chapter three 
                                                 
3 Joan Einwohner, ‘Who Becomes a Surrogate: Personality Characteristics’, in Joan Offerman-
Zuckerberg, Gender in Transition: A New Frontier (New York: Plenum, 1989), 123-32, at 127. 
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investigates the ethical concepts of commodification, exploitation and coercion 
for the child, the surrogate and the commissioning couple respectively.  
Chapter four considers the issues of self-interest, altruism and baby selling in 
paid and unpaid surrogacy.  Finally, chapter five studies three ways to manage 
surrogacy and surrogacy custody disputes in particular including a contract 
model, the adoption model which includes the best interests of the child and a 
final relational model.  A relational theme runs throughout the thesis, which 
allows for various emphases upon the self and the other, thus giving a 
spectrum of various outcomes, which can include different types of mothering. 
 
4. Chapter One 
 
Each of the five chapters will now be outlined.  The aim of chapter one is to 
provide a background to official responses and attitudes towards surrogacy 
from the government and from the churches.  Chapter one will explore six 
major British reports into surrogacy.  Three of the reports are secular and three 
are Christian.  Two of the secular reports were initiated by British 
Governments.  These are the Warnock Report,4 commissioned in 1982 by the 
Conservative Government and published in 1984.  The second one is the Brazier 
Report5 commissioned in 1997 by the Labour Government and published in 
1998.  The third secular report, called Changing Conceptions of Motherhood: The 
Practice of Surrogacy in Britain,6 was written by the British Medical Association 
(BMA) which is the professional body for medical practices in the UK.  The 
three church reports were theological responses to the developing new 
reproductive technologies including surrogacy.  Each of the church reports was 
written by a different denomination namely the Free Churches, the Church of 
                                                 
4 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (The Warnock Report) (London: HMSO, 1984). 
5 Department of Health and Social Security, Surrogacy (The Brazier Report) (London: HMSO, 
1998). 
6 British Medical Association, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood: The Practice of Surrogacy in 
Britain (London: BMA, 1996). 
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England and the Roman Catholic Church.  Each of the reports explores 
childlessness and the theology and ethics of the new reproductive technologies 
including surrogacy.  The Free Churches’ document was called Choices in 
Childlessness7 and was published in 1982 by the Free Church Federal Council.  
The Church of England’s document was called Personal Origins8 and was 
originally published in 1985, but with a revised second edition, published in 
1996.  Personal Origins was written by the Church of England Board of Social 
Responsibility, part of the General Synod of the Church of England, as part of 
its submissions to the Warnock Report.  The third and final Christian report to be 
analysed is Donum Vitae,9 published in 1987 by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith as part of the Roman Catholic Church.   
 
Chapter one is divided into two halves, considering how government and the 
Church have considered surrogacy.  The background to each of the six reports 
is given and how each of them regards surrogacy - by focusing upon the 
practice of surrogacy, the surrogate, the commissioning couple and the child.  
Particular attention is also given to important themes in surrogacy which will 
be developed later in the thesis, namely motherhood, baby selling, coercion, 
exploitation, commodification and surrogacy management.  Criticisms in two 
of the secular reports towards surrogacy will be investigated specifically in the 
Warnock Report and the Brazier Report.  Criticisms of the three Church reports 
will also be provided.  In addition the issue of surrogacy legislation is explored 
in the secular reports, while theological themes are also explored in the Church 
reports.  An evaluation of the secular reports will be given as well as an 
evaluation of the Church reports too, with an overall conclusion.  Chapter one 
therefore provides a basis for the main ethical and theological themes of 
                                                 
7 The Free Church Federal Council, Choices in Childlessness (London: The Free Church Federal 
Council, 1982). 
8 The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the Church of England, Personal 
Origins (London: Church House, 2nd ed., 1996).   
9 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum Vitae (London: Catholic Truth Society, 
1987). 
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motherhood, paid surrogacy and surrogacy management to be discussed later 
in the thesis. 
 
5. Chapter Two 
 
As surrogacy involves a woman acting as a surrogate mother for a 
commissioning mother to become a mother, the main aim of chapter two is to 
explore the concept of motherhood.  Like chapter one, the chapter is divided 
into two halves reflecting a secular approach and a Christian approach.  First of 
all, the issue of who is a mother is explored.  Various factors can be used to 
decide when a woman becomes a mother such as intention, conception, 
gestation, birth or bringing up the child as a social mother.  For the secular half 
of the chapter, the concept of motherhood is analysed using the work of three 
secular feminists: Caroline Whitbeck, Sara Ruddick and Barbara Katz Rothman.  
Each of these three feminists tends to focus primarily upon a particular aspect 
of motherhood.  Whitbeck concentrates upon a biological model of mothering, 
emphasising women’s biology to determine motherhood such as labour, 
childbirth and lactation.  Ruddick, in contrast, downplays the importance of 
pregnancy experiences for determining motherhood and instead highlights 
mothering as a nurturing social practice which occurs after birth and is linked 
to maternal thinking as a basis for other areas such as politics.  Rothman as a 
radical feminist highlights the gestational, birth and social aspects of 
mothering, rejecting the idea that a genetic connection to the child can 
determine a mother’s identity.  Of the three feminists, Rothman is the only one 
to explore the topic of surrogacy in particular and she is very critical of the 
practice.  Rothman regards the surrogate alone as the child’s mother, regardless 
of whether the surrogate is a gestational surrogate or a genetic surrogate.  Each 
of the secular feminists’ views towards surrogacy is explored along with the 
inadequacies of their views of mothering.  After this, an overall evaluation of 
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the secular feminists is made by looking at their positive points, along with 
how the secular feminists agree with each other.  However, criticisms of 
Whitbeck, Ruddick and Rothman are also made, including where they disagree 
with each other. 
 
After analysing the three secular feminists’ views towards motherhood, 
attention turns to two Christian feminists and a male theologian who has 
written on motherhood and the family.  The two Christian feminists to be 
investigated are the Protestant Bonnie Miller-McLemore and the Roman 
Catholic Rosemary Radford Ruether.  For each of the Christian feminists, an 
analysis of their theology and views of mothering will be made, unlike the 
critique of the secular feminists which just focused upon their views of 
mothering.  A comparison between the Christian and the secular feminists will 
be made which will suggest that the Christian feminists offer a more holistic 
approach towards mothering unlike their secular counterparts who tend to 
highlight just one aspect of mothering over another.  Advantages of the 
Christian feminists will be put forward, but also problems which are to be 
found in the work of Miller-McLemore and Ruether.  The work of Protestant 
theologian Don Browning will be explored to see how he views the family.  
Browning is influenced by the work of Roman Catholic theologian Louis 
Janssens.  Both Browning and Janssens can be used as a basis for the relational 
framework for surrogacy which is being developed within the thesis.  Finally 
chapter two explores how motherhood has been presented in Christianity in 
general with evidence being drawn from theologians, the Bible and the Church.  
It is found that motherhood has a wide ranging basis including the creation of 
life, conception, gestation, birth, lactation and nurturance, all of which can be 
used to suggest that motherhood is multidimensional and is not just about one 
function in isolation.  
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6. Chapter Three 
 
The third chapter of the thesis deals with three major ethical concerns 
regarding paid surrogacy, which are commodification, exploitation and 
coercion.  The focus of the chapter is on the possible effect on the child of 
commodification and on the surrogate of commodification, exploitation and 
coercion.  Attention is also given to the effect of payment in surrogacy upon the 
commissioning couple.  As the thesis is a thesis in Christian bioethics, the start 
of chapter three deals with the issue of human beings as made in the image of 
God (the imago Dei) and the importance of the theological concept of human 
dignity for paid surrogacy.  The concept of the imago Dei is explored with 
reference to the work of theologians Helmut Thielicke and Paul Ramsey.  A 
relational view of human dignity is mentioned with reference to the work of 
Roman Catholic moral theologian Janssens.   
 
Commodification is the concern that paying for a surrogate’s service could lead 
to the child or the surrogate being treated wrongly as a replaceable object, as a 
mere means to an end.  The fear is that surrogacy participants could find that 
they gain a high monetary value if they have desirable traits such as beauty or 
intelligence, whereas those with less desirable attributes such as lower 
intelligence could be considered to be worth less.  Children could become 
expensive fashion accessories or status symbols, used as an object and as mere 
means to satisfy the demands of wealthy commissioning couples to play happy 
families.  The existing children of the surrogate could suffer, fearing that they 
could be sold if they misbehave, for example.  Children born of surrogacy 
could become degraded by being valued according to their monetary worth, 
leading to a domino effect, where all children would be classified according to 
how much they cost or how much their particular features are worth.  The 
same effects could be observed for women too, with paid surrogacy possibly 
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leading to the commodification of all women.  Paid surrogates could become 
objects and treated as a mere means to an end.  Paid surrogates could be 
degraded by being treated as just a vessel to ensure that a richer 
commissioning couple do not have to go through the inconvenience or 
suffering of pregnancy.  However, the commodification section will also 
investigate the evidence for commodification in surrogacy and whether 
commodification has to occur as part of paid surrogacy. 
 
The other two major concerns of paid surrogacy are exploitation and coercion.  
The issue of possible exploitation for surrogates and for commissioning 
couples in surrogacy is explored by defining four types of exploitation in 
section 3.5.1-3.5.5.  Firstly, exploitation can be wrong for involving disparity of 
value if the surrogate is underpaid or if the commissioning couple are 
overcharged.  Secondly, surrogacy could involve a potentially problematic 
mutual exploitation which could harm participants.  Thirdly, there are 
concerns regarding consent in exploitation, while, fourthly, exploitation can 
involve commodification.  An unpaid surrogate may feel as though she is being 
exploited if she is not paid; however, others may regard surrogates as exploited 
if they are paid, thereby creating a ‘double bind’.  Coercion involves a threat 
and the concern is that some surrogates may be coerced to enter surrogacy 
especially from family members.  Again both exploitation and coercion are 
assessed to see if they really do or if they have to happen in paid surrogacy.  
Chapter three concludes with a call for more research, more regulation and 
more guidelines to ensure that paid surrogacy does not involve 
commodification, exploitation or coercion. 
 
 
7. Chapter Four 
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Chapter four continues the theme of analysing the ethics of paid surrogacy.  In 
order to ensure clarity, surrogacy involving no payment to the surrogate, 
which is sometimes called altruistic surrogacy, will be referred to as unpaid 
surrogacy.  This is done to ensure that altruism refers to its ethical term of 
concern for the other.  One of the aims of the chapter is to see if it is possible for 
a surrogate to be paid but to have concern for the other at the same time.  The 
chapter begins by emphasising the role of self-love and an ordered love in St 
Augustine of Hippo and St Thomas Aquinas.  The purpose behind presenting 
the views of Augustine and Aquinas is to demonstrate that within Christianity 
it is possible to have concern for the self and concern for the other co-existing 
without detriment to each other.  Further investigations are made concerning 
the definition of altruism.  Attention focuses upon the work of philosopher 
Thomas Nagel and his presentation of altruism.  Comparison is made with the 
work of Anders Nygren and his work on the theological concept of agape as 
love for the other, which is rectified by Gene Outka who believed that 
Nygren’s version of agape tended to focus too much upon self-abnegation.  In 
contrast to altruism and agape, the term mutuality is analysed as a possible 
alternative concept.  However emphasis is placed upon an alternative 
relational framework which includes relational altruism.  Relational altruism, 
as part of a relational framework, allows for a variety of emphases upon the 
self and the other through discourse and negotiation.  It is possible therefore 
for a moral agent to take care of others while taking care of themselves, which 
could mean that a paid surrogate is caring for herself while caring for another.   
 
The chapter goes on to explore attitudes towards paying surrogates in 
surrogacy by analysing how the Brazier Report thought of the issue of payment 
of expenses in surrogacy.  Some of the major ethical concerns of paid surrogacy 
centre on whether the practice inevitably involves baby selling or not.  An 
investigation is made into whether rights language is appropriate for surrogacy 
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in order to assess whether the commissioning father buys his parental and 
custody rights to the child if he pays the surrogate.  Chapter four also 
investigates whether surrogates can be paid for providing just a gestational 
service or whether paid surrogacy inexorably involves paying for the child as 
well as the gestational service.  In order to assess the financial attitudes 
towards surrogacy an analysis is made of the motives of the surrogates 
entering surrogacy, which questions whether financial reimbursement is their 
sole motive or whether they combine wanting payment with other motives.  In 
order to focus upon whether it is possible to combine self-interest in the form 
of wanting financial compensation with an altruistic concern for the other an 
investigation into blood donation is made.  Attention focuses upon the work of 
social scientist Richard Titmuss and the research he conducted comparing paid 
blood donation services in the United States of America with unpaid British 
blood donation services.  Titmuss’ arguments are supported by the work of 
Peter Singer, who favours unpaid services to ensure that altruism is able to 
prevail since he fears payment undermines altruistic motives.  However, this 
chapter uses examples from the voluntary sector to suggest that both paid and 
unpaid activities can co-exist without detriment.   
 
8. Chapter Five 
 
The final chapter of the thesis continues to develop the relational theme which 
has been developed throughout and explores how surrogacy is to be managed.  
The chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section explores traditional 
contractarian approaches to surrogacy, the second section analyses the 
adoptive model of surrogacy and the third section develops my own relational 
framework for surrogacy which draws upon the personalism of theologian 
Janssens. 
 
13 
 
In order to understand the contractarian approach to surrogacy a legal 
understanding of contract is outlined, by focusing upon the four key concepts 
to a contract: offer, acceptance of an offer, financial consideration and the 
intention to create legal relations.  Analysis is then made of how a hypothetical 
legal contract can be applied to surrogacy.  Problems of an idealised contract 
are outlined, followed by an exploration of the reality of legal surrogacy 
contracts.  
 
The second section of chapter five analyses the adoption model which tends to 
concentrate upon the surrogate keeping the child as the child’s birth mother.  
Attention focuses upon the work of Protestant theologian Scott Rae who is an 
advocate of the adoption model for surrogacy.  He is critical of the 
contractarian approach for surrogacy.  He concentrates upon the role of the 
commissioning couple, the surrogate and the child in surrogacy, and gives 
support for gestation as the crucial determinant of motherhood.  An outline of 
how surrogacy custody disputes would be solved using Rae’s adoption model 
are given, along with problems with the work of Rae and the adoption model.  
In traditional adoption, a closed adoption system involves the birth mother 
handing the child over to the adopters without further contact, whereas an 
open adoption system allows the birth mother to keep in contact with the child.  
It must be borne in mind that surrogacy is not adoption and there are 
differences between the two systems. 
 
The third section of the thesis outlines different types of relationalism and 
develops my relational framework for surrogacy, which is influenced by the 
work of the theologian Janssens.  I also develop my view of relationalism, 
which allows for a variety of emphases upon the self and other.  I outline what 
my relationalism does not involve and how it differs from Janssens’ 
personalism.  I go on to apply my relationalism to surrogacy by making 
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recommendations and applying it to custody disputes, embodiment and 
payment issues.  I also outline what my relationalism does not mean for 
surrogacy and also contrast my relationalism with a ‘best interests of the child’ 
approach.  Some of the problems of a relational framework are also provided 
before leading to the conclusion.  The main conclusion of the thesis will outline 
some possible implications of a relational approach for surrogacy.   
 
9. Scope and Focus 
Having outlined the thesis, I would now like to make three clarifications of its 
overall scope and argument. 
 
First, I will indicate why certain theological and ethical concepts, themes, 
theories and scholars were selected over others.  As this thesis is a thesis on 
surrogate motherhood from a Christian ethical perspective, it can be difficult to 
find a balance between the need to cover firstly, theological issues connected 
with the Bible, the Church, writings of patristic and modern theologians, 
secondly, Christian and secular ethical concerns, as well as thirdly, multi-
disciplinary themes relating to surrogacy such as the law, psychology and 
sociological concerns.  Some very difficult decisions had to be made as to 
which areas to focus upon.  It was decided to include both secular and 
theological reports on surrogacy in chapter one, as these represent the key 
major reports in the UK on surrogacy in order to compare and contrast their 
main concerns.  Reports from outside the UK such as the European report into 
the new reproductive technologies by the philosopher Jonathan Glover10 or the 
Canadian Episcopalian report into surrogacy11 were not included due to 
wanting to keep the focus upon the UK situation, even though these and other 
reports are important.  Both the secular and the theological reports chosen had 
                                                 
10 Jonathan Glover and others, Fertility and the Family: The Glover Report on Reproductive 
Technologies to the European Commission (London: Fourth Estate, 1989). 
11 John Baycroft (ed.), Whose Child Is This? Ethical, Legal, and Theological Dangers of “Surrogate 
Motherhood” (Toronto, Ontario: Anglican Book Centre, 1990). 
15 
 
common themes regarding the ethical practice of surrogacy, especially relating 
to motherhood, commodification, exploitation, coercion, baby selling and the 
management of the practice, as well as the effect upon the people involved 
namely the surrogate, the child and the commissioning couple.  These 
important ethical themes represent some of the major common concerns about 
surrogacy and are therefore addressed throughout the thesis.  It needs to be 
borne in mind that the Church reports by the Free Church Council and the 
Church of England about the new reproductive technologies, including 
surrogacy, were written as contributions to the secular debate and as evidence 
to the government commissioned Warnock Report.  Donum Vitae was also 
written in light of the practice of the reproductive technologies in order to 
provide theological comment.  The agenda therefore for the reports was, to 
some extent, set by secular society.  Even so, the Church reports were able to 
bring in their theological concerns relating to natural law, the status of the 
embryo, the unitive and procreative aspects of marriage and the right to a 
child.   
 
Not only did difficult questions have to be made as to which areas to focus 
upon, similar questions had to be made regarding what would be left out, due 
to space restrictions.  The priority in the thesis was to answer the ethical 
concerns raised in chapter one from the secular and Church reports namely the 
issues of motherhood, commodification, exploitation, coercion, baby selling 
and the management of surrogacy.   
 
In order to focus upon the relational framework in relation to the ethical 
themes of motherhood, commodification, exploitation, coercion, baby selling 
and surrogacy management, certain other areas connected with a Christian 
ethical relational approach unfortunately had to be left out.  Regrettably, there 
was not the space to develop the theological Trinitarian influences behind the 
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relational framework, as this would have detracted from the ethical concerns 
involved in surrogacy.  However, in the three paragraphs below I briefly 
outline some of the relational influences involved in the trinity.  In the 
background to the presentation of the relational framework in chapter five, 
attention focuses upon how relationalism is influenced by the personalism of 
Louis Janssens.  Unfortunately, there was not the room to include the research 
which had been done into the influences upon Janssens such as the writings of 
Max Scheler and the similarities and differences between Janssens and Scheler.  
I was unable to include the influence of the theology of the former Pope John 
Paul II on the theory of personalism, or provide an historical background to the 
issue of personalism or pragmatism.  Space restrictions meant that I was unable 
to include all of the research I had done into the various types of relational 
models from theologians such as Margaret Farley, Catherine Keller, Beverly 
Harrison, H. Richard Niebuhr, James Keenan or J. Kellenberger, as well as 
secular relational models from Stephen Mitchell, Lewis Aron, Sally Gadow, 
Margaret Urban Walker, including Lorraine Code’s friendship model and 
Virginia Held’s mother-child model.  These and other relational frameworks 
are briefly mentioned in chapter five, so that further reading can be done if 
required. 
 
Within Christian theology, relationality has often been used to describe God.  
The New Testament suggests that God is ‘three persons in relation’.12  
Relationality is found in the incarnation and in the trinity.13  Debates in the 
early church concentrated on relations between God and humans through 
Jesus, and the relations between the three hypostases (persons) Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit.14  Western tradition had translated the Greek ousia (being) by 
substantia (substance), thus indicating God’s real, single substance as ‘the being 
                                                 
12 F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 240. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
14 Ibid., 33.  
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that underlies the particular persons’,15 i.e. hypostasis (a single person).16  Arius 
considered the one, unbegotten God as non-relational. 17  However, Tertullian 
(160-225) developed the idea of there being ‘una substantia – tres personae’ (one 
God and three persons),18 in his treatise against Praxeas (c. 215).19  The 
Cappadocians used relation instead of substance to describe God.20  Gregory of 
Nazianzus (329-389, one of the Cappadocians), believed that the divine being 
involves the three persons, with a ‘shared, relational, being’.21  The 
Cappadocians regarded the trinity as demonstrating God’s ousia as being in 
communion;22 the three persons ‘in relation to each other’.23  Ousia reflects 
God’s distinction, unity and plurality.24  Ousia deals with God’s general being 
which relates to the relationship between the three persons in perichōrēsis.25  
Perichōrēsis was used by the early church to describe ‘relational spiritual unity’, 
translated in Latin by circumincessio, suggesting ‘a movement in, through, and 
with one another’.26  Cappadocian theology sees the hypostases as persons who 
are particulars who make up God’s being.27  The Cappadocians defined 
hypostasis and ousia separately, thus allowing the particular to take priority 
over universality.28  Care is used to prevent ‘tritheism’ where the three persons 
of the trinity are individuals, who later enter into a relationship together,29 with 
                                                 
15 Colin E. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity 
The Bampton Lectures 1992, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 191. 
16 Ibid., 197.  
17 Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 2nd ed., 1997), 
198. 
18 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God (London: SCM 
Press, 1981), 177. 
19 Ibid., 137. 
20 David S. Cunningham, These Three are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1998), 27. 
21 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 214. 
22 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 94. 
23 Ibid., 74.  
24 Ibid., 10.  
25 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 191.   
26 Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 92. 
27 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 197.   
28 Ibid., 191.  
29 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 175. 
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distinct wills.30  Perichōrēsis means that personhood and relations to others in 
the trinity are inseparable, but they are separated in us.31  The three participate 
in each other32 and become the persons in relationship to each other, as they are 
dependent on each other,33 by ‘what they give to and receive from each other’.34  
The three different Trinitarian persons mutually manifest each other in their 
relations,35 making them one36 and equal.37  God’s substance is in the particular 
and distinctive three persons and the mutual relations which make them up.38  
God’s being is unified and plural, i.e. God is one and many in ‘dynamic 
interrelations’.39  The Trinitarian God includes ‘plurality in relation’40 and 
‘particularity and relatedness’.41  God is not a collectivity, nor an individual, 
but a communion; ‘a unity of persons in relation.42  God is what he is only as a 
communion of the persons.43  In God, the three persons completely live in each 
other, so they cannot be divided from each other. 44  Even though all the parts 
of the trinity are equal,45 divine particularity does not mean that the three are 
identical to each other.46  The three persons have a common divine substance, 
but differ from each other.47  Despite the trinity involving mutually 
                                                 
30 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 198. 
31 Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 92. 
32 Cunningham, These Three are One, 165. 
33 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 172. 
34 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 143. 
35 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 176. 
36 Ibid., 175. 
37 Ibid., 176. 
38 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 191. 
39 Ibid., 163-164.   
40 Ibid., 177.   
41 Ibid., 152.  
42 Ibid., 225.  
43 Ibid., 191.  
44 Cunningham, These Three are One, 169. 
45 Ibid., 113.  
46 Ibid., 197.  
47 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 16. 
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participative relations, a particular activity can be linked to one of the three,48 in 
a relational whole,49 as they are simultaneously three and One.50   
 
Theologians agree with regard to God’s relationality but differ on the terms to 
describe it.51  Augustine used the term ‘three relations’.52  However, Colin 
Gunton believes that Augustine focused on God’s oneness instead of the 
trinity’s plurality,53 as Augustine said: ‘*t+he Father is called person in respect 
to himself, not in relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit’.54  Recent Trinitarian 
theology also emphasises relationality as an alternative position to seeing God 
as an isolated ‘single divine substance’.55 Trinitarian relationality is also a 
criticism of the Enlightenment view of a person as ‘an isolated individual 
consciousness’ who is detached from the world.56  Jürgen Moltmann develops a 
‘social’ understanding of the trinity57 and supports the ‘interpersonal reality of 
God’.58  Similarly, Catherine LaCugna argues that: ‘person, not substance, is the 
ultimate ontological category....the ultimate source of all reality is not a ‘by-
itself’ or an ‘in-itself’ but a person, a toward-another....God is self-
communicating existing from all eternity in relation to another’.59  Elizabeth 
Johnson comments that the ‘primary of relation in the idea of the triune 
God...challenges classical theism’s typical concentration on singleness in 
God....Since the persons are constituted by their relationships to each other, 
each is unintelligible except as connected with the others.  Relation is the very 
                                                 
48 Cunningham, These Three are One, 215. 
49 Ibid., 215.  
50 Ibid., 218.  
51 Ibid., 27.  
52 Ibid., 28.  
53 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 138. 
54 Augustine, De Trinitate VII.vi (11) cited in Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 95. 
55 Cunningham, These Three are One, 20 and 25. 
56 Ibid., 27.  
57 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, xvi. 
58 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 21. 
59 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco, CA: 
Harper/Collins, 191), 14-15, cited in Cunningham, These Three are One, 26. 
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principle of their being’.60  Robert Jenson suggests that: ‚The original point of 
trinitarian dogma and analysis was that God’s relations to us are internal to 
him, and it is in carrying out this insight that the ‘relation’ concept was 
introduced to define the distinction of identities.  If God is ‘one substance,’ this 
is a ‘substance’ with internal relations to other substances‛.61  Francis Jacques 
believes ‘...God is relationality.  God is the One who is, the One who makes 
relations possible, because God is a relation’.62  Gunton suggests that 
relationality can give ‘due weight to both one and many, to both particular and 
universal, to both otherness and relation’, since God is ‘both one and three, 
whose being consists in a relationality that derives from the otherness-in-
relation of Father, Son and Spirit’.63  However, David Cunningham regards 
relationality as ‘misleading’ because relations usually exist between 
independent entities.64  The three are not separate individuals acting 
independently of each other.65 The three do not enter into relation, but they are 
just relations i.e. ‘a subsistent relation’66 and they refer to a real and relational 
act or being.67  Nicolas Lash points out that humans have relations but God ‘is 
the relations that God has’.68  God is ‘a relational being’,69 i.e. ‘a being in 
relation’,70 as he ‘is wholly constituted by relationality’.71   
 
Cunningham suggests that the trinity encourages people to see themselves not 
as individuals who choose to enter relationships or not, but as ‘mutually 
                                                 
60 Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New 
York: Crossroad, 1992), 216, cited in Cunningham, These Three are One, 26. 
61 Robert W. Jenson, The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 
Press, 1982), 120, (identities here means three in God) cited in Cunningham, These Three are One, 
26. 
62 Cunningham, These Three are One, 189-190. 
63 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 6-7. 
64 Cunningham, These Three are One, 165. 
65 Ibid., 167.  
66 Ibid., 61-62.  
67 Ibid., 197. 
68 Ibid., 71. 
69 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 144. 
70 Ibid., 143. 
71 Cunningham, These Three are One, 165. 
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indwelling’, like the three, therefore ‘all pretensions to wholly autonomous 
existence are abolished’.72  Cunningham prefers to use ‘participation’ instead of 
relation, because relation is linked to individualism and allows us to leave 
relations without consideration.73  Whereas ‘participation’ means that the self’s 
existence as a person occurs by participating in others, and others participating 
in us,74 as an ‘imitate mutual indwelling’,75 with the self giving themselves 
‘completely and absolutely’ to the other.76  Cunningham does not think that 
Trinitarian theology can be located on a spectrum ranging from oneness to 
difference because the spectrum does not exist.77  However, Gunton 
acknowledges that the Trinitarian relations are diverse, involving dynamic and 
asymmetrical giving and receiving and not just reciprocity.78  My relational 
approach has similarities to a Trinitarian relationality by acknowledging the 
interaction between the self and the other.  However, as will be seen below, my 
relationality involves humans, who even though they can have fulfilling 
relationships, may have to leave a relationship for their own well-being and 
possibly for the well-being of the other too.  Even in the trinity the three 
persons do not just work in one set pattern of Father-Son-Spirit79 and in 
Gethsemane the Father left the Son alone80 and withdrew.81  Cunningham 
admits that sometimes some activities are the work of just one of the three82 
and even though he favours ‘participation’ over relationality, he suggests that 
in order to talk about a person it may be necessary to construct them as an 
individual.83  My relationalism allows for a spectrum of emphasis upon the self 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 166.  
73 Ibid., 190.  
74 Ibid., 189. 
75 Ibid., 166. 
76 Ibid., 294.  
77 Ibid., 293. 
78 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, 225. 
79 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 51. 
80 Ibid., 76. 
81 Ibid., 77. 
82 Cunningham, These Three are One, 116. 
83 Ibid., 203.  
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and the other and for dialogue and interaction between them, with more 
flexibility, including individuality sometimes and also mutuality, but without 
encouraging the self to be completely absorbed into the other. 
 
Despite examining the research into the issue of bonding in surrogate 
motherhood, especially empirical studies into the experiences of surrogates 
while pregnant, it was decided to focus upon the relational management of 
surrogacy cases if a surrogate does bond instead.  Unfortunately, the research 
conducted into the law and case law in both England and the United States of 
America, had to be considerably reduced, including other relevant laws too.  
Likewise, a detailed comparison between a legal contract and a philosophical 
contract, as presented in philosophy by philosophers such as Hobbes, John 
Rawls and David Gauthier, was also left out.  This comparison would have 
focused upon the differences between a legal and a philosophical contract by 
looking at the structure of the contract, the aim of the contract, the motivation 
to enter the contract, the role of authority and political influence, the issue of 
informed consent and the position of women.  Similarities between a 
philosophical and legal contract were also left out which focused upon the 
issue of consideration, the issue of impartiality, the issue of reasonableness, the 
lack of emphasis upon the family or emotions and the fact that contracts are 
usually enforceable and are made in advance.  In order to focus upon the role 
of the three key models for surrogacy namely a contractarian model, an 
adoption model and a relational model in chapter five, the research done on 
the relationship between law and morality was also not added. 
 
Other important areas which were left out include issues relating to 
globalisation and race in surrogacy,84 especially the attitudes of the surrogate to 
gestating or the willingness to gestate an embryo of a different ethnic origin, as 
                                                 
84 See France Winddance Twine, Outsourcing the Womb: Race, Class, and Gestational Surrogacy in a 
Global Market (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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well as the legal response to this issue if she wants to keep the child.  Due to 
wanting to focus upon the theological and ethical aspects of surrogacy, 
references to empirical studies done on surrogacy and the new reproductive 
technologies were kept to a minimum and were used to support the ethical 
debates.  Since a surrogate is not a prostitute, it was decided not to include 
comparisons between surrogacy and prostitution as a practice.  Likewise, 
discussions relating to the concepts of alienation, prudence and paternalism 
were also reduced, in order to focus upon issues which affected all the 
participants in the practice of surrogacy (i.e. the surrogate, the commissioning 
couple and the child) such as commodification and exploitation and not just 
those which affected the surrogate for example. 
 
As the topic of surrogacy raises so many ethical and theological issues, some 
key theological concerns had to be sacrificed in order to allow space to develop 
the relational framework.  One area which could have been explored in relation 
to personalism could have been the philosophy and theology of John 
MacMurray.  It was decided to focus upon the writings of Janssens due to his 
influence in the work of Don Browning and Bonnie Miller-Mclemore on the 
family, as well as the fact that Janssens wrote on the issue of the new 
reproductive technologies too.  Another area which could have been explored 
is the issue of the continuing desire to have children of one’s own and the issue 
of the maternal desire of the commissioning mother.  There can be great 
disappointment to a commissioning couple if they have repeated IVF failures 
and many suffer with depression if they are infertile.  Not all commissioning 
couples are suitable to adopt a child who may have special needs, but this is 
not to say that they would not make good parents, just that the needs of the 
child could be met by someone more able to provide for them.  After 
researching the issue of covenant as a possible framework for surrogacy, it was 
decided not to use it as it was too similar to the issue of contract with its 
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emphasis upon obligation, duty and responsibility, despite being used in many 
flexible arrangements and relationships.  As the thesis is focusing upon 
surrogate motherhood, it was decided to leave out the research which had been 
done on exploring the theology and ethics of the other reproductive 
technologies such as AIH, AID and IVF.  Other significant areas left out include 
a detailed analysis of the theology of the body and issues such as the 
surrogate’s pregnant bodily integrity and embodiment or a detailed analysis of 
natural law’s understanding of the use of the body to gestate another’s child.   
 
10. Theological Orientations 
Another area that should be clarified is that this thesis is in applied Christian 
theological bioethics.  In the thesis, references are made to the Bible, the 
teachings of the Patristic fathers, the writings of the modern day Churches on 
surrogacy and the views of Christian ethicists and theologians on motherhood 
and the family.  The thesis discusses theological concepts and themes 
throughout, including: the unitive and procreative aspects of marriage, the 
issue of natural law, the imago Dei, human dignity, Augustine and Aquinas’ 
ordered love or ‘caritas ordinata’.  
 
The theological emphasis of the thesis can also be seen from a summary of the 
theological dimensions of each of the chapters. In Chapter one, three Christian 
reports on surrogacy are explored.  Each of the following key themes are given 
a theological understanding in these reports: the use of natural law, nature, the 
role of mothering, the unitive and procreative aspects of marriage, the status of 
the embryo, the issue of childlessness and the rights to a child in light of God’s 
will, purpose and providence.  The church reports criticise surrogates for not 
continuing to mother the child after birth, believing that family life and marital 
fidelity are affected, as well as the surrogate’s dignity.  However, they do not 
acknowledge that a gestational surrogate could possibly act as a steward of 
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God’s creation by gestating an embryo if the commissioning couple who keep 
having miscarriages or by saving the life of a spare embryo, thus giving them a 
child to spread God’s kingdom.  After all, Donum Vitae allows procedures to 
save the embryo but not surrogacy. 
 
Chapter two explores motherhood in the writing of three secular and three 
theologians.  The chapter also describes the Biblical accounts of surrogacy in 
Genesis as including rape, concubinage, polygamy and slavery, with fear, 
invalid consent and jealousy, unlike modern day surrogacy.  Discussion is also 
made of the use of simile and metaphor to describe God for being ‘like a 
mother’ or ‘is a mother’.   
 
Protestant theologian Bonnie Miller-Mclemore criticises theology for ignoring 
women’s maternal experiences, thinking and feelings and for including self-
sacrifice and idealising mothers.  She develops a protestant feminist maternal 
theology, incorporating women’s experiences and problems, while 
emphasising love, grace, redemption, and mutuality, since mothers have self-
worth for being made in God’s image.  Family life is seen as a vocation and 
children are to be loved as God’s blessing and gift.  In addition to the use of the 
Bible, the church, theology and women’s experience she uses the concept of 
generativity by psychologist Erik Erikson within a theology of creation and 
procreation.  
 
Roman Catholic theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether, stresses equality and 
fairness but not patriarchalism from God’s image.  She highlights mutuality, 
sacrament, covenant, redemption, grace and blessing while calling for diverse 
postmodern families including cohabitation.   
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Protestant Don Browning in his writings on the family develops two main 
themes of love as equal regard and critical familism.  Firstly, love as equal 
regard is influenced by the mutuality of Janssens’ and gives equal weight to 
self-regard and other regard.  Theologically, man and woman are seen as being 
created in the image of God, which gives them equality and allows them to 
share God’s goodness and dignity within a context of grace, forgiveness and 
redemption.  Equal regard is connected with Christ’s command for us to love 
our neighbours as we love ourselves.  Secondly, he develops the concept of 
‘critical familism’ which is profamily and promarriage by supporting a 
committed intact married family with justice and equality within and between 
families.  Marriage as a covenant and a sacrament encourages the husband and 
wife to love each other equally and fulfil each other as part of the unitive and 
relational aspects of the marital relationship.  He includes Trinitarian concepts 
within the family for the mother, the father and the children, since the family is 
part of God’s creation and children are gifts from God who we love thus 
reflecting God’s love for us.  However, he recognises the reality of families 
today too. 
 
Browning’s theological method involves dialogue and conversation in four 
points: firstly describing concrete questions, secondly giving an interpretative 
concern of historical theology, thirdly seeing systematic theology as an ordered 
reflection or an interpretive process and fourthly a strategic practical 
theological reflection on how to proceed with concrete and faithful action.  His 
practical theology is normative, involves obligation, moral principles such as 
loving your neighbour and also premoral goods, such as food, wealth, health, 
shelter, self-regard.  He adopts a flexible Catholic view in a Protestant way; he 
allows contraception and AID, prioritises covenant over sacrament, revises 
natural law with philosophy, psychology and social science evidence, but 
rejects patriarchy. 
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Motherhood, as presented in Christianity in the Bible, Church history and by 
theologians, is regarded as complex, multi-dimensional and diverse.  
Motherhood is connected with creation, conception, gestation, birth, lactation 
and nurturance.  God in the Bible is seen as a creator, a birthing mom and as a 
nurturing mother who weans, nurses and shows love, compassion and mercy.  
The Church is regarded as the mother of all Christians, who gives birth since 
the font was regarded as a watery womb.  The Church is also regarded as a 
lactating mother who nourishes the faithful.  Mary is regarded as a mother who 
loves with a compassionate, womblike love and priests are regarded as 
mothers too.  However, a flexible relational framework is needed to deal with 
the different types of mothering.  
 
In chapter three, in order to highlight the theological basis to prevent 
commodification, exploitation and coercion in surrogacy, the concepts of the 
imago Dei (the image of God) and human dignity are discussed.  Helmut 
Thielicke believes that we have an alien dignity from God’s love and can reflect 
the image of God and his glory because we are made in this image, giving us 
self-worth, equality, uniqueness and a responsibility to others, while in 
relationship to God.  Paul Ramsey also develops a relational understanding of 
the imago Dei by believing that humans are able to reflect God’s image, his will 
and action due to Christ’s love which transforms us. 
 
Chapter four develops the theological aspects of relationship between the self 
and the other.  Both Augustine and Aquinas believed that ‘ordered love’ 
(caritas ordinate) orders the love between God, the self and the other and 
includes charity and grace, but is not the same as agape or altruism.  Negative 
love involves rebellion against God such as pride.  Neutral love includes self-
love as a rational natural choice to seek your own good.  Positive self love 
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involves loving God first because God loves us and also promotes our true 
welfare in God.  Aquinas’ love is proportional and he allows a partial love 
where we can love the family over others.  The theological virtues of faith, hope 
and charity (love) are seen as superior to the cardinal virtues of justice, 
prudence, fortitude and temperance.  Charity is regarded as the prime virtue 
and guides the other virtues by reason, but is beyond reason.  Charity is not 
acquired or natural, but is infused in us by God and includes self-love and 
neighbour love, as well as being connected to a rational soul. 
 
In contrast to the ordered love of Augustine and Aquinas, the agape of Anders 
Nygren is rejected for regarding self-interest as selfish sin for not putting others 
first.  The mutual agape of Gene Outka is also criticised for its balanced 
egalitarianism.  These theologians are criticised for not having a varied 
emphasis upon the self and the other, which is to be found in my alternative 
flexible relational framework.  My relationalism responds to the needs of 
participants by incorporating an ordered love which includes God, the self and 
the other in dialogue, but without egoism. 
 
In chapter five three models towards surrogacy are explored: a contractarian 
model, an adoption model and a relational model.  In chapter five, the 
relationalism of certain Christian theologians is summarised including 
Margaret Farley, James Keenan, J. Kellenberger and H. Richard Niebuhr who 
focused on people’s responsive relations with God and particular others.  The 
personalism of Roman Catholic Janssens is explored which includes mutuality, 
a teleological ethic with a final end and a proportionalist theology which 
incorporates conscience.  Janssen believes we are created in God’s image and 
therefore are to reflect it.  He wants us to know, worship and glorify God, with 
hope and love, prioritising our spiritual life over our temporal and material 
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life.  Therefore we are to live in faith, respond to God’s will and fulfil our 
humanity in mutual relationships with God and others.   
 
My relationalism is more open ended based on ongoing negotiation and 
discussion and therefore may not involve a predetermined proportionalism.  
My relationalism can involve God, as found in the hearts of those involved, in 
dialogue and by acknowledging that people are made in the image of God.  It 
is not dependent upon conscience, as this is regarded as too individualistic, too 
subjective and as relying on negative or guilty feelings after the event, since 
social interaction and discussion are need too.  Natural law is not to be 
regarded as a fixed end with rules coming from nature, however, nature does 
matter and is dynamic, allowing things to change.   
References to natural law are first found in the work of the Greek playwright 
Sophocles and aspects of it are also developed in Stoic philosophy.  It is 
believed that law is found in nature and that humans can use their reason to 
know it.  A similar sort of theme appears to be present in the Bible in Psalm 19, 
Romans 1:20 (which is congruent with God’s nature being seen through his 
creation) and Romans 2:15 (Christians believe God places his law within 
human hearts).  The tradition of natural law is most fully developed in Aquinas 
and for Aquinas the moral law reflects the eternal law in God’s mind and 
expresses the natural law.85  It is found by reason and conscience.86  Natural law 
or the law of creation (lex creationis) deals with how God orders creation.87  
                                                 
85 James M. Gustafston, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 13. 
86 Carl E. Braaten, Reclaiming The Natural Law for Theological Ethics, 
http://www.elca.org/What-We-Believe/Social-Issues/Journal-of-Lutheran-
Ethics/Issues/October-2007/Reclaiming-The-Natural-Law-for-Theological-Ethics.aspx, assessed 
27th June 2012, paragraph 2 
87 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
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Roman Catholics tend to believe that the moral law is ‘a gift of grace’ from 
God. 88   
11. Relational Framework 
Finally, I now outline how relationalism as a theme is developed throughout 
the thesis.  Relationalism is suggested as an alternative model to deal with 
surrogate motherhood in contrast to contractarian and adoption models.  
Relationalism is a methodology incorporating a framework or spectrum, 
allowing for a variety of emphasis upon the self and the other.  Relationalism 
encourages discussion and negotiation between participants to express the 
importance and priority of their particular needs and interests resulting in 
various outcomes.  Relationalism does not necessarily aim at a final fixed end 
which must be achieved.  The focus within relationalism is on the people and 
their needs and interests, it does not insist upon one solution such as mutuality 
or self-sacrificial agape.  Relationalism is a revised personalist ethic, influenced 
by the personalism of the Roman Catholic Janssens, but differs from his 
theological basis of conscience and proportional outcomes.   
 
Theologically both Augustine and Aquinas have developed an ordered love 
which incorporates God, the self and the other.  However, some theologians 
such as Anders Nygren focus upon a particular concept, in his case agape.  
Nygren believed that Christianity should focus upon self-sacrifice and love for 
the other instead of self-interest or self-love.  In contrast theologian Gene Outka 
focuses upon mutuality, wanting there to be an equal regard given to the self 
and the other.  Don Browning and Bonnie Miller-Mclemore take the theme of 
equal regard and apply it to families to encourage egalitarianism and 
mutuality. 
 
                                                 
88 Gustafston, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, 12. 
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Relationalism, as an ethical framework, can be seen as emerging from ethical 
thought which has tended to focus on one concept at the expense of other 
concepts.  Within philosophy, Aristotle for example, focused upon a 
proportionate mean as the way to deal with the interaction between the self 
and the other, encouraging balanced outcomes.  Thomas Hobbes highlighted 
the importance of self-interest to the detriment of acting for the genuine needs 
of the other and allowed the self to use the other instrumentally for self-gain.  
In contrast, Auguste Comte developed altruism, with the emphasis being all 
upon the other and not the self.  Therefore, when a person acts altruistically, 
they cannot combine self-interest with interests for the other.  Likewise, Kant 
was sceptical of allowing the self to use their own emotions as a basis for acting 
for the other, preferring altruistic acts to be motivated by duty alone.  Neo-
Kantian Thomas Nagel also believed that when a moral agent acts altruistically 
for the other they must be motivated by the needs of the other alone and not by 
subjective reasons such as self-interest.  Even when Nagel changed his mind 
from objective reasons overruling subjective reasons, thus allowing both 
objective and subjective reasons to act together, he still thought that when 
acting altruistically for the other self-interest cannot be included.  Likewise, 
Hegel tended to focus upon the needs of the community and society over the 
individual self and believed that the self is not able to exist outside of social 
discourse.  In contrast, existentialism tends to focus too much upon the self as 
an isolated individual being, instead as a person in relationship with others.  
The modernist philosopher Jürgen Habermas uses a constructive dialogue 
theory to encourage consensus between the self and the other.  Post-
modernism as a theory, with its emphasis upon deconstruction has tended to 
strip away the particular aspects of the self which make people unique and 
different.  Broadly speaking, within ethics, the interaction between the self and 
the other has tended to be for the other, with little opportunity for varying 
emphasis upon both the self and the other. 
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Relationalism needs to be seen out of this general theological and philosophical 
background.  Relationalism is developed gradually as theme throughout the 
thesis, culminating in the presentation of a relational model for surrogacy in 
chapter five.  Each chapter has an implicit relational theme highlighting the 
relationship between the self and the other.  Participants are allowed to agree 
to disagree and if a consensus is not reached then the discussion has not 
necessarily been wasted.  Unlike Hegel, the self is able to exist outside of the 
discourse and can try to choose to try to revert back to a time before entering a 
particular discourse, such as fleeing an abusive relationship, even though this 
may be difficult. 
 
Chapter one highlights the lack of relationality between the self and the other 
by suggesting that motherhood is not seen as multidimensional, since 
motherhood is seen as being defined by birth alone.  The Church reports regard 
surrogacy as distorting motherhood and overlook the commissioning mother.  
Paid surrogacy is regarded as being against human dignity and ignores the 
reciprocity a commissioning couple may feel towards their surrogate by 
wanting to give money as a sign of their appreciation or gratitude.  Therefore 
the rest of the thesis concentrates on how to deal with these themes and 
highlights the need for a relational framework. 
 
Chapter two focuses upon motherhood and suggests that motherhood is multi-
dimensional and diverse, according to the Bible, the Church and theologians, 
therefore suggests an alternative relational framework to deal with its 
complexity.  This view contrasts with secular feminists who tend to focus upon 
one aspect of mothering, such as gestation, biology, nurturance to the 
detriment of other aspects such as genes.  A relational view also contrasts to the 
position of theologians Bonnie Miller-Mclemore and Don Browning who want 
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to see the family incorporated into a mutuality model based upon Gene 
Outka’s equal regard, thus sidelining self-sacrifice and encouraging 
egalitarianism.  Similarly, Rosemary Radford Ruether calls for harmony, 
balance and mutuality in families.  A relational model is more flexible, 
allowing for supererogatory acts and acknowledging that relationships are not 
always mutuality.  
 
A relational theme is developed in chapter three by exploring the theological 
concepts of the imago Dei and human dignity in order to lay the foundations to 
suggest that paid surrogacy does not have to involve commodification, 
exploitation or coercion.  Paul Ramsey uses imago Dei to encourage a 
responsive relationship to God, but he tends to have a more negative attitude 
towards self-interest.  Therefore, a relational framework for surrogacy will 
draw upon the imago Dei and dignity to encourage positive self-interest, respect 
and care for the other, while preventing human objectification and 
degradation. 
 
The aim of Chapter four is to explore whether paid surrogacy involves baby 
selling and if both self-interest and altruism can co-exist, thus allowing both 
paid and unpaid surrogacy.  The chapter continues the relational theme by 
analysing the concept of ordered love, ‘caritas ordinata’, found in both 
Augustine and Aquinas.  Ordered love therefore differs to altruism (all for the 
other) or agape (self-abnegation) as it includes God, the self and the other.  The 
chapter outlines Comte’s altruism which prioritises the other in light of 
Hobbes’ egoism, but Comte tends to regard self-interest and self-love as 
ulterior motives.  Nagel also wants to ensure that our altruistic acts are 
motivated by concerns for the other only and not by self-interest.  The 
theologian Anders Nygren downplays self-interest as a sin and focuses on 
agape instead, whereas Gene Outka endorses self-interest by encouraging 
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mutuality, equal regard and harmony between the self and the other, thus 
reducing the self-abnegation of Nygren. 
 
My relationalism allows for an ordered love including God, the other and the 
self but with more flexibility, without requiring mutuality.  Chapter four 
develops ‘relational altruism’, where altruism is able to include acting out of 
self-interest while being motivated to act from concern for the other too, 
without being regarded as acting from ulterior motives.  Paid surrogacy could 
be regarded relationally as an opportunity for the commissioning couple to 
show their gratitude to the surrogate and for the surrogate to benefit by 
receiving money for her self-interest while demonstrating altruistic concern for 
the commissioning couple.  
 
Finally, in chapter five, the relational theme culminates in a relational 
framework being revealed for surrogacy as an alternative to a contractarian or 
an adoption model.  A surrogate contract model tends to take the needs of the 
commissioning couple only into consideration by ensuring the surrogate hands 
the child over.  Adoption models tend to focus upon the surrogate only, 
allowing her to keep the child as the birth mother.  Alternative secular and 
theological relational theories are summarised.  As my relationalism is 
influenced by the personalism of Janssens, I outline his personalism and how 
its influences from other scholars.  My relationalism includes a relational 
framework, the self, the self and the other, exclusion of some concepts, 
differences to Janssen’s Roman Catholic personalism, allows for relationships 
to end and has more emphasis upon emotion.  My relationalism is applied to 
surrogacy by focusing upon surrogacy custody disputes, suggested 
recommendations, the issues of embodiment and money and what my 
relationalism excludes when applied to surrogacy.  My relational framework 
for surrogacy, unlike a best interests of the child approach which focuses upon 
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the needs of the child only, tries to be flexible by including the needs, interests 
and priorities of the surrogate, the commissioning couple and the child.  The 
chapter closes with a discussion of the best interests of the child approach and 
some possible problems of a relational approach to surrogacy. 
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CHAPTER ONE GOVERNMENT AND CHURCH REPORTS 
INVESTIGATING SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore six major secular and Church reports on 
their attitude towards surrogacy.  Other key themes such as motherhood, 
payment and baby selling, exploitation and commodification, and the 
management of surrogacy are also studied.  As some of the key ethical, 
philosophical and theological issues within surrogacy, they form the basis of 
this and subsequent chapters of this thesis, with chapter two focusing on 
motherhood, chapter three on commodification, exploitation and coercion, 
chapter four on payment and baby selling, and chapter five on surrogacy 
management.  Concerns include surrogacy as contractual baby selling, which 
‘distorts’ motherhood and leads to the commodification of women and 
children.  These and other ethical concerns will be mentioned in chapter one 
and discussed throughout the thesis. 
 
The six reports to be studied are divided into two sections: secular reports and 
Church reports.  The first three secular reports to be studied are the Warnock 
Report,1 the Brazier Report2 and the 1996 British Medical Association (BMA) 
report called Changing Conceptions of Motherhood.3  The other three reports are 
Church reports: Choices in Childlessness4 from the Free Church Federal Council, 
                                                 
1 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (The Warnock Report) (London: HMSO, 1984). 
2 Department of Health and Social Security, Surrogacy (The Brazier Report) (London: HMSO, 
1998). 
3 British Medical Association, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood: The Practice of Surrogacy in 
Britain (London: BMA, 1996). 
4 The Free Church Federal Council, Choices in Childlessness (London: The Free Church Federal 
Council, 1982). 
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Personal Origins5 from the Church of England, and Donum Vitae6 from the 
Roman Catholic Church.  This chapter explores the reports’ backgrounds; why 
and when they were written; their ethics, philosophy and theology; criticisms 
of them, along with an evaluation of them.   
 
1.2 Background to the Secular Reports 
 
Investigating the background of the secular reports sets the scene for some of 
the major ethical concerns and practical issues regarding surrogacy which are 
developed throughout the thesis.  This section focuses on three issues for each 
report: why the report was written, their ethical concerns and their views of the 
relationship between law and morality.  All the reports considered it morally 
wrong to ban surrogacy outright and wanted to prevent the law from 
interfering in the procreative liberty of commissioning couples.  The reports 
only made recommendations concerning surrogacy and other reproductive 
technologies. 
 
1.2.1 The Warnock Report 
 
The Warnock Report was commissioned in 1982 by the Conservative British 
Government and chaired by the moral philosopher Mary Warnock.  It 
published its recommendations on ‘the social, ethical and legal implications’ 
(1.2)7 of the new reproductive technologies in 1984 along with dissenting 
comments from some members concerning surrogacy and embryo research.  Of 
the three secular reports, it was the most critical towards surrogacy, wanting 
                                                 
5 The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the Church of England, Personal 
Origins (London: Church House, 2nd ed., 1996).   
6 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum Vitae (London: Catholic Truth Society, 
1987). 
7 Throughout chapter one bracketed numbers refer to the relevant pages (paragraphs for 
Warnock and Brazier, with pages in these two reports indicated as p. or pp.) of the report being 
discussed. 
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both non-profit-making and profit-making agencies banned.  However, it 
allowed the practice to go ahead privately, as part of the procreative liberty of 
individuals.  The majority of the Warnock Committee rejected the licensing and 
regulation of surrogacy, even though their dissenters approved.  Since the 
publication of the report, Dame Mary Warnock has conceded that the 
dissenters were right to call for licensing for surrogacy, with specific terms and 
conditions for the practice.8   
 
Due to the complexity of morality in a pluralistic society, they were unsure 
how to deal with the moral issues involved.  It suggested that ‘correct’ moral 
judgements did not exist, only ‘better and worse’ ones (p. 96), and that moral 
judgements are not to be imposed on others as the only right one.  It refused to 
dictate morality to the public based on the committee’s opinions but suggested 
legislation based on moral judgements with reasoned discussion of the issues 
allowing for compromises.  Ethically, it forsook an international unified 
approach to the ‘difficult ethical issues’ involved (1.8).  The report regarded 
surrogacy as a risky practice (8.12) and used a Kantian type argument to 
criticise it for treating participants as a means to an end, regardless of the 
circumstances, especially in convenience surrogacy9 (8.17).  Proposed 
legislation appealed to utilitarian arguments, with the principle of utility 
justifying actions if more people were benefited than harmed, for example if 
happiness increased when infertile couples had children.  However, it stated 
that such a utilitarian calculation does not define whether an action is right or 
wrong (even though utilitarians tend to believe such calculations do define 
whether actions are right or wrong).  The Warnock Report suggested that moral 
conclusions are connected to moral feeling and that ‘*r]eason and sentiment are 
                                                 
8 Mary Warnock, Making Babies: Is There a Right to Have Children? (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 87-93. 
9 Convenience surrogacy involves commissioning mothers capable of pregnancy using a 
surrogate. 
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not opposed to each other’ (p. 1), but they preferred their views to be based on 
argument instead of sentiment (p. 2). 
 
Warnock differentiated between law and morality, acknowledging that law 
applies to all, and is not merely based on moral feeling.  It was based on the 
view that clear laws can control and prevent disputes.  It was suggested that 
the law needs to be ‘beneficial’, ‘intelligible’ and ‘enforceable’ without causing 
‘outrage’ to people’s feelings, but regarded making law with reference to the 
common good as an ‘imprecise goal’ (p. xvi).  Regarding the relationship 
between the law and morality they favoured the view of H. L. A. Hart who 
separated the question of the act’s morality from the question of whether the 
law is right to stop the liberty of those involved from doing it (p. xi).  Thus the 
report allowed individual liberty to treat infertility and thought it would be 
morally wrong to use the law to prevent people using or participating in 
surrogacy.  However, arguing from the diverse public opinion they received, 
Lord Devlin’s view - of a common moral view binding society together and 
reflecting public opinion which the law must uphold – was regarded as a myth.   
 
1.2.2 The Brazier Report 
 
The second governmental report to be assessed is the 1998 Brazier Report, 
commissioned by the Labour Government in 1997 and chaired by Margaret 
Brazier, Professor of Law at Manchester University.  The review team 
considered payments to surrogates, regulation and the law for non-
commercial, non-contractarian and unenforceable surrogacy arrangements.  
The report was more accepting of surrogacy than Warnock, but conservative in 
its approach towards payments, wanting surrogates to be paid clearly defined 
expenses only.  Of the three secular reports, Brazier is the only one to propose 
that surrogacy agencies are registered (8.1).   
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Instead of explicitly stating its own theoretical moral focus, Brazier 
concentrated upon ethical themes in surrogacy such as exploitation, the welfare 
of the child, procreative liberty and commodification (4.22-4.37).  It believed 
paid surrogacy commodifies childbearing, in effect turning it into the 
purchasing of children, and rejected suggestions that payment is for the 
surrogate’s services.  The report seemed to use a combination of Kantian moral 
theory, utilitarianism and pragmatism.  For example, Brazier expanded the 
Kantian argument used by Warnock of surrogacy treating someone as a ‘means 
to an end’, by adding the word ‘mere’ so it reads as ‘a mere means to an end’ 
(4.22-4.23).  Brazier wanted people to be treated as an end in themselves, 
allowing them to use their moral agency and make a free and informed choice.  
Appealing to utilitarian type arguments, Brazier sought to minimise harm, 
physical and psychological risks and possible dangers (4.16, 4.47, 7.25 and 8.6) 
due to the vulnerabilities of participants (7.9).  Revealing its pragmatism, it 
aimed for realistic and practical recommendations (1.4 and 1.49).  Pragmatism 
was reflected in the comments of the governmental minister Tessa Jowell who 
wanted the review to ‘provide a sensible and sensitive way forward’.10   
 
Brazier’s approach towards the law resembled Warnock’s, in that it did not want 
surrogacy to be illegal, on the basis that this would drive it ‘underground’ 
(4.38).  Unlike the majority of the Warnock committee, Brazier supported the 
regulation of surrogacy and recommended that surrogacy agencies be 
registered and follow a new Code of Practice (8.1).  Brazier analysed current 
surrogacy law to see if it safeguarded the welfare of the child and ‘adequately’ 
protects the interests (p. ii.7 and 4.6) and the ‘real needs’ of participants (7.6).  It 
wanted to ensure surrogacy law had the ‘confidence and support’ of the public 
(1.17) by meeting the ‘legitimate interests of society’ (7.6).  However, it rejected 
a single mandatory regulatory system; therefore they did not require 
                                                 
10 Hansard, HC deb., (11 June 1997), vol. 295, cc. 478-9 (Tessa Jowell, Minister for Public Health, 
announcing the review in answer to a Parliamentary question). 
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commissioning couples to use a surrogacy agency.  The report was reluctant to 
use regulation to prevent procreative liberty and the autonomous choice of 
women to become surrogates, unless this harmed their welfare.  Despite 
wanting to encourage procreative liberty, at times it appears a little 
paternalistic and draconian.  Its suggested Code of Practice to regulate 
surrogacy stipulated a maximum age for the commissioning couple (8.4). 
 
1.2.3 The BMA’s Changing Conceptions of Motherhood 
 
Over time, the BMA has changed their approach towards surrogacy.  In 1984 
they regarded doctors’ involvement in surrogacy as ‘unethical’ due to 
‘difficulties’ involved, but doctors had a ‘duty of care’ towards a pregnant 
surrogate.11  In 1985 at their Annual Representative Meeting (ARM), surrogacy 
was accepted as a ‘last resort’.12  In 1987 they published Surrogate Motherhood13 
which concluded that the interests of the children involved could not be 
guaranteed.  However at the 1987 ARM, even though a vote supporting 
surrogacy was maintained, doctors were advised not to participate in 
surrogacy until ‘ethical safeguards’ were met.14  In 1990, Surrogacy: Ethical 
Considerations was published which approved professional involvement in 
anonymous surrogacy arrangements only,15 to prevent the possible ‘deleterious 
effects’ and complicated family relationships16 caused by known surrogacy 
arrangements.  Changing Conceptions of Motherhood published in 1996, updated 
the 1990 report.  It is a guide for medical professionals to assist those seeking 
surrogacy and was written without public consultation.  Surrogacy is now 
considered not necessarily to damage the child, involve disputes, or cause any 
                                                 
11 British Medical Association, ‘Surrogacy: Ethical Considerations’, Occasional Paper - Ethics 
(London: BMA, Number 1, 1990), 1-47, at 3. 
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 British Medical Association, Surrogate Motherhood (London: BMA, 1987). 
14 BMA, ‘Surrogacy’, 4.   
15 Ibid., 29.  
16 Ibid., 25. 
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additional problems than other types of assisted reproduction.  Anonymity is 
not considered practical, as secrets can cause problems in families, especially 
due to the increased openness by those using surrogacy and the use of Parental 
Orders (32-4).  
 
Like Brazier, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood did not explicitly state its 
moral position, but it expressed similar ethical concerns such as the 
exploitation of poor women and child commodification.  It acknowledged that 
surrogacy is complex due to the competing interests of participants.  It advised 
the use of ethics committees to discuss difficult dilemmas (35).  It also used a 
combination of utilitarianism and pragmatism when discussing surrogacy.  Its 
utilitarian type arguments involve wanting participants to be aware of the 
possible pain and distress of surrogacy – for example psychological and health 
risks, such as multiple births.  Calls were made for risks to be minimised by the 
medical screening of participants to prevent disease spreading (13).  
Pragmatically, it requested for relevant and practical information on the legal, 
medical and emotional aspects of surrogacy to be given to participants, 
including counselling, risks (psychological and medical), pregnancy 
management and insurance for the surrogate (59-61).   
 
As Changing Conceptions of Motherhood is a document for health professionals, it 
focused upon the ethical virtues and principles of surrogacy and not upon 
legislation.  Health professionals are encouraged to have ‘mutual trust and 
openness’ with participants (20), with obligations and duty towards providing 
‘advice and care’, and an awareness of confidentiality issues (21).  They are to 
provide care sympathetically and non-judgementally and without proposing 
firm rules.  Although someone has to have overall management of the 
pregnancy, those with a conscientious objection to surrogacy have an ethical 
duty to refer patients to other colleagues.  It suggested that health professionals 
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have differing levels of ethical responsibility in surrogacy, depending upon 
whether the woman comes with a pregnancy already established, or if the 
procedure involves self-insemination or IVF (in vitro fertilisation) to start a 
pregnancy (59).  It regarded the ethical obligations and duty of care to a 
surrogate woman and child to be the same as other pregnancies, but with more 
information and psychological support, if problems develop.  It advocated 
sharing information, e.g. about the commissioning couple, but also keeping 
confidentiality sometimes, unless the child’s welfare is at risk, since they 
believed ‘no single ethical principle is absolute’ (24).  
 
Changing Conceptions of Motherhood reflects the increasing popularity of 
surrogacy.  It clarified surrogacy practice for participants and outlined 
potential risks to promote discussion regarding surrogacy management.  
However, the report tended to lack some theoretical depth.   
 
1.3 Surrogate Motherhood in the Secular Reports 
 
Having looked at the background to the reports, attention turns now to their 
views of surrogacy by considering four themes: surrogacy practice, the 
surrogate, the commissioning couple and others, and finally the child.  All the 
reports supported the view that surrogacy should be an unenforceable non-
legal contract; but they all allowed surrogacy to be used by infertile couples as 
a last resort, if the commissioning mother has a medical condition preventing 
pregnancy, such as no uterus.   
 
1.3.1 The Practice of Surrogacy 
 
The majority of Warnock acknowledged surrogacy as a risky practice due to 
consequences for the child, especially convenience surrogacy.  To avoid 
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surrogacy, they rejected surrogacy agencies operating under license or 
inspection.  They wanted commercial surrogacy, agency recruitment of 
surrogates and their organisation of surrogacy arrangements to become a 
criminal offence for being exploitative.  Medical professionals establishing a 
surrogate pregnancy would be ‘criminally liable’ (8.18).  However, they 
permitted private surrogacy arrangements to prevent stigmatising children 
born of surrogacy (8.19).  Despite its negative surrogacy conclusions, Warnock 
cited some positive arguments for surrogacy, admitting that for some couples it 
could be their only opportunity to have a genetically related baby.  They 
acknowledged surrogacy could be a deliberate and thoughtful act of generosity 
from one woman to another, despite the risks.  Surrogates could carefully 
choose surrogacy, and ‘altruistic’ and paid surrogacy are not assumed to be 
necessarily exploitative.  People who regard surrogacy as an intrusion of a 
third party into a marriage did not have to use it, but were not to prevent 
others accessing it.  It was admitted that little was known about bonding in the 
womb.  However, they indicated that adoptions only occur if the mother 
consents, despite bonding to the child during pregnancy (8.13-8.16).   
 
Two members of Warnock dissented from the majority’s perspective on 
surrogacy.  Like the majority they disapproved of convenience surrogacy and 
profit-making surrogacy agencies.  However, the dissenters suggested that 
medical professionals should be allowed to help with arrangements and offer 
medical services.  They also wanted non-profit-making surrogacy agencies to 
be controlled by regulation and licensing to protect the best interests of 
participants.  Surrogacy agencies would be optional and would provide 
participants with information.  The dissenters also endorsed surrogacy 
anonymity to protect participants from legal and emotional complications.  
They proposed (pp. 87-9) that not all surrogacy contracts should be illegal, but 
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that courts could decide each case on its ‘own merits’, since public opinion they 
believed had not been ‘fully formed’ on surrogacy (p. 89). 
 
Brazier cautiously approved surrogacy but without encouraging it.  It admitted 
that infertility can be ‘extremely distressing’ and that surrogacy could ‘provide 
a solution for some infertile couples’ (5.22).  It called for practical surrogacy 
regulation to reduce harm, but without major state intrusion into the lives and 
bodily integrity of individuals.  Brazier opposed a mandatory state-regulated 
licensing system, which prevents people making their own choices.  Therefore, 
it allowed commissioning couples to use family and friends instead of a 
licensed agency.  Brazier did not regard procreative autonomy as an absolute 
right, as this can conflict with the rights of others.  It wanted to balance the 
procreative liberty, autonomy and privacy rights of the commissioning couple 
alongside the ‘welfare of the child’, and the surrogate’s rights and those of her 
children (4.32-4.33).   
 
Therefore, Brazier proposed a new Code of Practice to regulate surrogacy, 
which would be binding for surrogacy agencies and would set out details 
regarding advice for participants (8.1).  Brazier’s Code of Practice aimed to 
protect the welfare, interests and expectations of all participants.  The 
children’s welfare - including the welfare of the surrogate’s existing children 
(4.21), was their ‘highest priority’ (4.50) and of ‘paramount concern’ (p. ii.7).  
Surrogacy agencies not following the Code would be deregistered and liable 
for prosecution even though the Code was unenforceable in the criminal 
courts.  It would also be an advisory Code for private arrangements to ensure 
altruistic and family surrogates give free and informed consent.  As part of the 
Code, it suggested a new non-contractarian ‘memorandum of understanding’ 
explaining the expectations of the surrogate and the commissioning couple 
(6.25, 8.12 and 8.13).  It would clarify details of the screening and conception 
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process, pregnancy management and expected support from the 
commissioning couple.  It would outline how the child is to be handed over 
and informed of their background and contact arrangements between the 
surrogate and the child.  A new statutory Surrogacy Act was proposed too, 
allowing payment for predetermined expenses only to prevent inducement and 
exploitation, as well as suggesting changes to the Parental Orders.  All 
surrogacy agencies would be ‘required’ to register with the Department of 
Health (6.23).   
 
Changing Conceptions of Motherhood regarded egg donation as preferable to 
surrogacy so that the surrogate could avoid pregnancy risks.  Participants are 
to think about ‘the potential medical, social and legal issues both for 
themselves and for other people’ (53).  It acknowledged surrogacy can be 
complex, possibly leading to depression, miscarriage, disability or the 
surrogate keeping the child.  It proposed counselling within surrogacy, by a 
trained infertility counsellor.  Due to practical requirements at the time 
(commissioning couples had to be married to acquire a Parental Order) they 
preferred that surrogacy is undertaken by ‘two parents’, however those in 
different family arrangements could ask for advice (6).   
 
1.3.2 The Surrogate 
 
Each of the reports expressed apprehension towards surrogacy, both genetic 
and gestational due to concern regarding the surrogate, even though they did 
not go into detail comparing the ethics of the two types of surrogacy.  Warnock 
suggested surrogacy is ‘the wrong way to approach pregnancy’ because the 
woman ‘deliberately’ becomes pregnant with the intention to give the child up 
(8.11).  Changing Conceptions of Motherhood advised that surrogates should have 
previously given birth, have completed their family, and have a partner for 
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support during and after the pregnancy (61).  It admitted there is limited 
information on surrogacy practice, but acknowledged fewer surrogates keep 
the child than mothers who planned to have their child adopted.  The BMA 
admitted that the surrogate’s feelings of ‘attachment’ can change and increase 
during the pregnancy, making relinquishment of the child difficult, and that 
the surrogate could worry whether the child is being loved by the 
commissioning couple.  It expressed concern that once a surrogate has handed 
the baby over she could have postnatal depression.  They cited a study of 
surrogates by Nancy Reame where 75% had ‘moderate or severe depression’ 
for 2-6 weeks (47).17  Brazier acknowledged that some surrogates who handed 
the child over have experienced ‘uncertainty and unhappiness’ (6.2).   
 
1.3.3 The Commissioning Couple and Others 
 
Concern was expressed over the commissioning couple and other family 
members of the surrogate.  Changing Conceptions of Motherhood noted that the 
commissioning couple may worry over the child’s health and whether the child 
will become theirs.  It was suggested that the surrogate’s own children were 
told of the arrangement, to prevent confusion at the baby’s disappearance, 
fearing they also could be ‘rejected and ‚discarded‛’ (48).  The surrogate’s 
parents could find it difficult not being grandparents to the child (48).  Warnock 
indicated that surrogacy threatened marital procreation and its ‘loving 
partnership’ by the ‘intrusion’ of a third party (8.10); the BMA, in Surrogate 
Motherhood, regarded surrogacy as ‘controversial’, challenging society and 
distorting the family.18  Brazier, however, found few rejected surrogacy due to 
third party involvement in marriage: it believed the private choice of marital 
exclusivity for some should not become public policy (4.5).   
                                                 
17 Nancy E. Reame, ‘Maternal Adaptation and Postpartum Responses to a Surrogate 
Pregnancy’, Abstracts of the 9th International Congress of Psychosomatic Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology, Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynaecology 10, Supplement 1, (1989), 86. 
18 BMA, Surrogate Motherhood, 7-8. 
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1.3.4 The Child 
 
The majority of Warnock disapproved of surrogacy as morally wrong, due to 
bonding in pregnancy and possible damage for the child (8.11).  Brazier stressed 
the welfare of the child, but without an undue incursion into the rights of the 
commissioning couple to privacy.  Brazier highlighted the rights of the 
surrogate and her children, along with the claims of the commissioning couple 
to procreative liberty (4.33).  Changing Conceptions of Motherhood suggested 
some children born from surrogacy could be teased, but indicated that these 
could be proud and grateful for their parents’ courage for using surrogacy for 
their birth.  It recommended that the child is told of surrogacy and its genetic 
background (for example if related to the surrogate), on the basis that secrecy is 
impractical.  It suggested surrogate children are psychologically similar to 
adopted children and those born from gamete donations since they are not 
genetically related to their parents (43).  Such views contrasted with previous 
BMA policy such as their Surrogate Motherhood.  Here they argued against 
surrogacy being made public policy because they were concerned over the 
psychological effect on the child being separated from its gestational mother, 
the effect on the child being told of its origins, and the effect on the surrogate of 
relinquishing the child or the effect if the surrogate decided to keep the child 
instead.  Surrogate Motherhood did not think that it was in the child’s best 
interests to be handed over ‘in the short term’, but admitted the ‘long-term 
interests’ depended on each case.19  They approved surrogacy if the child’s 
welfare was protected.20   
 
1.4 Motherhood, Payment, Exploitation, Surrogacy Management and 
Legislation in the Secular Reports  
                                                 
19 Ibid., 9. 
20 Ibid., i. 
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1.4.1 Motherhood  
 
Having looked at the issue of surrogacy generally, attention now turns to 
motherhood in surrogacy.  Five areas of concern are presented.  Firstly, the 
surrogate’s identity, secondly, the relationship between the surrogate and the 
child, thirdly, the legal position of the commissioning mother, fourthly, the 
relationship of the commissioning mother towards the child and fifthly, a lack 
of support for multiple-motherhood.  Motherhood as a concept will be 
explored more fully in chapter two. 
 
Firstly, all the reports identified the surrogate as the child’s legal mother by 
giving birth.  They allow the surrogate to keep the child, unless, as the BMA in 
‘Surrogacy’ suggested, she is an ‘unsuitable’ mother; therefore, the social 
services might ‘intervene’.21  The BMA in Surrogate Motherhood commented: ‘*i+t 
is unthinkable that any civilised country could countenance removing a 
newborn baby from a mother who was willing and able to look after it’.22  
Changing Conceptions of Motherhood suggested the surrogate might provide an 
‘information profile’ allowing the commissioning couple to inform the child of 
its background (50).   
 
Secondly, in Warnock the relationship between the surrogate and the child, is 
thought to be broken by surrogacy.  Surrogacy is seen to distort motherhood by 
breaking the relationship and maternal bonds between the mother and child at 
the point of relinquishing the child.  However, it admitted little is known about 
the extent of pregnancy bonding and that no great claims can be made 
regarding the breaking of the bonds.  Warnock regarded ‘the contribution of the 
                                                 
21 BMA, ‘Surrogacy’, 13. 
22 BMA, Surrogate Motherhood, 22.  
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carrying mother *as+ greater, more intimate, and personal’ than sperm donation 
(8.10).   
 
Thirdly, the commissioning mother has no legal standing in relation to the 
child, which as Brazier suggested, could be a problem if the commissioning 
couple divorced (7.15).  The same applied if she is single or her husband died 
before the Parental Order could be given, since she had to be married to the 
commissioning father to gain legal status, otherwise she would have to adopt.  
In order to receive a Parental Order, which makes a commissioning couple the 
child’s legal parents, they can only pay their surrogate reasonable expenses.  
However, Brazier acknowledged that some commissioning couples do not 
register the birth of the child, in order to allow higher payments to be paid to 
the surrogates, which lead to the commissioning mother not gaining legal 
status in relation to the child.  Brazier proposed a new statutory Surrogacy Act 
(7.1-7.2) which included revised Parental Orders.  Motherhood, therefore, for a 
commissioning mother, became dependent upon being married,23 being over 
18, having UK domesticity for at least 12 months and either she or her husband 
having a genetic connection to the child.  Becoming a parent through surrogacy 
also involved compliance with their recommended new Surrogacy Act and its 
Code of Practice by paying reasonable expenses only to the surrogate and 
limiting payments (7.3 and 7.11).  However, courts issuing Parental Orders 
now use the Parenting Orders 2010 Act which decides whether a Parental 
Order should be given using the child’s welfare as paramount, with payments 
made to the surrogate as a secondary consideration.   
 
Fourthly, the commissioning mother is regarded as lacking a relationship to the 
child.  Warnock treated gestational surrogacy like egg donation or embryo 
donation.  Therefore, the commissioning mother, like an egg donor, has no 
                                                 
23 This differs from paragraph 2.5 in The Warnock Report, which says that the lack of marriage 
should not prevent access to treatment. 
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parental rights or obligations to the child; it assumed the surrogate wanted to 
be the mother like the recipient of an egg or embryo donation, even though she 
is not genetically related to it.  Instead of dealing with the complexity of 
motherhood in surrogacy, such as whether the genetic or gestational woman is 
the mother, and in order to prevent arguments over inheritance and 
citizenship, Warnock tried to prevent gestational surrogacy occurring by 
banning professional involvement, making professionals such as doctors 
‘criminally liable’ (8.18).  It did not consider that some surrogates may only 
want to be a gestational donor or just an egg donor and may not wish to gain 
parental status.  Most commissioning mothers regard themselves as a mother 
of the child and not just an egg donor.  Brazier proposed that an arrangement in 
which a surrogate gestated a donated embryo, not related either to her or to the 
commissioning couple, would be regarded as ‘pre-natal adoption 
arrangements’ and treated by adoption law instead of a Parental Order (7.24).  
However, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood admitted that some people prefer 
gestational (‘full’) surrogacy to genetic (‘partial’) surrogacy as the surrogate is 
not genetically related to the child, which may make it easier to hand the child 
over (45-6), as it may not ‘remind her of her own children’ (46).   
 
Fifthly, multiple-motherhood is unsupported.  Brazier suggested that a 
commissioning mother could be ‘made insecure by continuing contact with the 
surrogate’ and could find it hard to mother the child (4.21).  It questioned the 
possible effect of having two mothers on the social, emotional and identity 
development of the child.  It admitted there could be family and psychological 
conflict if the aunt is the mother of the child.  The report cited the psychologist 
Eric Blyth who suggested possible difficulties between the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple (4.20).24  However, it indicated evidence (without giving 
details) which suggested that surrogates remain in contact with the 
                                                 
24 Eric Blyth, ‘‚Not a Primrose Path‛: Commissioning Parents’ Experiences of Surrogacy 
Arrangements in Britain’, Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 13 (1995), 185-96. 
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commissioning couples and the child, as in open adoption, where the birth 
mother remains in contact with the adoptive parents.  But some feared open 
adoption affected the security of the child’s relationship with their adoptive 
parents.  Even so, it thought a direct comparison with open adoption is 
difficult, as often in open adoption the child already has a close relationship to 
the biological mother before adoption.  They state that, although some 
expected that staying in contact with the surrogate could be positive for the 
child in understanding its origins, nevertheless the surrogate’s involvement 
could distress the child and could ‘undermine’ its relationship with the 
commissioning couple, especially in genetic surrogacy (4.12-4.13).   
 
1.4.2 Payment and Baby Selling  
 
Another key theme in surrogacy is the ethics of paying surrogates and the 
effect of payment on the surrogate, the child and the commissioning couple.  
All the reports opposed commercial surrogacy and profit-making agencies, 
fearing exploitation, risk and harm to the participants (e.g. Brazier 4.25).  
Warnock, unlike the other two reports, advised banning non-profit-making 
surrogacy agencies as well (8.17-8.18).   
 
Firstly, regarding surrogates and payment, Warnock acknowledged that 
surrogates could be paid expenses, a substantial fee, or nothing.  Paid 
surrogacy was regarded as ‘inconsistent with human dignity’, for using a 
uterus for profit and treating it as an ‘incubator’ for another person’s child 
(8.10).  Curiously though, it recommended that gametes and embryos could be 
sold and purchased under license (13.13).  It assumed the 1976 Adoption Act 
section 57 would prevent payment to surrogates since it outlaws payment or 
reward in the adoption or in the handing over of a child; likewise section 50 of 
the 1958 Adoption Act (8.4).  However, section 57(3) of the Act gave judges 
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discretion to sanction payment in appropriate cases, therefore some surrogates 
in private arrangements received up to £12,000.25  Concern was expressed 
regarding the motivation of surrogates.  Changing Conceptions of Motherhood 
believed surrogates act for many reasons; for some financial need was their 
only motive but for others their motive included valuing motherhood, or 
needing money for a particular purpose (40% had this has their main reason).26  
It is important to note that some surrogates may be motivated to act for the 
commissioning couple and for a particular purpose such as buying a car, which 
would not necessarily mean they were doing the action out of financial 
desperation.  Other surrogates are motivated by sympathy with the childless, 
enjoyment of pregnancy (without having to rear the child), ‘enhanced self-
esteem’ and overcoming traumatic birth experiences in the past, such an 
abortion (44).27  Similarly, Brazier expressed the view that ‘many’ women are 
‘primarily motivated by payment’ to become surrogates (5.14).   
 
Secondly, concerning the child and payment, Brazier did not recommend fining 
paid surrogates or paying commissioning couples, to prevent children being 
born with a taint of criminality,28 fearing parents would not register the child.  
It believed children born from paid surrogacy became commodities and would 
prefer not to know that they were born for high commercial payments; 
believing this would be psychologically damaging to their identity, self-esteem 
and family relationship.  Likewise, Warnock suggested that surrogacy degraded 
children who are ‘bought for money’ (8.11).  However, this comment is not 
                                                 
25 Dame Mary Warnock now approves of ‘an official non-profit-making surrogacy agency’, see 
Warnock, Making Babies, 88. 
26 The report here (pp. 43-4) refers to seven articles, references 23-9 on pp. 71-2.  The 40% 
reference comes from Joan Einwohner’s research, but she goes on to say: ‘*a+lmost never, 
however, is money the sole motive.  Almost all mentioned other feelings’ see Joan Einwohner, 
‘Who Becomes a Surrogate: Personality Characteristics’, in Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg (ed.), 
Gender in Transition: A New Frontier (New York: Plenum, 1989), 123-32, at 130.   
27 Einwohner, ‘Who Becomes a Surrogate’, 125-7 and 129.  The motives of the surrogates will be 
discussed in chapter four of this thesis. 
28 See also The Warnock Report, 8.19. 
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literally true, as otherwise it would be child-selling.  It must be remembered 
that the child is commissioned and is usually genetically related to one of the 
commissioning couple, who pay for the surrogate’s gestational services.  The 
commissioning couple do not buy an already existing child from the surrogate 
and her husband.  Changing Conceptions of Motherhood admitted that surrogates 
could regard the child as a ‘gift of a treasured baby’ (32) and that most 
surrogates have ‘altruistic’ and financial motives (30).   
 
Thirdly, regarding the commissioning couple and payment, Brazier 
acknowledged a Parental Order may not be granted if more than reasonable 
expenses were paid.  Brazier proposed new legislation which only allowed 
payment for predetermined expenses, thus preventing commissioning couples 
paying their surrogates and preventing surrogates asking for extra money.  
Brazier approved unpaid surrogacy, as a voluntary free gift donation like blood 
and live organ donation.  It believed such ‘altruistic’ arrangements are ‘less 
likely to break down’ (5.21).  Strikingly, it acknowledged that medical staff, 
counsellors and lawyers can be paid (3.26 and 3.28), unlike surrogacy agencies 
who cannot ‘charge for their services’ (3.32).   
 
1.4.3 Fears of Coercion, Exploitation and Commodification  
 
Other key ethical concerns in surrogacy include fears of coercion, exploitation 
and commodification of participants.  Firstly, money could coerce the 
unemployed and as Brazier said: ‘relatively poor and less educated women’ to 
become surrogates (5.17).  Changing Conceptions of Motherhood feared 
unintentional coercion in family relationships, where some surrogates feel 
‘emotionally coerced’ (30).  Brazier believed not paying surrogates reduced 
pressures upon them.  It believed surrogacy should be a ‘free act of giving’ 
(4.37) as a ‘gift relationship’ (4.36), similar to blood and live organ donation, 
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since it believed payment could induce vulnerable, poorer women to become 
surrogates without understanding or predicting the risk involved, thus 
increasing harm (4.19, 4.36-4.39 and 6.5).   
 
Secondly, Warnock regarded commercial surrogacy as exploitative and 
therefore wanted it made illegal (8.17-8.18).  Money could prevent a free choice, 
leading to ‘inducement’ and the surrogate may not understand, as Brazier 
suggested, ‘the physical and psychological risks’ involved (4.19).  Brazier said 
that some surrogates suffered ‘distress’, have made decisions they have 
‘regretted’ and ‘were treated in a demeaning way by the commissioning 
couple’ (4.18).  Part of the ethical discussion as to whether surrogacy is 
exploitative, is the issue whether surrogacy treats the participants involved as 
an end or not.  The BMA’s ‘Surrogacy’ warned that surrogates ‘would be used 
as a means’ to another’s ‘selfish ends’.29  They were concerned that the 
surrogate was taking risks for others and not for herself.30  Convenience 
surrogacy, was rejected as unethical by Warnock due to possible exploitation, 
‘*e]ven in compelling medical circumstances’ (8.17) and possibly because of 
potential risks to surrogates (8.12).  Brazier commented on the lack of evidence 
of convenience surrogacy (4.7).  So far, it appears that no convenience 
surrogacy cases have occurred in Britain.31   
 
However, it is acknowledged that exploitation is complex.  The BMA’s 
‘Surrogacy’ regarded exploitation as preventable and noted that the 
commissioning couple’s end may not be selfish, but they may respect the 
surrogate.32  Brazier admitted surrogacy can be exploitative if people are 
unpaid.  Some occupations are acknowledged as risky and monetary 
                                                 
29
 BMA, ‘Surrogacy’, 16 
30 Ibid., 23. 
31 Private email from Professor Olga van den Akker, psychologist and surrogacy researcher at 
Middlesex University, 12 August 2011. 
32 BMA, ‘Surrogacy’, 16.  
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compensation in these jobs is not exploitation; therefore Brazier did not want to 
encourage exploitation where women are denied financial recompense for their 
time and effort in surrogacy.  Brazier acknowledged that people can consent to 
risky jobs if they are aware of the dangers involved and therefore, are not 
induced against their better judgement nor exploited for being paid.  Informed 
consent seemed to ease the possibility of exploitation for them.  Brazier 
recommended that commissioning couples are to pay only expenses to prevent 
exploitation of participants (4.36, 5.16 and 5.24).   
 
Thirdly, another ethical concern is that payment in surrogacy leads to 
commodification with participants being treated as objects.  Warnock warned of 
commodification through the practice of using profiles to select the 
characteristics of the potential child, which could devalue children and lead to 
disappointment if these are unmet.  However, it approved donor profiles to 
specify ‘ethnic group’ and ‘genetic health’ (4.20-4.21).  Brazier rejected paid 
surrogacy for involving children being bought and sold as commodities, 
because it is difficult to separate payment for purchasing a child and payment 
for ‘a potentially risky, time-consuming and uncomfortable service’ (5.11); in 
effect it regarded paid surrogacy as baby selling.  The BMA’s ‘Surrogacy’ 
indicated that some reject surrogacy as child buying, seeing the money instead 
as payment for the woman’s reproductive services, but admitted such a service 
could become commodified.  However they also suggested that some valuable 
things can be bought and sold without damage occurring.33  
 
1.4.4 Surrogacy Management  
 
Of the three reports, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood went into the most 
detail regarding surrogacy management.  It admitted that surrogacy is 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 19. 
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unenforceable (14), and is aware of the ‘hazards of promise-making’ (30).  Even 
so, it called for surrogacy to be regarded as ‘prenatal adoption’ allowing for 
participants to be ‘bound by normal parental obligations of care and support’ 
in order to reduce the incidence of child abandonment (13).  As for surrogacy 
management, it focused upon four points: individual decision making, joint 
decision making, the surrogate’s decision making and responsibility to the 
child.  Firstly, it highlighted individual decision making by recommending that 
one person has overall management of the pregnancy.  Health professionals 
were not to propose ‘firm rules’ (33), but ‘to help individuals make informed 
choices’ (20).   
 
Secondly, it recommended joint decision making between the participants, up 
until the child is handed over, since participants are to decide how their own 
arrangement proceeds.  It emphasised mutual openness and a mutual 
agreement which supports a balance between the rights and needs of 
participants as autonomous adults or as children.  Participants are to decide 
their own ‘level of contact’ between them and the children afterwards (50).  
Health professionals and individuals are called to make careful joint decisions 
(21), since the health professionals are told they have ‘moral responsibilities’ to 
the adults and the child born (4).  It recommended discussion between 
participants and the health professionals regarding the birth plan, etc., but 
admitted that views could clash.  It questioned whether the pregnancy should 
proceed if agreement over issues such as handicap and abortion cannot be 
resolved prior to the arrangement.  It suggested trust can come through 
personal contact between the surrogate and the commissioning couple, who 
could remain in contact after the birth with mutual support, openness and 
truth-telling.  It wanted relationships between individuals to be based on 
‘respect for the needs and rights of others’ (30).   
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Thirdly, it also wanted health care workers to give primary obligation to the 
surrogate and the foetus, but with ‘predominant duty’ to the ‘potential child’ 
(27).  In a dispute, the surrogate and the health team are to make final decisions 
over issues such as delivery method.  The decisions of the surrogate and her 
well-being and that of the foetus take precedence and supersede any 
agreement between the parties up to when the child is six-weeks-old.  
However, once the child is handed over, decision making rests with the 
commissioning couple (41).   
 
Finally, despite supporting a balance between the rights and needs of 
participants as autonomous adults, and despite saying the surrogate takes 
ultimate responsibility for decision making, the BMA also suggested that 
health professionals have special obligations to the children.  The child’s 
interests and welfare take precedence, are paramount and are not just one of 
several factors.  It regarded it as essential that all decisions were seen from the 
child’s best interests, subordinating interests of the adults.  Nevertheless, 
surrogates are allowed to have full control over pregnancy termination.  It 
admitted surrogacy is ethically complex leading to possible conflict between 
the interests of participants such as the woman and the child.  Health 
professionals are to consider the effects of surrogacy upon other children of the 
surrogate and the commissioning couple.  They are to consider whether a child 
born of surrogacy is ‘disadvantaged’ by losing its gestating mother (23).  
However, the report seemed to lack a clear decision-making framework, with 
priority being given to the surrogate at some points and to the child at others.  
The BMA’s Surrogate Motherhood advocated an adoption model for surrogacy 
arrangements to ensure the interests of the child.34   
 
1.4.5 The Legislation of Surrogacy 
                                                 
34 BMA, Surrogate Motherhood, 21. 
59 
 
 
All the reports regarded the woman giving birth as the child’s legal mother 
(e.g. Warnock 6.8); since surrogacy contracts are unenforceable and void, the 
surrogate does not have to hand the child over to the commissioning couple.  
Warnock suggested courts would allow surrogates to keep any money received 
during the pregnancy.  It anticipated custody disputes would be resolved in 
court according to the child’s best interests and that surrogates would not be 
forced to hand a child over against her will (8.5-8.6), except ‘in very exceptional 
circumstances’ (8.6).  Unusually though, the Warnock dissenters proposed that 
not all surrogacy contracts are illegal, but courts should have discretion to 
decide each individual case on its ‘own merits’ (p. 89).35   
 
Brazier recommended regulating and monitoring surrogacy, in order to legally 
protect the interests of vulnerable parties and to prevent risks of harm, by a 
new statutory Surrogacy Act to replace the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 
and a revision of Parental Orders section 30 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (implemented 1st November 1994).  The new Act would 
still make surrogacy contracts non-enforceable, surrogacy advertising illegal 
and commercial surrogacy agencies banned (7.3).  However, the criteria which 
the commissioning couple would have to meet for Parental Orders were 
changed; they would have to have followed the surrogacy Code of Practice and 
pay only genuine, predetermined and provable expenses, with documentary 
evidence, to the surrogate and without excessive payments.  However, if a 
Parental Order was refused, it suggested the commissioning couple could 
adopt the child to prevent detrimental effects on the child’s welfare.  The new 
Act would allow Guardians ad litem to check the criminal records of the 
commissioning couple, to see if they could harm the child.  Surrogacy 
                                                 
35 The Warnock Report, ‘Expression of Dissent: A. Surrogacy’, pp. 87-9, where they agreed ‘with 
paragraphs 8.1 to 8.16 as a fair summary of these issues’, but started ‘to part company with’ the 
majority ‘in paragraphs 8.17 to 8.19’ (p. 87). 
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outcomes would be monitored by research, record keeping and statistics (6.26).  
However, most of Brazier’s recommendations (pp. 71-3) did not become law, 
but unmarried commissioning couples can now apply for a Parental Order.  
 
Changing Conceptions of Motherhood is critical of UK surrogacy law, calling it 
‘piecemeal’ (13).  It criticised the 1985 Surrogacy Arrangements Act: for not 
monitoring surrogacy, for not stipulating the need for expertise to run an 
agency, for insisting that only married couples can request a Parental Order 
and for having no provisions to protect the child’s interests (13).  It criticised 
voluntary surrogacy agencies as ‘unmonitored, unregulated’ with no formal 
complaints procedure or formal method to ensure the information provided is 
‘accurate and comprehensive’ (11).  Unlike Brazier, they did not want formal 
licensing of agencies, but ‘monitoring’ to ensure ‘credibility’ (3), see also (12).  
Concern was expressed over insufficient social and psychological research into 
surrogacy including the child’s welfare and the long-term effects of surrogacy.  
Therefore, it called for health professionals to check the health of the 
commissioning couple to ensure the couple can care for the child.  The report 
called for ‘honesty and openness’ and tell the child of the arrangement (34).   
 
1.5 Criticisms of the Secular Reports 
 
The previous section analysed surrogacy management.  Attention now turns to 
problems in the reports towards surrogacy, which conflict with previous 
approaches towards other reproductive technologies and other attitudes.  But 
the contexts in which the reports were written must be borne in mind.  Warnock 
was written at a time when the new reproductive technologies such as IVF 
were new and surrogacy was uncommon, therefore it may have been too 
controversial for them to endorse it.  Brazier was commissioned due to media 
publicity in 1997 regarding paid surrogacy and therefore focused upon 
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recommendations for expenses and regulation.  As will be shown in later 
chapters of the thesis, the reports can be criticised in many respects: as 
inadequate for not seeing motherhood as multidimensional; for not considering 
that self-interest and altruism can co-exist in paid surrogacy; for not realising 
that surrogacy does not have to include baby selling; and for not 
acknowledging that surrogacy does not have to operate as a contract.  Due to 
space restrictions, consideration will focus upon five problems in Warnock and 
six in Brazier, but not upon the BMA’s report, as it was fairly consistent.  
 
1.5.1 The Warnock Report 
 
Firstly, despite the majority finding surrogacy to be wrong, it defended the 
legal right of individuals to found a family and of couples to use surrogates.  
However, by banning professional involvement in gestational surrogacy (8.18) 
they denied the procreative liberty of a woman with a deformed uterus, for 
example, requiring a gestational surrogate to found her family.  The report was 
probably reluctant to endorse gestational surrogacy, as IVF itself was new and 
surrogacy was very controversial at the time and hardly used, especially 
gestational surrogacy. 
 
Secondly, Warnock allowed a husband whose wife received AID (artificial 
insemination by donor) to be the child’s legal father as the intending social 
father, despite lacking a genetic connection.  A child born from embryo 
donation to an infertile married couple is theirs legally (7.6).  However, the 
principle of intent to parent, without genetic relation to the child, was not 
applied to surrogacy.  In surrogacy, the woman giving birth is the child’s 
mother, regardless of her intentions and her husband has to disapprove of his 
wife being a surrogate in order not to be considered the legal father.  The 
commissioning couple are treated as gamete donors with no rights to the child 
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even if genetically related (8.9).  This however would not have been considered 
a problem for most of the Committee as they believed that the gestational 
mother is the legal mother. 
 
Thirdly, Warnock refused to let public opposition to AIH (artificial insemination 
by husband), AID, IVF and embryo experimentation prevent them from being 
used.  However, it argued that ‘the weight of public opinion’ was behind them 
in condemning surrogacy, despite providing no evidence (8:10).  Fourthly, due 
to the risks involved in surrogacy, it thought that no one ought to be asked to 
undertake a pregnancy for another in order to earn money.  However, it 
allowed embryo donation, despite a possible impact upon the child and despite 
possible risks to the egg donor (7.2).  This is presumably explained by their 
moral differentiation between performing a service for free and performing a 
service for money, even though the risks in pregnancy would be the same. 
 
Fifthly, Warnock failed to suggest that surrogacy could be positive for children, 
despite highlighting positive effects with AIH and AID.  AIH allows children 
to be born within ‘a stable relationship’ (4.4).  AID allows a wanted child to be 
brought up by parents as their own.  It suggested that it is better for the child to 
have a father and a mother, but ignored the possibility of surrogacy creating a 
family for a couple who are (in most cases) genetically related to the child.  It 
condemned surrogacy as being morally wrong due to the possible 
consequences for the child, despite there being no empirical studies on the 
impact of surrogacy upon the child.  However, such arguments of impact upon 
the child were rejected with AID, egg donation and embryo donation even 
though it admitted that with AID a child could be deceived about its origins 
and that this could undermine family relationships, harming the child if it 
found out accidentally.  Even so, in light of surrogacy being a new practice, 
with little evidence, they were cautious about its practice.   
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1.5.2 The Brazier Report 
 
The way in which Brazier has suggested surrogacy should be organised, leads 
to six possible problems.  Firstly, commissioning couples following the 
proposed new Surrogacy Act and Code of Practice could apply for a Parental 
Order, if ‘they have complied with the statutory limitations on payments’, as 
judges cannot approve ‘impermissible payments’ (pp. 72-73.9 (vii)).  However, 
it admitted that no Parental Orders have been refused when payment has been 
involved, which is how it did not want the law to be enforced.  Even so, the 
High Court regards the welfare of the child as having ‘paramount 
consideration’ which takes priority even if the commissioning couple have paid 
their surrogate, thus still allowing them to have a Parental Order.  Secondly, 
parents not following the law on banned excessive payments would be subject 
to criminal sanctions.  However, it suggested commissioning couples who pay 
would not be subject to criminal sanctions because it would not be in the 
child’s best interest, as couples might not register the child.  Also, it did not 
want to give a child a ‘taint of criminality’ by legally banning surrogacy (4.38). 
 
Thirdly, even though the Code of Practice is an advisory code, it is to be 
‘binding on any surrogacy agency’ (p. ii.7).  Fourthly, surrogacy agencies not 
following the Code would be deregistered and liable for prosecution.  
However, it said that the Code of Practice will not be enforced in the criminal 
courts (4.48).  Fifthly, it said that the Code will aim to protect, consider and 
clarify the welfare, interests, safety and expectations of all participants.  It 
suggested protecting vulnerable participants in surrogacy by reducing hazards 
(6.3 and 6.5-6.6).  However, legally a commissioning mother might be left 
without legal standing to the child if the surrogate has the main custody.  Even 
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so it did not regard the commissioning mother’s status because they regarded 
the surrogate as the legal mother. 
 
Sixthly, like Warnock, it was concerned about the welfare of the child (p. ii7) 
and it claimed surrogacy could have ‘negative effects’ on a child’s 
‘psychological well-being’ (5.18), including the welfare of the surrogate’s 
children, especially if they see her repeatedly giving up a sibling for money 
(4.15).  However, it admitted the review was done without empirical data on 
what happens to children born from surrogacy and the effect on the surrogate’s 
other children (4.27) as there is ‘uncertainty about the long-term effects of a 
surrogacy arrangement on the child’ (6.3).  It is important that such concerns 
are raised, despite a lack of empirical data; further evidence-based research in 
this matter is needed too.   
 
1.6 Evaluation of the Secular Reports  
 
Having looked at some problems in the reports, evaluation of the three secular 
reports is now possible.  Four common themes can be found, namely: the issue 
of payment; not going far enough to protect the welfare of all participants; 
being paternalistic towards participants; and making conclusions despite a lack 
of empirical evidence.   
 
Firstly, the guidance offered with regard to payment does not go far enough.  
In Warnock the advice given was unclear, since surrogates could be paid even 
though commercial agencies were banned.  In Brazier, even though surrogates 
are protected from exploitation and inducement by banning payment (other 
than ‘genuine expenses’ *5.24+) from the commissioning couple (4.19 and 4.24-
4.25) no consideration or redress was given to commissioning couples who 
might be exploited by the surrogate and be out of pocket for paying high 
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expenses to her, especially if she keeps the child and prevents them from 
having access rights to the child.  It is possible that it feared that if 
compensation was given to the commissioning couple it would turn surrogacy 
into ‘child purchase’ (4.35).  Chapter three of the thesis discusses the ethics of 
commodification, exploitation and coercion in surrogacy and chapter four 
analyses the issue of baby selling. 
 
Secondly, it is questionable whether the aims of the reports to safeguard 
participants’ welfare go far enough.  With Warnock, it seems that the 
Conservative Government’s own recommendations of setting up the 
Committee (to offer safeguards and policy and to consider the social, ethical 
and legal aspects of surrogacy) were not fully met, since commissioning 
couples would not be safeguarded if the surrogate kept the child.  Even though 
surrogacy was not the main reason for setting up the Committee of Enquiry, 
perhaps more emphasis could have been placed upon the ethical solutions of 
resolving surrogacy conflicts.  Instead, it preferred to stress argumentation over 
sentiment, overlooking the emotional aspects involved in settling child custody 
disputes.  It argued that the courts should leave surrogacy cases as they find 
them, which does not solve the ethical issues of commissioning couples, who 
have an emotional involvement and want to have access.  Perhaps it needed to 
offer an alternative framework, instead of an unenforceable contract which 
would tend to give custody to the surrogate.  Chapter five of the thesis explores 
the contract model, the adoption model and an alternative model for 
surrogacy. 
 
Brazier assessed whether existing surrogacy law safeguarded and protected the 
‘welfare of the child...the surrogate, her family and the commissioning couple’ 
(4.6).  However, by maintaining the surrogate as the legal mother, the 
commissioning mother may still be denied access and visiting rights.  If its 
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recommendations had been implemented, commissioning couples may not 
have sought adoption or a Parental Order fearing they would be denied legal 
parentage of the child for paying the surrogate.  However, courts could still 
make the commissioning couple legal parents in the best interests of the child, 
limiting the significance of the proposed legislation.  Since the Code of Practice 
is unenforceable in the criminal courts and since commissioning couples have 
no obligation to use the ‘advisory Code’ (7.18), if they do not use a surrogacy 
agency (4.48 and 7.18), its power to regulate surrogacy arrangements and 
protect commissioning couples is limited.   
 
Thirdly, the reports can sometimes be paternalistic towards surrogacy 
participants.  Brazier realised that surrogacy is an intimate and private issue 
dealing with procreative liberty by limited legal and state interventions.  
However, its proposed surrogacy Code of Practice is possibly draconian, since 
surrogates have to be 21, under a maximum age, must have their own child, 
leaving a two-year age gap between pregnancies (8.7-8.8).  Likewise, Changing 
Conceptions of Motherhood at times seemed paternalistic towards surrogacy 
participants.  It wanted surrogacy to be used as a last resort, after the 
commissioning couple have tried other treatments.  Commissioning mothers 
are to try egg donation before asking a surrogate to undertake the risks of 
pregnancy.  However, a surrogate as an autonomous adult woman could give 
valid informed consent to decide if she wants to undertake the risks of 
pregnancy; for example she may choose to be a surrogate for a sister who has a 
fear of pregnancy.  It was also paternalistic towards commissioning couples, by 
being critical if one of them has a terminal illness (44-5).  No mention is made 
that the surviving partner could raise the child well if the one partner dies.   
 
Fourthly, both Brazier and Changing Conceptions of Motherhood are aware of the 
lack of empirical research on surrogacy, but still make claims about surrogacy 
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without the evidence being there.  Brazier admitted there is a lack of empirical 
research into the effect of money in surrogacy and commented that it found no 
evidence that surrogacy resulted in significant harm, but failed to acknowledge 
this included paid surrogacy too.  Even though it called for a ban of payments 
above expenses to surrogates, it admitted that it did not know how a child 
would react to finding out if their surrogate had been paid, due to no research 
being conducted (4.11, 4.14 and 5.21).  Some of their concerns are prima facie 
understandable because at the time, little empirical evidence was available 
especially on the effects of surrogacy upon the child.  However, it could have 
suggested another review once more evidence was found.  Chapter three of 
this thesis discusses whether children and surrogates are commodified in 
surrogacy or not.  The appendix offers suggested questions for further 
research. 
 
Analysis of the secular reports was presented in five main sections.  Section 1.2 
provided a background to the three secular reports focusing upon why they 
were written, their ethical concerns and their views on the relationship 
between law and morality.  Section 1.3 looked at surrogacy in the reports, 
focusing upon the practice of surrogacy and the particular people involved i.e. 
the surrogate, the commissioning couple and the child.  Section 1.4 analysed 
important concepts which will be explored later in the thesis namely: 
motherhood, payment and baby selling, coercion, exploitation and 
commodification, surrogacy management and legislation.  Criticisms of the 
Warnock and the Brazier reports were presented in section 1.5, followed by an 
evaluation of all three of the reports in 1.6.  Section 1.6 focused upon the issues 
of payment, welfare of participants, paternalism and the lack of empirical 
evidence.   
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Overall all three reports opposed commercial surrogacy agencies and a 
statutory governmental agency, but acknowledged the procreative liberty of 
the commissioning couple to use unenforceable, unpaid surrogacy as a last 
resort with the surrogate as the legal mother.  They all shared common ethical 
themes such as pragmatism, preventing exploitation and harm to the surrogate 
and the child.  They all condemned convenience surrogacy, but without 
banning all surrogacy to prevent harming the child.  The reports did not regard 
motherhood as multidimensional, did not consider the needs of the 
commissioning couple enough or acknowledge that a paid surrogate could act 
with mixed motives of concern for the self and the other. 
 
1.7 Background to the Church Reports 
 
The first half of this chapter considered the three secular reports of Warnock, 
Brazier and Changing Conceptions of Motherhood.  Attention now turns to three 
Church reports in order to assess how the Free Churches, the Church of 
England and the Roman Catholic Churches have dealt with surrogacy.   
 
The three Church reports to be analysed, represent the writings of three 
Christian denominations towards surrogacy.  Analysis will be made of their 
attitudes towards surrogacy, the issues of motherhood, payment, exploitation 
and commodification and surrogacy management issues.  Criticisms of the 
reports and an evaluation of them will also be made.  In addition the reports’ 
theological views will be presented, looking at issues such as the unitive and 
relational aspects of procreation within marriage.  The first section below 
explores the background to the Church reports by looking at four areas.  Firstly 
an overview of the reports, secondly their views towards infertility, thirdly 
their ethical and theological attitudes to infertility and fourthly their attitude 
towards science and the use of reproductive technologies will be given. 
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First then, a brief overview of the three Church reports is given.  The first 
Church report to be assessed is Choices in Childlessness, published in 1982 by the 
Free Church Federal Council, which investigated attitudes towards the 
‘*p]sychological, social, ethical, and legal aspects of childlessness’ (v) including 
theological aspects (vii).  The second Church report to be analysed is Personal 
Origins by the Church of England, originally published in 1985, although the 
edition considered here is the revised second edition, published in 1996.  The 
working party of the Anglican Board of Social Responsibility, part of the 
General Synod of the Church of England, submitted evidence to the Warnock 
committee in 1983, publishing their findings as Personal Origins.  The second 
edition of Personal Origins kept the moral and theological considerations 
unchanged, but the Board updated it in light of the 1990 Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act, since the Act was modified in 1994 (and not 1995 as they 
state on page 14 of the report).  The report concentrated on three areas of 
debate: (a) the status of the fertilised egg, the theology of the early embryo, and 
the protection it is to be given; (b) the nature of the marital bond, the effect of 
introducing a third or fourth party with AID or egg donation; and (c) ‘*t]he 
nature and extent of divine providence and human responsibility’ (2).  Personal 
Origins accepted that some Christians disapproved of IVF and donated 
gametes.  On the whole the report accepted the use of the new reproductive 
technologies but not surrogacy, which is a similar view taken by Choices in 
Childlessness and represents the typical Protestant church view.  The third and 
final Christian report to be considered is Donum Vitae, published in 1987 by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith of the Roman Catholic Church.  
Donum Vitae is the most conservative of the reports, not generally accepting 
any new reproductive technology including surrogacy. 
 
Secondly, each of the reports explored infertility.  Due to the controversial 
issues involved, both Choices in Childlessness (vii) and Personal Origins (vi) 
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admitted that they did not always agree due to different approaches and 
judgements.  Indeed, Personal Origins commented that different theological and 
ethical approaches gave rise to different interpretations and conclusions.  The 
Church is called not to be ‘rigid and negative’, but that judgements of the 
‘complex moral questions’ are to be made sensitively and sympathetically (65).  
Choices in Childlessness wanted the Church to offer support and counselling to 
the involuntarily childless (53) since it believed in reducing unhappiness by 
‘sympathy and benevolence’ (19).  It suggested the community could be ‘acting 
responsibly’ in helping infertile couples (32), because human beings have 
powers of ‘imagination, inventiveness, intellect and practical skill’ to be 
creatively used in community service as ‘God’s stewards and co-creators’ (39).  
Children are not possessions owned by one person, but belong to the 
community and God, entrusted as a gift, by parents to the community, which 
the childless can share in nurturing.  It believed ‘God has given us the 
curiosity, inventiveness and power’ to transcend limits to create a ‘better 
world’ (39).   
 
In comparison, the more conservative document Donum Vitae tended to agree 
with previous Roman Catholic documents of the Magisterium, giving a 
unanimous condemnation of the general use of the new reproductive 
technologies, unless assisting the natural conjugal act on rare occasions.  Due to 
concerns that human beings become the givers and takers of life, children are 
not to be conceived by medical intervention despite ‘good intentions’ (25) and 
despite admitting that ‘the desire for a child is natural’ (33).  The ban on these 
techniques is to allow children a ‘secure and recognized relationship’ with their 
own parents (23).  Neither the good intention of a desire for a child nor 
fertilisation willed as the expression of a specific conjugal act, are acceptable, 
since the spouses are not deemed to be co-operating with God (29-30).  It 
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completely condemned the practice of surrogacy and did not discuss the issue 
of payment in surrogacy or management of surrogacy arrangements.  
 
Thirdly, each of the reports was keen to apply the principles of its ethical 
tradition to the issue of infertility.  Personal Origins applied ‘[b]iblical 
understanding and Christian ethical tradition in light of scientific knowledge’ 
(1) and also discussed issues of ‘human dominion and pastoral theology’ (vii).  
Donum Vitae by contrast focused upon principles derived from its anthropology 
and natural law moral.  The natural moral law is seen as expressing and 
outlining purposes, rights and duties, based on the human being’s true nature 
as an embodied soul.  Natural moral law is regarded as the rational order 
wherein man is called by God the creator to direct, regulate and use his body.  
Man is to work within the limits of a reasonable domain over nature.  
Rationality and the teachings of the Magisterium are to be used to reflect on the 
‘values of life and of human procreation’ (10) to decide whether an artificial 
reproductive technology is ‘morally admissible’ (10).   
 
Each report also focused upon the theological significance of marriage and 
childlessness when discussing the use of the new reproductive technologies.  
Choices in Childlessness acknowledged marriage as a vocation, which 
traditionally includes children, but realised that some couples may have a 
vocation to remain childless, serving God in other ways.  Others may have a 
vocation to have children (52) and try to overcome their infertility (13).  
Personal Origins acknowledged that some couples do not want a family, while 
others do and cannot, but that surgery, medicine and assisted conception can 
help.  It admitted that some regard marriage as involving a commitment to 
having children (66-7).  Donum Vitae wanted procreation and birth to occur 
within marriage and from the conjugal marital act alone, uniting the unitive 
and procreative parts of sexual intercourse.  The marital conjugal act which 
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allows spouses to become one flesh is seen as the preferable way for children to 
be conceived, reflecting their love for each other (23).   
 
Finally, the reports also commented upon their Church’s attitudes towards 
science and the use of the new reproductive technologies.  Choices in 
Childlessness, for example, regarded medical science as a gift from God, and the 
Church is encouraged to change its attitude to procreation, family life, 
parenting and childlessness.  It admitted that human beings can adapt nature 
to their needs, within limits (42).  Donum Vitae did not regard science and 
technology as morally neutral, but as needing a conscience to be guided by the 
moral law in order to serve human beings, to respect man’s inalienable rights 
and to know God’s will and design.  Artificial procreation is to be seen in 
connection with the existence and transmission of life in marital life, and is 
under God’s holy laws.  Technical means or medicine can take into account 
human dignity and can aid and serve conjugal acts but not replace them (32-3).   
 
1.8 Ethical and Theological Themes in the Church Reports  
 
Having looked at the background to the reports, we now turn to how the 
reports use Christian ethics and theology when investigating the new 
reproductive technologies.  Attention will focus upon five themes.  Firstly the 
role of ethics, secondly whether there is a right to a child, thirdly the issue of 
dignity, fourthly the procreative and unitive aspects of marriage and finally 
views on natural law and nature. 
 
Firstly, Choices in Childlessness suggested Christian decision making is shaped 
by Christian ethics, which is influenced by Christian views towards nature, 
human destiny and creation, which are in turn shaped by the gospel and God’s 
dealings with the world.  The morality of the actions and methods to alleviate 
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infertility are assessed by looking at the ends and the means, since not all 
means are morally justified regardless of the good ends.  It suggested that we 
have priorities of interest and moral boundaries and limits.  The report implied 
that more than one moral principle is often taken into account, since there are 
no clear-cut moral solutions, and our own assessments and judgements have to 
be made.  It wanted to prevent harm, guard rights, enhance the common good; 
they were concerned about human happiness in response to God’s purposes 
(51).  Personal Origins wanted to be faithful to biblical understanding and 
Christian ethical tradition along with scientific knowledge to specify relevant 
principles.  It placed problems in historical and theological context, but 
remained open to new thought and possibilities, by reflecting and revising 
previous ways of moral thinking in light of medical, scientific, ethical and 
social consequences.  It admitted that moral traditions need to be ‘extended 
and rethought’ with some maintained (53), since it wanted to be ‘faithful to the 
truth’ and was aware of ‘adapting our ethics to scientific advances’ (21).    
 
Secondly, none of the reports supported the view that the infertile have a right 
to a child.  Choices in Childlessness believed rights are about fulfilling basic 
needs and a child is not a basic need (22-4), therefore ‘parenting and 
childlessness’ are to be seen in light of God’s ‘will and purpose’ (24).  Personal 
Origins believed the Bible does not talk of rights and prefer responsibilities, 
duties and other privileges (4).  Likewise, Donum Vitae did not consider 
marriage as giving spouses a right to a child, as this would be against a child’s 
‘dignity and nature’, but spouses only have a right to the conjugal act (34).   
 
Thirdly, Choices in Childlessness considered whether the techniques dehumanise 
and offend humanity or enhance human dignity; whether the consequences 
foreseen are ‘morally acceptable’ and whether ‘social attitudes and 
expectations’ or interests are affected (32) and damaged (42).  It suggested that 
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we need time and space to develop self-identity and relationships with others 
(33).  Christological emphases can be seen in the reports.  Choices in 
Childlessness proposed that medicine can continue Jesus’ healing ministry, 
allowing procreation where impediment occurs (41).  Personal Origins 
suggested we can learn from Christ about the interdependence of social life, the 
‘worth and dignity’ of life and the ‘possibilities for human relationships’ (28).   
 
Fourthly, all three reports focused upon the theological themes of procreative 
and unitive issues in marriage.  Choices in Childlessness indicated that Church 
tradition, in the past, regarded children as the good or the primary end of 
marriage (the bonum prolis of Augustine), with the unitive ends of marriage 
seen as secondary.  In 1930 Pope Pius XI supported the 1917 Code of Canon 
Law, which also prioritised the end of marriage as firstly for procreation and 
secondly for ‘mutual help’ and to prevent lust, in his encyclical Casti Connubii 
(1930).36  However, the Second Vatican Council with Gaudium et Spes (1965) 
recognised that the two functions of marriage, ‘the procreative and the unitive, 
had equal dignity’.37  Pope Paul VI with Humanae Vitae (1968) regarded the 
procreative and unitive functions of marriage as having an ‘inseparable 
connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not 
break’.38  Humanae Vitae believed that ‘the precepts of natural law...teaches that 
each and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to 
the procreation of human life’,39 since this is regarded as part of God’s plan.40  
                                                 
36 Cited in Susan A. Ross, ‘The Bride of Christ and the Body Politic: Body and Gender in Pre-
Vatican II Marriage Theology’, The Journal of Religion 71 (1991), 345-61, at 346. 
37 Bernard J. Cassidy, ‘Essays in Honor of Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.: An Introduction’, Journal of 
Law and Religion 11 (1994-1995), 143-50, at 145. 
38 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1968), section 12.  
39 Ibid., 11. 
40 Ibid., 13. 
75 
 
Pope John Paul II endorsed Humanae Vitae which sees the joining of the 
procreative and unitive parts of sex as part of natural law.41   
 
Personal Origins believed the purpose and end of marriage are based upon the 
three traditional goods of marriage: procreative, moral and relational.  St 
Augustine called them ‘offspring, fidelity and sacrament’ (46) and they are 
traditionally held together (46-7).  Roman Catholics believe marital sexual 
intercourse should include these three goods each time.  Therefore, the Roman 
Catholic document Donum Vitae wanted procreation and birth to occur from 
the conjugal marital act alone (33-4), as ‘a gift and blessing of God’ (23), so that 
spouses become parents through each other’s ‘mutual self-giving’ and love 
(23).  Spouses cannot use artificial contraceptives as these would break the 
inseparable procreative and unitive goods of the conjugal marital act which 
have been ‘willed by God’ as ends of marriage (26-7).  The conjugal act reflects 
the unity of humans as body and soul, expressed in the body, and needs to 
remain open to procreation and to ‘the gift of life’ (27).  Therefore, the new 
reproductive technologies are generally not approved. 
 
By contrast, Choices in Childlessness suggested that Protestant churches see the 
procreative and unitive aspects of marriage as held together within creation.  
However, it allowed contraception, in order to choose when to have children.  
Contraception separates the procreative and unitive aspects of sex, since 
children are not seen as inevitable or an essential aspect of marriage.  The 
husband and wife relationship is the esse of marriage and the relationship 
between children and parents is seen as the bene esse of marriage.  Choices in 
Childlessness admitted that traditionally children are expected in marriage, but 
want to develop tradition by accepting deliberate childlessness as a vocation (8 
                                                 
41 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan (Boston, MA: Pauline 
Books and Media, 1997), 387, cited in Agneta Sutton, ‘The Symbolism of Marriage and of the 
Parent-Child Relationship: A Comparison Between Karl Barth and John Paul II’, New Blackfriars 
84 (2003), 64-79, at 66.  
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and 32).  Personal Origins indicated that some believe procreation is intended by 
God as ‘a proper good’ and purpose of marriage and is not optional, ‘except for 
very good reasons’ (48).    
 
Therefore, in Personal Origins some supported the new reproductive techniques 
which do not involve sexual intercourse or a relationship with the genetic 
donor.  It admitted that gamete donation separated procreation genetically 
from the marital relationship.  Technology can be used in a loving context to 
fulfil the good of marriage by strengthening the relational bond which has been 
affected by handicap.  IVF can maintain the procreational and relational 
aspects of marriage.  It wanted human life protected as bearing God’s image 
some from the moment of conception, but others on the Committee wanted 
embryos protected later, calling for ‘free and informed consent’ from all 
research subjects and ‘infertility services’ (55 see also 32-45).   
 
Finally, views on nature and natural law tended to fall into two camps in the 
Protestant reports.  Firstly, as Personal Origins indicated, some Christians 
respect nature and natural law as indicating God’s purpose with set 
boundaries and limits; therefore they are cautious of accepting technology.  
This is similar to the Aristotelian perspective which sees an essential fixed 
nature with a final end (24).  Secondly, however, Choices in Childlessness 
proposed we are God’s stewards and co-creators, using our natural powers of 
imagination, inventiveness, intellect and our practical skills to serve humanity 
and to fulfil our God given potential in his Kingdom.  It is suggested that we 
can overcome limitations, with creative transcendence.  The report regarded it 
as wrong ‘to condemn...medical intervention as ‚unnatural‛ simply because it 
is artificial’ (42).  As Personal Origins suggested, such Christians see nature as 
an ongoing creation; open to God’s future work (25) and which can be used for 
our own good ends with an active participation in God’s creative order (26-8 
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and 58) and dynamism by ‘active stewardship’ (6).42  These Christians are open 
to new possibilities with God’s providential care changing the world.  The 
natural order is seen as advancing God’s purpose towards an unachieved goal, 
since God is not seen as permanently fixing nature.  It suggested human beings 
can ‘co-operate with God’ to remedy nature’s flaws and natural deficiencies 
and therefore medical technology can help start a family (58).   
 
Nevertheless limits are still needed and Choices in Childlessness believed limits 
are part of the order of things, providing a framework for development and 
growth.  It suggested that limits are crossed if the intervention makes humanity 
less than human and that moral judgement and assessment has to decide 
where and what the limits are.  It indicated that an ‘ethical distinction’ is made 
between the natural and unnatural, which is based upon ‘what is in keeping 
with human nature and what is not’; they did not see it as a distinction about 
what is natural and what is artificial (42).  Likewise, Personal Origins 
acknowledged that human action is subjected to ‘moral limits’, and suggested 
we use prudence to ensure evil is not intended, since ‘God’s purposes for 
nature’ impose ‘moral limits’ upon our power over nature (29).  
 
1.9 Surrogacy in the Church Reports 
 
The section above explored the ethical and theological themes in the Churches’ 
reports.  I turn now to their approaches to surrogacy, focusing attention upon 
four points: firstly how the Churches consider surrogacy, secondly how they 
define the practice, thirdly positive comments about surrogacy and fourthly 
negative comments about surrogacy.   
 
                                                 
42 John Mahoney, Bioethics and Belief (London: Sheed and Ward, 1984), 16. 
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Firstly, all three of the Church reports disapproved of the practice of surrogacy.  
Choices in Childlessness called for the practice to be made illegal (55) even 
though it suggested there has been ‘no attempt’ to solve ‘the ethical and legal 
problems’ of surrogacy (17).  Personal Origins, likewise, regarded surrogacy as a 
morally unacceptable practice for Christians (53).  Similarly, Donum Vitae 
regarded participation as gestational or genetic surrogates as morally illicit 
(25), and called for prohibitive legislation to ban surrogacy (37).  In light of 
section 1.8 above, the reports could have discussed the ethics and theology of 
surrogacy more.  Little attention was paid to biblical presentations of surrogacy 
(e.g. Genesis 16 and Genesis 30), the social context of surrogacy or ways harm 
could be prevented in surrogacy.  No mention was made of surrogacy as 
possibly reflecting God’s purpose or surrogacy being used as a common good 
for society and individual couples. 
 
Secondly, each of the reports defined surrogacy, reflecting how they regarded 
the practice.  Choices in Childlessness did not define surrogacy exactly, but 
regarded a surrogate as a mother who enjoys pregnancy, but not parenting, 
who is impregnated with the sperm of the commissioning father and after the 
birth, hands the child over for a fee (17).  Genetic surrogacy is called ‘surrogate 
motherhood’ and gestational surrogacy ‘womb-leasing’ which involved ‘the 
conception and carrying of a child at the wish of another couple, whether for 
monetary gain or not’ (55).  ‘Womb-leasing’ is defined as a woman contracting 
to lease her womb to deliver a foetus she did not produce.  With gestational 
surrogacy, it suggested there could be ‘moral problems’ if an embryo from the 
commissioning couple is implanted into another woman and ‘presented to 
them as their child’ after the birth (55).  Personal Origins acknowledged that 
surrogacy can be performed using the gametes of the commissioning couple as 
well as egg and donor sperm (14), but without explicitly stating that surrogacy 
involves the surrogate using her own ovum.  Donum Vitae made a definitional 
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distinction between gestational and genetic surrogacy.  Both types of surrogacy 
are seen as involving the ‘surrender’ of a baby (25 [a] and [b]).  Gestational 
surrogacy is regarded as involving the gametes of donors and no distinction is 
made between gametes of third party donors and gametes from the married 
couple (25 [a]).  In relation to section 1.8 above, the reports tended not to 
discuss possible ethical differences between genetic and gestational surrogacy, 
or for different types of commissioning couples such as single or married. 
 
Thirdly, two of the reports gave some positive affirmations of surrogacy before 
condemning the practice.  Choices in Childlessness indicated that some regard 
women as having ‘the right to lease their wombs’ as their right over their 
bodies, but it did not endorse this (23).  Personal Origins admitted that 
surrogacy could possibly be medically justified to overcome infertility, a 
defective uterus, a hysterectomy, handicap, or a ‘medical condition such as 
heart or kidney disease’ where pregnancy could be dangerous (14).  However, 
Donum Vitae made no positive comments regarding surrogacy.  As seen in 
section 1.8, the reports did not regard a child as a right.  Even so, no mention 
was made of the possible right for the commissioning couple to associate with 
the child once born.  They did not discuss that some commissioning couples 
may regard a child as a need to fulfil God’s will for their marriage. 
 
Fourthly, however, overall the three reports are extremely negative towards 
surrogacy, giving a unanimous deontological condemnation in all cases.  All 
were concerned about the relationship between the child and the surrogate, 
and how this relationship affects the family and the child.  Choices in 
Childlessness believed surrogates regard surrogacy as a paid job and that once 
the child is born she will leave.  It considered both paid and unpaid surrogacy 
to demean the surrogate and the child, because the surrogate conceives and 
carries the child on the wish of the commissioning couple (55).  As seen in 
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section 1.8, Choices in Childlessness referred to Jesus’ healing ministry and also 
the importance of self-identity.  No consideration was given to a surrogate 
willing to help heal the consequences of infertility for a commissioning couple 
by gestating their gametes for them, thus enhancing their dignity from the 
possible depression of infertility.  The report regarded surrogacy as 
dehumanising the surrogate, with unacceptable consequences. 
 
Personal Origins, despite accepting other reproductive technologies, agreed 
unanimously that surrogacy fundamentally endangers the Christian institution 
of the family.  It assumed that strong bonding occurs gestationally between the 
woman and the foetus, which could lead to problems handing the child over to 
the contracting couple, especially as it regarded the surrogate as severing all 
relationship to and responsibility for the child.  However, despite such views of 
severance, it pointed out that the surrogate has to agree to relinquish the child 
by allowing the commissioning couple to use a Parental Order (14).  Therefore, 
legally, power rests with the surrogate who can keep the child and be the 
child’s legal mother.  In consequence of section 1.8 above, they could have 
regarded surrogacy as an interdependent relationship between the surrogate 
and the commissioning couple, if the surrogate was treated with dignity.  A 
gestational surrogate could help the commissioning couple procreate and 
achieve an end of their marriage by gestating a child for them. 
 
Donum Vitae is also concerned about how surrogacy affects the family and the 
child.  Its condemnation focused upon issues important to them such as 
ensuring procreation from marital unity.  Surrogacy is therefore considered as 
‘contrary to the unity of marriage and to the dignity of the procreation of the 
human person’ (25).  Surrogacy is specifically rejected for representing: 
 
an objective failure to meet the obligations of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity and 
of responsible motherhood; it offends the dignity and the right of the child to be 
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conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up by his own 
parents; it sets up, to the detriment of families, a division between the physical, 
psychological and moral elements which constitute those families (25-6).   
 
In light of section 1.8, Donum Vitae was unlikely to support surrogacy because it 
wanted procreation from the conjugal marital act only, as a mutual sign of the 
spouses self-giving, thus maintaining the procreative and unitive aspects of 
marriage. 
 
1.10 Motherhood, Payment, Exploitation and Surrogacy Management in the 
Church Reports 
 
1.10.1 Motherhood 
 
The section above looked at how the Churches considered surrogacy; their 
definitions of the practice, along with their positive and negative comments 
about surrogacy.  Attention now turns to how each of the three reports 
considered motherhood and payment in surrogacy. 
 
Firstly, Choices in Childlessness calls gestational surrogacy ‘womb-leasing’, 
seeing the gestational surrogate as a ‘nurse’ instead of a mother (48).  Womb-
leasing is assumed to involve the woman contracting her womb to gestate a 
foetus, which the report regards her as not producing (17), i.e. not procreating.  
It argued that because gestational surrogates lack a genetic link to the child, 
they were less likely to become emotionally involved towards it and not want 
to continue nurturing it, even if they have enjoyed the pregnancy and birth.  
Surrogacy is regarded as an irresponsible and inhumane act for deliberately 
disrupting and damaging the pre-birth relationship between the mother and 
child; changing its character and damaging its potentiality.  It wanted the 
‘mother-child relationship’ to be ‘continuously growing’ from pre-birth to post-
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partum, with its ‘mother’s continuing love and care’ (48).  It regarded 
surrogacy as breaking the identity between the biological and social mother.  
Procreation is considered to be reduced to just ‘a biological process’, with 
surrogacy regarded as ‘hardly motherhood’ (48).  However, the surrogate is 
seen as being involved in ‘a deepening relationship’ with the child up to the 
birth (48).  Earlier, it suggested mothering can be provided ‘in different ways, 
involving different persons and different institutions’, including a single 
mother (20).  It failed to realise, as indicative of its approach, that a surrogate 
could mother the child with care and attention on behalf of another or 
encourage the commissioning mother to mother the embryo.  
 
Secondly, Personal Origins regarded motherhood as normally involving the 
natural parents as ‘the genetic and social parents’, with the wife as the 
‘physiological mother’, but the new reproductive technologies allowed 
different parts of motherhood to be performed by different people (9).  It 
pointed out that with egg donation, the woman receiving the egg is regarded 
as ‘the social and physiological mother’ who nurtures ‘the child prenatally’ and 
delivers it (13).  It admitted that with egg donation, the child is not genetically 
related to the birth mother and has three parents.  Some regarded this as a basic 
confusion of the Christian understanding of parenthood.  It was undecided 
about whether egg donation raised further ethical problems.  With embryo 
donation, the receiving couple are not genetically related, but are ‘the social 
parents’ and the social mother provides prenatal nurturing before birth (14).   
 
Concerning its view towards motherhood in surrogacy, it suggested that the 
commissioning couple are the genetic and social parents but the 
commissioning mother is not ‘the physiological mother’ for she has not 
gestated the child (14).  It indicated that in surrogacy, parents take ‘the duties 
and privileges of parenthood only after the child has been carried in the womb 
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by another woman’ (52).  The report gave some support for gamete donation as 
non-adulterous (57), but they questioned surrogacy because of the ‘multiple’ 
‘practical and moral problems’ involved, including an irresolvable confusion 
and ‘complexity of relationships’ (59).43  They supported the use of ovum 
donation by suggesting that the genetic role is not as important as the gestatory 
role or the social role (52).  It admitted that a child born of egg donation is not 
related to the mother who bears it (58).  Concerning surrogacy however, they 
indicated that some regarded the genetic contribution as having overriding 
importance.  It admitted that for some the separation of the two female 
contributions to the biological origins of the child - i.e. the genetic and 
gestatory contributions - is unacceptable.  However, it allowed this separation 
with embryo donation.  Concern was expressed that surrogacy minimises the 
‘gestatory role’ of motherhood; the report suggested that the mother bearing 
the child has a ‘true parental and...social role’, with transference of parental 
responsibility by adoption (52-3).    
 
Thirdly, Donum Vitae rejected the use of donor gametes (24) on the grounds 
that this separates genetic, gestational and social parenthood, which damages 
‘personal relationships’ in families and society by creating ‘dissension, disorder 
and injustice’ (25).  Donor gametes are regarded as denying the vocation of 
those ‘called to fatherhood and motherhood’ (24), by denying the ‘unity and 
integrity’ (24-5) of ‘conjugal fidelity’ in marriage (24).  Donum Vitae identified a 
mother as the one who carries and provides maternal shelter to the embryo.  
Only married women can become mothers, by their ‘reciprocal self giving’ in 
their loving conjugal union with their spouses (23).  It rejected surrogacy for 
not meeting the obligations of maternal love, for denying conjugal fidelity and 
for not being responsible motherhood.  It also believed that surrogacy denies 
the dignity - and the child’s right - of conception and gestation within the 
                                                 
43 Chapter two (on mothering) clarifies some of the roles in surrogacy.   
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womb.  Surrogacy is considered to prevent the child being parented by their 
‘own’ parents (26).   
 
It seems therefore that the reports are keen to maintain a continuation between 
gestational and social motherhood in surrogacy.  However, the Protestant 
churches accept the division of genetic parenthood from gestational and social 
parenthood by accepting AID, egg donation and embryo donation, where the 
genetic donor differs to the social parents or the gestational mother.  However, 
they were not willing to accept the break between gestational motherhood and 
social motherhood in cases where the surrogate gestates a donated egg or her 
own genetic egg.  They wanted the woman who gestates to become the child’s 
social mother too.  Chapter two explores motherhood in more depth, 
suggesting that motherhood can be multi-functional, incorporating biological 
motherhood, gestational motherhood and a social relationship.   
 
1.10.2 The Issue of Payment 
 
The previous section analysed how the reports regarded motherhood.  As with 
the secular reports, the issue of payment is a key ethical concern for the Church 
reports.  In this section we discuss the churches’ concern with how both paid 
and unpaid surrogacy demean the dignity of the surrogate.  Both Choices in 
Childlessness and Personal Origins treated the issue of payment in surrogacy; 
Donum Vitae did not.  Payment is seen to demean the surrogate, affect her 
dignity and commodify the child.  Preference is therefore given to surrogacy 
being conducted as an unpaid gift.    
 
Choices in Childlessness opposed the view that children are commercialised 
commodities to be bought and sold (50 and 55).  Instead, children are seen as 
gifts of God’s providence, entrusted to the Christian community, though 
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human beings are involved in planning, deliberation, decision making and 
choice.  It saw surrogacy as a free service and gift to a childless couple and 
regarded paid surrogacy as unnatural and inhuman.  However, both unpaid 
and paid surrogacy were regarded as ‘demeaning’ and they called for them to 
‘be made illegal’ (55).  It indicated that surrogacy involves ‘an agreed fee’ for 
the surrogate to hand the child over to the commissioning couple (17) and after 
receiving her fee they expect her to ‘fade out of the picture’ (48).  Personal 
Origins argued that when surrogacy involved payment for the gestational 
service, the money undermined the women’s dignity, who bear children ‘they 
have no intention of mothering’ (59).  It was opposed to a child being created 
for adoption, especially if payment was used (53).  Personal Origins indicated 
that from a Christian view point it is seen as ‘inappropriate’ for donors to ‘sell 
their gametes for gain’ (9).   
 
1.10.3 Exploitation and Commodification 
 
The section above explored how the Church reports considered payment as a 
key ethical concern, believing that both paid and unpaid surrogacy demeans 
the dignity of the surrogate.  Attention here turns to how the three Church 
reports believe payment leads to exploitation and commodification.  Chapter 
three explores the concepts of commodification, exploitation and coercion and 
chapter four explores the issue of payment and baby selling in more depth. 
 
Firstly, Choices in Childlessness believed paying surrogates leads to a 
commercial business transaction involving large monetary exchanges and the 
sale of babies (50).  Children are to be seen as ‘a gift’, belonging to ‘the 
community and to God’ (30).  It wanted women and children to be treated with 
dignity and respect, without harm.  Procreation is not to be a business with 
children regarded as possessions.  Babies are not commodities, and it would be 
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‘unnatural and inhuman’ for family life - which emphasises care, uniqueness 
and the invaluable - to be substituted for the market place where all things 
have their price (50).  However, it suggested that medical technology can help 
overcome limitations by creatively promoting the common good, if used wisely 
with restrictions and without taking an instrumental approach to life (35). 
 
Secondly, despite Personal Origins not explicitly discussing exploitation as such, 
its authors were opposed to gametes being sold as commodities (9).  It 
acknowledged that some are opposed to anonymous embryo donation, where 
parents rear a child without a genetic relation to them, on account of the 
possibility that the process treats the child as a product (which in turn could 
affect the child badly).  It believed we can learn from Christ about the 
interdependence of social life, the worth and dignity of life, and the 
possibilities of human relationships.  It was implied that in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, individuals have dignity and responsibility and have a 
personal response to a loving God.  The report accepted that for Christians, 
human dignity includes acknowledging the body’s dignity (30).   
 
Thirdly, Donum Vitae sought to ensure that adults and embryos are respected 
with dignity, not exploited and commodified.  Dead embryos are to be 
respected for their humanity and are not to be used in ‘commercial trafficking’, 
since IVF embryos have dignity and the right to life from conception (18).  The 
report regarded as ‘immoral’ the production of human embryos which are 
‘destined to be exploited as disposable ‚biological material‛’ (18).  The embryo 
is not to be exploited or used for commercial purposes as this is opposed to 
human dignity.  Human beings are to be respected and not used as an 
instrument for others’ advantage.  A child is not an object which people can 
have rights to, or an object of ownership.  Therefore, children are not to be 
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‘desired or conceived’ as a ‘product’ of medical intervention, as this makes him 
‘an object of scientific technology’ (28). 
 
1.10.4 Surrogacy Management 
 
The last section looked at how the Churches believe payment leads to 
exploitation and commodification.  Unlike the secular reports, the Church 
reports do not go into much detail regarding the management of the practice 
because they are negative towards it and do not advocate it as a practice for 
Christians.  Even so, they tended to regard surrogacy as an unenforceable 
contract.  Choices in Childlessness pointed out that a judge described surrogacy 
as a ‘pernicious’ and an unenforceable contract (17).  Personal Origins regarded 
surrogacy as an unenforceable contractual or quasi-contractual agreement,44 
which can be paid or not.  Surrogacy is regarded as an arrangement involving a 
woman, who bears a child to be handed over at birth to a couple who will be its 
parents.  The arrangement is seen as having ‘unique features’ (59), as surrogacy 
could be used without requiring medical reasons for its use.  However, 
previously it stated that decision making is to include the interests of donors, 
professionals, the family, the community, in order to make choices and to be 
aware of the responsibilities involved (70).  Similarly, Donum Vitae did not go 
into detail regarding the management because it rejected surrogacy as a 
practice. 
1.11 Criticisms of the Church Reports  
 
Each of the Church reports contained statements which contradicted their 
attitudes towards surrogacy and which could possibly have led them towards 
a more positive attitude concerning accepting surrogacy as a practice to 
alleviate infertility.  Attention now focuses upon criticisms of the Church 
                                                 
44 Chapter five explores whether surrogacy has to operate as a contract. 
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reports.  Four criticisms of Choices in Childlessness are explored concerning 
payment, regulation, use of third parties and mothering.  Five criticisms of 
Personal Origins are investigated concerning the use of discussion, dynamic 
natural law, allowance for differing views, acceptance of other new 
reproductive technologies (especially embryo donation) and minimising the 
significance of genetic (but not gestational) motherhood.  Finally, three 
criticisms of Donum Vitae are considered including the saving of embryos, the 
use of medicine to help the sick, and how a child is the fruit of its parents’ love. 
 
1.11.1 Choices in Childlessness 
 
Choices in Childlessness contradicted its position towards the other reproductive 
technologies, including its attitude towards surrogacy.  Firstly, despite not 
allowing payment in surrogacy (55), it implied paid AID donation enabled 
emotional distance (45).  Allowing payment could help gestational surrogates 
keep a distance to the child they are gestating, even though it could be 
considered unwise to encourage emotional distance to a pregnancy with a 
foetus needing attention.  A study of paid surrogates in Israel demonstrated 
they deliberately distanced themselves from the embryo, but encouraged the 
commissioning mother to bond and interact with it.45  Surrogates act on behalf 
of another and psychologically it could be healthy for them not to be too 
emotionally attached to the foetus to prevent bonding, but such emotional 
distance does not necessarily mean that they are uncaring to the foetus.   
 
Secondly, it called for a Code of Practice with ‘principles and conditions’ to be 
developed for IVF (47), while for AID they called for ‘social and legal 
safeguards’ (54).  However, for surrogacy it called for the practice to be made 
illegal, admitting that no attempt had been made to solve the ethical and legal 
                                                 
45 Elly Teman, Birthing a Mother: The Surrogate Body and the Pregnant Self (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2010), 130.  
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problems.  Thirdly, AID is accepted despite using a third party, on the grounds 
that it could strengthen a couple’s marriage, since both spouses give consent.  
However, surrogacy is criticised for using a known third party, with more 
involvement compared to anonymous AID donors (43-6 and 47-8).  Fourthly, 
despite admitting that mothering can be provided in different ways, it 
criticised surrogacy for being irresponsible and inhuman, and for deliberately 
disrupting and damaging the relationship between a mother and a child (48). 
 
1.11.2 Personal Origins 
 
Personal Origins can also be criticised for its views towards surrogacy.  Firstly, it 
called for ‘observation and discussion’ to see if the reproductive practices 
‘threaten marriage’ or the child (53).  However, such discussion seemed 
missing with regard to surrogacy, especially as they did not seem to make an 
ethical distinction between gestational and genetic surrogacy, and also because 
at the time no research had been conducted into surrogacy.  With gestational 
surrogacy the surrogate does not procreate and the embryo is usually from the 
gametes of the married couple.  Secondly, despite their positive affirmations of 
a dynamic natural law - of seeing God as caring for an individual’s needs 
within the interdependence of life - it did not consider surrogacy as part of a 
dynamic natural law or responding to the particular needs of others, even if 
involving the gametes of the commissioning couple.  Some of them may have 
felt it was unnatural for a woman to hand over a child she has gestated, as she 
may have bonded to the child.  Thirdly, even though it admitted that ‘different 
but seemingly valid Christian conclusions can be drawn from the available 
data’ (2), allowing them to have different views towards IVF for example, it 
would not allow different and valid conclusions to be made about surrogacy.  
It could be that, due to the lack of empirical evidence about surrogacy, the 
report’s authors were hesitant to draw conclusions. 
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Fourthly, it seems illogical for them to accept the use of other reproductive 
technologies without accepting that surrogacy could also be used in some 
circumstances, especially as the report considered it logical to accept embryo 
donation after accepting AIH, AID and egg donation.  However, it did not 
regard surrogacy as being directly parallel to these other practices.  Fifthly, 
regarding their understanding of motherhood, it seems illogical to be prepared 
to minimise one type of biological parenthood (i.e. the genetic connection) 
when allowing egg donation and not the other (i.e. the gestational connection) 
in order to allow surrogacy, especially as they suggested we can use our bodies 
for God’s service (30).  However, it should be noted that they might well argue 
that there is a substantial difference between genetic and gestational 
motherhood. 
 
1.11.3 Donum Vitae 
 
Firstly, despite allowing procedures to occur on an embryo, which improve its 
health or survival (15), Donum Vitae would not allow a gestational surrogate to 
gestate an embryo instead of it being carried by a woman who has had 
repeated miscarriages.  If they did allow gestational surrogacy, the surrogate 
could possibly save an embryo’s life.  Secondly, even though it believed that 
medicine can work for the good of human beings and assist those who are ill 
and infirm, while respecting the person’s ‘dignity as a creature of God’ (9), they 
would not allow a woman to act as a surrogate, as a type of medicine, for the 
benefit of a commissioning mother, with an infirm and non-functioning womb 
for example.  Thirdly, a child is considered to be the fruit of their parents’ love 
(27-8); however, a couple could still love each other if their gametes are taken 
from each other and fused together and implanted into a surrogate to fulfil 
their marital duty to procreate.   
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However, Donum Vitae rejects surrogacy for being objectively wrong as the 
body is not being used in the right manner.  Being for them cannot be 
separated from meaning and therefore the womb, for example, can only be 
used in one way; for a wife to carry a child conceived with her own husband.  
Roman Catholic theology of the body does not allow the procreative and 
unitive aspects to be separated within marriage.  Roman Catholics distinguish 
between an objective good and a subjective feeling about a good.  Even though 
the married couple emotionally love each other, Roman Catholicism expects 
them to procreate by a biological self-giving through bodily sexual intercourse 
as an objective good of their married love.  Consequently, the aims, intentions 
and desires of a commissioning couple wanting to procreate using a surrogate 
would be irrelevant, as surrogacy separates the procreative and unitive aspects 
of marriage. 
 
1.12 Evaluation of the Church Reports  
 
Having investigated criticisms of the Church reports, an evaluation of them is 
now made.  Even though all three reports rejected surrogacy, they failed to 
consider whether surrogacy could reflect support for the infertile in four ways: 
(1) by failing to see surrogacy as helping infertility; (2) by failing to see 
surrogacy as a creative solution; (3) by not being consistent towards surrogacy; 
and (4) by failing to see that participants in surrogacy could be treated with 
dignity. 
 
Firstly, they failed to see surrogacy as helping the infertile.  All three Church 
reports unanimously condemned surrogacy as a means for Christians to 
alleviate infertility.  Such disapproval comes despite Choices in Childlessness 
advocating the reduction of human unhappiness by ‘*s]ympathy and 
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benevolence’ (19) and likewise Personal Origins calling for ‘sympathy’ and 
pastoral support for the infertile, along with requests for the Church not to be 
too ‘rigid’ or ‘negative’ (65).  Even so, neither report considered that surrogates 
may be motivated by sympathy and benevolence to help overcome the 
suffering of infertility.  After all, Choices in Childlessness acknowledged that 
infertility can cause suffering and that Christians can act responsibly by 
helping the infertile, and they called for the Church to give ‘understanding and 
support’ (53).   
 
Secondly, they failed to see surrogacy as a creative solution to infertility.  
Choices in Childlessness suggested that wanting a child can be a vocation for 
parenthood and is a sufficient reason for others to help the infertile.  It also 
believed that children are a gift of parents to a community; they are not owned 
by one person, but are from God and entrusted to a community as a gift.  
Indeed, it suggested we can creatively use our imagination and practical skills 
in service to our communities ‘as God’s stewards and co-creators’, (39) to 
become like God.  However, no suggestion is made that a Christian could 
become a surrogate, using IVF to gestate a commissioning couple’s embryo as a 
creative and imaginative way to help overcome the suffering of infertility or 
that a child could be entrusted by a surrogate as God’s gift to the 
commissioning couple and the community.  An infertile commissioning 
woman, for example, might still feel she has a vocation to mother even after a 
hysterectomy, with help from a willing surrogate.  Likewise, Personal Origins 
also claimed to be open to ‘new possibilities...of God’s providential care’ (28), 
suggesting our bodies can be used for God’s service.  It suggested we can ‘co-
operate with God’ to deal with natural deficiencies and the new reproductive 
technologies can help to start a family (58) and to fulfil the end of a marriage 
which has been affected by handicap (49).  Some might consider a 
commissioning mother with a womb removed due to cancer as being disabled 
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and a surrogate as someone helping a married couple fulfil the ends of 
marriage. 
 
Thirdly, they failed to be consistent.  Within the Church reports, attitudes 
expressed elsewhere are not readily applied to surrogacy.  Even though 
Personal Origins allowed for disagreement to occur over the moral and 
theological issues in human fertilisation and allowed for positive attitudes 
towards other reproductive technologies, they considered surrogacy to 
‘endanger’ the Christian family and therefore to be morally unacceptable for 
Christians (53).  Elsewhere, Personal Origins acknowledged that technology can 
separate motherhood into the genetic, social and physiological mothering roles 
(9).  Egg donation is accepted, despite creating additional parentage but 
surrogacy is regarded as having multiple practical and moral problems which 
they believed can cause confused relationships.  With surrogacy, it highlighted 
that some regard genetic contributions as having overriding importance, which 
they are prepared to down play in the case of egg donation.  Arguments based 
on the separation of the gestation and genetic contributions are accepted to 
support the other technologies but not surrogacy (52-3).  There is a danger that 
an infertile Christian couple, who need to use surrogacy as their only way to 
have a child, could feel the Church of England is not being responsive to their 
situation when other reproductive techniques are accepted. 
 
Earlier, Personal Origins claimed that it wanted to be faithful to biblical 
understanding and challenge interpretations of the Bible and tradition if they 
are ‘based on false premises’ (21).  However, no discussion occurs of the 
biblical presentations of surrogacy (e.g. Genesis 16 and Genesis 30), nor do they 
question these accounts as possible examples of rape and concubinage.46  
Theologically it accepted the separation of procreational and relational aspects 
                                                 
46 See chapter two of this thesis, section 2.2.  
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of marriage by contraception and accepted gamete donation which separates 
the procreational from the gestational relationship, but keeps the relational and 
social aspects together in the rearing of the child (48-50).  Nevertheless, it failed 
to apply these arguments to surrogacy.  After all, in gestational surrogacy, even 
though the commissioning mother did not gestate the child, it comes from the 
one flesh union of the commissioning parents.  In both gestational and genetic 
surrogacy, the parents can rear the child together as the social parents.  Genetic 
surrogacy, like donor gametes, involves a procreational act of the surrogate 
separate from social parenting of the commissioning couple.  However, despite 
accepting embryo donation using donor gametes, genetic surrogacy was 
rejected.  
 
Finally, they failed to see that surrogacy could respect the dignity of 
participants.  Donum Vitae regarded children as coming from the one flesh 
conjugal union of spouses, and as worthy of treatment with respect and 
dignity; surrogacy is rejected for breaking the procreative and unitive 
relationship.  However, a sympathetic Christian friend might volunteer as a 
gestational surrogate to help fulfil the vocational calling to parenthood for a 
childless married Roman Catholic woman after her hysterectomy due to cancer 
of the uterus.  The married couple could regard their gametes, fused using IVF, 
as representing their loving marital union.  The surrogate could treat the 
embryo with respect and dignity, regarding her actions as working with God 
as a co-creator, co-operating with God.  The couple might turn to surrogacy 
due to their extraordinary circumstances, though they would prefer to have 
procreated normally and do not regard the surrogate act as replacing their 
continued marital acts of conjugal love.  The couple do not intentionally want 
to separate the conjugal act from procreation, but they intentionally want to 
ensure that procreation occurs out of their love for each other.  The couple 
could aim to follow the teaching of Donum Vitae ensuring no embryos are 
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destroyed, no embryos are frozen and no spare embryos are created.  They 
could masturbate together to produce the husband’s sperm, as a unitive and 
possibly procreative act, out of love, instead of a solitary act performed by the 
man alone.  Both they and the surrogate could regard surrogacy as a way to 
enhance their marriage, allowing them both to fulfil their natural desire for a 
child and to continue to care for it while as a foetus in the surrogate’s womb 
and after the birth, allowing them to become a family.  Of course under the 
teachings of Donum Vitae the couple would be acting in a morally illicit way for 
using a surrogate (25) as it breaks the procreative and unitive aspects to the 
commissioning couple’s marriage; masturbation would also be criticised.  
Surrogacy is considered an objectively wrong way for a woman to use her 
body, as it breaks the expected natural law purpose and end of her womb to 
gestate her own child. 
 
1.13 Conclusion 
 
Chapter one has explored six major reports which have been written on 
surrogacy.  It considered their backgrounds, their attitudes towards surrogacy, 
motherhood, payment and baby selling, exploitation and commodification, 
surrogacy management, the theology of the Church reports, criticisms and a 
critical evaluation of the reports. 
 
Warnock and Brazier made practical recommendations for governmental 
ministers to legislate and regulate surrogacy in a clear and straightforward 
way, but without burdening the general public.  However, ministers did not 
follow all of Warnock’s recommendations and no action has been taken with 
Brazier apart from changing the criteria for Parental Orders to include 
unmarried couples.  Both reports were affected by public opinion concerning 
the practice of surrogacy, without necessarily considering the wishes of 
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surrogacy participants (for example calls to pay surrogates a fair amount for 
their services).  The difficultly both of these documents faced, was the tension 
between wanting to make suggestions for the legal organisation of surrogacy, 
without intruding too much into the individual private lives of citizens.  
Changing Conceptions of Motherhood gave advice to health professionals 
involved, but without offering solutions in cases involving ethical dilemmas 
between the surrogate and the commissioning couple.   
 
Common themes within the reports towards surrogacy included fears of 
convenience surrogacy - despite no reported occurrence in the United 
Kingdom - and fears of risk to the surrogate’s health, even though these are 
similar to the risks for most pregnant women.  Concerns were expressed that if 
a third party is involved this constitutes adultery, even though both members 
of the commissioning couples agreed to the practice, and that the children 
would be affected psychologically, even though their family wanted them.  
Theologically, recurring themes occur: the separation of the procreative and 
unitive aspects of marriage, the exclusive union of marriage and the use of a 
third party donor.  Other considerations include the status and possible 
destruction of the human embryo, the demeaning treatment of the surrogate 
and her dignity as a human being.  Other issues included the discontinuous 
maternal care, the separation of motherhood into gestational, genetic and social 
parts (even though they tended not to recognise the role of the commissioning 
mother).  Concern was expressed over the use of masturbation to produce 
sperm, the role of nature and the Bible, as well as concern that it is a contractual 
business arrangement with possible commodification of the surrogate and the 
child if payment is involved.   
 
However, despite the risks, official reports have acknowledged that surrogacy 
has not had the negative effects first envisaged.  Changing Conceptions of 
97 
 
Motherhood implied that their fears had not materialised since surrogacy was 
now more widely accepted amongst the public and participants were willing to 
inform the child of the arrangement (32).  Likewise, Brazier argued that there 
were not enough problems to justify setting up a controlling body.47  Often the 
reports failed to apply the same logic in their theological and ethical thinking to 
surrogacy, which they applied positively to other areas of reproductive 
technology.  Indeed in a private conversation with Professor Brazier, she 
admitted that some form of payment could now possibly be made to 
surrogates,48 which contrasted with her views in Brazier.  Ongoing research is 
needed to assess the psychological effect of surrogacy on the surrogate, the 
commissioning couple, the children born of surrogacy and the surrogate’s own 
children, especially when comparing altruistic and paid surrogacy practices.  
The focus for this thesis is on ethical issues involved in surrogacy.  Over the 
next four chapters, further analysis will be made.  Chapter two explores 
motherhood as multidimensional.  Chapters three and four discuss key ethical 
themes in surrogacy such as commodification, exploitation, coercion, payment 
and baby-selling.  Chapter five outlines how the practice is conducted with an 
analysis of the contractarian model, the adoption model and the relational 
model.  Suggestions for possible research are made in the appendix.   
 
                                                 
47 The Brazier Report, 6.2. 
48 Private conversation with Professor Brazier on 8 September 2008, at the Institute of Medical 
Law 4th Annual Conference entitled: ‘Transformation/Transgression: The Legal, Medical and 
Cultural Regulation of the Body’, at the University of Birmingham, England. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE CONCEPT OF MOTHERHOOD 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter one explored the concept of surrogacy in three secular reports and in 
three Church reports.  It focused on the key themes of motherhood, payment, 
commodification, exploitation, coercion and surrogacy management.  The aim 
of this chapter is to explore the concept of motherhood and its implications for 
surrogacy in greater depth.  Other chapters in the thesis will develop the key 
themes established in chapter one.  Chapter three explores commodification, 
exploitation and coercion for the child, surrogate and commissioning couple.  
Chapter four analyses whether paid surrogacy involves baby selling and 
chapter five investigates the management of surrogacy using a contract model, 
an adoption model and finally an alternative relational approach. 
 
Attention in this chapter will focus upon those who have a view on mothering 
and think it is ethically significant.  Firstly, the definition of motherhood is 
questioned: What makes someone a mother?  When does mothering start?  
What does mothering entail?  It will be proposed that the traditional monolithic 
understanding of motherhood - the assumption that there is only one ‘real’ 
mother - is inadequate.  It unnecessarily limits and oversimplifies the concept 
and fails to accommodate the intricate nature of motherhood.  Instead, the 
concept of motherhood is deconstructed to reflect the diverse definitions, types 
and practices of mothering in existence including genetic, gestational and social 
mothering, as well as combinations of these.  By examining the meaning of 
motherhood, new terms are made available to those involved in surrogacy to 
articulate the varying roles and practices involved.  Indeed, one aim of this 
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thesis as a whole is to develop a framework that incorporates the complexity of 
motherhood in the context of surrogacy in particular.   
 
The work of three secular feminists on motherhood is explored, namely 
Caroline Whitbeck, Sara Ruddick, and Barbara Katz Rothman, as well as 
problems with their work.  Assessments will be made as to whether their 
mothering models are sufficiently detailed to deal with surrogacy.  As in 
chapter one, distinctions will be made between genetic surrogacy and 
gestational surrogacy.  In contrast to them, the work of two Christian feminist 
theologians, Protestant Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Roman Catholic 
Rosemary Radford Ruether on motherhood will be explored, along with the 
work of Protestant theologian Don Browning.  Other Christian attitudes 
towards mothering will be presented, focusing upon the Bible and the Church.  
Suggestions are given that an alternative framework to accommodate 
motherhood as multidimensional needs to be explored.  I have chosen not to 
consider feminists who do not regard mothering as ethically significant, such 
as Shulamith Firestone1 or Jeffner Allen.2   
 
2.2 Who is the Mother? 
 
Questions can be asked to clarify the identity and meaning of motherhood.  
Who can - and how does one - become a mother?  When does mothering begin?  
Is motherhood determined by intention, genes, commitment or duty?  By egg 
donation, by the conception of an embryo, by implantation or gestation?  Is 
mothering a gender specific practice or a psychological emotional connection?  
Is mother-child bonding a result of hormones, an innate maternal instinct, or 
socially constructed from an ultrasound scan?  Motherhood could be defined 
                                                 
1 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1971). 
2 Jeffner Allen, ‘Motherhood: The Annihilation of Women’, in Joyce Trebilcot (ed.), Mothering: 
Essays in Feminist Theory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 315-30.  
100 
 
by pregnancy experiences such as quickening, giving birth as legally 
recognised motherhood, marriage, the financial and material standing of the 
carer, the amount or quality of social nurturing, a moral claim or right, a 
choice, socially constructed role, practices or qualities influenced by culture.3  
Questions can be raised regarding the value, significance and priorities of each 
of these elements, in whatever combination they occur.  Whether before, 
during or after a pregnancy, they are key questions for surrogacy participants, 
in constructing and attributing the identity, meaning and concept of 
motherhood.  
 
Current terminology fails to describe the diverse meanings within mothering.  
Traditional motherhood involved a woman giving birth to her own genetic 
child and nurturing it.  In England, a child is regarded as having one ‘real’, 
legitimate and natural mother since legally motherhood is determined by 
birth.4  Therefore, an infertile woman receiving an anonymously donated 
embryo or egg, but also a gestational surrogate gestating a commissioning 
couple’s embryo for them, or a genetic surrogate, are the legal mothers on the 
grounds of having given birth.  A woman gestating her daughter’s embryo 
would be legally regarded as the child’s mother and not as the child’s 
grandmother.  English Law is probably influenced by the 1839 ‘tender laws 
doctrine’, which allows birth mothers to have custody of their children.5   
 
                                                 
3 Virginia Held, like Sara Ruddick, highlights that men can demonstrate mothering qualities, 
(Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics [Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993], 80).  However, we tend to call them fathers due to their socially 
constructed genders.  Held uses ‘mothering person’ for inclusivity (197-8). 
4 English law on motherhood is guided by these two principles: ‘Mater semper certa est’, i.e. it is 
always certain who the mother is, and ‘mater est quam gestatio demonstrat’, i.e. by gestation is the 
mother demonstrated or motherhood is demonstrated by birth.   
5 The tender laws doctrine dates from 1839 in Britain and assumed the birth mother was the 
best parent of the child, over the father, see Joan Mahoney, ‘An Essay on Surrogacy and 
Feminist Thought’, Law, Medicine and Health Care 16 (1988), 81-8, at 86.  
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It can be difficult to identify one universal definition of one true or ‘real’ 
mother, as each case differs.  Traditional motherhood can be deconstructed to 
clarify - as opposed to harmfully fragment - women’s maternal identity.  The 
meaning of motherhood can be classified according to its various components 
and the types of mothering activities, practices, functions, roles, relationships 
and people, - for example, in terms of the genetic, gestational, intentional, 
instinctual, biological, psychological and social dimensions.  The meaning of 
motherhood can be analysed and terminology used to reflect its intricacy.  It is 
possible to escape from essentialistic and naturalistic stereotypes towards 
motherhood, including the assumption that all mothers are genetically related 
to their children and nurture them.   
 
Motherhood does not have to be essentialistic or naturalistic.  Maternal 
instincts are not necessarily universal or natural.  Genes or biological 
experiences such as gestation do not necessarily create a maternal attitude to 
the child.  Not all women want to be mothers; some abort, abandon or have the 
child adopted, even if it is genetically related to the mother.  Meira Weiss, after 
six years of research, found that mothers have been known to reject physically 
deformed new born infants for not matching their social expectations, but 
usually accepted them if they had an internal injury, thus suggesting a lack of a 
universalised maternal instinct.6  Cultural influences also affect mothering.  
Edward Shorter suggests that children in medieval Europe children were often 
abandoned or neglected, with little or no maternal love, since mothers often 
showed little grief on their death.7  However, Stephen Wilson argues that wet 
nursing was not as common as first thought and that it tended to be 
                                                 
6 Meira Weiss, ‘Conditions of Mothering: The Bio-Politics of Falling in Love with Your Child’, 
The Social Science Journal 35 (1998), 87-105, at 91-2. 
7 Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family (London: Collins, 1976), 169-72.   
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‘localized’.8  An innate maternal instinct or nature does not exist for all women, 
but does for some alongside bonding or an emotional attachment to the child.   
 
The law tends to take an essentialistic view of mothering by automatically 
regarding the woman who gives birth as the child’s mother.  The legal 
definition of a mother ignores the varying types of possible mothering 
relationship.  Within extended families, mothering as a social nurturing 
function, can be performed by other family members, including aunts, sisters 
and grandmothers, with cultural variations.  Apart from the widespread 
practice of adoption in Europe, within the Afro-Caribbean communities, the 
concept of ‘othermother’9 exists; these have their own societal status and assist 
the genetic mothers to raise their children.  Some are related such as 
‘*g]randmothers, sisters, aunts, or cousins’, but some are non-relatives – so-
called ‘fictive kin’.10  According to Judith Modell, the native people of Hawai‘i 
engage in the cultural practice of ‘hanai’, an ‘informal adoption’ where someone 
gives a child to another without going to court.  This practice leads to the 
creation of families known as ’ohana, who live together and regard themselves 
as kin.11  Ken Daniels and Karyn Taylor indicate that in Maori society 
behaviour now labelled as surrogacy is ‘long-standing and widespread’,12 
while Moira Wright comments that surrogacy occurred within families of 
British ethnic groups, to overcome the ‘tragedy’ of having no family heir.13   
 
                                                 
8 Stephen Wilson, ‘The Myth of Motherhood: The Historical View of European Child-Rearing’, 
Social History 9 (1984), 181-98, at 195-6. 
9 Patricia Hill Collins, ‘Black Women and Motherhood’, in Virginia Held (ed.), Justice and Care: 
Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 117-35, at 120-1. 
10 Ibid., 121. 
11 Judith Modell, ‘Rights to Children: Foster Care and Social Reproduction in Hawai’i’, in Sarah 
Franklin, and Heléna Ragoné (eds.), Reproducing Reproduction: Kinship, Power, and Technological 
Innovation (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 156-72, at 159. 
12 Ken Daniels, and Karyn Taylor, ‘Surrogacy: The Private Troubles and Public Issues’, 
Community Mental Health in New Zealand 6 (1991), 28-50, at 41. 
13 Moira Wright, ‘Surrogacy and Adoption: Problems and Possibilities’, Family Law 16 (1986), 
109-13, at 111. 
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The Bible can demonstrate the complex nature of motherhood.  The use of 
other women to act as mothers was a feature of Old Testament times.  
Traditionally, the biblical accounts of a woman bearing a child for an infertile 
woman - for example, Hagar for Sarai in Genesis 16, handmaid Bilhah14 for 
Rachel and handmaid Zilpah15 for Leah in Genesis 30:9-13 - have been called 
surrogacy.  In Genesis 16 the barren Sarai offers her slave girl16 Hagar, to 
Abram who becomes a wife17 so Sarai could have a child through her and he 
could procreate.  Hagar the slave becomes Abram’s concubine without her 
recorded consent.  A concubine (Hebrew pileges) was a female possession, with 
a lower social position to the main wife.  Sarai is still described as Hagar’s 
mistress even though Hagar has become a wife of Abram’s and her social 
position has improved.  Pregnant Hagar now feels contempt for her barren 
mistress (Genesis 16:4), reflecting the social significance of children, even 
though a handmaid was supposed to be subservient.  Hagar does not hand the 
resulting child, Ishmael, over to Sarai.  Due to the jealously and competition 
between the two women, Sarai deals harshly with and disowns Hagar, telling 
Abram that Hagar is in his hands (Genesis 16:6), and Hagar consequently runs 
away (Genesis 16:6), fleeing into the wilderness, where an angel of the Lord 
finds her.  Hagar is not condemned for her actions, but is told to return and 
submit to her mistress.  Both women only refer to the other woman by their 
respective positions.  The relationship between the two women deteriorates; as 
exemplified by Genesis 21, where Sarah is concerned at seeing the son of Hagar 
(she cannot even say his name) playing with Isaac.  Abraham was distressed 
with Sarah’s request to cast Hagar and his son Ishmael out.  
                                                 
14 Bilhah in Genesis 29:29, 30:4 and 7, is called a maid (NRSV), i.e. a slave girl (Hebrew 
shiphchah) and in Genesis 30:3 is called a maid (NRSV), i.e. a slave woman (Hebrew ‘amah). 
15 Zilpah in Genesis 29:24, 30:9, 10, 12, 18, is just referred to as maid (NRSV), i.e. slave girl 
(Hebrew shiphchah). 
16 In Genesis 16:1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and Genesis 25:12, Hagar is called a slave girl (NRSV; Hebrew  
shiphchah) in Genesis 21:10, 21:12-13, Hagar is called a slave woman (NRSV; Hebrew ‘amah) 
which can also mean concubine, which fits in with Hagar’s later status as Abram’s wife.  
17 The same word in Hebrew (‘ishshah) is used to describe Sarai, Hagar, Rachel, Bilhah and 
Zilpah as wives. 
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It was not only the Hebrew Scriptures that mention the use of concubines to 
relieve childlessness.  The ancient law code of Hammurabi, paragraph 146, a 
Nuzi text dated to 1792-1750 BC, warned that a slave girl ‘elevated’ by her 
mistress could ‘not claim equality with her mistress’.18  The wife was allowed to 
make the concubine’s child her own child and if the concubine tried to become 
equal to the wife she became a slave again, but could not be sold to others.19   
 
However, the biblical accounts involving Hagar, Zilpah and Bilhah should 
probably not be rendered as surrogacy, but as accounts of concubinage, 
slavery, polygamy and possible rape as indicated by Christine Overall who 
suggests the biblical ‘surrogates’ would have had sexual intercourse with their 
commissioning fathers, unlike most of today’s surrogates.20  Modern surrogates 
are not slaves compelled and coerced to participate in a marriage out of fear, 
with a lack of consent, little support or respect in a contemptuous jealousy-
ridden relationship.  Modern surrogates are usually free, independent women 
who consent to enter surrogacy, have support and counselling with the choice 
to be a genetic or gestational surrogate.  Usually commissioning mothers do 
not already have four children like Leah, who was motivated by jealousy at her 
sister Rachel, but most use surrogacy as a last resort to overcome infertility.   
 
Wider definitions and interpretations of pregnancy and mothering, with 
greater flexibility, creativity and dynamism are needed to reflect the pluralistic 
examples of the types, meanings and activities of mothering today.  For 
example, within society, we already use various terms to denote the varied 
                                                 
18 Ephraim Avigdor Speiser, Genesis: The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), 117-
18.  See also David Winton Thomas (ed.), Documents from Old Testament Times (New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1958), 32. 
19 Speiser, Genesis, 120. The code of Hammurabi paragraph 146 is seen as offering the closest 
parallel; as Genesis 16 is part of the tradition it cannot be tied to one particular text.  I am 
grateful to Professor Mary Callaway for assistance on this. 
20 Christine Overall, Human Reproduction: Principles, Practices, Policies (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 120. 
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types of mothering in existence.  We use the terms ‘natural mother’ to 
designate a woman who is genetically related to a child, ‘foster mother’ 
denotes a temporary mothering activity, ‘adoptive mother’ refers to a social 
mother, the term ‘stepmother’ signifies a social mother who is not genetically 
related to the child, and ‘grandmother’ relates to a senior mothering figure.  We 
also use the term ‘godmother’ to indicate a woman who has been selected by 
the family to act as a spiritual guardian and sometimes as a standby mother if 
the natural mother dies for example.  Titles are given to professionals involved 
in looking after children to denote very specifically their roles, functions, 
practices and relationship to the child: for example a wet nurse, a baby sitter, a 
nanny, an au pair, a nursery nurse, a child minder, a teacher, etc., who are 
usually granted the term in loco parentis to demonstrate their particular status.  
Such concepts can be used within surrogacy too, to denote the specific roles 
and functions of participants. 
 
As outlined in chapter one, surrogacy involves a genetic or a gestational 
surrogate, and usually a commissioning couple.  Questions can be asked as to 
who the ‘real’ mother is.  Some regard the commissioning mother as the 
mother; Laura Purdy, for example, regards the nurturing woman as the 
mother.21  Others see the ‘real’ mother as the gestator,22 whether she is a 
gestational surrogate or a genetic surrogate.  Others in a similar vein see the 
commissioning mother as the surrogate,23 i.e. a secondary substitute mother, 
instead of seeing the surrogate mother as the surrogate.  However, it should be 
noted that within this thesis, the term surrogate is used within its capacity to 
                                                 
21 Laura M. Purdy, ‘Another Look at Contract Pregnancy’, in idem. (ed.), Reproducing Persons: 
Issues in Feminist Bioethics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 198-215, at 200. 
22 Overall, Human Reproduction, 119.  Hilde Lindemann Nelson and James Lindemann Nelson, 
‘Cutting Motherhood in Two: Some Suspicions Concerning Surrogacy’, Hypatia 4 (1989), 85-94, 
at 86.   
23 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 216. 
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denote a woman who gives birth to a child on behalf of someone else and 
therefore ex hypothesi the commissioning mother cannot be the surrogate.   
 
The word ‘surrogate’ means ‘substitute’ and calling her a surrogate mother, 
implies that she is an alternative, non-‘real’ mother.  Usually it is perceived that 
there is an either/or, i.e. that either something is ‘real’ and authentic or it is not. 
However, the child’s ‘real’ mother could be one of many possible 
combinations; there is no need for a single meaning to be dominant.  
Motherhood can have a basis in biology, but motherhood does not have to be 
defined by biology alone.  Genes, gestation and nurturance do not have to 
belong together as they would in traditional concepts of motherhood.  It is 
possible to regard the genetic surrogate as a ‘real’ mother for providing the 
genes and a gestational surrogate as a ‘real’ mother for providing the 
gestational function and the commissioning mother as a ‘real’ mother for 
providing the nurturing role.  A child therefore does not have to have just one 
‘real’ mother, since the child could regard both women as her mother, as in 
adoption.  After all, both the surrogate and the commissioning mother are ‘real’ 
women who can act as ‘real’ mothers in their varying roles.  The surrogate can 
provide an authentic and ‘real’ mothering function to the foetus in her care, 
even if it is temporary, while she looks after and nurtures the foetus as she acts 
as a gestational mother for the commissioning couple.  Just because she is not 
expected to provide social nurture and mother the child after birth, does not 
mean that she is to be regarded as a substitute, since she provides a ‘real’ 
temporary mothering function and activity for the foetus in her care.   
 
However, the reasons given by the surrogates for the type of surrogacy they 
choose reflect their priorities regarding motherhood.  Anthropologist Heléna 
Ragoné found that surrogates do not see the child as theirs, but as belonging to 
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the commissioning couple.24  The typical surrogate decides her relationship to 
the child by separating the social and biological aspects of motherhood, 
preferring to call herself a surrogate and not a birth mother, in order to keep a 
distance from the child.25   
 
It is possible that the reason why surrogates do not regard themselves as 
mothers is due to the inadequacy of language to describe their role and 
function.  Instead, wider definitions of mothering could be used to reflect the 
various roles taking place.  A genetic surrogate could be renamed as a genetic-
gestatory mother.  A gestational surrogate could be called a non-genetic-
gestatory mother.  Commissioning mothers are the intentional mothers who, 
despite not undergoing pregnancy, want to be the socially nurturing mothers 
of the child.  They can be genetic-nurturing mothers or non-genetic nurturing 
mothers.  Research by Susan Golombok indicates that those, such as a 
commissioning couple, who go to extra lengths to have a child, for example by 
using AID or IVF, are very motivated parents, and their quality of parenting is 
often higher than comparable samples of those with children conceived by 
ordinary means.26  An egg donor may regard herself as an anonymous genetic 
mother.  New terms can be used; for example, one commissioning mother, 
whose biological sister was her genetic surrogate, used the word ‘mattie’ to 
combine the words mother and aunt to denote the ‘kinship term’ used by the 
child.27    
 
This section has shown some of the complexities surrounding the concept of 
motherhood.  The following sections aim to demonstrate how secular feminists, 
                                                 
24 Heléna Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 
126. 
25 Ibid., 8, 39 and 75-7. 
26 Susan Golombok et al., ‘Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies: Quality of 
Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of the Children’, Child Development 66 (1995), 
285-98.   
27 Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, 135. 
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religious feminists and Christianity have regarded motherhood.  The secular 
feminists to be analysed are Caroline Whitbeck, Sara Ruddick and Barbara Katz 
Rothman.  They have been selected as important and significant theorists who 
have written on motherhood, with varying emphases upon its biological, social 
and cultural aspects.  However, the practical implications of their mothering 
models lack the complexity to accommodate surrogacy, and the models are 
therefore inadequate and oversimplified.   
 
2.3 Caroline Whitbeck 
 
2.3.1 Caroline Whitbeck’s Biological Model of Mothering 
 
Feminist philosopher Caroline Whitbeck places the focus very firmly upon the 
gestational and biological dimensions of mothering as her main emphasis.  
Only later, as a minor note, is she aware of criticisms that she has been over 
essentialist.  In light of not wanting to appear essentialist, she also brings the 
social and cultural aspects of mothering out too.  In order to shake off 
essentialist criticisms she is also open to suggestions that men can mother too,28 
but her main emphasis in mothering is that of biology and gestation (266).29  
Whitbeck focuses on the biological differences of women and their conscious 
biological experiences such as labour, childbirth, lactation, which affect how 
women relate to their babies compared to men’s relationship with their babies.  
Whitbeck believes that the biological experience of motherhood is primarily 
significant, as women have had a nine-month investment in the child.  She 
believes that women’s uniquely physical bodily pregnancy experiences ‘are 
likely to enhance those feelings, attitudes, and fantasies which induce people 
                                                 
28 Caroline Whitbeck, ‘Feminist Ontology: A Different Reality’, in Carol C. Gould, (ed.), Beyond 
Domination: New Perspectives in Women and Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 
1983), 64-88, at 74. 
29 Numbers in brackets refer to Caroline Whitbeck, ‘The Maternal Instinct’, The Philosophical Forum 
6 (1974/1975), 265-73.   
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generally to care for their infants’ (272).  Such experiences are regarded as 
being ‘the same cross-culturally’ (271-2).  Whitbeck is usually regarded as a 
maternal feminist of the feminine school of thought, which tends to focus upon 
the unique aspects of women in a positive light such as their different 
embodied experiences.  Such a view differs from liberal feminists who tend to 
call for women to be equal to men and thus play down any differences between 
men and women as essentialist for leading to stereotypes for women’s 
behaviour. 
 
However, in order to qualify her main views, she admits that physical 
pregnancy experiences may not create a maternal instinct, since hormones may 
not result in maternal behaviour (271-2).  Men are encouraged to mother too.  
She acknowledges that not all women choose to mother.  Recognition is given 
that maternal behaviour can depend on experience, and parental affection can 
include feelings towards the child after the birth (268).  She also admits the 
influence of socialisation in affecting the difference between men and women 
in the attachment to their children (266). 
 
2.3.2 Critique of Caroline Whitbeck’s Biological Mothering Model  
 
Despite some good points regarding mothering, Whitbeck lacks a fully 
developed conceptual theory of motherhood.  She believes that women’s 
pregnancy experiences are the same cross-culturally.  However, not all women 
will experience or will want to experience pregnancy in the same manner.  
Whitbeck’s mothering focuses on the biological gestational aspects, but this 
seems to overlook the complexity and flexibility of maternal relations, which 
do not all come under the biological experiences of pregnancy.  Whitbeck 
ignores the importance of genes as an aspect of the biological contribution to 
motherhood; therefore in a surrogacy custody clash, she might favour a 
110 
 
gestational mother over a genetic commissioning mother due to biological 
experiences of pregnancy.  She comments that the pregnant mother has a 
greater investment due to the nine months involved (271-2).  Lesbian mothers 
or adoptive mothers may feel as though their relationship with their child is 
lacking for not undergoing the biological experience of a pregnancy.  
 
2.4 Sara Ruddick 
 
2.4.1 Sara Ruddick’s Nurturing Social Model of Mothering 
 
The feminist philosopher Sara Ruddick limits mothering to a social practice 
based upon nurturing the child after birth.  Ruddick outlines a care-based 
‘maternal thinking’, centred on an attentive love, and the virtues of empathy, 
humility and cheerfulness, which evolve from meeting the demands of the 
child.  Such demands from the child include, firstly, preservative love: to 
preserve the child’s life, which she believes mothers find natural to protect and 
foster their child’s growth.30  Secondly, it involves growth, which helps the 
child grow emotionally and physically.  And thirdly, it encompasses the social 
acceptability of the child, which is met by ‘preservative love, nurturance and 
training’ (17).31  She admits that ‘*m+any women and some men express 
maternal thinking in various kinds of working and caring with others’.32  
Ruddick regards the maternal as ‘a social category’,33 which can include men 
and adoptive or step mothers, who are not to be regarded as less qualified for 
not giving birth, since giving birth is not regarded as sufficient to do maternal 
                                                 
30 Sara Ruddick, ‘Maternal Thinking’, in Trebilcot, Mothering, 213-30, at 216 and 218.  See also 
Sara Ruddick, ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction: Some Reflections on Mothering and 
Peace’, in Trebilcot, Mothering, 231-62, at 260 n. 12, she regards ‘preservative love’ as an activity 
caring for children, informed by interest in ‘preservation, growth, and acceptability’. 
31 Numbers in brackets refer to Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace 
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1989).  
32 Ruddick, ‘Maternal Thinking’, 225. 
33 Ibid., 225.  
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work or to do it effectively.  Ruddick acknowledges that some parts of 
maternal thinking come from the mother’s biological make up and 
experience.34  She downplays the significance of pregnancy and birth saying 
they are not ‘much like mothering’ (50).  She does not think that women can 
apply maternal tasks directly to the foetus while pregnant, but only to the 
future baby, such as making clothes or buying a crib. 
 
Ruddick would more than likely be classified as a social feminist for wanting to 
concentrate upon the social practice of mothering as an activity which comes 
from experiencing nurturing.  She draws away from emphasising the biological 
aspects of mothering, to prevent women being expected to mother just by 
being women and having a female body.  In order to include men as mothers, 
unlike Whitbeck, she downplays the significance of pregnancy and birth and 
focuses upon the social activity, which can lead to maternal thinking in other 
areas such as politics. 
 
2.4.2 Critique of Sara Ruddick’s Social Mothering Model 
 
Ruddick’s theory of motherhood and maternal thinking seems to demonstrate 
complexity, allowing for experience and interaction with children to influence 
her concept of motherhood.  However, the practical implications and her 
conclusions are inconsistent with her theory of motherhood: four difficulties 
will be discussed.   
 
Firstly, Ruddick, with her theory of maternal thinking, stresses mothering as a 
natural activity coming from meeting the ongoing practical needs of the child.  
However, the ability to perform some aspect of mothering does not have to 
come as the consequence of long-term maternal care, but can come instantly 
                                                 
34 Ruddick, ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction’, 235. 
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and intuitively from an innate drive or socialization or by being with a child 
and automatically being able to respond to their immediate needs.  A childless 
person for example could demonstrate mothering qualities by playing a game 
like ‘peek-a-boo’ with a stranger’s child they meet on public transport, possibly 
echoing the maternal care shown to them as a child. 
 
Secondly, it could be suggested that Ruddick idealises mothers, because her 
expectations of them are too high, making her impractical and unrealistic.   
Margaret Simons believes Ruddick’s ‘moral virtues’ suggest ‘sentimentalized 
motherhood’.35  Ruddick, for example encourages cheerfulness for mothers, 
despite life’s conditions,36 and expects that humility and cheerfulness will 
emerge from the practice of mothering.37  However, for some women the sense 
of constantly feeling pressurised by extremely demanding children or the 
caring for a child with a terminal illness may militate against the developing of 
positive maternal attitudes.  Ruddick admits: ‘[w]hat we are pleased to call 
‚mother love‛ is intermixed with hate, sorrow, impatience, resentment and 
despair; thought-provoking ambivalence is a hallmark of mothering’ (68).   
 
Thirdly, it can be suggested that in order to detract from the biological 
emphasis of motherhood and claims of essentialism, she states that mothering 
begins after birth.  She can be seen as being inconsistent for stating that 
mothering is not involved in pregnancy or birthing labour (50 and 197).  
Ruddick sees pregnancy, birth and lactation as ‘different in kind from other 
maternal work’ (48) and she distinguishes birth from mothering (193).  Ruddick 
believes pregnant women can adopt a maternal attitude to a foetus and engage 
in projective maternal tasks, but such tasks are not seen as relating to the foetus 
but to the future child.  However, Ruddick fails to realise that women while 
                                                 
35 Margaret A. Simons, ‘Motherhood, Feminism and Identity’, Women’s Studies International 
Forum 7 (1984), 349-59, at 353. 
36 Ruddick, ‘Maternal Thinking’, 218. 
37 Ibid., 214 and 218. 
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pregnant can choose to socially mother their foetuses as a choice, for example, 
talking to the foetus, stroking her abdomen, playing it music.  A pregnant 
woman could deliberately want to engage in the activities of Ruddick’s 
maternal practice such as preserving the child’s life by eating additional 
vitamins especially for the benefit of the foetus and not herself, protecting the 
foetus from harm, for example, by not drinking.  She may want to help the 
child grow physically and emotionally by exercising, talking to it, playing it 
music, interacting with it – all of which could be regarded as direct mothering 
activities if done outside of the womb.  After all, Ruddick describes a mother as 
someone who fulfils the child-care needs of preservation, growth and social 
acceptability (50-1).  Therefore, a woman can actively mother a foetus while 
pregnant and a father could mother the foetus too as well as an adoptive 
mother or a commissioning mother.  Otherwise, those who have had 
miscarriages would be expected not to feel maternal bereavement at the loss of 
the foetus.  A woman who intends to have her child adopted, may feel 
disgruntled that Ruddick undervalues her contribution to the child’s 
development by not regarding her caring activities for the foetus as her time of 
mothering in the child’s life.   
 
Fourthly, maternal thinking would seem to be inappropriate for the 
collaborative practice of surrogacy involving the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple.  Surrogacy is usually a shared birth experience and 
practice with planning and involvement.  A commissioning couple could sense 
that they are being denied the opportunity to feel as though they are 
procreating with their surrogate together as a whole unit.  Ruddick suggests 
that the birth giver should be respected, as a mother is inclined to ‘ask certain 
questions - those relevant to her aims [emphasis added] – rather than others’ 
(24).  Even though Ruddick does not refer directly to surrogacy, she could be 
interpreted as indicating that only the surrogate’s interests matter and they are 
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to take priority over the commissioning couple.  Her maternal practice model is 
based upon partiality of allowing ‘a legitimate special concern for the children 
one has engendered’38 which will have an impact upon how motherhood and 
possibly surrogacy is practiced.  Even though Ruddick respects the individual 
wishes of a birth mother to hand the child over to an adoptive mother, care is 
needed to ensure that both the needs of the commissioning couple as the 
intentional and in some cases genetic parents should be consulted and included 
too, as well as the surrogate within a custody dispute.  A gestational surrogate 
should also be allowed some acknowledgement, as one of the child’s mothers 
even though she has not ‘engendered’ the child herself.   
 
2.5 Barbara Katz Rothman 
 
2.5.1 Barbara Katz Rothman’s Gestational and Birth Model of Mothering 
 
Radical feminist Barbara Katz Rothman believes that the act of gestation and 
birth determines the child’s mother and not the child’s genetic connection.  All 
three secular feminists, Whitbeck, Ruddick and Rothman downplay the genetic 
dimension of motherhood favouring their own aspects instead of seeing genes 
as an equally significant part.  Whitbeck ignored the importance of genes for 
motherhood focusing on the mother’s biological experiences such as gestation 
and childbirth.  Ruddick in Maternal Thinking does not refer to the word ‘genes’ 
and only uses the word genetic three times, twice to refer to the connection 
between a grandmother and their grandchild in context of the ‘Abuelas’, the 
grandmothers of the ‘disappeared’ children of Argentina.39  Instead Ruddick 
focuses on the social practice of mothering as a nurturing model and not the 
genetic connection.  Rothman also downplays the genetic dimension, possibly 
                                                 
38 Ruddick, ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction’, 239. 
39 Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 54 and 228.  The word ‘genetic’ is mentioned on p. 154, referring 
to women’s genetic makeup. 
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because she is aware of adoptive parenting, having adopted children herself (4 
and 7).40  She values ‘nurturance and caring relationships more than genetic 
ties’ (22).  It is possible that she wants to prevent motherhood being regarded 
like fatherhood as just a progenitive procedure (20-3).  Rothman is similar to 
Whitbeck in emphasising the gestational and biological elements of mothering.  
However, like Ruddick, Rothman tends to focus more on the social aspects of 
mothering such as nurturing, whereas Whitbeck focused more on female 
biological features such as lactation, with the social dimensions added later.   
 
Motherhood for Rothman is based upon nurturance, love, care and a social 
relationship, along with the ‘intimate connections’ with the baby, its 
movements during pregnancy and giving birth (20).  The child automatically 
belongs to the birth mother (109), giving all gestational mothers parental 
custody rights and responsibilities of motherhood, regardless of the foetus’s 
origin.  She regards a genetic father who does not nurture as not being a father.  
However, she admits genes should be recognised and appreciated, though not 
as ‘the determining connection’ (22), since she regards parenthood as ‘a social 
relationship, not a genetic connection’ (82).  She sees motherhood as a chosen 
activity, which can be shared with others, including men (10); as an experience, 
set of values, and a discipline; as work, as an activity and project learnt by 
practice; and as influencing life in the world.  She admits children can have 
both a birth mother and a social mother (83).   
 
Mothering is seen to include intimate care to create competent community 
members, involving feeding, tending and care as well as other ‘social and 
psychological and physical tasks’ (24).  Motherhood for Rothman is a feeling of 
identity, capacity for empathy, as well as an experience of the body and mind.  
Pregnant women can establish nurturing and caring relationships to the foetus, 
                                                 
40 Numbers in brackets refer to Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2nd ed., 2000). 
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which can also be demonstrated by men to the foetus.  Pregnancy therefore is a 
social and emotional relationship, not just physical.  Mothers are not just the 
birth mother, since loving men and other women such as adoptive mothers, 
foster mothers and hired mothers can be engaged in the discipline and 
activities of motherhood, giving warmth, care, love and nurturance to children 
(169).  She approves of relationships involving joint parenting where mothers 
without a spouse can act as a legal co-parent without having given birth.  
Rothman suggests those who have acted as child-care workers should be given 
visitation rights to the child because they have given ‘prolonged personal care’ 
(204).  She admits that: ‘*o+pen adoption and egalitarian relationships in 
surrogacy face tremendous and very similar obstacles’ ‘placed by definitions of 
‚family‛ which permit one and only one mother per child and obstacles of 
class that make cross-class ‚egalitarian‛ relationships profoundly challenging’ 
(166).   
 
In parenting she emphasises the social and interpersonal relations established 
between parents and children based on love, nurturing and care instead of 
ownership and the physical biological characteristics of genetic kinship within 
patriarchal families (169-70).  Rothman believes her ‘value system’ places ‘the 
woman, her experiences and her relationships, at the very heart of my 
understanding of all pregnancies’41 and consequently rejects mothering models 
based on genetic ownership or preconception intentional agreements.  
Rothman therefore believes, ‘*t+here is no such thing *as surrogacy+ under this 
system’ (202).  She believes surrogates are regarded as substitutes, who devalue 
pregnancy and birth and diminish women (164 and 167).   
 
2.5.2 Critique of Barbara Katz Rothman’s Gestational Mothering Model 
 
                                                 
41 Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchical Society 
(Ontario: Penguin Books Canada, 1st ed., 1989), 243. 
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Rothman defines motherhood as determined by gestation and birth, but 
downplays motherhood based on genetic connection.  For Rothman biological 
motherhood is a relationship in which the mother engages in a social 
interaction with her foetus during the pregnancy.  She admits that women can 
‘create bonds between the foetus’ and others who ask to feel the baby’s kicks 
(67).   
 
With surrogacy she believes the surrogate is the ‘obvious’ mother, due to her 
biological experiences of pregnancy (167).  She states:  
 
[e]very woman bears her own baby.  I believe that is true regardless of the source of 
the sperm, and regardless also of the source of the egg (171).   
 
She adds: ‘*f+urther, accepting a baby is a gift from its mother, regardless of the 
source of the egg and the sperm, is a form of adoption’ (168; italics original).  The 
commissioning mother who despite having had a social and nurturing 
relationship with a developing foetus, all features which Rothman equates with 
motherhood, and despite being possibly genetically related and intentionally 
wanting to mother the child, is not considered to be a mother.  Therefore, with 
surrogacy, she regards the commissioning couple as donors, with the surrogate 
as the mother, expecting her child (162 and 167).   
 
Despite supporting open adoption and joint parenting and despite suggesting 
the adoption model can be applied to surrogacy, she is extremely reluctant to 
articulate the possible details; for example, she does not state that the 
commissioning mother or the surrogate could be regarded as a social mother, 
within a collaborative co-parenting model.  This is despite her belief that in the 
best circumstances, the significance of the birth mother and the social mother 
can be acknowledged based on the sharing involved (46).  In connection with 
adoption, she states: ‘[t]hat someone else is mother to her child does not erase 
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the birth mother as a mother: the motherhood of one woman does not cancel 
out the motherhood of the other’ (83).  Logically, Rothman could allow both the 
surrogate and the commissioning mother to be acknowledged at the same time, 
due to their genetic, birthing and nurturing relationships to the child regardless 
whether the surrogate keeps the child or not.  Such an oversight on her part 
towards surrogacy reflects a failure to be logically consistent, since she is 
willing and happy to accept a social mother in the case of adoption but hesitant 
to do so in the case of surrogacy.   
 
An alternative model would allow both mothers to play a role in the child’s life, 
without custody battles and without the commissioning mother’s maternal 
status being dependent upon the surrogate relinquishing the child over to her, 
especially when she already has a relationship to the child.   
 
Rothman generally supports radical feminist values for society as including, ‘a 
sense of organic wholeness, roundness, interconnectedness’.42  These values are 
echoed by Alison Jaggar, who indicates that radical feminists support values of: 
 
emotional expressiveness, gentleness, sensitivity to the feelings of others, closeness to 
nature, flexibility rather than rigidity, a distrust of abstract principles, the acceptance of 
all bodily functions and an acknowledgement of their capacity to bring pleasure.43   
 
Despite the importance of such values in radical feminism, Rothman believes 
that within pregnancy women have, ‘full rights of personal privacy, bodily 
autonomy, and individualist decision making in pregnancy’.44  Such a 
perspective of Rothman’s reflects more individualist liberal views than the 
interdependency of some radical feminists.  Therefore, within Rothman’s value 
                                                 
42 Rothman, Recreating Motherhood, (1989), 253.  
43 Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
1983), 251. 
44 Rothman, Recreating Motherhood, (1989), 258. 
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system elements of radical feminism’s interconnectedness, co-operation, 
wholeness and sensuality to the feelings of others exist alongside elements of 
liberal feminism including the full right of personal privacy and bodily 
autonomy.  Usually the two sets of values co-exist, but within surrogacy an 
overemphasis upon liberal feminist values such as individual privacy could 
cause problems.  A liberal approach to surrogacy could prevent a collaborative 
approach to surrogacy pregnancy management, embodiment and the bodily 
integrity of the surrogate, as well as custody solutions involving the surrogate 
and the commissioning couple instead of just the surrogate.  Therefore, by 
taking the individualist approach that the surrogate is the child’s only real 
mother she is denying the collaborative social approach suggested by her 
mothering model, which logically should at least acknowledge the 
commissioning mother as a social mother. 
 
Therefore, despite seeing parenthood as a social relationship, the practical 
application and implications of her own model of motherhood falsely limits and 
oversimplifies the complexity of motherhood, by denying various aspects 
involved: for example, intention, genes and social care.  By focusing upon 
gestation as her prime criterion of motherhood, she fails to consider that the 
qualities of nurturance and care within her value system can be demonstrated 
by surrogates towards their pregnancies, but on behalf of another.  Also the 
commissioning mothers could demonstrate and continue the nurturance and 
care of the foetus/child during and after the birth.  By regarding the surrogate as 
the child’s only mother and by ignoring the importance of a genetic connection 
to those involved in the surrogacy arrangement, it denies the commissioning 
mother the opportunity to claim motherhood.  She is critical of men who claim 
fatherhood by genetic connection alone, but she adopts another exclusive 
position for motherhood, but based on gestation.  The conclusions she draws 
regarding surrogacy fail to allow for her social values of nurturance, love and 
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care to exist between the commissioning mother and the child and between the 
commissioning couple and the surrogate.  Instead, according to negotiations, 
both the surrogate and the commissioning mother should be acknowledged as 
different types of mothers.  The women can be acknowledged for their different 
gestational, genetic, and social mothering roles in the child’s life, regardless of 
whether the surrogate keeps the child or not.  
 
2.6 Evaluation of the Secular Feminists  
 
2.6.1 Positive Points of the Secular Feminists 
 
Despite criticisms of these secular feminists, some positive aspects of their 
views on mothering can be made.  Whitbeck is right to bring out the unique 
experiences of mothering that women are able to offer.  She focuses upon the 
biological experiences of mothering such as pregnancy, childbirth and lactation 
(266).  The physical aspects of pregnancy are highlighted, which she believes 
are able to increase the feelings of care from a woman towards the child (266, 
269 and 272).   
 
Ruddick does well to bring in aspects of social care for a child into her 
mothering.  She highlights the virtues and philosophy of mothering which 
from the practice of nurturing a child including preservative love and training 
(17).  Such an attitude is able to focus upon the needs of the child to ensure that 
they flourish in their well-being. 
 
Rothman is right to focus upon the importance of gestation and birth for 
women as mothers, and for their relationship to the child, which of course are 
important features of mothering (20).  She is also right to focus upon aspects of 
love and care involved in nurturing a child.  Love and care are important for 
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the child’s well-being, which can be performed by others too (169).  Unlike 
Ruddick, she acknowledges that women are able to be mothers while pregnant 
(155). 
 
2.6.2 Where the Secular Feminists Agree with Each Other 
 
Whitbeck and Ruddick admit that both men and women can mother.  All three 
feminists agree on the importance of biology for motherhood, without 
emphasising the use of hormones by concentrating on gestation and the act of 
birth.  They also highlight the importance of the social aspects of mothering, 
albeit usually after the birth.  All of the feminists want to highlight women’s 
unique experiences of mothering and acknowledge that the biological 
experiences of pregnancy for women can contribute to their mothering either 
during the pregnancy or later.  They tend not to concentrate upon the 
importance of genes for mothering, possibly wanting to move away from the 
patriarchal connotations of owning a child due to genetic connection only.  
Unfortunately, they also agree on failing to allow motherhood to operate in a 
flexible, pluralistic and diverse system where different aspects of mothering 
can be acknowledged and work together with varying emphasis upon the 
diverse types such as a gestational mother, a genetic mother or a social mother 
such as in surrogacy.   
 
2.6.3 Where the Secular Feminists Disagree with Each Other 
 
There are also differences within these writings towards motherhood.  
Whitbeck focuses upon the biological experience of pregnant women for 
mothering, but tends to downplay the genetic aspects.  In contrast, Ruddick 
focuses more upon the social aspects of mothering after birth and turns 
mothering into a pragmatic philosophy resulting from the practical nurturing 
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of a child.  One of Ruddick’s weaknesses is that she does not include the 
possibility of a pregnant woman being able to mother her own child, since she 
focuses upon mothering as the nurturance of a child once it is born.  Her 
mothering view is also very child-centric, as mothers are expected to meet the 
needs of the child, however, the mother’s needs matter too.  She also focuses 
upon an idealisation of motherhood and tends to regard mothering as natural.  
The feminists unfortunately tend not to give a comprehensive view of 
surrogacy, and fail to take different cultural forms of motherhood into account.  
Rothman seems to contradict her logic regarding her acceptance of birth 
mothers and other mothers in adoption but not allowing the same for 
surrogacy (46).   
 
2.6.4 Critique of the Secular Feminists  
 
The concepts of motherhood in Whitbeck, Ruddick and Rothman lack a 
comprehensive and nuanced view of mothering.  They fail to realise that 
mothering is a complex, pluralistic concept, made up of differing components 
including genetic contribution, gestation, social care while pregnant, and 
lactation and nurturance after birth.  Often they ignore different aspects and 
experiences of mothering by focusing upon one aspect of mothering at the 
expense of another.  Whitbeck focuses too much upon the gestational aspects of 
mothering and ignores the genes.  Ruddick concentrates on the nurturing parts 
of mothering after birth and ignores the mothering done during pregnancy. 
Rothman highlights gestation and nurturance but again downplays a genetic 
connection.   
 
Their understanding of motherhood lacks a dynamic interaction between the 
differing components of mothering, failing to see an equal worth between 
different types of mothering.  They ignore the possibility of an interaction or 
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relational spectrum between mothers in order to give a wide pluralistic 
understanding of mothering.  At times, their views of motherhood are 
romanticised and idealistic.  The practical implications of their mothering 
models lack the complexity to accommodate surrogacy, and the models are 
therefore inadequate and oversimplified.  Since they restrict their 
understanding of motherhood, it is not open to different types of motherhood 
working together within a relational framework.  Therefore, they are unable to 
accommodate surrogacy as part of their understanding of mothering.   
 
One of the problems of the secular feminists is that none of them takes a 
holistic approach towards mothering and each of them tends to be one sided.  
It could be an accident of the secular feminist scholars I happen to have chosen.  
However, it could be due to the way secular philosophy is based around 
winning arguments by making clear and direct points with one particular 
view, thus leading to a one-sided emphasis.  Such an approach could be the 
reason why the secular feminists tend to be less rounded in their view on 
mothering, because they want to make an original point and belong to one 
school of thought, without being influenced by others in order to make their 
point stronger.  Such a methodology could be due to modern philosophy’s 
tendency to engage in dualistic rhetorical discussions where one side is 
expected to defeat the other to claim a victory. 
 
Therefore for a practice such as surrogacy to work, an alternative framework is 
required which allows for the working together of a gestational, a genetic and a 
social mother with interdependence, mutuality and individualism.  We need to 
ensure that a multidimensional view of motherhood is possible with various 
emphases upon the different aspects of mothering, which can on some 
occasions come together in one person and can, on others, be performed by 
different people in an interdependent framework. 
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2.7 Christian Feminists  
 
2.7.1 How the Christian Feminists Differ from the Secular Feminists 
 
Having explored three major secular feminists on motherhood and 
demonstrated the lack of a comprehensive view of mothering, our attention 
now turns to the work of two Christian feminists who have written on 
motherhood and the family.  Unlike the secular feminists, the Christian 
feminists of Protestant Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Roman Catholic 
Rosemary Radford Ruether regard mothering as a complex and comprehensive 
concept, allowing for both a biological (gestation and genes) and social input.  
Their understanding of mothering is not limited to just one aspect of mothering 
such as gestation or social mothering after the birth.  They recognise the roles 
both men and women can take in creating and nurturing a child.  Both are keen 
to relate to women’s mothering experiences and to ensure their well-being is 
respected as well as the child’s, without insisting on compulsory self-sacrifice.  
They realise that mothering can occur in diverse and different ways in different 
women, without taking a universal model of the mothering role.  They take a 
more realist view, instead of an idealised and romantic view.  Motherhood for 
the Christian feminists is practiced in a framework involving mutuality, 
interdependence and justice within diverse and pluralistic relationships.  They 
are more open to negotiation and dialogue towards a better understanding of 
motherhood.  The varying roles of mothering are more likely to be 
acknowledged and treated equally, due to their egalitarian emphasis, instead 
of one aspect of mothering being seen as superior to another.  The motherhood 
of both Miller-McLemore and Ruether will now be discussed along with their 
theological influences. 
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2.7.2 Theology and Mothering in Bonnie Miller-McLemore  
 
Protestant theologian Bonnie Miller-McLemore criticises theology for ignoring 
mothers and their experiences.  She considers the Christian ideal of mothers as 
self-sacrificing, which has been promoted by Church tradition and society, to 
be destructive for women and to misinterpret God’s intention in creation and 
the promises of the gospel (20-3).45  Likewise, she believes that mothers who 
engage in self-sacrifice for their children can endanger mothering since 
children do not benefit from it (162).  She believes religion has told ‘old lies 
about motherhood’46 and even though feminist theologians use maternal 
imagery and language for God, she criticises them for neglecting families and 
motherhood, as they have not learnt about theology from this view.47  She 
acknowledges that feminist theologians reject patriarchal families for the 
‘oppressive, unjust relations’ and ‘stereotypical gender roles’, but admits that 
alternative family models or motherhood roles have tended to be ignored (85).  
Miller-McLemore believes that few theologians have considered the effects of 
mothering upon theology and calls for feminist theology to include mothers’ 
discourse as part of its social context, method and content (94).  She wants 
feminist theologians to define the ‘ambiguities of good mothering’ and to 
elaborate ‘new constructive ideals and future possibilities’.48   
 
In order to ensure that the family and work are not divided by gender, Miller-
McLemore develops a feminist maternal theology, which is based on maternal 
experience, knowledge and embodiment such as the pregnant body (20, 104 
and 147).  Her Protestant theological background leads her to seeing 
                                                 
45 Numbers in brackets refer to Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, Also a Mother: Work and Family as 
Theological Dilemma (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1994). 
46 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, ‘Ideals and Realities of Motherhood: A Theological Perspective’, 
in Julia E. Hanigsberg, and Sara Ruddick (eds.), Mother Troubles: Rethinking Contemporary 
Maternal Dilemmas (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999), 281-303, at 282. 
47 Ibid., 287. 
48 Ibid., 288. 
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motherhood as a vocation, with children as a gift and blessing of God (37).  
Miller-McLemore wants to reconnect mothering and the family.  
Philosophically, she sees the self and reality as connected instead of separate, 
while theologically she regards motherhood as ‘social and relational’ in a social 
context of supportive relationships.49  Miller-McLemore acknowledges 
differences between idealism and realism in Christianity regarding the family.50  
She acknowledges that religious ideals can shape mothering, and believes 
alternative ideals in Christianity can shape culture and families into new 
directions.  She wants to remove patriarchy from motherhood and create good 
institutions of ‘family, marriage, partnership and motherhood’ so that ‘the 
good of mothers’ and others are secured.51  Women’s salvation is not regarded 
as dependent on motherhood (cf. 1 Timothy) but on divine grace (151).  
Churches are to reinterpret biblical passages and Church practice to prevent 
oppressive gender relationships or family relations, with more attention to 
justice and care (191).  She calls for the values of caring labour to be for men 
and women (20).   
 
Mutuality is a key concept for Miller-McLemore for her understanding of the 
family in Christianity.  She uses the creation stories of Genesis 1-3 to show 
equality between men and women because women are created in God’s image 
(139-41), which she uses to support her mutual and relational understanding of 
the family (141 and 186).  Sexual difference is not to reflect inequality and 
subordination, but is part of the goodness of creation in Genesis 1:31 and is part 
of human beings’ relationality (140).  Women are regarded as equal to men, but 
different too (82).  She is pleased that feminist theology highlights the self-
worth of women created in God’s image (104).  Miller-McLemore also 
considers that mutuality is found in the Trinity with a ‘relational godhead’, 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 283. 
50 Ibid., 295. 
51 Ibid., 299. 
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since God is three-in-one in wanting relationships with human beings.52  She 
believes that early Christian families supported mutuality.  She considers that 
the household codes in the New Testament, which set out the rules of family 
relationships, should be reinterpreted in order to have mutuality in marriage.  
Mutuality is regarded as ‘a transformative Christian ideal with potentially 
more dramatic consequences for families than sacrificial love’.53  
 
She sees church congregations today as helping to develop parental 
inclinations in broad circles of caring labour, alongside mutuality (189).  
Therefore, she wants to ensure that the Church is able to affirm parenting as 
‘an act of faith’ and as a type of ‘ministry of service’ (189).  She regards 
mutuality as an emotional, ethical and religious idea dealing with ‘self-giving 
love and social justice’.54  She realises that mutuality in parenting can be 
difficult.  Miller-McLemore uses the concept of ‘generativity’ proposed by 
psychologist Erik Erikson, which is influenced by the Golden Rule and is seen 
as enhancing the mutuality of the self and the other (21 and 50).  Generativity 
focuses upon a life cycle of interaction with others, where mutual acts between 
the self and the other enhance each other (50).  She sees the theological concepts 
of grace, justice and love as part of human generativity (151) and sees 
generativity as involving all adults caring for children, which have been 
generated (49).  Miller-McLemore links generativity theologically to ‘creation, 
procreation, vocation, and redemption’ (22).   
 
Miller-McLemore wants to ensure that theology listens to a mother’s thoughts, 
feelings and desires.  She wants theology to understand nurturing, mutuality, 
the gift of life and the creation of personhood (40).  Theology is to include 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 297. 
53 Ibid., 296. 
54 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, ‘Family and Work: Can Anyone ‚Have it All‛?’, in Anne Carr, 
and Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, (eds.), Religion, Feminism, and the Family (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 275-93, at 287.  
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mothers’ experiences in relation to creation, procreation, vocation, salvation 
and redemption (22-3), in order to give theological reflection on human 
fulfilment (91-2).  Therefore theology needs to speak with women’s maternal 
experiences so women can evaluate birth, caring labour and childcare (105).   
 
Miller-McLemore draws upon the maternal work of Ruddick and relates it to a 
theological understanding.  Ruddick believes that by maternal practice, 
mothers gain ‘a discipline of maternal thought’ involving preservation, growth, 
and acceptability of their children (157).  These help the mother to ensure that 
the mother actively caters for the child’s physical and psychological needs,55 
therefore the child can grow physically, emotionally and intellectually so that 
the child is accepted by others and becomes an adult ‘she can appreciate’.56 
Ruddick’s maternal thought is considered to be similar to the theological 
concepts of creation and care, found in the Bible and tradition, which Ruddick 
does not suggest.  Such religious virtues for Miller-McLemore include: 
 
the priority of holding over acquiring; humility and a profound sense of one’s limits; 
humor and resilient cheerfulness amid the realities of life; respect for persons; 
responsiveness to growth; and ultimately, the capacity for what Ruddick calls 
‚attentive love‛ (157).   
 
Ruddick calls this an exercise in ‘keeping over acquiring, of conserving the 
fragile, of maintaining whatever is at hand and necessary to the child’s life’ 
(157-8), which Miller-McLemore sees as a divine love for creation, especially for 
the child (157-8).   
 
Miller-McLemore regards the term ‘mother’ as referring to the ‘physiological 
processes of conception and birth’ (172) and regards pregnancy as a ‘bio-
                                                 
55 Ruddick, ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction’, 240. 
56 Ruddick, ‘Maternal Thinking’, 215.   
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cultural matrix’ (132).  She acknowledges that mothering includes women’s 
biological processes of conception, gestation, birth and lactation, and realises 
that these unique female embodied experiences can reflect a particular 
perspective and lead to ways of knowing and thinking, (but without 
universalism) (135) since they can give women a ‘heightened maternal 
investment’ (143).  However, she does not regard mothering as just biological 
destiny (48), since freedom plays a part (135).  She regards biology as 
secondary (151): the mother’s biological investment with the child should not 
prevent both men and women being involved in nurturing and caring 
childcare (144).  Female biology is not seen as automatically leading to an 
effective nurturing mother (150).   
 
Mothering is seen as complex and not as one universal essentialist form for all 
women (135-6).  She also acknowledges caring labour as part of motherhood 
and believes that the values of caring labour are for men and women, which 
can include:  
 
dressing, nursing, feeding, cleaning, wiping, brushing, guarding, protecting, 
reprimanding, teaching, watching, following, listening, mediating, responding, and 
anointing the head of a child (158).  
 
She calls for mothers to support each other (20).  Community responsibility 
from other relatives, neighbours, parents, friends and other adults is advocated 
to help women in their obligations to raise children (170).  She regards the 
actions and thoughts of mothering as unique and suggests mothering can lead 
to ethical reasoning, including an awareness of self and other (158).   
 
Miller-McLemore focuses on mutuality, self-respect, interdependence, shared 
responsibility and social justice (14) instead of destructive self-sacrifice for 
mothers and a romanticised portrayal of mothers (137).  She favours the 
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experience of mothers over the demands of agape as self-sacrifice (104-5).  She 
wants to ensure the well-being of all women and children.  Therefore, she 
advocates a realist view of ‘good enough’ mothering (190).  She favours 
‘egalitarian parenting’ in diverse family forms.57  Miller-McLemore wants a 
new motherhood, new fatherhood and new families.  Men are encouraged to 
share parenting too with ‘mutuality and partnership’58 and to attain an 
attachment to their child (144).  She wants to see liberation, justice and equality 
in the family with generativity, fulfilment and flourishing (105).  Institutions 
are called to acknowledge the experience of complex motherhood and of 
diverse families to enhance the common good.59  Miller-McLemore believes 
that surrogacy ‘involves heavy burdens upon the woman and is less a 
substitution than a shared labor’ (54).  However, she does not discuss what 
those heavy burdens might be, how surrogacy can be a shared labour between 
two mothers - the surrogate and the commissioning mother - or how surrogacy 
could be performed relationally.   
 
2.7.3 Mothering and Theology in Rosemary Radford Ruether 
 
Roman Catholic theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether uses a modern 
Christian egalitarian theology, similar to Luther, which acknowledges women 
as originally created equally in God’s image.60  Woman’s subjection is seen as 
God’s punishment for her sin in the Fall, but has since been removed by 
Christ’s redemption, giving women equality with men.  Ruether supports a 
feminist anthropology by citing Galatians 3:28 (‘in Christ there is neither male 
                                                 
57 Miller-McLemore, ‘Ideals and Realities of Motherhood’, 288. 
58 Don S. Browning et al., From Culture Wars to Common Ground: Religion and the American Family 
Debate (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 294. 
59 Miller-McLemore, ‘Ideals and Realities of Motherhood’, 293-4. 
60 Rosemary Radford Ruether, ‘Christian Understandings of Human Nature and Gender’, in 
Anne Carr and Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen (eds.), Religion, Feminism, and the Family (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 95-110, at 96, 99 and 103. 
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nor female’) to show that women are equal with men in Christianity,61 but are 
different too.62   
 
In light of her theology, Ruether re-evaluates the Christian historical tradition 
on the family (225).63  She challenges the oppressive cultural patriarchalism of 
early Christian families.64  She acknowledges that early Christianity supports 
both singleness and marriage, and that the Bible contains various family forms 
(4).  The natural family is subordinated to a ‘new eschatological family’, (25) 
reflecting Christ’s words that ‘[w]hoever does the will of God is my brother 
and sister and mother’ (Mark 3:35).  She describes the first Christians ‘as a 
‚fictive kin group‛ awaiting eschatological transformation’ (13).  It is suggested 
this is similar to non-blood relatives, such as godparents by baptism, who 
become part of a ‘family-like’ caring community with a network of mutual 
support (13 and 231 n. 3).  The new family in Christ caused divisions between 
parents and children and between other natural kin, who were to take a lesser 
role within a redeemed eschatological and spiritual community.  After all, as 
she points out, Paul indicates that we are adopted by God (28-30). 
 
Ruether proposes an alternative ‘ecofeminist’ ethic, with eco-justice, which 
allows equality and fairness between men and women at work and in the 
home.  She considers her ecofeminist ethic to have theological and biblical roots 
and to articulate ‘the full and equivalent humanity of women in partnership 
with men’ (207-8).  Her ecofeminist ethic therefore discards gender hierarchy 
along with gender differences of male rationality or autonomy and female 
intuitions and altruism, as distorting ‘the full humanness’ of both male and 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 95. 
62 Ibid., 106. 
63 Numbers in brackets refer to Rosemary Radford Ruether, Christianity and the Making of the 
Modern Family (London: SCM Press, 2001). 
64 Rosemary Radford Ruether, ‘Church and Family 1: Church and Family in the Scriptures and 
Early Christianity’, New Blackfriars 65 (1984), 4-14, at 13.  
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female (208), and therefore calls for ‘rationality and intuition, autonomy, and 
relationality’ to transform each other and for male egoism to be influenced by 
altruism.65  She calls for men and women as human beings to equally engage in 
family nurturing and work with ‘harmony and balance’ (229).  She wants to 
ensure that both men and women, as legal and biological parents, along with 
the whole community are responsible for childcare, and not just women, unless 
it is their choice.66  Men are to collaborate with women over parenting decisions 
(221).  Ruether believes that male and female cultural roles are ‘rooted in 
culture and history rather than in a relatively fixed ‚nature‛’.67  Ruether says 
that due to the time involved in female gestation and nursing, biological fathers 
have to put more effort into providing physical care for their children.68  
Families through the life cycle are to have ‘mutuality in self-giving and 
receiving’ (208) between men and women with ‘interdependent flourishing’ 
between each other and not at each other’s expense (208).  She advocates a 
mutuality that allows declaration of ‘different ways of being’ and allows for 
‘variety and particularity’.69  Therefore, she rejects liberal individualism with 
autonomous isolated selves, outside of relationships.  Men and women are 
encouraged to be relational and individuals within ‘an interactive process’.70  
Ruether allows a limited use of self-sacrifice, for men and women, believing 
each partner will equally give up something or limit the self for the well-being 
of the other without women sacrificing the most.  She does not consider such 
an arrangement to be ‘fixed and finalized’ (208) but to be constantly reformed 
within processes of ‘growth and change’ (208).   
 
                                                 
65 Ruether, ‘Christian Understandings of Human Nature and Gender’, 106. 
66 Rosemary Radford Ruether, New Woman/New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation 
(New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 207-11. 
67 Browning et al., From Culture Wars to Common Ground, 175. 
68 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (London: SCM 
Press, 1983), 177.   
69 Ibid., 20. 
70 Ruether, ‘Christian Understandings of Human Nature and Gender’, 108. 
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Consequently, she considers family structures to be diverse, complex and 
different, believing there is no ‘one’ normative family form (181), but that 
families can be made up of both kin and non-kin, i.e. both biological and social 
parents (4 and 181).  Often families are not just households but kin networks 
with a ‘web of relationships’ (183).  Under Ruether, the ‘monolithic’ nuclear 
family is replaced by a postmodern family view with a diverse variety of 
partnerships (210-11) and pluralist family formations (12).  Ruether says: ‘we 
need to reimagine a dynamic interrelation of creation and new creation, of the 
reproducing and renewing of life’ (229).  She supports diverse family forms, 
such as single households, gay couples, adopting families by former marriage 
or artificial insemination, single parents, nuclear families, extended families, 
step-families, cohabiting partnerships of two, and flatmates.  Women for 
Ruether can be full time housewives with breadwinning husbands if this has 
been chosen and enhances both of their talents, as well as allowing for full-time 
househusbands (212).   
 
Ruether uses her theology to ‘reimagine’ the family as sacramental, and ‘as a 
redemptive form of covenanted community, engaged in processes of mutual 
love and service’ (12).  She supports the church being able to use covenants and 
covenant ceremonies to bless holy unions, to support diverse family forms at 
different stages in life (11-12).  One such covenant ceremony she advocates is a 
child’s baptism or naming ceremony where couples and godparents would 
pledge their faithfulness to parenting the child, whether the relationship stays 
together or not (215-16).  She wants those who intend to create and raise 
children to be committed to giving them ‘a permanent, life-long relationship’ to 
ensure their well-being (220-1).  Religion is seen as being able to encourage 
families to be ‘mutual, sustaining, and life-affirming’, adding to a flourishing 
life (212-13).  Marriage is regarded as a ‘mutual covenant’ allowing for 
interdependence and individualism of spouses, allowing for new families in a 
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society incorporating interrelation of individualism and community.71  The 
church is called to support the spirituality and ethics of relationships as 
‘sacramental bonding and redemptive promise’ (214).  Sacraments are seen to 
reflect ‘renewed grace in nature’ and creation is regarded as a sacrament (75).  
In order to clarify theological issues, she wants to separate the state’s legal role 
in family contracts from the church’s role of blessing covenants; therefore, 
churches would not become legally involved in family arrangements.  She 
distinguishes the sacramental from the legal and covenants from contracts, 
thus allowing for legal homosexual civil partnerships (213-14).  The church as a 
redemptive community is to re-imagine the family as sacramental and as a 
‘liberated community of chosen kin’ (229).  She supports the church being able 
to use covenants to bless holy unions, to support diverse family forms at 
different stages in life (11-12).   
 
2.7.4 Advantages of the Christian Feminists  
 
Unlike the secular feminists, the Christian feminists allow for an open maternal 
relationship with diversity for differing maternal roles.  Miller-McLemore 
allows theology to listen to the voices, experiences, feelings of mothers.  She 
encourages the well-being of mothers as a ‘theological and creative dilemma’ 
(15) and looks at issues which many others share (24).  She does not want to 
romanticise, idealise or demonise motherhood for women (23 and 137) and 
takes a realistic view of motherhood, admitting that it can be disordered and 
messy (136).  Miller-McLemore does not over emphasise self-sacrifice, but 
focuses on justice, self-respect, mutuality and interdependence (14).  She argues 
for justice in egalitarian families.  She has a more complex view of mothering as 
involving conception, pregnancy, birth, lactation and aftercare (132 and 149-
50).  Women’s biological experiences of pregnancy, birth and lactation may 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 108. 
135 
 
contribute to ‘particular ways of perceiving and thinking’ (135).  However, she 
does not see biology as destiny (48), but as secondary (151).  Men and others 
can have emotional care for the child too (144 and 174).  She does not take 
universal essentialist view to mothering as being the same for all women (135-
6). 
 
Ruether takes a comprehensive view of mothering, seeing it as an activity for 
women, men and the whole community.72  She acknowledges pluralistic, 
complex and diverse family formations and sees equality, but also difference, 
between men and women (207 and 212).  She wants mutual and 
interdependent relationships within families so that all parties flourish (208 
and 212-3).   
 
In contrast to the secular feminists, the Christian feminists are more rounded 
and take a holistic view towards what being a mother involves.  The Christian 
feminists are bringing out the relational dimensions of the Christian theology 
of the trinity.  Miller-McLemore takes a ‘holistic’ and ‘antidualistic’ view of the  
 
flesh and spirit as inseparable is a particular reading of experience or nature and 
institution or culture shared by feminist readings of Jewish and Christian traditions.73   
 
Both have a more complex view of mothering, focusing upon mutuality, 
interdependence and flourishing in egalitarian families.  Dialogue and 
negotiation allow for differing types of mothering relationships.  Christianity 
tends to encourage equality and flourishing within an openness of dialogue 
with an emphasis upon communication by prayer and acknowledgement of 
being created in God’s image with an emphasis on all being the same within 
Christ. 
                                                 
72 Ruether, New Woman/New Earth, 207-11. 
73 Miller-McLemore, ‘Ideals and Realities of Motherhood’, 300.   
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2.7.5 Critique of Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Rosemary Radford Ruether 
 
However, the Christian feminists are not without their difficulties.  McLemore 
admits to three problems herself.  Firstly, even though she has used recent 
research, she regrets not talking to enough ‘poor women, racial-minority 
mothers, single mothers, or to mothers of older children’ (24).  She believes 
white middle-class women like herself can learn from other women in different 
‘racial and economic groups’, especially from their difficulties (32).  Since she 
stresses mutuality, more could have been made of learning from all mothers, 
including fathers as well as white women, the poor or the middle-classes.  
Secondly, she admits to clashes between the private vocation of maternal 
desires of ‘creation, nurturing and sustenance’ (31) with childcare and domestic 
life alongside her public vocation as a professor and her hopes for justice and 
equality in a world hostile to children (30-1).  Finally, she admits that 
discussion of mutuality by feminist theologians ‘has sometimes been sloppy’,74 
due to mutuality assuming a relationship between equal adults.  
Acknowledgement is made that within practices like parenting, teaching and 
counselling, ‘equal relationships are rare’ and mutuality can be difficult in 
unequal relationships.75  However, Miller-McLemore could have spoken more 
about a solution to this problem.   
 
At least six other issues can be raised regarding Miller-McLemore’s views 
towards mothering.  Firstly, she admits self-sacrifice can be a part of a 
relationship between a parent and child, and self-sacrifice should aim at 
mutuality, without being an ideal.  She believes self-sacrifice comes with the 
promise of a heavenly reward or a return (164).  However, not all self-sacrifice 
is ideal and self-sacrifice should not be conducted with the hope of self-gain.  
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Miller-McLemore believes that ‘*m+ost children do not need or benefit from the 
kind of unconditional self-sacrificial love that Christianity often esteems as the 
ideal’.76  However, some self-sacrifice might be done as a purely altruistic or 
supererogatory act to benefit the other only and not the self.  Not all self-
sacrifice will result in mutuality, as the person receiving the self-sacrifice may 
be unable to reciprocate or engage in symmetrical equal relations.  A concept of 
relationality instead of mutuality might be more accurate to describe the 
ontology between self and other and will be explored in chapter five in the 
context of dealing with clashes in surrogacy custody cases. 
 
Secondly, at times, Miller-McLemore fails to expand her ideas with enough 
detail and dismisses further discussion.  She states: ‘a reconstructed religion 
alone and Christianity in particular will not give answers to the complex 
contemporary quandaries about mothering’.77  More thought could have been 
given to this issue, to deal with problems such as custody clashes between 
mothers and fathers, the legal standing of lesbian social mothers, or possible 
difficulties between a surrogate mother and a commissioning mother if the 
surrogate wants to keep the child.  Part of her problem could be that she 
focuses upon mutuality and may have realised that mutuality as a concept is 
unable to deal with the complexity of mothering.  Instead, a concept such as 
relationality with a wider ontology between self and other could have been 
more useful.  Relationalism and the contrast with mutuality will be discussed 
in chapter five. 
 
Thirdly, Miller-McLemore gives contrasting views on the significance of 
biology and gestation for generative activities such as parenthood (48), without 
considering the ethical implications and significance of her views.  She admits 
that neither anatomy (48) nor biology is destiny and that biology plays a 
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secondary and relative role (151).  Even so, she suggests that anatomy cannot 
be ignored since it enriches human horizons; likewise, biology is seen as 
shaping the meaning of generativity.  However, she believes we cannot own 
children and does not want biology to determine the ownership of children78 or 
to determine modes of generativity.  After all, a biological connection to a child 
can play a major role in deciding custody in disputes. 
 
Fourthly, instead of using gender to create division in families, Miller-
McLemore develops a Christian maternal feminist theology based on maternal 
experience and knowledge (20) as ‘body-mediated’ (147).  She believes that 
gestation as a ‘biological inclination’ gives women a ‘heightened maternal 
investment’, meaning an emotional equity between mother and fathers is only 
cautiously attainable (143).  Attachment for women is seen as given, but 
attained by men who have to make more efforts to care for others.  Even 
though she wants to support mothers and prevent essentialism, she is in 
danger of possibly excluding men and non-gestational mothers.  She ignores 
the evidence that not all women automatically bond to their children and the 
research which indicates that bonding is emotional and not biological.  Women 
differ greatly regarding how they bond to their children in pregnancy and even 
in different pregnancies.  Some men may find her comments patronising, since 
they will have a deep emotional attachment to a child who is genetically 
biologically related to them while the child is being gestated.  Non-genetically 
related social parents can have deep emotional attachment too, meaning they 
will not have to work at such an attachment as she suggests.  Men have a 
different type of biological attachment, similar to arguments for kin altruism 
with their parental investment based upon their genes.  However, she admits,  
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a mother’s physiological investments in her offspring should never be used to deny the 
attainability of an emotional and cognitive equity between women and men in the care 
of offspring (144).   
 
Fifthly, Miller-McLemore possibly overlooks the importance of fathers and 
male ways of fathering, in favour of egalitarian parenting.  She believes caring 
for a child involves ‘egalitarian parenting’79 in order not to stereotype men or 
women.  However, both particular mothering skills and fathering skills can be 
acknowledged without essentialism or an amalgamation into an androgynous 
parenting role.  Male experience is important as fathers and should not be 
dismissed as part of patriarchalism.  Miller-McLemore calls for theology to 
listen to mothers to understand nurture and mutuality, in order to speak with a 
mother’s voice.  However, for a mutual relationship theology needs to speak 
and listen to the voices of mothers, fathers and children too. 
 
Finally, even though Miller-McLemore supports mothers and encourages men 
to care for children, a couple of her remarks could offend some mothers for 
indicating that mothering is an inferior practice and role.  Calls are made for 
men to take part in day-care centres so that ‘children do not grow up thinking 
that only women are demoted to these apparently less valued, less profitable 
tasks’.80  She also wants others to learn to care for children because she regards 
this as ‘far too important to be left to mothers alone’.81   
 
One of the areas Ruether could have spent more time discussing in her 2001 
book Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family is that of the new 
reproductive technologies and how the relationships involved between donors 
and recipients may be organised.  She calls for a ‘permanent, lifelong 
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relationship’ between those who intend to create and those who raise the child 
(220-1).  However, she does not take into consideration infertile couples using 
anonymous gamete donation.  In such cases a relationship between the donors 
and their recipients may be impossible.  Even if the donors are known, a life-
long relationship may not be desired.  Some Christians like Scott Rae reject her 
acknowledgment of lesbian couples using sperm donation as a third party to 
create a family, whereas others may criticise her for not going far enough to 
support changes in the law to protect legally the non-biologically related 
lesbian mother. 
 
Even though Ruether mentions the need for pluralistic families, she could have 
explored surrogacy in greater depth.  She briefly mentions that surrogacy 
‘shifts the relationships between the social and the biological parent’ (220).  
However, she does not explore how surrogacy could work or the possibility of 
a relationship between the surrogate and the commissioning couple, or 
between the surrogate and the child.  Nor does she suggest how the Church 
could be involved with a special baptism for the child with the surrogate and 
the commissioning mother making vows for the child.  She does not explicitly 
explore the possibility of the social and the biological relationship working 
together, instead of being ‘shifted’.  After all, the possibility is there with her 
mutual and pluralistic eco-feminism.  Needless to say, no author can write on 
every issue. 
 
As part of her support for postmodern pluralistic families, she seems to allow 
for various family formations, including co-habiting couples and homosexual 
relationships (210-11 and 213).  Some Christians may find such arrangements 
too ‘liberal’ for not reflecting Christian tradition or for being against some 
biblical passages.   
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As a Roman Catholic, she re-imagines the family as a redemptive sacramental 
covenanted community (12).  Some Protestants may have problems accepting 
her creative covenantal relationships as sacramental, especially for non-
Christians or mixed marriages, due to not wanting them to be automatic 
vehicles of grace or redemption, because of our fallen natures.  However, she 
uses the term ‘sacramental’ to mean a channel of grace, and not ‘sacrament’, 
making it seem less controversial.  Other Christians may find problems with 
her emphasis upon covenant and its tendency to insist on permanent obligation 
and duty.  She suggests that couples pledge to parent a child for life even if 
their relationship disintegrates (220-1).  However, such a relationship may not 
be in the child’s interests if the parent is or becomes a violent alcoholic.  Some 
Christians may oppose her temporary covenantal-vows for young people in 
non-permanent relationships (219) as not reflecting God’s steadfast love.  Some 
Christians could have concerns about fornication and the watering down of 
commitment by agreeing to temporary covenants for young people before 
marriage. 
 
2.8 Theologian Don Browning 
 
2.8.1 Don Browning 
 
A third theologian is the Protestant, Don Browning, who was a prominent 
writer on theology and the family.  In two of his major works From Culture 
Wars to Common Ground82 and Equality and the Family,83 he restructures the 
Christian family using ‘critical familism’.  Critical familism is a new flexible 
family ideal, with three key points referred to as the ‘committed, intact, equal-
regard, public-private family’ (406).  However, it is not to be considered as ‘the’ 
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Christian family.84  Firstly ‘committed intact’ relates to married parents raising 
their own children from nature, adoption or the new reproductive 
technologies.85  Secondly, ‘equal-regard’ refers to marriage with ‘mutual 
respect, affection, practical assistance, and justice’, which ‘values and aids the 
self and other with equal seriousness’.86  Thirdly, ‘public-private’ means that 
both husband and wife participate equally and have responsibilities in the 
public world of work and the private world of childcare.87  Presumably, the 
spouses therefore must have such responsibilities to their children which can 
involve a free choice to enter the public world of work.  Browning sees the 
family as postmodern, meaning that divisions between work and home, and 
working husband and domestic mother are not idealised (58-9).  Critical 
familism and their supporting theological themes will now be discussed. 
 
The theological basis of his critical familism is a hermeneutical practical 
theology, which includes descriptive theology (describing the present 
situation), historical theology (looking at past traditions),88 systematic theology 
(the ideals of faith), moral theology (critical reflection) and strategic-practical 
theology (seeing what can be done to the problem) (35-6).  He reconstructs 
Catholic natural law family theory (120), by revising a natural law model with 
a flexible Catholic natural law (used in a Protestant way) (103), which does not 
tie natural law to a final end (330).  As part of his pragmatic theology of the 
family, Browning uses kin altruism and social science evidence to support the 
‘committed, intact’ families of his critical familism (344 and 406).   
 
The first point of critical familism refers to ‘committed, intact’ families (406).  
He cites social science evidence suggesting that children raised by their 
                                                 
84 Browning et al., From Culture Wars to Common Ground, 7. 
85 Ibid., 2. 
86 Ibid., 2. 
87 Ibid., 1-2 and 170. 
88 Ibid., 337-8. 
143 
 
married natural parents do better at school, have more stable jobs, stable 
marriages and engage in less criminal activity than children in families with a 
single parent or step-parents (344).  He wants these more effective family forms 
to be encouraged in law and politics, supported by Christian covenant and 
sacrament (262).  He urges churches to put the good of children first, by 
realising that not all pluralistic family formations raise children equally (57).  
Therefore, churches are to promote egalitarian intact families with a married 
mother-father and their children.  Browning supports Emil Brunner who 
regards parents as responsible for the child’s existence and as bound together 
in a ‘trinity of being’ of human existence in a one-flesh union of mother, father 
and child (341).   
 
His ideas of a committed intact family of a married couple raising their natural 
children are supported by kin altruism.  Kin altruism allows ‘preferential 
treatment’ to genetic natural children because the children have 50% of each 
parent’s genes.89  Kin altruism is seen as part of God’s intended natural creation 
and is considered natural for parents to care for their children.  Browning 
acknowledges that biology can influence, but not ‘completely determine, the 
form and dynamics of families’, since biology is directed by ‘imagination and 
practical reason’.90  Thomas Aquinas believed in ‘special obligations’ to our 
own kin and that parental obligations are for men and women (89).  He 
regarded the natural children of parents as God’s gifts; made in God’s image, 
who are loved for reflecting God’s goodness (122).  Browning suggests parents 
have natural inclinations towards their children and are deeply attached to 
them.  Biological attachment can make people ‘good and nurturing parents’ 
(343).   
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However, quality parenting is rated higher than biological relatedness.91  Kin 
altruism is ‘not an ultimate good’ to ‘trump all other goods’, since other types 
of child-rearing cannot be ignored (354).  Indeed, ‘intactness’ in families is not 
to ‘trump all other values’.92  Churches are to acknowledge family plurality and 
be concerned ‘for the welfare and dignity of all families’ (406-7).  Browning 
regards the ‘postmodern family’ as pluralistic but with more ‘divorce, non-
marital births, and cohabitation’ (84).  Due to family break-up, he accepts the 
need for adoption (359).  Adults are called to show benevolence to all children 
because God loves them and his goodness is within them (122).  Adoptive 
children can flourish, due to the screening and motivated parenting of their 
adoptive parents, despite not knowing their biological parents (355).   
 
The second point of his critical familism is ‘equal-regard’ marriages, which 
involve a mutual covenant, ensuring spouses treat each other as ends and not 
just means (316).  It features egalitarian families with gender equality and equal 
relations between spouses,93 while acknowledging each other’s differences 
(307-8).  Browning’s love as equal-regard or mutuality, is influenced by Louis 
Janssens’, so the needs of others are taken as seriously as our own, allowing for 
teleology within a deontological moral logic (280).  Therefore premoral goods 
can be hierarchically ranked while maintaining a wider deontological ethic 
(280).  Human beings are made in God’s image (Genesis 1:27) and share God’s 
goodness, thus giving them equality, dignity and respect.94  In order to deal 
with the ideals and the reality of human life, he wants equal-regard to occur 
within a context of ‘sin, grace, forgiveness, and redemption’ (98).  Love as 
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equal-regard is also influenced by Kant’s categorical imperative (351-2), which 
treats human beings as ends and not just means.   
 
Love as equal-regard is regarded as ‘an intersubjective and dialogical concept’, 
which takes feelings into consideration.95  It is not achieved unilaterally, but 
together by communication, listening, understanding and empathizing the 
needs and desires of others, supporting each other and living out the mutual 
agreements.  Marriage is also seen as a ‘covenant of intersubjective dialogue’.96  
Families are formed by ‘biological, psychological, historical, and religiocultural 
negotiation’,97 involving spouses, families, community, tradition, children and 
God.98  Self-sacrifice (self-giving) is part of, but ‘subordinate to’, love as equal-
regard,99 and occurs in rhythms, so equality and mutuality are later restored 
over the whole life-cycle (192-3).  Browning wants intact families reconstructed, 
without ‘patriarchy, abuse, inequality and exploitation’.100   
 
The third and final point of his ‘critical familism’ involves the equal-regard and 
public-private family, where both parents have responsibilities to raise their 
children (281).  He uses Genesis 1:28 to show that in life men and women have 
equal authority over reproduction and economics.  However, he acknowledges 
that male-female asymmetries exist regarding parental investments in 
procreation and child raising (325).  He believes: 
 
*t+here is little doubt that pregnancy, lactation, a mother’s parental certainty, and other 
physiological changes give most women a head start over men in parental investment.101   
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Browning admits that women have often raised children since they can give 
them nourishment (294-5).  He suggests that ‘vulnerable’ mothers at childbirth 
and the child’s infancy should be given preferential rights and support by 
culture and law in custody matters, due to such asymmetries, unless the 
mother is incapable or unfit (325-6).  He suggests critical familism differs to 
gynocentric legal feminism which elevates a mother’s status before the law and 
government (323).  However, he admits that after the birth, the mother may 
have a ‘slightly grander role to play’ but fathers are also to be involved in this 
‘mutual recognition’ for the child and for himself,102 as birth signifies 
parenthood for both mother and father.103   
 
Browning wants fathers to care for infants to avoid asymmetrical parenting 
between spouses.104  Therefore, the biological investment of a mother to her 
child is not to prevent an equal emotional and behavioural involvement in 
childcare for men and women.  Browning believes that fathers have less 
investment than mothers have at the start of reproduction and slowly consider 
the child as theirs and learn to take responsibility later (294).  Browning sees 
families as subordinated to the common good, be it God’s kingdom or ‘civil 
society’.105  Browning draws on Pope Leo XIII, who believed human beings 
have rights and responsibilities to the ‘fruits of their bodily labor and the issue 
of their procreative activity’, as a law of nature (337).  He suggests that equal-
regard means that families are to ‘respect and support the inclinations of other 
families’106 to look after their own children.  The welfare of a family is not to 
negatively affect other families’ welfare.  All families are to support ‘the justice 
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and welfare of all families as families and not just the welfare of individuals in 
abstraction from family ties’.107   
 
As seen above, Browning offers a theologically influenced case for effective but 
flexible and diverse families, within a context of marriage, informed by 
dialogue and negotiation.  He gives equal respect to men and women, for both 
to be involved in childcare.  The biological investment of women towards their 
children is acknowledged, but without excluding men, who also have a genetic 
investment in their children based upon the theories of kin altruism.  The 
quality of parenting is seen as more important than parental biological 
relatedness.  He envisions a covenantal aspect to families with justice, well-
being, communication, mutuality and duties to children.   
 
The implications of Browning for families could possibly mean that after 
dialogue and negotiation, a surrogacy could go ahead between a married 
commissioning couple having fertility difficulties and a surrogate.  With the 
need for communication, well-being and respect for each other, any possible 
disputes would be solved with consideration for the child as well as those 
involved, possibly allowing for different types of mothering to be 
acknowledged.  In a private email from Professor Browning regarding 
surrogacy, he commented that he was ‘not very firm’ in his opinion.  He tends 
to accept gestational surrogacy ‘if used by a married couple who contribute egg 
and sperm’.  He believes this because:  
 
children have the right to be born into a society that intentionally maximizes it [sic] 
chances of being raised by it [sic] own biological mother and father.  Accidents occur 
and this will not always happen.  But to intentionally plan for it not to happen probably 
disrespects children’s rights (the international legal question) and the biblical one-flesh 
union which, in many interpretations, includes the child in the one-flesh union (the 
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theological view).  So, gestational surrogacy, yes, but I am not sure it should go beyond 
that.108 
 
2.8.2 Critique of Don Browning 
 
However, Browning’s equal-regard family is not without its difficulties and 
seven problems will now be highlighted.   
 
Firstly, Browning regards his love as equal-regard to be covenantal, but fails to 
stipulate its use, theological significance, ethical usage or implications.  
Covenant is a comprehensive term, which can be applied to many relationships 
and situations with varying degrees of permanency, obligation and 
responsibility.  More attention could have been given to explain the 
significance and relationship between natural law and covenant for marriage, 
especially for the infertile and how they may overcome their infertility, since he 
acknowledges that family formation includes ‘natural tendencies’ according to 
‘God’s intentions for creation’.109   
 
Secondly, Browning supports using new reproductive technologies which 
‘enhance covenanted marriage’ (365), but fails to articulate which techniques he 
supports and why.  The issues of infertility and its possible solutions seem to 
be overlooked.  He also assumes that those using the techniques are doing so 
within ‘a new individualistic culture of ‚procreative liberty‛’ (359).  Browning 
fails to focus upon differing Christian attitudes to the use of the techniques or 
how they can be used positively to enhance the family, without acting from 
purely individualistic motives.  He tends to reject genetic surrogacy; however, 
this could be less invasive and more successful than gestational surrogacy, 
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which may not be available for some commissioning mothers if they cannot 
produce their own ova.   
 
Thirdly, disquiet can be raised over Browning’s understanding of mutuality 
and love as equal-regard concerning the true motives behind the action of self-
giving and self-sacrifice.  He sees self-sacrifice as a ‘transitional ethic’ with a 
non-permanent role (280) existing before relations are restored to mutuality.  
Self-sacrifice or self-giving is regarded as subordinated to love as equal-
regard110 and seems to be needed because of ‘broken and unequal relations’ 
(280).  He suggests that Christianity regards sacrifice as ‘symmetrical’ for 
spouses.111  However, Browning does admit that self-giving is part of Christian 
love and can occur without ‘immediate return’ (98 and 189).112 
 
Even so, self-sacrifice should not always be seen as inferior or subordinate to 
equal-regard.  Sometimes the needs of the other may lead to self-sacrifice as a 
supererogatory act or as an act of pure altruism.  Self-sacrifice might be 
temporary or ongoing and may not result in mutuality.  The person engaging 
in the self-sacrifice may not be aiming at mutuality, but purely the needs and 
the good of the other.  A loving self-sacrifice is done for the other’s good, but 
sometimes mutuality can occur too.  Browning needs to take into consideration 
that not all unequal relations are due to sin and injustice, since unbalanced 
relationships are not necessarily unethical.  A spouse may be disabled and 
unable to reciprocate or participate in equal and mutual relationships within 
the marriage.   
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Fourthly, Browning calls for ‘psychological and ethical sophistication’113 
concerning the ‘cooperative interaction of interdependent and individuated’ 
family members.114  In his ethic of equal-regard he suggests giving ‘equal 
weight’ to self-regard and to other-regard,115 echoing Janssens and Christine 
Gudorf who want to balance self-fulfilment with self-giving love (127).  The 
individual is not regarded as ‘solely autonomous but a being-in-relation’.116  He 
wants the other’s selfhood to be regarded as your selfhood.117  He advocates a 
symmetrical and mutual ontology between self and other.118  However, ethical 
sophistication could mean that self-fulfilment and self-giving love cannot 
always be balanced with equal weight.  Self-regard and regard for the other 
may not always be possible at the same time.  An alternative relational 
ontology which allows for various asymmetrical emphases upon the self and 
the other is required.  We cannot always have equality or symmetry, due to the 
specific needs of a particular person, for example a disabled child.  A healthy 
person will not necessarily regard the selfhood of a sick relative to be the same 
as their own selfhood.  Caring for another’s needs may not always lead to self-
fulfilment as sometimes priority may have to be given exclusively to the self or 
to the other without mutuality or reciprocity according to need.   
 
Fifthly, Browning supports kin altruism, which gives ‘preferential treatment’ to 
biologically related parents.119  However, Browning needs to take into 
consideration the role social parents play in a child’s life, for if a clash occurs 
between a surrogate gestating a donor embryo and a commissioning couple 
wanting to keep the child, under Browning’s logic the anonymous genetic 
gamete donors would be the parents and more likely to want the child.  
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Protestant theologian Ted Peters is critical of Browning’s emphasis on kin 
altruism as he sees it as perpetuating the importance of genes.  Peters believes 
Jesus did not advocate preferential treatment towards your biological kin, but 
suggests Jesus supported ‘social kin’.120  
 
Sixthly, another area of concern is Browning’s ethic of equal-regard and its 
practical implementation regarding ‘the reordering of gender relations’ 
between mothers and fathers (100).  He believes there are asymmetrical 
investments between mothers and fathers in procreation, with men having less 
investment so they have to learn to take responsibility for the child.  He wants 
his ethic of equal-regard, culture and the law to give preferential rights, 
support and extra protection for vulnerable mothers at childbirth and during 
the child’s early years in custody cases (294, 325-6).  However, his comments 
that men have less investment in their children could be seen as patronising to 
fathers, since their investment is not ‘less’, just different to that of women.  
However, Browning could be seen as making a social scientific point, reflecting 
a general truth that men do not take a strong interest in their children or have 
such an investment in their children as women do.  Both fathers and mothers 
can have an emotional and genetic involvement in a child, and the gestational 
involvement of a mother may not increase her bonding to the child. 
 
Finally, Browning’s equal-regard and critical familism means all relationships 
are to aim at mutuality, including parents and infants during feeding and 
cleaning times (eye-to-eye contact is considered mutual interaction).121  
Children are seen as having a ‘significant’ reciprocal role in family life and are 
regarded as peers to their parents, otherwise mutuality is inadequate.122  
However, it is difficult to see how a child can have a mutual and equal 
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relationship with its adult parents.  Browning admits that mutuality may not 
be achieved until the child is an adult, but this is still expected as part of an 
equal-regard family.  It is difficult to see how families can maintain a balanced 
and mutual equal relationship between all members, since the needs of one 
member may have to come first at whatever stage in a person’s life-cycle due to 
the needs of that person, such as a severely handicapped child.  Browning 
admits that reciprocity when children are young is not perfect123 and will 
involve ‘extreme effort’ and brief periods of self-sacrifice.124  He admits that 
parents will not give equal decision-making powers to infants (401).   
 
From Browning we can appreciate that the Christian family is flexible but 
occurring within a context of a married couple.  He has a revisionist approach 
to natural law, without insisting on a final end.  He prioritises the quality of 
parenting over biological relatedness and regards the postmodern family as 
pluralistic.  Browning was influenced by Janssens’ mutuality and the needs of 
the self and the other with a hierarchical ranking.  He highlights human beings 
made in the image of God which means they are to be treated as ends and not 
just a means.  His methodology is a dialogical which encourages negotiation.  
However, as seen above there are problems with his approach including an 
over emphasis upon mutuality. 
 
2.9 Christian Writing On Motherhood 
 
Having looked at three modern-day theologians’ views concerning 
motherhood and the family, attention now focuses upon how mothering has 
been presented in Christianity as in the Bible, Church History and by other 
theologians.  These sources help to further establish the complexity of 
motherhood found in Christianity in light of the theologians discussed above.  
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Attention will focus upon Christian themes of motherhood, namely creation, 
conception, gestation, birth, lactation and nurturing.  This complex view of 
mothering is found in the Bible, with differing mothering images for God, with 
various roles for mothers in the Bible.  Also the Church, Mary and priests are 
seen as mothers too.  This section will go through such examples of mothering 
to show its comprehensive and complex depiction in Christianity.   
 
2.9.1 Motherhood in General in Christianity 
 
Christians often regard the Bible as the primary source of Christian authority 
(norma normans) and tradition as secondary (norma normata), but they can both 
be used to show the different types and complexity of motherhood in 
Christianity.  Despite Alan Lewis suggesting that calling God ‘mother’ would 
be ‘illegitimate and cause hurt’,125 it is possible to find many examples of God 
being referred to as a mother.  In the Bible, God as a mother tends to focus 
upon God as a creator, as a birthing mother and as a nurturing mother.  These 
types of motherhood will be explored later.  Some of the early Church fathers 
also regarded God as mother.  For example, Clement of Alexandria commented 
in 215 AD that:  
 
God is love, and for love of us has become woman.  The ineffable being of the Father 
has out of compassion with us become mother.126   
 
Julian of Norwich declared of God:  
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*t+hat fair lovely word ‚mother‛ is so sweet and so kind in itself that it cannot truly be 
said of anyone or to anyone except of him and to him who is the true Mother of life 
and of all things.127   
 
Robin Jensen indicates that the Church itself is called ‘the Mother of all 
Christians’ which was later applied to Mary, the mother of Jesus.128  Paulinus of 
Nola (353/4-431) also referred to the ‘Mother Church’.129   
 
Modern-day theologians such as Christian feminist Margaret Hebblethwaite 
have used the simile ‘God as mother’130 and called God ‘she’, leading some 
feminists to think she was stereotyping women as mothers.131  Hebblethwaite 
accepts Mary as our mother, but also regards God as ‘the fundamental mother 
and root of all motherhood’.132  She indicates that the Church of Scotland 
report, The Motherhood of God133 accepted the use of God is like a mother as a 
religious simile, but if the word ‘like’ is not used it becomes a deeper and more 
profound religious metaphor, which can be done with father but not mother.134  
She believes the ‘extraordinary quality’ of maternal love comes from God who 
is a mother.135  She points out that at first it was thought that the male sperm 
created life, with women only nurturing, which meant God as the father was 
seen as the creator, however she now wants theology to reflect biological 
changes of the discovery of the female egg.136  It is not just feminist theologians 
who regard God as mother, but Paul Tillich regards the ‘ground of being’ or 
                                                 
127 Julian of Norwich, Showings, chapter 60, cited in Storkey and Hebblethwaite, Conversations on 
Christian Feminism, 30. 
128 Robin M. Jensen, ‘Mater Ecclesia and Fons Aeterna: The Church and Her Womb in Ancient 
Christian Tradition’, in Amy-Jill Levine (ed.), A Feminist Companion to Patristic Literature 
(London: T. and T. Clark International, 2008), 137-55, at 138. 
129 Paulinus of Nola, Ep. 32.5 cited in ibid., 148-9. 
130 Margaret Hebblethwaite, Motherhood and God (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1984). 
131 Storkey and Hebblethwaite, Conversations on Christian Feminism, 6 and 27. 
132 Ibid., 30. 
133 Lewis, The Motherhood of God. 
134 Storkey and Hebblethwaite, Conversations on Christian Feminism, 30. 
135 Ibid., 31.  
136 Ibid., 30-2. 
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God’s divinity as mother-love which gives life.  He refers to ‘the mother-
quality of giving birth, carrying, and embracing’.137  Traditionally, God as 
mother has tended not to be used in Christian discourse, though the use of 
analogy and also metaphor is popular with some Christian feminists and 
others. 
 
2.9.2 Motherhood as Creation and Conception  
 
Motherhood in Christianity is linked to creation and conception.  In the Bible 
God is regarded as the creator of life, as seen in Deuteronomy 32:18 (‘[y]ou 
were unmindful of the Rock that begot you; you forgot the God who gave you 
birth’).  God as a creator can be interpreted as the instigator of life (a 
commissioning mother in surrogacy could be regarded as creatively instigating 
the surrogacy).  Psalm 139:13-16 sees God as involved in creating a human 
being in the mother’s womb, and also in Jeremiah 1:5 (‘[b]efore I formed you in 
the womb I knew you, before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed 
you a prophet to the nations’).  See also Job 10:9-12, 31:15, Psalm 119:73 and 
Ecclesiastes 11:5.  God is seen as being involved in the creation of human 
beings from conception in the Old Testament, for example, ‘births to Sarah 
(Genesis 17:15-22; 21:1-7), Leah and Rachel (Genesis 30:1-24), Ruth (Ruth 4:13-
17), and Hannah (1 Samuel 1:19-20); in the New Testament’ with Mary and 
Elizabeth (Luke 1:24-35, 39-44).138  These passages help to show the complexity 
of motherhood, in this case demonstrating an active creativity. 
 
                                                 
137 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. III (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 293-
4. 
138 Andreas J. Köstenberger, God, Marriage, and Family: Rebuilding the Biblical Foundations 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), 130. 
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The Church is also seen as a conceiving mother since in the fourth century, 
Ambrose of Milan, saw the Church as a mother who conceives by the Holy 
Spirit.139  
 
2.9.3 Motherhood as Gestational  
 
Gestation as part of motherhood is also highlighted in Christianity.  Jeanette 
Rodrígnez considers Mary to be ’the compassionate Mother of the people’, who 
loves with a ‘womblike’ love which reflects ‘God’s compassion’.140  Similarly, 
Jensen suggests that the Church’s ‘fecundity’ comes from the Holy Spirit 
descending ‘upon her watery womb (the font)’.141  The Church can be seen as 
performing a gestational mothering role - being a ‘vessel’ and ‘giving birth 
from her womb’ - which leads to salvation, ‘protection and sustenance’.142   
 
The Church could possibly be depicted as a gestational surrogate mother.  
Theodore of Mopsuestia believed that the bishop at baptism is involved in  
 
asking God to let the grace of the Holy Spirit come upon the water and make it capable 
of begetting this awesome birth, making it a womb for sacramental birth.143   
 
Theodore believed that just as in a human birth a mother’s womb receives a 
seed, so in baptism, the womb (i.e. the font) also receives a seed from God.  
Jensen suggests that Theodore of Mopsuestia believed that the font is like a 
womb having a fertilised embryo implanted into it.144  It could be possible that 
Augustine supported something similar to what we now regard as genetic 
                                                 
139 Ambrose, Exp. Luc. 2.7, cited in Jensen, ‘Mater Ecclesia and Fons Aeterna’, 145.   
140 Anne M. Clifford, Introducing Feminist Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), 198.  
141 Jensen, ‘Mater Ecclesia and Fons Aeterna’, 152. 
142 Ibid., 145-6. 
143 Ibid., 147.  Theodore, Bapt. Hom. 3.9, in trans. Edward Yarnold, S.J., The Awe-Inspiring Rites of 
Intitiation (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2nd ed., 1994), 185, see also 3.2-5.   
144 Jensen, ‘Mater Ecclesia and Fons Aeterna’, 147. 
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surrogacy.  Augustine in his treatise On Baptism, Against the Donatists145 
acknowledges that different wombs give birth to children, but in order for 
children such as Ishmael who are born to slave women to receive their 
promised inheritance, they are to be joined to the true wives of their father, like 
Sarah.  Augustine did not want such children to be considered children of an 
adulterous union.146   
 
2.9.4 Motherhood as Giving Birth 
 
Christianity also focuses upon the act of giving birth as part of motherhood.  In 
the Bible, God is depicted as a mother who gives birth in Exodus 19:4 (‘I bore 
you *Israel+ on eagles’ wings and brought you to myself’) and in Job 38:29 
(‘[f]rom whose womb did the ice come forth, and who has given birth to the 
hoarfrost of heaven?’).  Isaiah also has examples such as Isaiah 42:14 (‘I will cry 
out like a woman in labour, I will gasp and pant’), Isaiah 46:3 (where Yahweh 
describes Israel as a people ‘who have been borne by me from your birth, 
carried from the womb’), and Isaiah 66:9 (‘[s]hall I open the womb and not 
deliver? Says the Lord; shall I, the one who delivers, shut the womb?’)   
 
Such imagery is not just found in the Bible.  The Eleventh Council of Toledo 
(675), in discussing the Trinity, suggested that the Son is begotten and born 
from the Father’s womb.147  The Church was frequently seen as a mother giving 
birth.  Jensen, for example, comments that from the second to the fifth century 
liturgical evidence exists of baptism as rebirth from the mother’s womb.  She 
believes the Church was regarded as a mother, with a font as a womb, which 
reflected feminine maternal and sexual imagery.148  Jensen suggests Augustine 
                                                 
145 Augustine, On Baptism, Against the Donatists 4.17, cited in Jensen, ‘Mater Ecclesia and Fons 
Aeterna’, 143-4. 
146 Jensen, ‘Mater Ecclesia and Fons Aeterna’, 143-4. 
147 Storkey and Hebblethwaite, Conversations on Christian Feminism, 33-4. 
148 Jensen, ‘Mater Ecclesia and Fons Aeterna’, 138. 
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often referred to ‘the maternal Church with a font for a womb’149 and Ambrose 
regarded the Church as ‘fertile in childbirth’.150  Jensen indicates that the 
baptismal birthing metaphors were popular ‘in the West in the late fourth and 
early fifth centuries’, for example Zeno of Verona (ca.370) regarded the newly 
baptised as infants coming from ‘the one womb’ who gathered as ‘nurslings’.151  
Jensen suggests that some ancient fonts were designed to signify a mother’s 
womb by having a round shape.152 
 
Theologian Jeanne Stevenson-Moessner regards parents as biological and social 
as their parent-child relationship reflects God’s womb-love.153  She believes that 
God loves as womb-love [rechem+ and reflects God’s mercy and compassion in 
the Old Testament.  Womb-love shows God as a mother with ‘continual and 
constant’ compassion, nurture and love for his children.154  She points out that 
Phyllis Trible utilised the ‘metaphor of God as a birthing mother’ by linking the 
Hebrew word womb (rehem) with the Hebrew word merciful or compassionate 
(rahum).155  Rahum is used just for God as creator and not the creatures.156   
 
2.9.5 Motherhood as Involving Lactation and Nurturance 
 
Lactation and nurturance in motherhood are also highlighted in Christianity.  
The Church has been regarded as a lactating mother; Irenaeus, implies that 
those outside the Church are lost and are not ‘nourished into life by the 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 144. 
150 Ambrose, On Virginity, 1.6.31, cited in ibid., 145-6. 
151 Ibid., 148. 
152 Ibid., 152-3. 
153 Jeanne Stevenson-Moessner, The Spirit of Adoption: At Home in God’s Family (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 1. 
154 Ibid., 19. 
155 Ibid., 90.  However, ‘God as a mother’ is usually a simile and ‘God is a mother’ is usually 
metaphorical. 
156 Ibid., 90. 
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mother’s breasts’.157  Jensen points out that the first Eucharist included 
candidates having a drink of sweet milk which represents the mother 
nourishing her children (cf. Hebrews 5:12).  The Church has also been seen as a 
nurturing mother; Irenaeus described the Church as enlivening and nourishing 
the faithful.158  
 
God is also portrayed as a nurturing mother in the Bible in Deuteronomy 32: 
11-12 (‘[a]s an eagle stirs up its nest, and hovers over its young the Lord alone 
guided him’).  The Psalms also support this view of God, with Psalm 8:4 
showing that God cares for human beings; Psalm 17:8 depicting God as a 
mother bird; Psalm 131:2 (‘I have calmed and quieted my soul, like a weaned 
child with its mother’).  Isaiah also has examples including Isaiah 49:15 (‘[c]an a 
woman forget her nursing child, or show no compassion for the child of her 
womb?  Even these may forget, yet I will not forget you’), and Isaiah 66:13 
(‘[a]s a mother comforts her child, so will I comfort you’).   
 
Theologians also regard God as a nurturing mother.  The Jewish writer 
Emmanuel Levinas suggests that in Numbers 11 God becomes like a mother for 
Moses, helping him with the people who seem impossible to deal with.159  
Theologian Marie-Theres Wacker regards Hosea 11 as showing God involved 
in ‘maternal activities of tending and nourishing’, with ‘maternal caring and 
feelings of the heart’.160  Wacker believes Hosea regards God as an ‘adoptive 
parent’, because God did not give birth to Israel but rather called him from 
Egypt.161  Christian feminist Elaine Storkey believes the Trinity includes God as 
                                                 
157 Ireanaeus, Against Heresies (Haer), 3.24.1 and the Church’s ‘nourishing bosom’ in 5.20.2, cited 
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Father, which incorporates God as a nurturing mother,162 thus including 
motherhood as part of God’s being.  Storkey suggests that mothers’ experiences 
are close to God’s heart ‘and the heart of God is the love, the compassion, the 
self-giving and sacrificial vulnerability that we know as mothers’.163  She 
proposes that God shows ‘attention, concern, motherly compassion, 
protectiveness, care, nurture and so on’ and says that ‘*we] can call God 
‚Daddy‛ (or ‚Mummy‛)’.164  Storkey disapproves of a cosmic mother due to its 
link to ‘goddess’.165  Stevenson-Moessner mentions God is a ‘midwife’ (Psalm 
22:9-11), a ‘mother bear’ (Hosea 13:8) and a ‘mother hen’ (Matthew 23:37).166   
 
It is not just God who is depicted as nurturing, but other women as mothers in 
the Bible too.  Andreas Köstenberger indicates that in the Old Testament, 
mothers nurtured their children by naming them,167 by defending their 
daughter’s virginity at marriage, by giving them wisdom in instruction,168 by 
‘instructing’ and ‘caring for’ her children.169  For example, Proverbs 31 suggests 
that mother’s responsibilities towards her children include providing food, 
clothing and shelter.  At birth, mothers would cut the umbilical cord, wash the 
child and put it into a cloth (cf. Ezekiel 16:3-4).  The mother would look after 
and educate the child at home during its first ten years and they would usually 
instruct their daughters to become future wives and mothers.170  Levinas in 
Otherwise than Being regards Moses as a mother who is able to bear the stranger 
whom he has ‘neither conceived nor given birth to’ (Numbers 11:12) in his 
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arms and at his breast ‘as the wet-nurse bears the nursling’.171 Therefore, Lisa 
Guenther believes that for Levinas, ethical responsibility is like a maternal 
body hosting another, bearing the other, and taking on responsibility for the 
other, like Moses in Numbers 11:12 who takes ‘responsibility for another’.172  
Köstenberger suggests that the New Testament regards women as having a 
‘God-given calling as mothers’, (citing Titus 2:4-5).173  He suggests that Paul 
regarded childbirth and mothering, i.e. the nurturing of children and home 
management, as ‘primary roles’ for women (1 Timothy 2:15 and 5:14).174  He 
believes the New Testament encourages parents to raise children ‘in the 
nurture and admonition of the Lord’ (Ephesians 6:4).175   
 
It is not only Mary and the Church who are considered to be mothers, but 
priests too, as Margaret Hebblethwaite mentions that St Bernard regarded the 
priest as a mother.176  Christianity therefore, throughout its various parts such 
as the Bible, the Church and its theological writings, depicts the complexity of 
motherhood as involving various elements such as creation, conception, 
gestation, birth, lactation and nurturance.   
 
2.10 Motherhood as Multidimensional 
 
In light of the discussion in the chapter, it can hopefully be seen that 
motherhood can be made up of many varying components including genetic, 
gestational, birth, lactation and social nurturance.  Such features of motherhood 
have been seen in Christianity in portrayals of God as a mother in the Bible and 
the Church as a mother and in the writing of theologians too.  A framework is 
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needed which allows for the various types of mothering to come together – 
even if performed by different people.  This framework will incorporate a 
range of emphases upon the different types of mothering, according to the 
needs and wishes of those involved.  The theological framework of allowing 
dialogue and negotiation could for example provide a platform for the 
surrogate and the commissioning mother to both be acknowledged as mothers.  
Such a framework could have a relational understanding, so that varying 
degrees of involvement could be allowed to exist between participants.  It may 
be that the relationships involved are unidirectional with the child seeing just 
one mother, the commissioning mother.  Alternatively, there could be a 
symmetrical, equal-regard and mutual relationship between the surrogate and 
the commissioning mother.  The relational framework though, unlike 
Browning’s is not insistent upon mutuality and equal-regard.  Relationalism 
allows for a spectrum of involvement between the surrogate and the 
commissioning mother, which would allow the surrogate to have various 
lengths of visitation access.  Therefore, a relational framework needs to be 
comprehensive and flexible enough to allow for the many dimensions of 
motherhood of the secular and Christian feminists, but to be acknowledged in 
varying ways according to the wishes of those involved, which will include the 
needs of the child too.  Chapter five will explore in more depth the relational 
framework for surrogacy. 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
 
The overall aim of this chapter has not been to develop a totally new theory of 
motherhood or of surrogacy.  Instead, its objective has been to demonstrate the 
complexity of the concept of motherhood and the inadequacies, 
oversimplification and inconsistencies of the mothering models for surrogacy 
as espoused by Whitbeck, Ruddick and Rothman, due to the type of 
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relationships involved in surrogacy and its contextual nature.  Neither 
pregnancy nor motherhood is a completely universal experience, since 
women’s experience and bodily occurrences are varied and it is difficult to give 
one definition or universal account of surrogacy or motherhood. 
 
After setting out the complexity of motherhood and the successes and failings 
of the secular feminists, attention turned to the portrayal of motherhood in the 
writings of three modern day theologians.  Here the theologians presented a 
more nuanced view of motherhood, which allowed for the various aspects of 
motherhood to be realised.  By using theological insights from the Bible and 
Christian Tradition, the theologians were able to suggest a comprehensive view 
of motherhood within a mutual framework, allowing for diverse family 
formations.  The work of the theologians seeing motherhood as involving 
diverse roles was echoed and supported by biblical imagery of God as mother 
and by the Church as mother too.  Even though the theologians’ accounts were 
not without their difficulties, they provided a more comprehensive background 
to develop further a relational framework, which will allow for varying 
emphasis upon the different types of motherhood in surrogacy.   
 
A relational theme will be explored more fully in the following chapters.  The 
next chapter, chapter three, will explore the issues of commodification, 
exploitation and coercion in paid surrogacy.  Chapter four will focus upon 
accusations of baby selling in surrogacy in order to highlight the ongoing need 
for a new relational framework for the practice.  The final chapter five will 
question the suitability of a contractarian framework and an adoption model 
for surrogacy and instead, offer an alternative relational framework.  
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CHAPTER THREE COMMODIFICATION, EXPLOITATION, AND 
COERCION IN SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD   
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As previously indicated, the aim of this thesis is to suggest that a relational 
ethical framework can be used as a basis for surrogacy.  A relational 
framework provides a basis for thinking through the relationship between the 
surrogate, the commissioning couple and the child.  As seen in chapter two, 
motherhood can be considered multidimensional and a relational approach 
could possibly accommodate the complexity of motherhood in surrogacy.  
However, before attending to that directly, this chapter considers some 
standard ethical objections to paid surrogacy, including commodification, 
exploitation and coercion, and how they impact upon the child, the surrogate, 
and the commissioning couple.  Critics of paid surrogacy include Phyllis 
Chesler, who regards it as immoral to treat human beings as a commodity,1 and 
George Annas, who considers paid surrogacy to be ‘the exploitation of women 
and infertile couples, and the dehumanization of babies’.2  Other concerns 
include paid surrogates being treated as objects, as mere means to an end, 
losing their dignity and being degraded.  This chapter lays the foundation for 
chapter four which assesses whether surrogacy involves baby selling.  These 
two chapters do not aim fully to defend surrogacy commercialisation as good 
practice, but to investigate and analyse the criticisms of it.  It is suggested that 
the association of money with surrogacy does not necessarily lead to typical 
capitalistic rhetoric simply because it is a commercial practice.  It is proposed 
that paying surrogates can be appropriate in some cases, giving women 
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2 George J. Annas, ‘The Baby Broker Boom’, The Hastings Center Report 16 (1986), 30-1, at 31. 
165 
 
economic empowerment within a context of a caring surrogacy relationship, 
but there is a need for caution and regulation to prevent possible problems 
such as commodification, exploitation and coercion.   
 
Attention now focuses upon the image of God and human dignity along with 
their implications. 
 
3.2 The Image of God (the Imago Dei) and Human Dignity 
 
In order to understand the basis of possible commodification, exploitation and 
coercion in surrogacy, we need to think theologically by analysing the image of 
God.  The most common theological grounding of human dignity as the basis 
for opposition to commodification lies in the biblical notion of the image of 
God.  According to Genesis 1:26-7, human beings are created in God’s image 
(tselem) and likeness (d’muth), giving them dignity and importance so they are 
not mere instruments.  Human beings are commanded to rule the earth in 
Genesis 1:28 and 2:15, reflecting their dignity as rulers.3  The Fathers regarded 
the imago Dei as connected with reason, physical nature (Tertullian)4 and a 
status given by God (Origen).5  Therefore human beings have ‘universal and 
inviolable’ rights and duties according to Vatican II.6  Peter Bristow believes 
man’s rationality also gives him dignity and an elevated position in the world.7  
The imago Dei was distinguished from the likeness of God which is linked to 
                                                 
3 Stephen Riley, ‘Observing the Breach: Dignity and the Limits of Political Theology’, Law 
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4 David J. Atkinson, and David H. Field, The New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral 
Theology (Leicester: IVP, 1995), 477. 
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original righteousness,8 God’s eternity (Tertullian)9 and human imitation of 
God (Origen).10  However, the Reformers, unlike Roman Catholicism, regarded 
both image and likeness as the same.11   
 
The imago Dei is also connected to Christology, since Christians regard Christ 
as God incarnate, his perfect humanity reflecting his perfect divinity.  
Colossians 1:15-16 describes Christ as ‘the image of the invisible God, the 
firstborn of all creation’, and all things as created in him.  Through Christ, 
Christians become new persons and have their sins purified since Jesus reflects 
God’s being (Hebrews 1:3), therefore the new self of Christians is created 
according to God’s likeness (Ephesians 4:24).  
 
Another view of dignity is a relational view.  Roman Catholic theologian Louis 
Janssens highlights dignity as a basis for how we treat others in our 
relationships.  Human beings cannot be treated as objects towards our goals, 
but are to be respected as persons with their dignity promoted.  Janssens 
considers human beings as subjects who cannot be treated as mere means or 
exploited.12  He regarded actions as morally good if they serve human dignity, 
if they benefit the whole person in their relationships with the world, with 
others socially and with God.13   
 
We now turn to the imago Dei as presented by Helmut Thielicke and Paul 
Ramsey; two prominent Christian ethicists of the twentieth century, who 
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tended to take a biblical and theological view, whereas others, like Janssens, 
took a more philosophical approach.   
 
3.2.1 The Imago Dei According to Helmut Thielicke14 
 
Human beings are made in God’s image and likeness.  This gives us self worth, 
which affects how others treat us and how we treat others.  Theologian Helmut 
Thielicke regarded human beings as having infinite worth based upon an ‘alien 
dignity’, coming from God (45).  Only in Christ do we find the imago Dei 
fulfilled, which we as human beings can partake in and thus have a 
relationship with God, reflecting God’s glory and agape love (46).  Karen 
Lebacqz notes that some criticise alien dignity for being external to us and not 
intrinsically part of us, making God distant and omnipotent compared to 
human beings.  Human beings only reflect the imago Dei which comes from 
God’s glory (47).  But, Lebacqz argues, God partakes and shares our human 
suffering and is not remote (48).  
 
Five parts to alien dignity exist.  Firstly, alien dignity protects people, giving 
them worth.  Human dignity is ‘alien’ because it is given to human beings as 
part of their creation from God’s love (48).  Human dignity is not earned or 
lost, is non-transferable and inalienable (49).  Therefore human beings may not 
be valued instrumentally or used as a mere means; people have worth even if 
they lose their functional capacities.  Human beings cannot be possessed fully 
by another, nor are the different parts of a person to be separated out by 
                                                 
14 The page references in brackets in section 3.2.1 refer to Karen Lebacqz, ‘Alien Dignity: The 
Legacy of Helmut Thielicke for Bioethics’, in Allen Verhey (ed.), Religion and Medical Ethics: 
Looking Back, Looking Forward (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 44-60. 
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objectifying them since human beings are wholes with an ‘indivisible totality’ 
(50-1).   
 
Secondly, alien dignity equalises people.  Human worth comes from God, 
making us equal, despite differences.  Human life has immeasurable value, so 
we cannot compare people’s dignity.  Alien dignity is an expression of God’s 
love, giving people a unique and incomparable value (51-2).  Thirdly, alien 
dignity requires a personal response.  Thielicke regards alien dignity as an ‘I-
Thou’ relationship involving personal responsibilities (54).  Agape involves 
responding to the alien dignity of others, and dignity becomes a personal 
response involving responsibility for others’ needs (54).  Fourthly, alien dignity 
requires a structural response.  Thielicke was reluctant to see care 
institutionalised, rationalised or routinized, preferring personal responsibility.  
He favoured people receiving agape or charity over claiming welfare as a right 
(55-7).  Thielicke believed rights and claims lead people into hostile and 
opposing relationships, preferring instead a partnership as the basis of 
Christian action.  In contemporary politics the language of partnership is used 
as an alternative to the language of entitlement.  Fifthly, alien dignity is 
regarded as relational, occurring in our relationship with God and others.  God 
gives us dignity by loving us; others acknowledge our dignity by acting from 
agape towards us (57).   
 
From Thielicke we can learn that alien dignity means that God regards people 
as subjects and they are not to be degraded by being used as mere objects.  
Others cannot be regarded as ‘passive recipient*s+ of our actions’ or just valued 
for their usefulness (56).  Alien dignity prevents owning people, objectification, 
oppression, instrumentalisation and imposing our aims upon them.  People 
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have dignity and are to be treated equally while acknowledging their 
differences.   
 
3.2.2 The Imago Dei in Paul Ramsey’s Basic Christian Ethics15 
 
Paul Ramsey regards man’s creation in God’s image as a basic principle of 
Christian morality (249).  Ramsey outlines two theories of the imago Dei and 
human nature, the substantial form and a relational form.  Firstly the 
substantial form believes there is an inner capacity of the mind within human 
nature which distinguishes us from animals.  This inner capacity is linked to 
God’s image and is connected to the Stoic idea of a divine spark being inside 
everyone.  Aristotle regarded man as having reason and rationality, reflecting 
God’s image (250-1).  However, Ramsey criticised the substantial form of the 
imago Dei for equating human nature with the divine (254).   
 
Instead, Ramsey prefers a second relational view for understanding the imago 
Dei and human nature.  He uses an analogy of a mirror reflecting an object’s 
image.  The imago Dei is not connected with something within us, such as 
reason or culture and history, but occurs by being in a ‘responsive relationship 
to God’ (254), reflecting God’s will and actions.  The imago Dei is reflected in 
human beings due to their position before God (255).  Jesus allows us to be 
changed into God’s glory and likeness (2 Corinthians 4:6 and 3:18), therefore 
the imago Dei is not defined by human nature but is found in Christ’s love, 
humility and obedience, reflecting God’s glory (259).   
 
                                                 
15 Pages numbers in section 3.2.2 refer to Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1950).  
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Ramsey’s relational view of the imago Dei does have some positive parts, but 
his view of human nature also has some negative aspects too.  He regards 
human beings as subservient, who become ‘nothing through the act of 
worship’ to quote Kierkegaard (257).  Human rationality is considered 
‘rebellious’ unless obeying God (264).  For Ramsey, a human being standing in 
the imago Dei is ‘least concerned about his own value’ (354).  In the relationship 
of the imago Dei, individual rights are overlooked: ‘*w+hen man ceases to reflect 
the image of God and begins simply to reflect upon himself and his own rights, 
he is no longer in the image of God’ (354).   
 
However, many believe human beings in Christ are glorified, having a restored 
relationship with God.  God loves us as we are and we can grow spiritually 
with God.  Our self-interest, wants, needs and rights matter without resorting 
to selfishness or egotism.  In Christ, Christians are forgiven, restored and can 
fulfil their God-given plan and potential, which personally enhances them.  
Human beings are not robots, without free will, but can live life in fullness.  It 
could be argued that Christians should not have to imitate Christ’s self-
sacrificial obedience which leads to the loss of the self on the cross, but they 
should live in the power of the resurrection allowing for self-growth and 
development, since Christ’s sacrificial redemption was a one-off act done for 
all.   
 
It is important to be aware of the way a major theologian such as Ramsey has 
understood a relational view of the imago Dei.  However, his view of 
relationalism has its weaknesses.  I believe Ramsey has a negative view of self-
interest, since he favours agape and self-sacrifice as the basis for human 
obedience to God.  An alternative relational understanding of the imago Dei 
incorporates a more positive understanding of self-interest and acknowledges 
171 
 
the importance of the other which will be explored in chapter four.  An 
alternative view of relationalism and its significance for surrogacy is developed 
in chapter five.  
 
3.2.3 The Implications of Being Made in the Imago Dei 
 
Since human beings are created by God in his image, all humans have worth 
and value.  Jerome Wernow suggests that being created in the imago Dei means 
that human beings are equal,16 that the imago Dei has moral content and is 
linked to choosing to be righteous and holy including universal moral norms.  
Lactantius in his Divine Institutes says that human beings who are in God’s 
image are to give their dues to God and give love, justice and protect them, 
instead of harming others.17  Dónal O’Mathuna regards being in the imago Dei 
as encouraging people to ensure that their attitudes and actions reflect and give 
glory to God by taking responsibility for the ‘ethical impact of their actions’.18  
James Childress regards human beings as ‘God’s representatives’ in his 
kingdom, who are to rule like God and ‘should not be exploitative’.19   
 
Different theologians have taken alternative views towards the practical 
implications of the imago Dei.  John Wilkinson regards human beings as having 
‘a status and dignity’ for being made in God’s image which limits the ‘nature 
and extent’ of experimentation to prevent them being demeaned or 
                                                 
16 Jerome R. Wernow, ‘Saying the Unsaid: Quality of Life Criteria in a Sanctity of Life Position’, 
in John F. Kilner et al. (ed.), Bioethics and the Future of Medicine: A Christian Appraisal (Carlisle, 
Cumbria: Paternoster, 1995), 93-111, at 102. 
17 McGrath, The Christian Theology Reader, 215-6. 
18 Dónal P. O’ Mathứna, ‘The Bible and Abortion: What of the ‚Image of God?‛’, in Kilner et al., 
Bioethics and the Future of Medicine, 199-211, at 204. 
19 John Macquarrie and James Childress (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics (London: 
SCM Press, 1986), 293. 
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humiliated.20  Ted Peters believes human beings in the imago Dei are ‘co-
creators’ and should use our ‘scientific and technological creativity’ to serve 
others with beneficence and neighbour love.21  For surrogacy, the imago Dei 
could mean all the participants treat each other with dignity, care and respect, 
allowing for valid and autonomous decisions during the pregnancy while 
being aware of each other’s needs.  Dignity takes people’s interests, welfare 
and human flourishing into consideration, so they are treated as ends and not 
objectified.  Writing about children being sold in commercial surrogacy, Scott 
Rae adheres to the view that people have inherent worth, dignity and value.  
Having the imago Dei therefore means their value cannot be considered in 
monetary, market-based terms.  Human beings cannot be sold, as human 
dignity would be violated.22  Christian writer Judith Bellow Khazoum regards 
surrogacy as an ‘inherently wrong’, ‘degrading and unnatural’.23  The Church 
of England document Personal Origins suggests surrogacy undermines the 
dignity of women to bear children they do not intend to mother, especially if 
paid.24   
 
We have seen that the Bible regards human beings as made in God’s image; 
giving them intrinsic dignity.  Also, Janssens’ philosophical discussion of 
human dignity attempts to do justice to the fundamental theological insight.  
                                                 
20 John Wilkinson, Christian Ethics in Health Care: A Source Book for Christian Doctors, Nurses and 
Other Health Care Professionals (Edinburgh: The Handsel Press, 1988), 366-7.  References to 
Wilkinson in the rest of the chapter do not relate to John Wilkinson, but to Stephen Wilkinson, 
see n. 26. 
21 Ted Peters, Playing God? Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom (London: Routledge, 1997), 
161. 
22 Scott B. Rae, ‘Pregnancy for Profit? Legal and Moral Perspectives on Commercial Surrogate 
Motherhood’, in Kilner et al., Bioethics and the Future of Medicine, 227-37, at 233. 
23 Judith L. Bellow Khazoum, ‘The Ethics of Surrogate Motherhood’, Dialog 28 (1989), 191-7, at 
197. 
24 The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the Church of England, Personal 
Origins (London: Church House, 2nd ed., 1996), 59.   
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Generally Catholics have focused on dignity and Protestants on the image of 
God.  Dignity is important for both Christian theological and philosophical 
reasons and the grounds for rejecting any commodification, objectification, 
exploitation or coercion of human beings.  Attention now turns to whether the 
child, surrogate and commissioning couple are affected by commodification, 
exploitation and coercion in paid surrogacy.  By looking at these areas, 
alternative views to those expressed by Khazoum and Personal Origins above 
are explored.   
 
3.3 The Child in Paid Surrogacy 
 
3.3.1 Introduction  
 
The first participant to consider is the child.  Some believe paid surrogacy is 
immoral for treating children as commodified products.25  Section 3.3 focuses 
upon child commodification in nine subsections: defining commodification 
(3.3.2), how payment affects the child (3.3.3), child objectification (3.3.4), 
children treated as mere means to an end (3.3.5), children as fungible (3.3.6), 
the domino theory that all surrogacy children are commodified (3.3.7), 
psychological harm to children born of surrogacy (3.3.8), and harm to the 
surrogate’s own child*ren+ (3.3.9).  The final section (3.3.10) calls for research.  
Each section starts with objections, followed by counter arguments which I 
tend to favour, which suggest that paid surrogacy does not have to involve 
child commodification.    
 
3.3.2 Definition of Commodification 
                                                 
25 The Brazier Report believed a child would be commodified see Department of Health and 
Social Security, Surrogacy (The Brazier Report) (London: HMSO, 1998), (i) paragraph four.   
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To assess whether child commodification occurs in surrogacy, we need to be 
clear about the terminology used.  Commodification in a ‘broad sense’ refers to 
all things traded, usually involving monetary exchanges within a market.26  
Stephen Wilkinson distinguishes between two types of commodification.27  
Firstly, non-moral or descriptive commodification involves the buying and 
selling of commodities and is socially acceptable.28  Secondly, normative 
commodification can be an adverse ethical concept and is a type of 
objectification and wrongfully involves treating something as a mere object, 
which should not be regarded in that way.29  Treating a person as a commodity 
includes having a commodifying attitude towards them.30  If a person is treated 
wrongly as a mere means to achieve another’s goals,31 then their dignity, their 
subjectivity, personhood and intrinsic value are ignored by disrespectful 
treatment.32  Objectification is also called ‘wrongful use exploitation’ (see 
section 3.5.5).33   
 
Normative commodification can also involve wrongful fungibility, where we 
wrongly treat someone as fungible (i.e. interchangeable), by regarding them as 
an object.34  Wrongful fungibility goes against Kant’s argument that people 
have rational wills, dignity and equal worth over mere price, by not giving 
                                                 
26 Stephen Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 46 and 48.  References to Wilkinson in the rest of the chapter are to Stephen 
Wilkinson. 
27 Ibid., 45. 
28 Ibid., 44. 
29 Ibid., 27 and 44-45. 
30 Ibid., 46. 
31 Ibid., 55. 
32 Ibid., 36. 
33 Ibid., 27. 
34 Ibid., 46-8. 
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people dignity and seeing them in monetary terms.35  Kant wanted to respect 
people as ends-in-themselves, so they are separated from and are above market 
prices.36  Kant articulates a core insight or truth given to us in the Christian 
tradition: the notion of the end in itself, though not fully capturing everything 
said in the image of God, does capture a core insight.  It is a violation of the 
intrinsic dignity of human beings to be bought and sold as commodities, since 
turning them into mere products cheapens their existence.   
 
Sometimes people can be interchangeable without losing their dignity or 
respect, as long as they are not treated as a mere means to an end.  A person 
may not be bothered which bus driver they have as long as they do the job 
competently.  It is acceptable though to treat commodities such as cocoa beans 
as fungible, since they are replaceable inanimate objects.  Wilkinson suggests 
that if money is not involved it is a matter not of commodification but of 
fungibilisation, or objectification, where something is treated as a commodity 
without monetary involvement.37   
 
3.3.3 Claim One: Effect of Payment in Surrogacy upon the Child 
 
The first claim of commodification upon the child in surrogacy is that wealthy 
commissioning couples could demand specific eugenic characteristics in the 
children they are paying for.  In genetic surrogacy, they could pay more to 
select a surrogate with particular genetic traits such as high IQ, eye, hair and 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 46. Kant says: ‘In the realm of ends everything either has either a price or a dignity.  
Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, 
whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity’, see Immanuel 
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1959), 51.  
36 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 47 and 51-2.  
37 Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale, 46-8. 
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skin colour or in gestational surrogacy they could screen and implant the 
embryos which match their criteria, such as a particular sex.  Commodification 
could lead to disabled embryos being considered as imperfect merchandise and 
rejected.  Societal eugenic pressure could increase quality control over 
procreation for perfect children.  Children could become degraded and lose 
their dignity.  Children born without selection may be bullied by peers as 
‘cheap’ if purchased at a lower price compared to their ‘dearer’ friends.  
Children’s personhood and human flourishing could be wronged if regarded 
in market terms.38  Successful selection could lead parents to feeling happy 
with their ‘product’ and treat the child well.   
 
However, regulated surrogacy does not have to include selecting foetus’ 
attributes, but for some, such selection could prevent sex-linked genetic 
conditions.  Clinics are expected to assess the child’s welfare, which would 
probably prevent screening gametes for social reasons.  Preventing couples 
from paying more if a child has particular features would reduce 
commodification.  Most commissioning couples in surrogacy just want to have 
a child they are ‘genetically related to’.39  Alice, aged 13, born of gestational 
surrogacy, commented that no one at school had teased her about surrogacy, 
until one pupil accused her of being abnormal and called her the teacher’s pet 
for being a ‘test-tube kid’.40  However, she thought it was ‘stupid’ as he did not 
understand why her birth was different and that IVF is common and does not 
involve a test-tube.41  She regarded him as ‘just another bully who bullied 
                                                 
38 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’, Harvard Law Review 100 (1987), 1849-937, at 
1927-8. 
39 Debra Satz, ‘Markets in Women’s Reproductive Labor’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992), 
107-31, at 119. 
40 M. Kirkman, and A. Kirkman, ‘Sister-to-Sister Gestational ‚Surrogacy‛ 13 Years On: A 
Narrative of Parenthood’, Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 20 (2002), 135-47, at 145. 
41
 Ibid., 145. 
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everyone’ and she considered it less embarrassing to be conceived in a Petri 
dish than by parental sex.42  As a child, she might have been embarrassed at the 
thought of her parents having sexual intercourse, but that does not mean it is 
embarrassing to be conceived that way.  In her evidence of life as a surrogate 
child, no mention of commodification was made.43 
 
3.3.4 Claim Two: The Child is an Object  
 
The second concern regarding paid surrogacy upon the child is that payment 
could turn children into commercial products, alienable pieces of property to 
be bargained over and disposed of at the surrogate’s will.  A commissioning 
couple may believe they have bought the child’s parental and custody rights 
from the surrogate and can treat it as they like.  Children may develop a 
harmful commodified attitude towards themselves from how their parents 
treat them.  Children could feel pressured to live up to their buyers’ 
expectations for being an expensive product.  Commodification could devalue 
all children, ‘treating them like products or pets for our own pleasure’.44  Mia 
Kellmer-Pringle criticises attitudes regarding children as consumer durables to 
complete a family.45  Participants in unpaid surrogacy could also demonstrate 
an objectified attitude by treating the child as a disposable object.  A 
commissioning father from Michigan, who only wanted a girl, accepted the 
female baby when his surrogate gave birth to a boy and a girl, but the boy was 
placed in foster care, until the surrogate and her husband won custody of both 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 145.  
43 Ibid., 142-5. 
44 George J. Annas, ‘Death Without Dignity for Commercial Surrogacy: The Case of Baby M’, 
The Hastings Center Report 18 (1988), 21-4, at 22. 
45 Mia Kellmer-Pringle, The Needs of Children (London: Hutchinson, 1977), 69-70, cited in 
Michael Freeman, ‘Is Surrogacy Exploitative?’, in Shelia McLean (ed.), Legal Issues in Human 
Reproduction (London: Gower, 1989), 164-84, at 175. 
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children.46  One boyfriend of a surrogate regarded the baby as ‘absolutely 
nothing’ and they were:  
 
in it for the money: it’s a business.  That’s the way we look at it.47   
 
Usually commercial transactions occur within an open market, with profit 
motives, allowing anyone with money to buy.  Business dealings usually 
involve advertisements, bulk purchases, special offers, cost cutting activities, 
sale targets and stockpiles waiting for customers.  However, paid surrogacy 
does not have to operate as a commercial practice with typical market rhetoric.  
Firstly, commercial surrogacy agencies cannot legally operate in the UK, 
surrogates cannot advertise their services and they select their commissioning 
couple.  Secondly, many commercial marketing techniques are not found in 
surrogacy.  Surrogates carrying twins do not offer bulk purchase discounts, or 
offer a sale reduction for January births, disabled children are not reduced as 
damaged goods, surrogates do not stockpile babies at home waiting for buyers.  
Thirdly, most surrogates do not see surrogacy as a business transaction, thus 
reducing the likelihood of their regarding the child as a commodity.48  
Practicing surrogacy with a set fee and not as a commercial practice reduces 
commodification, since twins would not cost more, as all surrogacy would cost 
the same.  Surrogacy does not involve an ‘unfettered’ commercial baby market 
since surrogates do not bear a child in order to auction it to the highest 
                                                 
46 Janna C. Merrick, ‘Selling Reproductive Rights: Policy Issues in Surrogate Motherhood’, 
Politics and the Life Sciences 8 (1990), 161-72, at 165. 
47 The New York Times Magazine 29 March 1987, 33, cited in Lenore Kuo, ‘The Morality of 
Surrogate Parenting’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (1989), 361-80, at 361.  
48 Heléna Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 
123-4, see also 121, which has similar views from a commissioning couple.   
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bidder.49  Therefore, monetary involvement in paid surrogacy may not be 
detrimental to children. 
 
3.3.5 Claim Three: The Child is Used as a Mere Means to an End 
 
The third fear of the effect of payment upon children in surrogacy is that they 
will no longer evoke unconditional maternal love, obligation, duty or 
responsibility.  Pregnancy becomes a job, deliberately creating a child without 
the intention to raise it.  Children become merely a means for surrogates’ 
financial gain - to satisfy their own ends instead of fulfilling children’s needs.  
Children could suffer negligence if surrogates take an instrumental attitude to 
pregnancy and distance and alienate themselves from the child.  The 
surrogates could treat the child disrespectfully with indignity; possibly putting 
its life at risk by smoking heavily or drinking excessively because it is not hers.  
The surrogate may not care about the child’s welfare; preferring to have a 
commissioning couple who pay the most, instead of the one most likely to 
provide a loving home.  
 
However, surrogates usually love children and want others to experience the 
joys of parenting.  Surrogates have usually completed their families and gestate 
or procreate and gestate an additional child, which they regard as belonging to 
the commissioning couple for them to love.  Screening could prevent selection 
of participants with purely commodifying attitudes.  Surrogates do not 
abandon the child but help to create or gestate a child for a commissioning 
couple to become parents.  Most surrogates are concerned for the child’s 
welfare and carefully select which commissioning couple to work with.  Some 
women will not choose to be surrogates unless they can choose which 
                                                 
49 Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale, 147-8. 
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commissioning couples to associate with.50  Most surrogacy children are told of 
their surrogate mother’s identity and many surrogates continue to play a part 
in the child’s life after birth.    
 
The infertile do not approach families to sell their existing children, nor do they 
pressurise women who have conceived a baby with their husband to relinquish 
it.  The commissioning couple have usually gone to great lengths to have a 
child due to infertility or difficult circumstances such as a hysterectomy from 
uterine cancer.  They are usually keen to love and parent this particular wanted 
child born of surrogacy.  Most commissioning couples long for a child, thus 
reducing the probability of them harming or treating the child as a mere 
product.  This is demonstrated in a couple of studies by Susan Golombok.  In 
the first study, 42 families with children aged one, conceived through 
surrogacy, were compared to 51 families with children from egg donation and 
80 families with children conceived naturally.  It was found that the surrogacy 
families had higher levels of psychological well-being and adaptation to 
parenting compared to the parents of naturally conceived children.51  Towards 
their children, the commissioning couples demonstrated higher levels of 
warmth, attachment, acceptance and enjoyment of parenting with lower 
parenting stress levels and depression than parents of naturally conceived 
children.52  In the second study, 37 surrogacy families with children aged two 
were compared to 48 egg donation families and 68 families with children 
                                                 
50 Private conversation with a surrogate at The University of Westminster, GEDR Egg Donation 
Conference, 8 February 2003, who had presumably spoken with other surrogates.  I telephoned 
COTS, (Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy, one of the major surrogacy agencies in 
the UK) in August 2012 who confirmed that all surrogates select which commissioning couples 
they would like to meet from information about them.  The surrogate’s details are then passed 
on to the commissioning couples, who decide if they would like to speak to her and then meet 
her. 
51 Susan Golombok et al., ‘Families Created Through Surrogacy Arrangements: Parent-Child 
Relationships in the 1st Year of Life’, Developmental Psychology 40 (2004), 400-11. 
52 Ibid., 404-8. 
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conceived naturally.53  It was suggested that the commissioning couples were 
motivated, committed parents who had positive relationships with a higher 
quality of parenting with their children than the parents of naturally conceived 
children.54  At the age of two, surrogate children had lower levels of aggression 
than naturally conceived children.55   
 
Leonard Fleck indicates that the child’s existence can be regarded as ‘an act of 
love’ and not profit-making, since the child is an end in itself and not a means 
to an end.56  Commissioning mother Rona Walker disliked American surrogacy 
involving large payments, believing that it did not serve the child’s interests.  
She thought that surrogacy does not have to be ‘exploitative, or encouraging 
women to sell themselves’.57  Ninety percent of American surrogates 
considered payment to be a ‘decisive, but not the sole, motive’58 to becoming a 
surrogate, as they also wanted to be happy being pregnant, display altruism, 
and overcome guilt connected to earlier abortions.59  Even though surrogacy 
could be a positive experience for the surrogate wanting to overcome an 
abortion, the surrogate will hopefully have been screened to come to terms 
with her guilt and that she will not regret handing the child over.  Surrogacy 
does not have to be conducted negatively, but ethically with regulation, which 
will be discussed later. 
 
                                                 
53 Susan Golombok et al., ‘Surrogacy Families: Parental Functioning, Parent-child Relationships 
and Children’s Psychological Development at Age 2’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 
47 (2006), 213-22, at 213. 
54 Ibid., 219. 
55 Ibid., 217. 
56 Leonard M. Fleck, ‘Surrogate Motherhood: Is it Morally Equivalent to Selling Babies?’, Logos: 
Philosophical Issues in Christian Perspective 9 (1988), 135-45, at 143.  
57 Rona Walker, Love Child: Our Surrogate Baby (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), 178.  
58 Miroslav Prokopijević, ‘Surrogate Motherhood’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 7 (1990), 169-81, 
at 175. 
59 Ibid., 175. 
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3.3.6 Claim Four: The Child is Treated as Fungible 
 
A fourth concern regarding payment upon the child is that commissioning 
couples could regard their existing children as fungible and use paid surrogacy 
to upgrade and replace them.  J. Robert Prichard believes people will buy a 
newborn child to ‘trade up’ and ‘trade in’ unsatisfactory children.60  Even 
though Prichard referred to paid adoption, his ideas could be applied to paid 
surrogacy.  Surrogacy could be used to buy a new child from a surrogate with a 
high IQ to replace an existing child with lower intelligence.    
 
However, most commissioning couples do not treat the child as a commodity 
as they initiated its existence, intend to parent it and are often genetically 
related.  The surrogate assists in the procreation of an additional wanted child 
for others to parent.  The commissioning couple’s motivation of wanting to 
parent a child helps to bring the specific surrogate child into existence.  The 
child should not suffer because the commissioning couple plan to provide for 
its needs and treat it with dignity.   
 
Once a child is born from a surrogacy arrangement, laws exist to protect it, and 
parents are expected to give unconditional love with their parental duties.  
John Robertson indicates that commissioning couples cannot:  
 
buy the right to treat the child...as a commodity or property.  Child abuse and neglect 
laws still apply, with criminal and civil sanctions available for mistreatment.61   
 
                                                 
60 J. Robert S. Prichard, ‘A Market for Babies?’, University of Toronto Law Journal 34 (1984), 341-
57, at 349. 
61 John A. Robertson, ‘Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All’, The Hastings Center Report 13 
(1983), 28-34, at 33.   
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Commissioning couples cannot sell the child on a ‘whim’,62 nor can the 
commissioning father ‘destroy, transfer or abandon the child’.63   
 
The intrinsic worth of children is beyond money and money cannot be a fair 
exchange for a child, as it is inappropriate to put a value on a child’s life.  Child 
commodification in surrogacy can be lessened since most participants do not 
believe payment reflects the child’s or surrogate’s worth, since children and 
women are intrinsically priceless.  Some paid surrogates regard the child as a 
gift to the commissioning couple and associate surrogacy with kinship, human 
relations, and not money.64  One surrogate stated: ‘*y+ou can’t put a price on a 
baby’s life’.65  Richard Epstein suggests that surrogacy may not turn children 
into commodities because commodities are consumed and fungible, whereas 
children are unique and irreplaceable.66  Consequently, participants in paid 
surrogacy may treat the child as precious and sacred with intrinsic worth, 
despite payment.   
 
3.3.7 Claim Five: The Domino Theory – All Children are Commodified 
 
A fifth concern regarding children in paid surrogacy is that payment could 
lead to a ‘domino effect’.  Here all children are regarded as commodified 
products and they rate their dignity and self-worth according to parental 
payments.  This could be understood in Hobbesian terms, according to which 
                                                 
62 Michael J. Meyer, ‘The Idea of Selling in Surrogate Motherhood’, Public Affairs Quarterly 4 
(1990), 175-88, at 180-1. 
63 Satz, ‘Markets in Women’s Reproductive Labor’, 120. 
64 Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, 59. 
65 Heléna Ragoné, ‘The Gift of Life: Surrogate Motherhood, Gamete Donation and 
Constructions of Altruism’, in Rachel Cook et al. (eds.), Surrogate Motherhood: International 
Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2003), 209-26, at 214. 
66 See Richard A. Epstein, ‘Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement’, Virginia Law 
Review 81 (1995), 2305-41, at 2326-38, in Denise E. Lascarides, ‘A Plea for the Enforceability of 
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts’, Hofstra Law Review 25 (1997), 1221-59, at 1237. 
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‘*t]he value, or WORTH of man, is as of all other things, his price’.67  Margaret 
Radin wants to ban market-led surrogacy to prevent child commodification.68  
She approves unpaid surrogacy which occurs without: sale, ‘supply or demand 
pricing...advertising and marketing, stockpiling’ or commodification of 
participants.69  Radin regards unpaid surrogacy as aiding human flourishing, 
but believes it cannot operate alongside paid surrogacy, as a market framework 
would ‘drive out’ the nonmarket version.70  She assumes the domino theory 
develops by turning payment for one, into commodification of all: ‘once the 
fact of market value enters our discourse, it must be present in, and dominate, 
every *emphasis added+ transaction’.71  Therefore commodification of some 
surrogate children leads a domino effect of all being commodified.72  Radin 
fears non-surrogate children will measure their capital worth, parents will 
compare their children’s prices, human flourishing and personhood will suffer 
by creating ‘class, race and gender divisions’.73   
 
Heather Widdows is concerned over the ‘negative cumulative social effects’ of 
the NRTs (new reproductive technologies)74 and possible objectification of all 
children when parents select their children’s physical attributes, such as sex, 
race, eye colour, IQ, unless done for medical reasons in order to have a healthy 
child.75  She fears the selection and resulting commodification would not 
                                                 
67 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford University Press, 1996), 
chapter 10, paragraph 16.  
68 Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’, 1935-6. 
69 Ibid., 1855. 
70 Ibid., 1923 and 1933-7. 
71 Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, Body Parts 
and Other Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 101. 
72 Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’, 1933. 
73 Ibid., 1926-7. 
74 Heather Widdows, ‘Persons and Their Parts: New Reproductive Technologies and Risks of 
Commodification’, Health Care Analysis 17 (2009), 36-46, at 38. 
75 Ibid., 38-9 and 45. 
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acknowledge a person’s ‘ethical significance’ or ‘equal moral status’,76 leading 
to parental disappointment regarding their children if expectations are unmet.77  
As body parts are connected to persons, then the commodification of body 
parts may lead to commodification of persons.78 
 
However, I believe Radin’s and Widdows’ claims are possibly exaggerated and 
speculative and do not reflect surrogacy practice.  To suggest that all 
transactions are commodified if payment is involved, that children will feel 
their only value is monetary, and that women’s features are commodified for 
all women, is to overstate the case without conclusive evidence.  Radin admits 
the effects of the domino theory are ‘remote’, that fathers do not attach a 
monetary value to their genes, therefore children born from paid surrogacy do 
not have to be seen as fully commodified, thus lessening the domino effect.79  
Radin confesses that women’s reproduction does not appear ‘as commodified 
as their sexuality’ and she does not know if this is due to them being 
commodification-resistant or if it develops later.80  However, she thinks that the 
effects of the domino effect are serious enough to stop paid surrogacy.81  
Widdows admits the question whether the NRTs change expectations towards 
children and all children is ‘under-theorised and under-researched’.82  She 
accepts that some believe that if parents select their child’s body parts and 
attributes it does not commodify people.83  However, universalised 
commodification of all children in society from the effects of paid IVF has not 
occurred and far more people choose IVF than surrogacy, which has only about 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 40-1. 
77 Ibid., 39-40. 
78 Ibid., 41. 
79 Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’, 1933. 
80 Ibid., 1933. 
81 Radin, Contested Commodities, 145. 
82 Widdows, ‘Persons and Their Parts’, 38. 
83 Ibid., 41. 
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40 to 50 births a year in the UK.  Radin also ignores the surrogacy context, since 
for many surrogates, their actions aid their human flourishing; she regards 
theories supporting context as possibly harming people.84  Therefore, she may 
be reluctant to support cases where surrogates spend the money received on 
their education as not really aiding their human flourishing, despite surrogates 
enjoying surrogacy and furthering their careers through additional education.  
 
3.3.8 Claim Six: Children Born of Surrogacy are Psychologically Harmed 
 
A sixth concern regarding payment upon the child in paid surrogacy is that a 
child born from surrogacy could suffer psychological harm.  Such harm could 
include low self-esteem, rejection and insecurity, knowing that their natural 
mother was paid to deliberately conceive them and sell them to the 
commissioning couple.  The child could feel commodified and resent its 
gestational mother for abandoning it instead of loving it.  Children may suffer 
if surrogacy is used as an alternative to adoption, circumventing stringent 
checks upon the commissioning couple, allowing some to become parents who 
would have been rejected due to health or social factors.  Michelle Moody-
Adams warns that a child born from surrogacy could later lose self-respect, 
respect and trust for others, and might fear being sold if unsatisfactory.85 
 
However, I believe that if the context of paid surrogacy is explained to the 
children then fears of resale are alleviated, seeing their conception as wanted 
and longed for.  One study found that 42 commissioning couples with a one-
year-old born through surrogacy all told their family and friends about 
                                                 
84 Radin, Contested Commodities, 62. 
85 Michelle M. Moody-Adams, ‘On Surrogacy: Morality, Markets, and Motherhood’, 
Public Affairs Quarterly 5 (1991), 175-90, at 183.  
187 
 
surrogacy and planned to tell the child.86  Alice, the 13-year-old born from 
gestational surrogacy, commented that her relationship with her gestational 
surrogate was as aunt and niece ‘just the way it should be’.87  She comments 
that some people told her she would think she had been given away, but she 
knows is not true and knows the children of her surrogate are her cousins and 
not her siblings.88  Alice, when aged 7 or 8, told her social mother that she was 
not her mother and that she could not boss her about, adding that she was ‘a 
terrible mother’ and she should not have had her and her infertility was for a 
‘good reason’.89  Her mother was not upset by it because she was confident in 
her role as her mother and took it as the words of a child, angry for being told 
off.90  Commissioning mother Linda Nelson received twins from surrogacy and 
at seven years of age, one of them wrote about her surrogate:  
 
[i+t was a good job we had Kim as your friend, mummy.  Otherwise you wouldn’t have 
us.91   
 
The gestational surrogate keeps in contact with the twins she incubated,92 who 
are ‘well-adjusted’, ‘outward going and happy’93 and understand the surrogacy 
arrangement.94 
 
                                                 
86 Fiona MacCallum et al., ‘Surrogacy: The Experience of Commissioning Couples’, Human 
Reproduction 18 (2003), 1334-42, at 1334. 
87 Kirkman and Kirkman, ‘Sister-to-Sister Gestational ‚Surrogacy‛ 13 Years On’, 144. 
88 Ibid., 144. 
89 Ibid., 141. 
90 Ibid., 141. 
91 Linda Nelson, ‘Truth and the Surrogate Child’, in Eric Blyth et al. (eds.), Truth and the Child 10 
Years On: Information Exchange in Donor Assisted Conception (Birmingham: BASW, 1998), 53-6, at 
54. 
92 Ibid., 54. 
93 Ibid., 54. 
94 Ibid., 55. 
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The child could have enhanced self-esteem and be delighted at the lengths her 
social parents went to achieve her existence, allowing her to trust others and 
love the surrogate who undertook risks for her birth, realising she was 
‘compensated rather than exploited’.95  The present lack of research on 
commercial surrogacy and the child means generalised statements as found in 
the Brazier Report paragraph 5:21 which implied that children born from 
surrogacy would not want to know they were born from high payments paid 
to surrogates, this needs clarification by future research to assess children’s 
reactions to surrogacy.   
 
3.3.9 Claim Seven: The Surrogate’s Own Children are Psychologically Harmed 
 
Seventhly, there are concerns that the surrogates’ own children could suffer 
psychologically in surrogacy, by not trusting their parents, feeling insecure or 
anxious out of fear that they will be relinquished if they misbehave.  Children 
of genetic surrogates have expressed fears of being sold like their half-sibling 
and have suffered loss at being deprived of a sibling.96  Janna Merrick refers to 
works by surrogates Elizabeth Kane97 and Amy Overvold98 suggesting the 
surrogate’s own children experience ‘embarrassment’ from peers finding out 
about the arrangement and experience ‘confusion’ when their sibling is 
relinquished to a stranger.99  Children are expected to suffer from low self-
                                                 
95 Eric Blyth and Claire Potter, ‘Paying for it? Surrogacy, Market Forces and Assisted 
Conception’, in Cook et al. (eds.), Surrogate Motherhood, 227-42, at 235. 
96 Kay Longcope, ‘Surrogacy: Two Professionals on Each Side of the Issue Give Their 
Arguments for Prohibition and Regulation’, Boston Globe, 23 March 1987, 18-19 and Iver 
Peterson, ‘Surrogate Mothers Vent Feelings of Doubt and Joy’, New York Times, 2 March 1987, 
B1 and B4. 
97 Elizabeth Kane, Birth Mother (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988). 
98 A. Z. Overvold, Surrogate Parenting (New York: Pharos, 1988). 
99 Merrick, ‘Selling Reproductive Rights’, 167. 
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esteem because of the changed attitude towards pregnancy and maternal duty 
induced by surrogacy.   
 
However, caution needs to be exercised as no long-term studies have been 
conducted into this area and some concerns are only predictions.  There is one 
study which has looked at how the surrogate’s children perceived surrogacy.  
Of 34 surrogates who had given birth to a surrogate child a year previously, 
virtually all (32) already had children of their own and all told them of the 
arrangement, with 29 of the 32 explaining it fully.100  Eighty one percent of the 
surrogates’ own children were positive about surrogacy during pregnancy, 
88% were positive at the handover, and 88% were positive one year on.  None 
of the children were negative about surrogacy during the pregnancy, at the 
handover or one year on.  Sixteen percent were neutral or ambivalent about 
surrogacy during the pregnancy, 9% were like this at the handover and 12% 
had the same attitude one year on.101  No ‘major problems’ about surrogacy 
were expressed from the surrogates’ children.102 
 
Lori Andrews believes the fears of surrogates’ children that they will be 
relinquished can be eased by telling them from the start that the child belongs 
to the commissioning couple and is ‘not part of their own family’.103  
Commissioning mother Margaret Kirkman used her sister Linda as a 
gestational surrogate to gestate her own egg, but with donor sperm.  Linda 
ensured her children did not fear being given away by telling them of the 
                                                 
100 Vasanti Jadva et al., ‘Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers’, Human Reproduction 
18 (2003), 2196-204, at 2197 and 2202. 
101 Ibid., 2202-3. 
102 Ibid., 2203. 
103 Lori B. Andrews, ‘Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists’, in Larry Gostin, 
(ed.), Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privacy (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), 167-82, at 177. 
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arrangement.  They accepted ‘without question’ that the baby was their cousin 
and not their sibling and were ‘slightly disdainful of others who could not 
understand’ what was clear to them.104  Michael Freeman admits that children 
‘can be remarkably resilient’.105  It is possible they could appreciate their 
mother’s love of children and family life which motivated her to become a 
surrogate, allowing the infertile couple to have a family.  Heléna Ragoné found 
that many surrogates choose to spend their payment upon their children and 
husbands as compensation for surrogacy’s inconvenience,106 demonstrating the 
care surrogates have towards their own children.  All the surrogates in Olga 
van den Akker’s study told their own children that the surrogate baby was 
going to be part of the commissioning couple’s family and not their sibling.107  
Most surrogates thought they would continue contact with the family so their 
own children could see the child, as this was perceived to make it easier for 
them to understand events.108   
 
3.3.10 Lack of Research 
 
As a general point, more empirical research needs to be conducted into the 
occurrence of child commodification in surrogacy due to lack of research.  The 
executive summary of the Brazier Report admitted to the lack of research 
concerning the ‘incidence, nature and outcomes of surrogacy arrangements’ 
including the child’s welfare.109  Eric Blyth, a surrogacy researcher, has 
                                                 
104 Linda Kirkman, ‘Still Not Maternal: Giving Birth to My Niece (10 Years On)’, in Robert 
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108 Ibid., 57.  
109 The Brazier Report, (i). 
191 
 
confessed to being ‘speculative’ concerning children’s possible positive 
attitudes towards payment in surrogacy due to the lack of research.110  Some 
scholars make claims, but frequently these are merely assertions that certain 
attitudes or outcomes will prevail in surrogacy, appealing to a series of 
slippery slope arguments despite the lack of evidence.  However, from my 
reading, I am unaware of any empirical evidence of child commodification in 
surrogacy and no evidence of insecurity amongst children born of surrogacy.  
It is possible that the research has been done and that I am unaware of it, or 
that no research has been done in this area and that commodification (or a lack 
of it) is waiting to be found, even so far there is no indication of child 
commodification for example.  It is important to remember that absence of 
evidence regarding commodification is not the same of evidence of an absence 
of commodification.  Caution needs to be exercised looking at the practices of 
contraception and abortion in order to see if commodification has developed 
and whether this can also be applied to surrogacy.  After all, the use of 
contraception and abortion are different types of practices to surrogacy, which 
is a far more personal relationship.  There is a need for future long-term 
research to assess the psychological impact of paid surrogacy upon the child 
(including whether surrogate children suffer from lowered self-esteem and 
whether commissioning couples treat their children as commodities), as well as 
how society regards and treats these children.  However, until evidence-based 
empirical research is conducted, caution needs to exist over any statements in 
this area.  An appendix at the end of the thesis suggests some areas for 
research.  
 
3.4 Commodification of the Surrogate in Paid Surrogacy 
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3.4.1 Introduction 
 
The last section explored possible child commodification in paid surrogacy.  
The rest of the chapter explores the effects of commodification, exploitation, 
coercion upon the surrogate and upon the commissioning couple.  Firstly we 
consider commodification of the surrogate, using a range of similar themes 
including objectification, degradation and being used as a mere means to an 
end.  Once again each section starts off with the negative views followed by my 
more positive rejoinders.  
 
3.4.2 Claim One: The Surrogate is Treated as an Object 
 
The first concern is that surrogates could be commodified by being regarded as 
a mere replaceable womb.  She may be treated ‘disrespectfully and 
inconsiderately’ by being used as ‘a mere object’.111  Teresa Iglesias uses the 
term ‘rent-a-womb’ to reflect the idea of surrogates becoming property.112  In 
Philip Parker’s study one surrogate reported that she was ‘only an incubator’.113  
Ragoné reported a commissioning husband who regarded his gestational 
surrogate as an ‘oven’ and not as the mother.114   
 
Certainly we should accept that paid surrogacy could potentially turn 
pregnancy into a commodified market-led transaction where surrogates with 
less marketable attributes are paid less.  Elizabeth Anderson calls surrogacy an 
‘industry’ for allowing commissioning couples to select the surrogate’s 
                                                 
111 Rosemarie Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993), 21. 
112 Teresa Iglesias IVF and Justice: Moral, Social and Legal Issues Related to Human In Vitro 
Fertilisation (London: The Linacre Centre, 1990), 70-1.  
113 Philip J. Parker, ‘Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings’, American Journal of 
Psychiatry 140 (1983), 117-18, at 118.   
114 Ragoné, ‘The Gift of Life’, 218.  
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attributes including her height, intelligence and race.115  In September 1988 an 
advertisement was placed in USA Today next to car advertisements for a 
surrogate with blue or green eyes, 5’2‛ to 5’8‛ to be paid $10,000 plus 
expenses.116  Radin assumes paid surrogacy has a ‘domino effect’, meaning all 
aspects of women’s attributes are commodified.117  All women therefore are in 
danger of harm from commodification since some women’s attributes might be 
worth more.  Subsequently, all pregnant women and not just surrogates will 
want paying.  Radin favours unpaid surrogacy to prevent the surrogate’s 
attributes becoming fungible objects and commodities.118   
 
However, paid surrogacy should not excuse commissioning couples or society 
to regard surrogates as a commodified product or a mere foetal carrier without 
dignity.  People use many parts of their bodies for financial gain - e.g. foot 
painters their feet, perfumers their noses and sword swallowers their throats - 
while being respected by others.  The above advertisement for a surrogate 
occurred in the USA, but in the UK it is illegal to advertise for a surrogate or a 
commissioning couple, which prevents requests for specific attributes; I have 
found no evidence of British commissioning couples selecting surrogate 
attributes.  Indeed, outside of surrogacy people often favour certain 
characteristics when selecting sexual partners but this does not mean they are 
treated as commodities.  The commissioning couple may feel they are 
respecting the surrogate’s humanity by offering her money as a reward for her 
actions and believe they are treating her as a slave if they do not pay her.  Some 
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surrogates may regard payment in surrogacy as reflecting their reproductive 
freedom and economic empowerment.   
 
3.4.3 Claim Two: The Surrogate is Degraded in Paid Surrogacy 
 
Secondly, commissioning couples could commodify and harm surrogates by 
degrading them.  A surrogate’s rights, autonomy and emotional needs could be 
compromised, violated or denied in order to fulfil their demands.  The 
surrogate could have her bodily integrity and inalienable right to the child 
ignored.  Some commissioning couples may want to prevent the surrogate 
from smoking to protect the baby or feel they have a claim right to associate 
with the child.  The surrogate could feel obliged within an unequal bargaining 
situation to have an abortion or a caesarean section against her will if the child 
has been tested positive for a condition such as Down’s syndrome for example.  
Issues such as these are important; the law is able to protect surrogates and 
what is legal may properly be influenced by what can go wrong, such as a 
commissioning couple trying to force an abortion.  Unfortunately, there is not 
the space to discuss this issue here in depth, though it will be briefly mentioned 
in the conclusion to the thesis.   
 
However, commissioning couples (whether paying or non-paying) have a 
responsibility to respect the surrogate’s personhood and intrinsic worth.  They 
may acknowledge her autonomous decision-making capacities, by caring for 
her emotional well-being and providing enough information for her to give 
informed, valid consent.  A surrogate could be treated well with her rights and 
privacy respected, so she can maintain her bodily integrity and self-respect 
while treated as an end.  Commissioning couples hoping to become parents 
after a long wait are more likely to treat her with gratitude for her actions.  
195 
 
They are unlikely to treat her just as a living womb possibly out of fear of 
upsetting her so she does not keep the baby.  The commissioning couple do not 
have an absolute claim right or control over the woman’s body because of 
payment.  They cannot insist on the service being completed, or control the 
surrogate’s behaviour, since they do not own her as a piece of property or as a 
reproductive slave without autonomy.  Therefore, surrogates cannot be 
subjected to detrimental or degrading treatment.  A relational framework could 
ensure both are treated as ends by respecting their needs, regardless of whether 
money is exchanged or not.   
 
3.4.4 Claim Three: The Woman is Used as a Mere Means to an End 
 
Thirdly, the commissioning couple could treat the surrogate as a mere means 
to their end of wanting a child because they have paid her.  One 
commissioning couple regarded surrogacy as a business operation.  They 
treated their surrogate with contempt, not wanting to meet her, know of her 
physical discomfort or her problems in explaining surrogacy to her own 
child.119  Such an attitude could lead to fungibilisation, since being used as a 
mere means neglects a person’s individual qualities, treating them as 
‘expendable, replaceable’ by anyone performing similar activities.120  Surrogacy 
could enforce societal expectations of women as just child breeders or 
reproductive carriers.  Mary Warnock considers it ‘intrinsically immoral’ for 
surrogates to be used as a means to another’s end.121   
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Kant in his second formulation of the Categorical Imperative wanted every 
human being to be treated as an end and not ‘simply as a means’.122  Treating 
someone as a mere means to an end is unethical for disrespecting their human 
dignity, however treating someone as a means to an end can be done with 
respect and the person’s consent.  There is a difference between treating the 
surrogate as a mere means to an end with no concern for her interests or 
humanity and treating her as a means to an end by giving her money for 
services rendered, respecting her rationality, her welfare and emotions.  Most 
commissioning couples treat their surrogates with respect and dignity.123  The 
chances of the surrogate being used as a mere means to an end are reduced 
because none of the commissioning couples in one surrogacy study for 
example had used surrogacy for convenience, as all had problems trying to 
conceive.124  One surrogate regarded surrogacy as a ‘woman-to-woman’ 
relationship, an ongoing and inter-related arrangement and not a ‘business 
arrangement’.125   
 
The last three subsections have explored whether surrogates are commodified 
in paid surrogacy.  Firstly section 3.4.2 rejected the idea that surrogacy treats 
surrogates as mere objects.  Secondly, section 3.4.3 dismissed the view that 
surrogates are degraded.  Thirdly section 3.4.4 proposed that surrogates are not 
a mere means to an end.  The next section, 3.5, analyses the effect of 
exploitation upon the surrogate in paid surrogacy.  It will analyse different 
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types of exploitation, consent in exploitation, exploitation of women and the 
need for regulations.   
 
3.5 Exploitation and the Surrogate in Paid Surrogacy 
 
3.5.1 A Definition of Exploitation 
 
The last section outlined commodification as broadly relating to everything 
which is traded for money.  It is immoral if people are treated as objects, as 
mere means to an end, with indignity, with disrespect and regarded as 
replaceable.  Commodification is linked to exploitation because objectification 
is also called wrongful use exploitation when money is involved.  Exploitation 
is generally a legitimate offer which could involve harm if a person does not 
receive the monetary worth for a good or service.  Wilkinson distinguishes 
between non-moral and moral forms of exploitation.126  If exploitation is used 
in a non-moral or ‘innocent’ sense,127 the use is regarded as acceptable.128  For 
example a person ‘exploits’ their talent to become a professional concert 
pianist.  By contrast, exploitation used in a moral sense has negative 
connotations, since the exploitee is often harmed, for example a worker earning 
low remuneration for long hours during a shortage of jobs.  Wilkinson, 
influenced by philosopher John Harris, identifies two types of ‘moral’ 
exploitation: firstly, ‘disparity of value’ exploitation and, secondly, ‘wrongful 
use’ exploitation.129   
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Firstly, disparity of value exploitation involves an exchange with a disparity in 
the value of the goods or services, e.g. being underpaid or overcharged.130  It is 
wrong because the exploitee is used unfairly in a ‘bad deal’131 and Allen Wood 
believes exploitation occurs in all market transactions involving participants ‘in 
unequal bargaining positions’.132  Jeffery Reiman regards exploitation as 
involving unpaid labour.133  However, Alan Wertheimer suggests a case is not 
exploitation if B makes a gift to A and volunteers his labour,134 as a voluntary 
and altruistic transfer of disproportionate value to A. 
 
Secondly, wrongful use exploitation (without monetary involvement) is called 
instrumentalisation, a type of objectification, where the exploiter wrongs the 
exploitee by using them as a mere means or a mere fungible object.  Wilkinson 
says: ‘A exploits B...if A treats B merely as a tool for, or as means of, achieving 
A’s goals’.135  If money is involved then wrongful use exploitation is called 
commodification, as commodification is instrumentalisation but with money.136  
Wilkinson regards exploitation as referring only to disparity of value 
exploitation,137 preferring to regard wrongful use exploitation as 
instrumentalisation.   
 
Wertheimer distinguishes between non-consensual and consensual 
exploitation.138  Non-consensual exploitation involves invalid consent and fails 
to protect the vulnerable.  Consensual exploitation is entered into voluntarily, 
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allowing both the exploiter and the exploitee to benefit.139  Exploitation 
therefore can be mutually advantageous and represent a win-win situation for 
both exploiter and exploited, even though it is still a bad deal for the exploited.  
Wertheimer warns that A’s action can still be exploitative even if B has given 
voluntary and informed consent, since B could suffer a wrongful loss according 
to a ‘fairness’ baseline even in a consensual mutually advantageous transaction 
and B may resent A’s exploitation.140  An unemployed teacher may agree to 
work as a cover supervisor even though it is less money, but is still more than 
unemployment benefit.  
 
It is important to look at the exploiter’s motivation and see if they are trying to 
advance their own interests at the expense of the exploitee’s interests by 
avoiding justice for the exploitee and by avoiding acting in a virtuous, honest 
and honourable manner.  More emphasis should be placed upon the 
interaction between the exploiter and the exploitee so neither side is deceived, 
but both can benefit without harm and while maintaining the virtue and 
character of each other with integrity, openness, trust, care and justice. 
 
Exploitation should not be confused with coercion.  Exploitation often involves 
a legal offer which can be turned down, whereas coercion usually involves a 
threat which will worsen the person’s situation if refused and is often 
performed under duress.  A’s proposal can be exploitative and coercive,141 e.g. a 
surrogate benefits herself at the expense of her commissioning couple by 
threatening to abort the baby if they do not pay her.  A’s proposal can be 
coercive and non-exploitative,142 e.g. a commissioning couple coerces a 
                                                 
139 Ibid., 12. 
140 Ibid., 205 and 251-2. 
141 Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 225-6. 
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surrogate to do something that is in the surrogate’s interest but does not 
benefit the couple such as getting her to exercise.  Wertheimer believes A's 
proposal can be ‘exploitative and non-coercive’,143 e.g. a surrogate charges a 
commissioning couple a very high price.   
 
Exploitation in surrogacy can take many forms including ‘disparity of value’ 
where surrogates receive a lower rate or commissioning couples are 
overcharged (3.5.2).  Non-moral exploitation involves surrogates exploiting 
their fertility and ease of giving birth (3.5.3).  Exploitation can be connected 
with consent (3.5.4) and be classed as wrongful use or commodification (3.5.5).  
These points will now be critically explored with the problem or issue stated, 
followed by possible solutions.  
 
3.5.2 Exploitation for Not Enough Pay – ‘Disparity of Value’ 
 
Surrogacy could be exploitative and unfair to the surrogate, if she does not 
receive enough money.  A surrogate could be exploited by a surrogacy agency, 
refusing to give her a fair share, despite high fees charged to the 
commissioning couple, due to wanting large profits.144  In Britain 69% of 
surrogates receive under £5,000 and 3% earn over £10,000.145  In America, 
surrogates receive only a quarter ($0 to $12,000) of the total fees paid by the 
commissioning couple, with other fees covering legal, medical, psychological 
and insurance services.146  Surrogacy pay is low if calculated hourly and is 
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below the minimum wage, especially as surrogates provide a twenty-four hour 
service with high risks involved.  Surrogates may feel exploited compared to 
other professionals in surrogacy.  Doctors are still paid if IVF treatments fail, 
but surrogates may receive nothing if a miscarriage or stillbirth occurs.  Some 
may feel increasing the money given in surrogacy could make it more coercive 
and difficult to resist, compromising the voluntariness of the surrogate’s 
decision. 
 
However, offering a surrogate a minimum wage could prevent exploitation 
from low pay; ensuring women are offered fair compensation for their time, 
effort and gestational service.  Until 30th September 2011, the minimum wage in 
Britain is £5.93 per hour for an adult over 21, which when applied to surrogacy 
is £35,864.64, for 24 hours a day for nine months.  Such a figure is high in 
comparison to the average British surrogacy fee of £5,000.  Alternatively, a 
surrogate paid £5.93 for 37 and a half hours per week, would receive £8,005.50.  
However, surrogates paid a minimum wage may subsequently class it as a 
mere job.  Screening surrogates could discover if they are motivated solely by 
money without care for the child or the commissioning couple.  Surrogates 
could work while pregnant.  Accusations of baby selling and exploitation could 
be lessened if surrogates receive payment for stillbirths or miscarriages if not 
her deliberate fault.  
 
3.5.3 Mutually Beneficial Exploitation 
 
Another type of exploitation is called non-moral or innocent exploitation.  Even 
though I disagree with exploitation, surrogacy here could be classed as 
mutually beneficial exploitation, performed without harm.  A surrogate could 
exploit her fertility and ability to gestate a baby.  It can be questioned whether 
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such an arrangement should be considered ‘exploitative’, as it could be a 
consensual, voluntary and rational decision, reflectively entered into with 
informed and valid consent.  The surrogate and the commissioning couple 
could both benefit without worsening their situation within a mutually 
reciprocal agreement.  The surrogate could become better off by escaping 
poverty and other poorly paid jobs, and it could improve her situation giving 
her more choice and enhancing her freedom without making her worse off if 
she does not do it.  The payment could reflect the gratitude, kindness, 
beneficence, benevolence, generosity and commissioning couple’s respect 
towards her.  The money could be regarded as reciprocal payment and a 
reward for the gift they have received within a co-operative and interpersonal 
framework.  The commissioning couple may hold the surrogate in high esteem 
and regard the money given to her as a generous gift, demonstrating their 
gratefulness, appreciation and thankfulness.  They may regard the payment as 
reflecting their virtuous character.  The commissioning couple may feel an 
obligation towards her and believe that until they have paid the surrogate, they 
are in a debt of gratitude to her.  After all, as David Heyd indicates, Thomas 
Aquinas suggested ‘a supererogatory gift deserves a slightly larger gift in 
return’.147  Such reciprocal giving will benefit the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple in a mutually advantageous win-win situation, since 
altruism is all too often expected of women and usually moral agents are not 
expected to benefit from a moral action.  However, Wertheimer warns that 
mutually exploitative arrangements could still be unfair and exploit the 
surrogate despite providing a net benefit.  But if she receives fair compensation 
then she is not exploited.148 
                                                 
147 David Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 38 n. 2. 
148 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 107-8. 
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3.5.4 Consent 
 
In order to assess whether surrogacy is exploitative we need to consider the 
issue of consent which is linked to exploitation.  Wertheimer regards a defect in 
consent as a condition of exploitation because it comes from the view that 
exploitation must be harmful.149  The Brazier Report considered some surrogates 
as not giving valid consent.150  It believed ‘payments create a danger that 
women will give a less than free and fully informed consent to act as a 
surrogate’,151 and women should not become ‘professional surrogates’.152  Such 
invalid consent could be a sign of exploitation.  The surrogate’s invalid consent 
could be due to her incompetence, inexperience,153 involuntary, and defective 
consent.  Some women may be exploited by not having enough information or 
time to reflect to make a fully voluntary choice or they may underestimate their 
bonding to the child due to ‘cognitive and emotional limitations’ and learn to 
regret their decision.154  Money and coercion could compromise the 
voluntariness of the surrogate’s choice and offering more money to prevent 
exploitation could worsen the situation, making the consent unfree.  Surrogates 
may feel exploited even after giving voluntary and informed consent, due to 
low pay.   
 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 249.  
150 The Brazier Report, 6.2. 
151 Ibid., (i) paragraph four. 
152 Ibid., 5.17. 
153 Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale, 76-7. 
154 Alan Wertheimer, ‘Two Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 21 (1992), 211-39, at 214 and 227-9. 
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However, exploitation is considered not to occur if ‘exploitees’ enter the 
relationship voluntarily.155  Wertheimer does not think exploitees voluntarily 
consent to actions which are detrimental to their interests.156  Wood suggests 
exploitees are willing to be exploited due to no worse alternatives.157  This 
could mean that the exploitees have chosen to be exploited as giving them a 
slightly better alternative to their present situation.  Therefore Wood, unlike 
Wilkinson, does not regard defective consent part of defining exploitation.158 
 
The surrogate could give valid consent with clear, accurate and relevant 
information, so she understands what is being asked of her and the possible 
risks and consequences involved.  Therefore the risk of harm from non-
consensual exploitation is lowered.  Even so, surrogates should not have to 
consent to a bad deal.  Section 3.8 explores the need for clear regulations.  
Wertheimer believes people can consent to something without experiencing it, 
but to prevent miscalculation in surrogacy he suggests surrogates should have 
already given birth and have experienced bonding or receive ‘careful 
psychological screening’.159   
 
3.5.5 Wrongful Use Exploitation (Instrumentalisation or Commodification) 
 
In section 3.5.2 above we looked at the first type of moral exploitation called 
disparity of value exploitation, where a person is exploited for not receiving an 
appropriate amount.  We now consider the second type of moral exploitation 
called wrongful use exploitation which involves instrumentalisation and no 
                                                 
155 Ibid., 224. 
156 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 249. 
157 Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale, 79. 
158 Ibid., 79. 
159 Wertheimer, ‘Two Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation’, 228.   
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pay.  Here people are regarded as ‘fungible’,160 usually for the exploiter’s 
benefit.  The exploiter substantially harms the exploitee by ignoring their 
interests and welfare, making them worse off.161  Wrongful use exploitation 
involving payment is known as commodification162 (see section 3.3 and 3.4).  
Therefore, both poor and wealthier surrogates could be exploited due to being 
degraded or used as a mere means to an end from their paying or non-paying 
commissioning couple.  Surrogate Kim Cotton found that surrogacy within 
families was more problematic than using unknown surrogates, as families 
rarely gave their known surrogates expenses, making them feel used and 
unfulfilled.163   
 
However, participants may not feel exploited and may want to avoid 
exploitation.  Friends or family members should not feel compelled to be 
unpaid, especially as some could prefer to be paid to reflect their self–interest 
as a rational choice.  One surrogate for example felt that her payment 
represented a commitment by her commissioning couple.164  A paid surrogate 
could have a commissioning couple who respect her human flourishing by 
respecting her autonomy and rights.  Some commissioning couples rejected 
‘closed’ surrogacy programmes as exploiting surrogates.  These programmes 
offered no interaction between surrogates and commissioning couples during 
the pregnancy, until the child’s adoption at the end and gave no psychological 
support or counselling to surrogates.165   
 
                                                 
160 Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale, 47. 
161 Ibid., 42. 
162 Ibid., 47-8. 
163 Kim Cotton, ‘Surrogacy Should Pay’, British Medical Journal 320 (2000), 928-9, at 928. 
164 Kirsty Stevens with Emma Dally, Surrogate Mother: One Woman’s Story (London: Century, 
1985), 27. 
165 Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, 18.  
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Attention now turns to two main claims made by those who view surrogacy as 
exploitation, namely that poor women and women as a class are exploited, and 
that both paid and unpaid surrogacy are exploitative.  Once again negative 
positions will be given first followed by my more positive understanding of the 
situation.  The section helps to lay the foundations for whether both paid and 
unpaid surrogacy can co-exist (which will be explored in chapter four). 
 
3.5.6 Claim One: Poor Women and Women as a Class are Exploited in 
Surrogacy 
 
Another concern of paid surrogacy is that richer commissioning couples could 
take unfair advantage and exploit the situation of poor and uneducated 
surrogates, leading to the exploitation of women generally in society.  Poverty 
may compromise the surrogate’s consent, making surrogacy non-consensual 
exploitation.  The commissioning couple could deliberately exploit the 
surrogate’s ignorance by not telling her she can keep the child if she changes 
her mind.  Andrea Dworkin believes that society allows the sale of women’s 
reproduction to ensure women’s survival.166  Gena Corea suggests women’s 
exploitation is linked to women’s economic status; earning less than men and 
for being discriminated against at work.167  In Australia in the early 1980s, 
about half of the inquiries about surrogacy came from women who were 
divorced, single, widowed, and wives with terminally ill husbands.168  John 
Stehura, President of the Bionetics Foundation believed that the surrogacy 
‘industry’ should go to poorer parts of the USA, where $5,000 would be 
                                                 
166 Andrea Dworkin, Right-Wing Women: The Politics of Domesticated Females (London: The 
Women’s Press, 1983), cited in Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from 
Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (London: The Women’s Press, 1988), 228. 
167 Corea, The Mother Machine, 228. 
168 Scott B. Rae, The Ethics of Commercial Surrogate Motherhood: Brave New Families? (Westport, 
CT: Praeger 1994), 58. 
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acceptable (which was half the going rate).169  Stehura also suggested $1,000, a 
tenth of the surrogacy fee, could be paid to third world women.170   
 
However, I suggest it is not the surrogate’s fault that the commissioning couple 
are infertile and it is not the couple’s fault that the surrogate may be 
underprivileged.  The commissioning couple do not insist upon financially 
poor women coming forward, since the practice is open to richer middle-class 
women too.  The involvement of a poor woman does not necessarily make a 
practice intrinsically exploitative.  Ragoné discovered surrogates usually have 
lower education levels and belong to a lower socio-economic class compared to 
the commissioning mothers.  However, surrogates are not bothered by this and 
did not feel exploited but made an informed choice, seeing it not as a job but as 
a calling or vocation, knowing it was right for them.171  The skilful poor are 
often employed by richer others within a private home setting without 
exploitation, such as babysitters, child minders or nannies.   
 
The surrogate’s payment could be treated as a fee for a professional and skilful 
gestational service similar to other professionals such as doctors and lawyers.  
The money could reflect her dignity as a woman, her liberty and autonomy.  
Rae, an opponent of paid surrogacy, admits that statistics on 600 surrogacy 
cases indicate that potential for exploitation on a wide scale has not 
materialised, even though he believes the potential for exploitation and abuse 
exists.172  Most women who become surrogates are not desperately poor, with 
                                                 
169 Corea, The Mother Machine, 214.  The Bionetics Foundation closed in 1989, see 
http://bionetics.tripod.com assessed 15 September 2011.  
170 Rita Arditti, ‘The Surrogacy Business’, Social Policy 18 (1987), 42-6, at 45.   
171 Olga B. A. van den Akker, ‘Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of 
Surrogacy’, Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 21 (2003), 145-61, at 146, referring to 
Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, 56.  
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the majority of them earning about $25,000 a year.173  The average surrogate 
attended college for two years, is married and has ‘all the children she and her 
husband want’, having completed her family.174  Andrews indicates most 
surrogates do not do it for basic needs such as food or health care: for example 
Mary Beth Whitehead paid for the education of her children, Kim Cotton 
redecorated her home, and another wanted a car.  Some surrogacy agencies 
reject women below some income levels to avoid accusations of exploitation.175  
However, it could be suggested that it is discriminatory to prevent poorer 
women from becoming surrogates, especially if they have given valid consent 
and have thought deeply about the practice, see also section 3.6.2 below which 
discusses the ‘double bind’. 
 
Paid surrogacy could allow some women to enter the public arena and receive 
money alongside a possible redistribution of economic power by taking them 
out of the unpaid private sphere.  They are ‘free agents’ who make a ‘deliberate 
and informed choice’ to become surrogates and could benefit financially and 
emotionally by increasing their self-worth by helping others.176  Surrogates 
often personally benefit from the money received, by spending it on their 
education.177   
 
3.5.7 Claim Two: Paid Surrogacy and Unpaid Surrogacy are Exploitative 
 
                                                 
173 Ibid., 57 n. 103. 
174 H. M. Malm, ‘Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum’, Hypatia 4 (1989), 
128-35, at 134, citing Itabari Njeri ‘Surrogate Motherhood: A Practice That’s Still Undergoing 
Birth Pangs’, Los Angeles Times, 22 March 1987.  Some Christians may reject the phrase 
‘completed their family’ believing God may give more children later.  
175 Andrews, ‘Surrogate Motherhood’, 174.   
176 Ken Daniels and Karyn Taylor, ‘Surrogacy: The Private Troubles and Public Issues’, 
Community Mental Health in New Zealand 6 (1991), 28-50, at 39. 
177 Private conversation with Dr van der Akker Birmingham University (September 2000). 
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Surrogacy includes concerns that women are exploited for being paid, but are 
also exploited if the pay is low or if they are unpaid.  Both points of view 
represent different theoretical perspectives within feminism which will now be 
explored.   
 
3.5.7 (i) Do Women Become Victims if Paid? 
 
The first group of feminists to be explored is radical feminists and their view 
towards payment.  Radical feminists prefer unpaid surrogacy, believing that 
paid surrogates are exploited and are victims of men’s demands for a genetic 
child.  Mary Shanley suggests paid surrogacy occurs within structures of 
institutional sexism with domination and subordination between men and 
women.  She fears that women’s self-esteem could come from being pregnant 
and that men might buy control over women’s reproduction with a resulting 
objectification and commodification of pregnancy.178  Some regard surrogacy as 
exploitative for involving ‘economic duress’ because women feel they have to 
become surrogates or hand the child over for money, thus making their choice 
unfree and socially conditioned, instead of being a voluntary and informed 
choice.179  The offer could be ‘exploitatively high’, which could include 
‘psychological compulsion’, making it difficult to ‘resist the offer’,180 with the 
result that the pay could affect the woman’s consent and judgement.181  
Consequently women may alienate their relationship to the child by denying 
any emotional relationship to it.  Women who believe they choose to become 
surrogates could act under a false consciousness by denying the economic 
                                                 
178 Mary Lyndon Shanley, ‘‚Surrogate Mothering‛ and Women’s Freedom: A Critique of 
Contracts for Human Reproduction’, Signs 18 (1993), 618-39, at 628-9. 
179 John Lawrence Hill, ‘Exploitation’, Cornell Law Review 79 (1994), 631-99, at 638-40 and 643.  
180 Ibid., 633. 
181 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 108. 
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pressure they are under, as they may not choose to be surrogates if they were 
wealthier.   
 
However, Wertheimer suggests that reducing exploitation in surrogacy by 
paying the surrogate more is not advocated in society, as unpaid surrogacy is 
seen as ‘less exploitative than paid surrogacy’.182  Increased pay is not suggested 
since it may make the surrogates feel they were doing a sordid activity and it is 
seen as immoral for procreative labour to be commodified.183  ‘Social norms’ 
could deem it ‘inappropriate’ for a surrogate to ask for more money.184  Indeed, 
by ensuring they receive fair compensation surrogates could prevent 
exploitation by disparity of value from low pay.   
 
3.5.7 (ii) Does Not Paying Women Reinforce Stereotypes? 
 
In contrast to the radical feminists above who believe paid surrogacy is 
exploitative and surrogacy should be unpaid, liberal and socialist feminists 
usually believe unpaid surrogates are exploited and discriminated against.  
Presently in Britain all surrogates should be unpaid, receiving expenses only.  
Unpaid surrogacy could be regarded as perpetuating female inequality and 
altruistic expectations, thus fulfilling women’s stereotypical role as selfless, 
self-sacrificing, caregivers for others, unable to financially benefit.  Anderson 
regards surrogacy as taking advantage of non-autonomous ‘self-effacing 
‚altruism‛’ which women gain from social conditioning.185  Shanley suggests 
the State, by banning paid surrogacy, could treat the reproductive service like 
women’s domestic labour ‘as unpaid, noneconomic acts of love and nurturing 
                                                 
182 Ibid., 101. 
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184 Wertheimer, ‘Two Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation’, 231. 
185 Anderson, ‘Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?’, 91. 
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rather than as work and real economic contributions to family life’.186  
Preventing paid surrogacy, for Shanley, denies women ‘the full and effective 
proprietorship of [their] bod[ies]’.187   
 
Some want unpaid surrogacy banned.  They believe not having unpaid 
surrogacy would not compromise the surrogate’s autonomy.  Surrogates are 
considered not to acquire altruistic motives autonomously.188  Some women 
may be unaware that they have been socially conditioned to become a 
surrogate, from family, friends, work colleagues or society as a whole 
expecting women to bear babies.  Therefore, women offering to become a 
surrogate could be given counselling to explore societal pressure to bear a 
child.   
 
Having unpaid surrogacy only could make some surrogates resentful, feeling 
that it is unjust for the commissioning couple to benefit, and preferring 
payment for their service, time and risks involved.  A psychiatrist in Michigan 
found 90% of women screened to become surrogates wanted payment.189  Alan 
Ryan believes if you make a free gift to someone you are not exploited, but 
suggests ‘the exploited are forced to accept less than they are entitled’.190  If a 
person voluntarily assumes a risk and is unpaid or does not receive a benefit 
then according to Wertheimer the person is exploited,191 especially if they did 
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not intend to make a gift of their services since they might want to gain.192  
Even Rae, who is opposed to paid surrogacy, admits the demands of surrogacy 
are ‘too burdensome to be supplied altruistically’.193  Socialist feminists may 
support paid surrogacy as compensation for providing a gestational service, as 
payment for labour traditionally unpaid, along with ‘all birthing...housework 
and family maintenance’ to be paid, which is seen as exploitative for being 
unpaid.194  Payment could ensure women are not taken for granted and a 
woman’s altruism is not exploited unfairly.  An American surrogacy agency 
allows surrogates to name their own fee as they often unaware that they can be 
paid.195  An infertility clinic suggested unpaid surrogacy can succeed, but some 
commissioning mothers were unable to find surrogates and were denied 
treatment.196  The Californian court case Johnson v. Calvert,197 indicated that 
despite the commissioning couple being richer than surrogates, surrogacy does 
not exploit poor women, since economic need does not exploit people into low 
paid jobs. 
 
Liberal feminists emphasise women making an autonomous choice to become a 
paid surrogate with informed and valid consent.  Surrogates can choose how to 
use her body to achieve her interests and those of the commissioning couple.  
Radin acknowledges some feminists believe ‘power in the market is power, 
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and power is liberating’.198  Sharyn Roach Anleu indicates monetary 
involvement does not have to be exploitative by definition as we often pay for 
services.199   
 
3.5.7 (iii) Reasons for Unpaid Surrogates  
 
So far we have seen that radical feminists want only unpaid surrogacy, out of 
fears that men in paid surrogacy exploit poor surrogates.  We saw above that 
liberal and socialist feminists regard unpaid surrogacy as exploitative for 
fulfilling societal stereotypes of women.  However, I prefer both paid and 
unpaid surrogacy to operate together and suggest that it is paternalistic to deny 
women the opportunity to be an unpaid surrogate if they want as they may not 
regard it as undignified.  By allowing both paid and unpaid surrogacy to 
operate then those who want to do it unpaid will make it their genuine choice, 
instead of being expected not to receive a fee by societal pressure or by the law. 
 
Brenda Baker indicates that some do not want unpaid surrogacy to occur as it 
endorses stereotypes of women as giving and self-sacrificing.  However, Baker 
criticises this view as restricting women’s behaviour.200  She wants women to be 
made aware of ‘gender-specific roles and gender stereotyping’ but not to limit 
or proscribe their roles and choices.201   
 
As long as the surrogates give informed consent based upon detailed 
knowledge and are aware of possible dangers of coercion and oppression, 
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surrogacy for some women will affirm values important to them and aid their 
human flourishing.  There may be psychological and physical risks to the 
surrogate but all pregnancy involves risks and the surrogate needs to be fully 
informed of possible dangers.  Therefore, if all participants are aware of the 
dangers of exploitation in surrogacy, it could be possible for both paid and 
unpaid surrogacy to operate together, which will be explored in chapter four.   
 
3.5.7 (iv) Paid and Unpaid Surrogacy Can Operate Together 
 
The next chapter will investigate if payment involves a reduction in altruism 
and whether paid and unpaid surrogacy can co-exist.  It will be suggested that 
a paid or an unpaid surrogate could have virtuous motives and care for her 
commissioning couple and the child too.   
 
Section 3.5 has explored possible surrogate exploitation in paid surrogacy.  It 
suggested that interactions include justice, care and virtue to prevent 
exploitation and deception (3.5.1).  Disparity of value exploitation could be 
reduced by giving surrogates a minimum wage, screening their motives and 
giving them a fee if a miscarriage or still birth occurs (3.5.2).  It asked whether a 
non-moral exploitation of surrogates ‘exploiting’ their fertility is really 
exploitation, as they make a voluntary choice with valid consent to become 
surrogates, are not harmed and benefit from their actions (3.5.3).  Clear 
information and regulations are needed to alert surrogates to possible 
problems and to prevent non-consensual exploitation where surrogates give 
invalid consent (3.5.4).  Paid or unpaid surrogates should not be treated as an 
object or degraded (3.5.5).  Paid surrogates are not always desperately poor and 
commissioning couples are open to richer women becoming their surrogate 
(3.5.6).  It was tentatively suggested that both paid and unpaid surrogacy can 
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co-exist (which will be explored in the next chapter), unlike the radical 
feminists who only want unpaid surrogacy to prevent exploitation by men of 
poor women or liberal and social feminists who only want paid surrogacy to 
prevent self-sacrifice (3.5.7).   
 
Another major area of concern with paid surrogacy is whether the surrogate 
and the commissioning couple are coerced.  The following section (3.6) 
explores coercion in three subsections with ‘A’ as the coercer and ‘B’ as the 
coerced.  Firstly, coercion is defined (3.6.1); secondly the ‘double bind’ is 
investigated (3.6.2); thirdly whether surrogates are coerced by their family and 
friends to enter surrogacy (3.6.3); and fourthly the issue of whether surrogates 
are coerced to hand the child over is explored (3.6.4)  
 
3.6 The Surrogate and Coercion 
 
3.6.1 The Definition of Coercion 
 
The last section explored exploitation.  Exploitation is a legal offer which can be 
turned down.  However, coercion is a threat of harm which would make the 
person worse off if unperformed, often leading to an action done under duress.  
For example, a car driver could be coerced at gun point to drive a gang of 
thieves away from a robbery.  However, if B needs money and not knowing 
this, A offers them money for sexual favours, and if B would be worse off if 
they said no, then this is not usually regarded as coercion.  The person making 
the offer A, is making an illegal offer as paying for sexual favours is illegal, and 
A’s offer could be regarded as exploitation not coercion.  With coercion it is a 
deliberate attempt to cause harm by active or ommissive harm and is 
considered a threat and not an offer. 
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Wertheimer defines two types of coercion.202  The first is non-moral, value-free 
and descriptive.  The second is a normative moral judgement,203 usually with 
negative moral connotations204 and is linked to the wrongful use of people, 
violation of autonomy and invalid consent.205  Attention in this section will 
focus upon coercion as a normative moral judgement.  Wilkinson regards 
coercion as a proposal where A threatens B with harm relative to a normative 
baseline, unless B does what A wants.206  He believes the coercer is usually 
responsible for the coercee’s situation and distinguishes between active and 
omissive coercion.  Active coercion threatens harm if the coerced refuses to do 
the action.  Omissive coercion involves a threat of omissive harm, when the 
coercer has a duty to do something for the coerced, but threatens not to do it 
unless the coerced does what he wants.  Therefore, A could have a duty to 
alleviate the situation of B even if they did not cause that situation.207  If a 
lifeboat rescuer refuses to rescue a dog at sea unless the owner pays them a 
high fee, then it is a coercive offer and is a threat, as rescuers normally do it for 
free and have an obligation and expectation to rescue the dog.  A vet does not 
coerce if she offers to heal your dog if you pay her as she is not a rescuer but a 
professional.  Wertheimer indicates that threats coerce, limit freedom, 
involve involuntarily responses and are usually not turned down.  By 
contrast, offers do not coerce, but enhance freedom, involve voluntarily 
acceptance, and can be turned down.  A’s proposal may include both a 
threat and an offer (what Michael Taylor calls a ‘throffer’), e.g. marry me or I 
will kidnap you.  Wertheimer indicates a ‘throffer’ can be a threat, since if 
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B rejects A’s proposal ‘B will be worse off than in the relevant baseline 
position’.208  Wilkinson does not think coercion always has to be wrong, ‘all 
things considered’; it may sometimes be justified, such as to save a life.209   
 
Attention will now focus on whether paid surrogacy is a coercive ‘double bind’ 
offer, whether families or friends of the surrogate coerce her to enter surrogacy 
and whether the commissioning couples use coercion to make surrogates hand 
the child over.  Once again the negative points will be placed first, followed by 
a more positive counter argument, which I tend to favour. 
 
3.6.2 The Double Bind 
 
Radin believes surrogacy could be problematic for creating a ‘double bind’ for 
women.  Paid surrogacy could empower and liberate poor, uneducated women 
from poverty, overcome powerlessness and oppression, but with a lower 
standard of human flourishing.210  However, allowing paid surrogacy could 
oppress, disempower and degrade poor, ‘ignorant women’, as their 
reproduction, features and genes are seen as fungible in order to perpetuate a 
male’s genes,211 thus reinforcing class and gender oppression,212 leading to 
inferior human flourishing.213  But not allowing paid surrogacy could appear 
‘harmful or disempowering to *the+ poor’.214  Denying poor women the 
opportunity to sell something could harm their personhood,215 and keep ‘them 
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out of the economic mainstream’,216 which could be a burden, but maybe for 
the best. 217  Therefore the possibility of a double bind is created.218   
 
It is possible that poor people may be unfree to decline an enormous offer, 
especially if there are no alternatives.  However, they could still give valid 
consent to surrogacy by deliberating carefully, using rational reflection.219  
Society could ensure there are alternatives to paid surrogacy, to prevent poor 
women feeling coerced to become surrogates against their will.  A woman 
could then decide for herself if she is coerced and she may not feel coerced.  
Surrogate Kirsty Stevens rejected an offer from an American commissioning 
couple which included £60,000, paying off her mortgage along with travel, 
medical and legal expenses.  She thought they were trying to rush the decision 
by making an offer you cannot refuse.220  Instead, she wanted a relationship 
with her couple,221 preferring surrogacy to be done from trust and friendship 
and not as a contract.222  A surrogate may believe she is using her free will to 
act in an empowered manner because she enjoys pregnancy and wants to give 
another a child.  She has to consider the advantages of furthering her interests 
with the money received against possible negative effects of handing the child 
over, compared to the lost opportunity cost of not participating on her welfare, 
such as not escaping poverty or improving her career prospects.   
It may be that only agents and not a situation of poverty can coerce by 
threatening harm relative to a person’s normative baseline, but the threat of 
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poverty could be used to coerce another into doing what the coercer wants.223  
A commissioning couple could omissively coerce a poor woman into surrogacy 
if they are responsible for her poverty and if they refuse to fulfil their 
obligation to help her, unless she becomes a surrogate and hands a child over 
to them.  However, most commissioning couples do not create the surrogate’s 
poverty, unless possibly known well to her and, by making her an offer, they 
are rescuing her from a situation of poverty and are not coercing her.224  A 
commissioning couple may ‘have no special obligation to help potential 
surrogates without demanding anything in return’.225  Surrogates needing 
money are not necessarily being coerced, because if they refuse the offer they 
are ‘not deprived of anything’.226  The offer from the commissioning couple is a 
proposal to make her better off with regard to her baseline and is not a threat 
and is therefore uncoercive. 
 
Commercial surrogacy is seen to involve hidden class exploitation, as those 
who can afford it are usually middle-class, rich and powerful whereas 
surrogates are poor working-class housewives without power or qualifications.  
In the Baby M case, the commissioning couple, the Sterns, had professional 
degrees and a family income of over $90,000.  However the surrogate, Mary 
Beth Whitehead, had dropped out of school227  and had a family income of   
$28, 000, but her home was in repossession.  William Winslade reported that 
40% of altruistic surrogates were on welfare or unemployed.228  Class 
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differences could lead to unequal bargaining and power between the 
participants.  However, Joan Einwohner notes that the surrogate and her 
spouse are often ‘in their twenties’ and the commissioning couple ‘in their 
thirties’; the surrogate’s income is similar to other families in their twenties and 
therefore they are not needy.229   
 
3.6.3 Are Women Coerced by Their Family and Friends to Become Surrogates? 
 
A woman, against her better judgement, could be coerced into surrogacy not 
by money, but by demands from her family, friends, work colleagues to 
become an unpaid surrogate.  J. Harvey suggests that related donors are under 
‘heavy psychological and emotional pressure’.230  For example, Alejandra 
Munoz was an illegal Mexican immigrant brought into the USA.  She was told 
by her family she would be impregnated with an embryo, which would be 
washed out and implanted into her cousin, but she later discovered she would 
have to carry it.   
 
However, not all unpaid surrogates are coerced, since many family members 
make a genuine offer to become a surrogate or they are nervously asked to 
become one.  In a 2003 study, Fiona MacCallum et al., found ‘little evidence’ 
that known surrogates who were a family member or a friend were coerced 
from the commissioning couple, since ‘in over three-quarters of cases, the 
suggestion had come from the surrogate mother herself’.231  However, 
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awareness of possible coercion, instrumentalisation and exploitation could 
prevent it.   
 
3.6.4 Are Surrogates Coerced to Hand the Child Over?  
 
Concerns are often raised in surrogacy that surrogates are coerced.  The money 
offered and the need for money could coerce a surrogate, compromising her 
autonomy and behaviour before, during and after the pregnancy.  The 
commissioning couple may believe paying the surrogate allows them to control 
her, leading to a coercive relationship with an imbalance of power.  If a 
surrogate wanted to keep the child and as the commissioning couple are 
legally not entitled to it, they could coerce her, by threatening to make her 
situation worse if she does not relinquish the child to them.  Both paid and 
unpaid surrogates may face pressure from counsellors and the surrogacy 
agency to relinquish the child to the commissioning couple.  
 
However, most surrogates hand the child over voluntarily and do not feel 
coerced by the money to relinquish the child.  Counsellors usually remind 
surrogates that they can keep the child and any money received.  The couple 
could try and persuade someone to become a surrogate with reasons other than 
money, such as appealing to someone to give them the gift of life so they can 
found a family.  Most will be pleased that after a long search, their hope of 
having a child could come true.  Consequently, they are more likely to treat the 
surrogate well by respecting her rights, freedom and autonomy.  It is not in the 
commissioning couple’s interests to coerce a woman into surrogacy, since 
coercion can be used as an excuse to prevent completion of an act thus 
compromising her obligation and responsibility.  Commissioning mother 
Maggie spent every day with her sister who was her gestational surrogate and 
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they ‘both found it distressing’ to find in the press and the radio that the sister 
had been coerced into surrogacy and a ‘defective’ baby would be rejected.232  If 
a surrogate wanted to keep the child, she is unlikely to allow a coercing 
commissioning couple visitation, nor are the authorities likely to allow the 
couple to adopt the child.  Commissioning couples are probably worried that if 
they mistreat the surrogate she will harm the child or not give it to them; 
therefore most will want a caring and harmonious relationship to ensure they 
receive their child.  Many couples will want an ongoing relationship with the 
surrogate after the birth and will want to acknowledge her role by ensuring the 
child meets her later.   
 
The way most British surrogacy relationships operate reduces coercion.  Firstly, 
most women wanting to become surrogates approach a surrogacy agency 
directly, since advertising for a surrogate is banned.  Surrogates using the 
surrogacy agency COTS are given a two-hour counselling session to assess 
their motives.  Secondly, commissioning couples do not make direct offers to 
specific surrogates, but send their details for the potential surrogate to select 
them.  Thirdly, the surrogate selects which commissioning couple to associate 
with, thus reducing claims that a commissioning couple coerce specific women 
to work for them.  Fourthly, commissioning couples do not entice women with 
already existing children to sell them for a profit, thus reducing claims that 
surrogacy involves child trafficking.  Fifthly, since the surrogate decides to 
become a surrogate herself, the commissioning couple cannot be accused of 
preventing her from following alternatives or restricting her freedom.  Sixthly, 
since most commissioning couples do not know their surrogates prior to being 
selected by them, it is not possible for them to be responsible for her 
background situation and therefore do not cause her poverty.  Most 
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commissioning couples do not threaten to make the surrogate’s situation worse 
if she does not do it.   
 
Section 3.6 has explored the issue of coercion and the surrogate in paid 
surrogacy in three subsections: coercion was defined (3.6.1); the double bind 
was investigated (3.6.2); whether surrogates are coerced to enter surrogacy was 
analysed (3.6.3); and the issue of coercion to hand the child over was explored 
(3.6.4).  The next section, 3.7, deals with the effect of paid surrogacy upon the 
commissioning couple.  The commissioning couple could be coerced by a 
surrogate threatening to abort or keep the child.  They could be exploited by a 
demand for high fees by the medical profession.  However, the commissioning 
couple could try to coerce relatives to become a surrogate for free and they 
could possibly exploit their surrogate by not paying her enough.   
 
3.7 The Effect of Paid Surrogacy upon the Commissioning Couple 
 
It is not just the child and the surrogate who may experience problems in 
surrogacy, but the commissioning couple too.  A surrogate could coerce her 
commissioning couple by threatening to abort the baby or keep it if they do not 
give her more money.  One surrogate tried to coerce her commissioning couple 
into handing more money over, to ensure adoption. 233  Another surrogate used 
blackmail to coerce her commissioning couple into giving her additional 
money for drugs, by threatening to reveal that the commissioning mother had 
had a sex-change operation which could have jeopardised the child’s 
adoption.234   
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A commissioning couple could feel coerced by their families and society to 
become parents.  A family might threaten a childless married couple with 
losing their inheritance if they do not produce a grandchild for them.  The 
couple may feel coercion from their peers, fearing that if they do not have 
children they will miss out on having a social life evolving around children. 
 
Theoretically, if money is not offered to surrogates there is a danger that the 
commissioning couple may be tempted to coerce relatives or friends to do it for 
free, especially if the couple were turned down for adoption.  However, no 
evidence has been found to suggest that this has happened.  One way to ensure 
poorer commissioning couples are not denied access to surrogacy in order to 
procreate, would be to offer financial assistance.  Otherwise, only rich infertile 
couples will be able to afford to pay a surrogate in secret or go to a country 
such as the USA where paid surrogacy is legal in some states such as 
California.  Alternatively, surrogates who are willing to be unpaid could 
possibly be matched with couples unable to pay the full amount.   
 
Wood assumes it will be the surrogate in a position of vulnerability235 and fails 
to acknowledge the commissioning couple’s vulnerabilities and anxiety; they 
have to trust the surrogate to gestate and deliver the child, fearing she may 
abort it or keep it.  They may regard surrogacy as a supererogatory act, 
meaning the surrogate is not under an obligation to hand the child over, that 
she could pull out at any time and maintain full claim rights to the child and do 
so at their expense, ignoring their needs to associate with the child.  The 
surrogate may exercise considerable power over her commissioning couple 
and emotionally exploit them by taking unfair advantage of their vulnerability 
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of being infertile and their desperation for a child in order to benefit herself.  
An unequal bargaining relationship could develop with the surrogate holding 
the commissioning couple to ransom by charging extortionate fees or 
demanding more money.  The surrogate could treat the arrangement as a 
business transaction in order to make profit with no regard for the 
commissioning couple.  The surrogate usually sets her fees and she selects 
which couple she works with.  The surrogate could decide to work with those 
willing to pay more, or give the child to the highest bidder.  One 
commissioning mother admitted: ‘*i+f you are desperate for a child you will do 
almost anything’.236  She acknowledged that once the payment has been made a 
surrogate could change her mind or lie about the pregnancy and 
commissioning couples could feel they are at the surrogate’s mercy.  She also 
said: ‘I would have felt exploited handing out a large sum of money for a child 
simply because I couldn’t have one naturally’.237   
 
Some poor commissioning couples may feel they are being exploited and 
harmed by the medical profession with the high fees they have to pay when 
receiving infertility treatment.  Some commissioning couples entering 
surrogacy could be poor and find it difficult to pay a surrogate, especially as 
surrogacy is not available on the NHS in the UK.  Some working-class couples 
in the United States, for example, were prepared to mortgage their home in 
order to try and find the $10,000 fee for their surrogates.238  Surrogacy could 
become a status symbol with only the wealthy able to pay for an experienced 
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surrogate.  Poorer commissioning couples may find they have little to spend on 
the baby after paying the surrogate.   
 
Some commissioning couples are wealthier than the surrogates, but this is 
often due to being infertile, childless and older than their surrogates who are 
younger and have raised families.  One commissioning couple admitted they 
had managed to save money by being childless.239  However, commissioning 
couple John and Lorelei were a driver and a dispatcher, and their $2,000 
cheque for their surrogate cleared out their savings.240  In a 2003 study of 
commissioning couples’ reaction to surrogacy, including its cost, by 
MacCallum et al., 66% felt no financial strain, 27% felt some strain and cut 
down on expenses to afford treatment, and 7% had a financial burden with 
requiring loans or borrowing money to pay for gestational surrogacy.241  It may 
be suggested that if commissioning couples are experiencing financial 
difficulties choosing to become parents, then it should not be a choice they are 
allowed to make.  However, such an approach could be seen as discriminating 
against the poor and their ability to found a family.  In Israel, for example 
commissioning couples receive financial State help and it could be argued that 
if the UK government allows paid for IVF treatments then this could possibly 
include surrogacy payments too.  A set fee could quell the fears of the Brazier 
Report (5.21) that the surrogate will make ‘increased financial demands’ upon 
the commissioning couple.  There is the possible risk that if only unpaid 
surrogates are used then a shortage of surrogates could occur, jeopardising the 
reproductive opportunities of the infertile.   
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3.8 The Need for Research, Regulation and Guidelines 
 
So far in this chapter we have focused upon the possibility of commodification, 
exploitation and coercion for surrogacy participants.  More empirical research 
is needed in this area and the appendix to the thesis outlines some areas for 
further research.  Clear regulation and guidelines could reduce the risk of 
commodification, exploitation, and coercion in surrogacy along with the 
following seven practical measures.   
 
Firstly, a code of practice could set out fair terms and conditions to ensure no 
one harms or degrades the other by treating them as a mere means to an end.  
Both parties should be sensitive to each other’s rights, needs and welfare.  
Secondly, compulsory counselling with independent counsellors could ensure 
participants are given time to reflect if they wish to enter the practice or not 
and if they want to hand the child over, so they are made aware of possible 
dangers of coercion, harm and risk.  Despite claiming to be more surrogate-
centred, Ragoné found evidence suggesting the commissioning couples’ 
feelings dominate in some American agencies.242  If agencies and counsellors 
were paid for by the State and not by the commissioning couples’ fees, it could 
lessen possible bias and coercion to make the surrogate relinquish the child.  
 
Thirdly, clear information should be provided to all participants, so they are 
aware of what they are being asked to do, as well as pregnancy management 
issues such as abortion, smoking, caesarean section, place of birth and child 
relinquishment, so consent is autonomous, informed and valid.  Fourthly, 
careful psychological and medical screening of participants could ensure 
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surrogates in desperate financial need do not hide possibly detrimental 
medical conditions which could be passed on to the child in order to receive 
payment.  Screening of genetic disorders including HIV, hepatitis B and C and 
sexually transmitted diseases could occur including assessment to ensure the 
surrogate’s and commissioning couple’s motives are not solely financial.  
Fifthly, independent mediation and legal services could intervene between the 
surrogate and the couple if difficulties arise over the child’s custody, possibly 
finding a foster family for the child if rejected at birth.   
 
Sixthly, a set fee in paid surrogacy could prevent a commercial market-led 
practice operating so attributes of surrogates are not commodified.  A set fee 
could prevent surrogates coercing their commissioning couples for more 
money by threatening to keep the child if they do not receive additional 
payments.  In order for a set fee to operate, English law would need to be 
changed to allow surrogates to be paid, other than reasonable expenses, since 
at the moment commissioning couples risk not being able to adopt the child if 
payment has occurred.  If a set fee were used then the minimum wage could 
operate to ensure a fair amount was paid along with taxes.  Finally, a relational 
approach to the arrangement, the pregnancy and custody could reduce 
exploitation to ensure justice for all participants within a framework of careful 
negotiation.   
 
3.9 Conclusion  
 
Further empirical research is needed to find out if exploitation, harm, 
commodification and coercion occur before, during and after surrogacy to the 
surrogate, the commissioning couple, and the child born of surrogacy both in 
the short and the long term.  Research needs to focus on the decision-making 
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processes of a woman entering into surrogacy to assess if her consent to the 
practice is constrained by the short-term prospect of earning money, or if she 
considers possible long-term adverse psychological effects connected with 
relinquishment.  Some surrogates may feel they are acting rationally or on 
impulse.  We need to ask if surrogacy is of benefit and if it is fair to the 
surrogate.   
 
However, one of the arguments of this thesis is that surrogacy can sometimes 
be a justified practice - for example in the case of the infertile wife who has had 
a hysterectomy due to cancer, but has functioning ovaries; or the fertile wife 
who has had repeated miscarriages.  Paid surrogacy could operate without 
negative influences such as child commodification and it could occur in a more 
positive way with society doing all it can to stop commodification, exploitation 
and coercion.  Commodification, for example is more of an attitude than an 
inevitable consequence of monetary involvement in surrogacy.  An unpaid 
surrogate or commissioning couple could regard the child or surrogate as an 
object, as a mere means to an end with contempt, alienation and no dignity or 
respect for their emotions.  Equally a paying commissioning couple could 
respect the surrogate’s dignity, intrinsic worth and personhood by respecting 
her autonomy, decision making, rights, bodily integrity and embodiment.  
Most surrogates and commissioning couples will treat the child with respect as 
the context differs from a black market attempt to sell an existing child to the 
highest bidder.  A set fee, instead of a commercialised market system, could 
operate to prevent commodification.  Paid surrogacy should not reflect the 
child’s or surrogate’s personal value, dignity or worth but her service.  
Surrogacy could be a mutual benefit, aiding the human flourishing of all 
participants.  Measures must be taken to prevent exploitation in surrogacy, so 
it is practiced in an honest and open way with integrity, virtue and dignity. 
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Risks could be reduced by a code of practice with safeguards and guidelines 
before, during and after the event.  Independent counselling, mediation, legal 
advice and a cooling off period could help to ensure the surrogate gives her 
valid and informed consent to enter surrogacy or to relinquish the child, thus 
preventing possible duress from a coercive imbalance of power between her 
and the commissioning couple.  Participants could be provided with clear, 
accurate and relevant information so they are aware of what to expect, aware 
of the legal situation and possible problems of coercion, exploitation and 
commodification.  Screening may uncover medical problems, which could be 
passed on to the child, which the surrogate was hiding to be accepted and 
receive the money.  The surrogate should be made aware of her motivations for 
entering surrogacy, to prevent those solely doing it for money, as well as an 
awareness of alternative economic options so she can decide for herself if she is 
being coerced and if her choice is voluntary or involuntary.  Counsellors 
should look out for potential commodification in the commissioning couple’s 
motives.  Advertising for particular attributes of a surrogate could be banned.  
Commissioning couples could be prevented from selecting the genes of the 
embryo the surrogate will carry in order to stop particular physical 
characteristics being selected in the child to be born.  Guidelines, regulation 
and a code of practice with clear laws could help prevent surrogacy being a 
commodified and market-led practice.  Exploitation could be prevented by 
ensuring surrogates are of a certain age, have had time to give informed and 
valid consent, have the opportunity to back out before insemination, etc.  A 
protocol could ensure commissioning couples know how to treat their 
surrogates with respect and dignity to prevent them being regarded as an 
object.   
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All participants in surrogacy have moral duties and obligations to each other 
which can be explored within a relational framework set out in chapter five.  
The next chapter will explore whether surrogacy involves baby selling or not.  
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CHAPTER FOUR SELF-INTEREST, ALTRUISM AND BABY SELLING IN 
PAID AND UNPAID SURROGACY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
So far analysis has included six reports featuring surrogacy, exploration of 
motherhood as multidimensional and suggestions that paid surrogacy does not 
necessarily result in commodification, exploitation and coercion.  The aim of 
this chapter is to argue that the co-existence of paid and unpaid surrogacy can 
be ethically positive, with the motives of self-interest and other regard co-
existing.  Self-interest can be regarded positively instead of negatively.  In 
section 4.2 the relationship between the self and other is explored in St 
Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas with an emphasis upon self-love and 
ordered love.  The concepts of altruism, agape, mutuality and relationalism are 
discussed in section 4.3 as a basis for relational altruism which allows for a 
variety of emphases upon the self and the other.  The discussion provides a 
foundation for the view that unpaid and paid surrogacy (but non-commercial 
without marketisation) can co-exist.   
 
Various authorities have equated commercial surrogacy to baby-selling.  
Questions will be raised regarding the objects of payment in commercial 
surrogacy, e.g. whether parental rights and custody are bought and sold.  
Discussion in section 4.4 focuses upon the suggestions and possible 
implications of the Brazier Report1 that expenses alone should be provided for a 
surrogate.  Section 4.5 concentrates upon whether the commissioning father 
buys his parental and custody rights.  Consideration will also be given to 
whether surrogacy is or is not a gestational service in section 4.6, with reference 
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to the distinction between gestational and genetic surrogacy along with claim 
rights, property rights and intention to mother.   
 
The practical issues surrounding payment are examined by looking at 
surrogates’ motives (4.6.3) and by considering a parallel debate regarding the 
blood donation system in section 4.7.  It will be proposed that problems of paid 
blood donation can be met by careful screening and regulation.  The 
philosophical underpinnings of the practical nature of the debate surrounding 
blood donation are assessed with the work of Richard Titmuss and Peter 
Singer, both of whom assume that a social practice has to be based upon either 
concern for self or a concern for others and that the two motives cannot co-
exist.  Their work will be criticised for suggesting self-interest drives out 
altruism.  Kenneth Arrow’s contribution to this debate is also evaluated.  
Section 4.7.3 refers to Charles Handy who has investigated voluntary 
organisations where unpaid volunteers work alongside paid professionals. 
 
The final section 4.8 indicates surrogates should not be expected to become 
purely altruistic alone nor should altruism be paternalistically denied.  Not all 
altruistic acts are a result of oppression, as suggested by some feminists, since 
some altruism is carefully chosen by the altruist and such behaviour need not 
fulfil feminine stereotypes of women. 
 
4.2 The Self and Other in St Augustine and St Aquinas  
 
In order to provide support for both paid and unpaid surrogacy, self-interest as 
self-love will be analysed according to the theologians St Augustine and St 
Aquinas.  By showing self-interest positively, it supports the idea that a 
surrogate who seeks her own interest by wanting payment is not selfish, as 
long as money is not her sole motive.  The surrogate can have self-interest and 
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altruistic concern for the commissioning couple.  But self-interest should not be 
regarded as good only because it is compatible with or redeemed by an 
altruistic concern for the other; it can be good in itself to look after the self.  It 
must be pointed out that technically Augustine and Aquinas do not use the 
phrase ‘the self’ in their writings, since the term did not exist.  I could have 
used the term agent to refer to the self in their writings but have decided to 
retain ‘self’ due to its use by modern readers. 
 
Self-interest deals with the interests of the self and can be subjective and 
objective, aiding a person’s flourishing.  Attitudes towards self-interest have 
often been negative; for example, sociobiologists consider it to be genetically 
programmed selfishness.  Self-interest has been seen as operating within a 
rationalistic framework, which excludes concern for others in order to 
maximise self-benefit - being willing or pretending to co-operate with others 
for self-gain only.  Some branches of economics use the term ‘homo economicus’ 
to suggest that agents are only interested in their own financial gain.  Self-
interest should not be equated with selfishness, since self-interest includes a 
built-in positive concern for the self, whereas selfishness tends not to.  
However, not all self-interest requires excessive self-concern and detrimental 
action to the other.  Some actions could be self-interested while having 
altruistic motivations.  Even so, some actions could be altruistic but have selfish 
and ulterior motives. 
 
4.2.1 St Augustine of Hippo  
 
Oliver O’Donovan begins his book The Problem of Self-Love in St Augustine2 by 
admitting that the notion of self-love is confusing and even contradictory 
within Augustine’s writings.  For Augustine, self-love can have ‘positive, 
                                                 
2 The references in section 4.2.1 relate to Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. 
Augustine (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1980). 
235 
 
negative, and neutral’ meanings (2).  Firstly, a negative understanding of self-
love is found in De Doctrina Christiana, as a ‘rebellious self-love which refused 
to accept subordination to God’ (97-8).  Wrong self-love is connected with ‘sin 
and rebellion against God’ (137).  It involves pride, where a person glorifies 
themselves and satisfies themselves without God, leading to sin.3   
 
Secondly, Augustine in the 14th book of De Trinitate, sets out the neutral 
understanding of self-love, which considers it natural and universal to love 
yourself, because no one can hate himself.  This natural self-love is linked to 
self-protection and is part of human rational nature, since passages in the De 
Trinitate regard self-love as part of self-consciousness, self-understanding and 
self-awareness.  Indeed self-interest is perceived to be a Christian duty (157-8).  
Augustine in the Soliloquia states it is wrong to love the neighbour more than 
yourself and Augustine implies that love has self-interested elements within it.  
Augustine is seen as opposing self-sacrifice, since we are to love ourselves no 
less than our neighbours (143), but O’Donovan indicates that self-sacrifice is 
possible in Christianity.   
 
Thirdly, loving yourself for Augustine is a positive love which is co-extensive 
with the love of God and any differing self-love is self-hate.  Positive self-love 
finds its only true expression in loving God completely, since for Augustine 
moral obligation comes from obligation to God and to fulfil yourself.  In De 
Doctrina Christiana, Augustine regards perfect self-love as being one with the 
love of God.  However, the activity of loving yourself and loving God are not 
the same.  Only by perfect self-love and explicit perfect love of God can loving 
yourself and God be the same.  It is a benevolent, rational and cosmic love to 
love yourself since you are promoting your ‘true welfare in God’ (137). 
 
                                                 
3 Kelly Rogers (ed.), Self-Interest: An Anthology of Philosophical Perspectives (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 48. 
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Christians are called to love their neighbour as themselves, for the sake of 
loving God.  Loving your neighbour as yourself is modelled on perfect self-
love which is expressed in love for God.  Attention now turns to Aquinas who, 
like Augustine, also believed in three types of self-love: negative, neutral and 
positive. 
 
4.2.2 St Thomas Aquinas  
 
St Thomas Aquinas distinguished between the theological virtues of faith, hope 
and charity and the cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and 
justice.  Aquinas regarded the theological virtues as superior to the cardinal ones.4  
The theological virtue of charity - i.e. love - is the prime virtue which takes priority 
and directs all the other virtues.  Charity is not acquired or natural but infused 
within us by God.  For Aquinas, charity is part of a ‘fellowship of eternal 
happiness’5 and includes three parts: God, human beings and the human body.  
Charity leads to love of self and love of neighbour and is seen as being rooted 
in a human being’s rational soul.  It is guided by reason, but it is also beyond 
reason and beyond nature too.6 
 
Like Augustine, Aquinas believed in three types of self-love: a negative self-
love, a neutral self-love and a positive self-love.7  Firstly, negative self-love 
deals with wanting worldly goods, and is called ‘inordinate love of self’,8 and 
causes desires such as pride, leading to sin, disharmony and turning away 
from God.  Secondly, neutral self-love takes two forms ‘natural’ and ‘from 
choice’.9  Neutral self-love with a natural form involves naturally seeking our 
                                                 
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: English and Latin (60 volumes) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), (ST) I-II, 62, 2; II-II, 23, 6. 
5 Rogers, Self-Interest, 70. 
6 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 24, 2 co. 
7 Rogers, Self-Interest, 50. 
8 Ibid., 50. 
9 Ibid., 50. 
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own good and perfection.  Neutral self-love can also come ‘from choice’, since 
we wish good for the self and reason wants a rational choice which benefits us.  
If you accidentally fail to want the good, you are considered to become a self-
hater.  A person may desire something and not realise it is evil or they may 
want the nonessential compared to those which are essential for the self.  
Thirdly, positive self-love involves the self directing themselves towards God, 
in seeking our perfection we desire God.10  Loving God directs a person 
towards God and makes their life harmonious.  Aquinas’ view of self-interest 
deals with the afterlife and with a human being’s relationship to God instead of 
the relationship to himself, but a degree of self-love is allowed as ‘natural and 
necessary’.11 
 
Aquinas accepts a love of self as obligatory.  Aquinas’s positive self-love is 
considered ‘superior to love of neighbour’.12  But he acknowledges that our true 
self-love is not individualistic, as we are ‘social animals’13 who naturally desire 
to love others as part of our ‘common humanity’ and ‘shared goods’.14  Self-
perfection in charity involves loving and caring for your neighbour with 
proportion and moderation.  Others are not to be used as instruments for our 
self-perfection, but we give alms, for example, due to our love of God, therefore 
we love others ‘for their own sake’.15  If we fail to love the other, we fail to love 
the self correctly.  Love of neighbour can take priority over love of strangers.  
However, prudence with charity does not mean ‘unmitigated altruism’16 for 
                                                 
10 Aquinas, ST, I, 6, 1 ad. 2. 
11 Rogers, Self-Interest, 51. 
12 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 25, 12; 26, 4 see Douglas J. Den Uyl, The Virtue of Prudence (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1991), 96.  
13 Stephen J. Pope, ‘Expressive Individualism and True Self-Love: A Thomistic Perspective’, The 
Journal of Religion 71 (1991), 384-99, at 390. 
14 Ibid., 390, see also 392-3. 
15 Douglas J. Den Uyl, ‘The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity’, in Ellen Frankel Paul et 
al. (eds.), Altruism (Cambridge: The University of Cambridge, 1993), 192-224, at 207 n. 27.  
16 Uyl, The Virtue of Prudence, 96. 
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Aquinas, but it does mean more emphasis upon loving others.17  Aquinas 
allows us to love one neighbour more than another, with varying degrees of 
affection, whereas Augustine believed Christian love requires we have the 
same love for everyone.18  For Aquinas we are allowed to love our family more 
than strangers.   
 
The self therefore in both Augustine and Aquinas has positive connotations, 
but both raise concerns about how the self is to relate to others.  The 
relationship between the self and the other is explored in the concept of charity 
or ‘caritas ordinata’, which refers to an ordered love where the self is to be taken 
into consideration in relationship.  This is explored below in sections 4.2.3 and 
4.2.4. 
 
4.2.3 Augustine and Ordered Love 
 
The concept of charity involves the notion of ‘caritas ordinata’ (or dilectio 
ordinata) – ‘ordered love’.  St Ambrose ‘taught that caritas ordinata required a 
man to love God first, then his parents, then his children, then those of his own 
household and finally strangers’.19   
 
Augustine regarded caritas as the only right kind of love,20 which is also 
infused into people’s hearts by grace.  Love has a natural order, where all 
objects of love are placed in a hierarchy dependent upon how close they are to 
God.  Caritas is ‘God’s love given to the self’,21 allowing the self to love God and 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 96. 
18 Stephen J. Pope, ‘The Order of Love and Recent Catholic Ethics: A Constructive Proposal’, 
Theological Studies 52 (1991), 255-88, at 262. 
19 Brian Tierney, ‘The Decretists and the ‚Deserving Poor‛’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 1 (1959), 360-73, at 363-4. 
20 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: SPCK, 1957), 484. 
21
 Darlene Fozard Weaver, Self Love and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 4. 
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others.22  Human beings are to love God before themselves, because God is 
higher.  Loving your neighbour is to love another as you love yourself and 
direct them to God.  By loving God we can love the self rightly, as we find 
satisfaction in the highest good.  Right self-love finds its bonum in God and is 
part of any human beings best interest.  Augustine believed that loving God 
and our neighbour orders other love, for example self-love occurs because we 
are called to love our neighbour as our self.23  Caritas Ordinata deals with a 
proper self-love which is ordered to the self.  Love of neighbour and self-love 
are connected because we are to love our neighbour as we love our self, as this 
is a human being’s natural inclination.  Augustine comments: ‘charity seeks not 
her own, means that she puts the common good before her own private 
interests’.24  In comparison, false or inordinate self-love is the basis of all evil 
and is called ‘unordered love’ i.e. ‘cupiditas’ or ‘dilectio inordinate’, which wants 
satisfaction in something which is not God and in things which are temporal, 
transient and worldly.25 
 
4.2.4 Aquinas and Ordered Love 
 
For Aquinas, charity is a friendship with God, inspired by grace, with God as 
its main object, not the self or the neighbour, meaning the self is loved not for 
itself, but for the sake of God.  As part of charity, a person loves God as the 
principle of good and has right self-love by being involved with this good.26  
Aquinas and Augustine believe that true happiness for the self, ‘beatitudo’, is in 
God, because proper self-love loves the self ‘in God’,27 as the highest good, 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 4. 
23 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Leicester: 
Apollos, 2nd ed., 1994), 239. 
24 Augustine, Epist. CCXXI.PL 33 and 963, cited by Thomas Aquinas in Rogers, Self-Interest, 72 
n. 130. 
25 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 709-10. 
26 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 26, 4. 
27 Pope, ‘Expressive Individualism and True Self-Love’, 387. 
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whereas improper self-love loves God instrumentally ‘for the self’.28  God’s 
love for us is the exemplary form of charity and our charity becomes perfect if 
we copy God’s.  We belong to God and love out of charity and therefore we 
love our self and others due to our love for God.  Charity is part of self-
perfection but ‘is not a means to self-perfection’,29 since a person is not 
charitable in order to gain self-perfection, but charity reflects a person’s self-
perfection.30   
 
Aquinas believes we are naturally ordered by God in charity, to love God, 
ourselves and the common good.  In question 26 of the Secunda Secundae of 
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas points out that ‘order’ deals with that coming 
‘before’ and that coming ‘after’.31  Aquinas’ ‘ordo caritatis’ is similar to 
Augustine’s view where we love God first, then the self, then the neighbour 
and then our own bodies.32  Charity distinguishes between ordered and 
disordered family ties, which is not for the good and involves hating the 
family.33  For Aquinas, self-love can follow or ignore right reason, self-love can 
be ordered or disordered towards the good, or self-love can be expressed 
‘properly or improperly’.34  Improper self-love is self-hatred, and is disordered 
for not loving yourself according to your natural rational nature, by not 
wanting the good or not doing that which perfects reason, whereas charity 
allows self-love.35  Both Augustine and Aquinas have a moral psychology 
where people are motivated by the love of the good and Aquinas has a 
teleological understanding of self-interest.     
                                                 
28 Ibid., 387. 
29 Uyl, ‘The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity’, 204. 
30 Ibid., 204-5. 
31 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 26, 1.   
32 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine trans. J. F. Shaw in Robert Maynard Hutchins (ed.), Great 
Books of the Western World: The Confessions, The City of God and On Christian Doctrine, (volume 18 
of 54), (Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), Book 1, chapter 22, (21) and chapter 23, 
(22). 
33 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 26, 7, ad. 1.   
34 Pope, ‘Expressive Individualism and True Self-Love’, 387.   
35 Aquinas, ST, II-II, 25, 4, ad. 3 and ST, II-II, 26, 4.22. 
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4.3 Altruism, Thomas Nagel, Agape, Mutuality and Relational Altruism 
 
As seen above, both Augustine and Aquinas support self-love or self-interest.  
Both want us avoid negative self destruction, both acknowledge that self-love 
is natural where we want to protect and perfect ourselves, and both want us to 
love God, ourselves and our neighbours.  We now turn to the concept of 
altruism as developed by Auguste Comte in light of Thomas Hobbes.  This will 
be followed by the insights of self-interest and altruism by modern day neo-
Kantian Thomas Nagel.  After Nagel we turn to a section on agape as presented 
by the theologian Anders Nygren, and the effects of his favouring the other 
over the self in agape will be considered.  Three other areas including 
mutuality, a relational alternative and relational altruism will also be 
presented. 
 
4.3.1 The Term Altruism 
 
The word ‘altruism’ is derived from alter, Latin for ‘other’ and was coined in 
the eighteenth century by the founding figure of sociology, Auguste Comte.  It 
was developed as a principle to guide action for the interests of others, in order 
to subvert the philosophy of egoism as self-interest36 which had been 
developed by Thomas Hobbes.  Comte wanted to understand how people, 
motivated by selfish thought on the Hobbesian model, could be motivated by 
sympathy for the other in line with Hume’s non-selfish model for the other.  
Basic moral psychology came to be rewritten in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries by the dominant categories of egoism and altruism as opposed to the 
theological concept of charity.  However, Comte with a different reading of 
pre-modern history stated: ‘[i]n a word, Biocracy and Sociocracy will be alike 
                                                 
36 Paul et al., Altruism, vii. 
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pervaded by Altruism; whereas during the long period of theological and 
military training Egoism predominated’.37  Comte wanted to develop ‘common 
interests and goals’ alongside ‘social harmony’.38   
 
However, Comte’s altruism risks regarding self-interest as inferior to the needs 
of others.  On this view, others’ needs take priority,39 since morality is linked to 
altruism and fails to include any sense of the good of the self.  Comte may have 
been concerned that some people, ostensibly acting for others, had ulterior 
motives because they were really acting for their own interests alone.  Altruism 
is predicated on a moral psychology which is not the one of traditional 
theology.  Egoism believes people act for their own self-interest only, but this is 
not what Augustine says. 
 
Colin Grant suggests: ‘[a]ltruism is a modern concept, but its roots lie in the 
Christian understanding of love as agape, the self-giving love that is seen to be 
characteristic of God and in which human beings are called to participate’.40  
However, altruism and agape can be contrasted to ordered love, which differs 
from altruism and agape because it allows for ordered relationships between 
the self and the other as well as God.  It needs to be borne in mind that 
Aquinas, for example, did not use the terms agape or altruism, with altruism 
developed by Comte as a secular term for concern for the other.  Religion does 
not have to be seen as ‘the material principle of altruism’ which Grant 
advocates,41 since religious ethics does not have to be equated with agape and 
altruism does not have to be regarded as pure altruism only.   
 
                                                 
37 Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity, vol. 1 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1875), 500. 
38 Colin Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 74.   
39 Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (eds.), Self-Interest, (Cambridge: The University of Cambridge, 1997), 
vii.  
40 Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethics, xvii. 
41 Ibid., xix. 
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Part of the problem of altruism has been a movement away from an inclusion 
of God in the loving of self and other towards a secular understanding of love 
as self-interest or as love for others with altruism.42  Aquinas believed the end 
of human beings is God, and people are to aim toward this good.  In contrast 
modern ethics tends to focus upon following duties towards others with rules 
or a maximization of a social utility, so self-interest became restrained in favour 
of a social moral principle, thus reducing duties to the self.  Without God or 
teleology, altruism (the moral primacy of the other) becomes the main focus, 
for example Hobbes regarded others to be the object of charity, which becomes 
social co-operation instead of self-perfection.43  It is possible that less emphasis 
was placed upon God due to some of the theological and political changes 
leading to increased diversity in the practice of religion.  In the burgeoning 
industrial age, more emphasis was placed upon economic maximisation. 
 
Emphasis within ethics became focused upon the other as our neighbour 
instead of God.44  Consequently (and problematically) self-love has been 
assimilated into love for the other, so self-love becomes subordinate and 
involves self-abnegation and fails to include reference to God.  Nygren 
indicates that Max Scheler believed that modern altruism is separate from 
Christian love because altruism does not have a ‘religious basis’, saying:  
 
He [Comte] fails to observe that ‘love’ in the Christian sense is understood as a species 
of act, which is of a spiritual nature, and by its very nature is directed primarily to the 
spiritual person (of God and of men); that consequently the reference to the other is by 
no means characteristic of its essence and that just for this reason Christianity knows, 
and must know, a ‘self-love’ that is different in kind from all ‘egoism’!45   
 
                                                 
42 Weaver, Self Love and Christian Ethics, 44. 
43 Uyl, ‘The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity’, 205 and 208-9. 
44 Weaver, Self Love and Christian Ethics, 44-5. 
45 Max Scheler¸ Vom Umsturz der Werte, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist, 1919), 166, cited in 
Nygren, Agape and Eros, 95-6 n. 1. 
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Self-interest is often perceived to be outside morality, which is defined 
exclusively in terms of the other, leading self-interest to clash with altruistic 
moral motives concerning the other.  The traditional meaning of altruism, as 
pure altruism, involves denial of the agent’s own interests or pleasure from 
altruism, for such interests are considered to be ulterior motives, with priority 
given to the other’s needs only.  A positive co-existence of the motives of self 
and other in altruism is not thought possible because of an expectation that 
self-concern would detract from and harm the others involved and also 
because concern for the other is supposed to be antagonistic and detrimental to 
your own self-interest.46  The self is expected to be motivated by concerns and 
benefits for itself only, as demonstrated in the rationalistic utility-maximising 
theories, since even when acting for others, the self is supposed to do so for its 
own gain alone.  The theologian Colin Grant is typical of those who regard the 
co-existence of self-interested and altruistic motives as incompatible:  
 
Altruism and self-interest do not relate by direct contrast.  The attraction of a relation 
of complementarity, in recognizing a role for each on a common spectrum, is suspect 
precisely because of it neatness.  The clash and commonality of altruism and self-
interest suggest that the most productive way of envisioning the ongoing relation 
between them is in terms of conflict.47   
 
In order to overcome egoism, the ethics of pure altruism subordinated self-
interest to the needs of others.  However, we need to ensure that ethics can 
include the mixed motives of concern for the other as well as for the self, with a 
variety of emphasis upon the self and the other.  Such an approach would 
reflect the ordered love of the theologians which allows relationships with the 
self, the other and God. 
                                                 
46 This idea is demonstrated by psychologists: ‘focusing on one’s own needs and development 
cannot help but lead away from other-directed concern’ (Michael A. Wallach and Lise Wallach, 
Psychology’s Sanction for Selfishness: The Error of Egoism in Theory and Therapy [San Francisco, CA: 
W. H. Freeman, 1983], 261). 
47 Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethics, 76. 
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4.3.2 Thomas Nagel48 
 
In contrast to the theologians Augustine and Aquinas, Thomas Nagel is a 
modern neo-Kantian and rationalistic philosopher.  Nagel’s The Possibility of 
Altruism was published in 1970 and, according to Alan Thomas, focuses upon 
‘the idea of reasons for action’.49  Thomas suggests The View from Nowhere50 
extends the discussion of ethics ‘into political theory’.51 
 
Altruism, for Nagel, is ‘not abject self-sacrifice, but merely a willingness to act 
in consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior 
motives’ (79).  He believes altruism includes behaviour motivated by the belief 
that someone will benefit or avoid harm.  The self-interested needs and good of 
the other are regarded as rational reasons for an agent to be altruistic to them 
and such reasons are independent of our emotions (81-4).  He acknowledges 
some altruistic acts may be performed with some ‘inconvenience’ to the agent 
or be of ‘no benefit’ to them (79).   
 
Altruism therefore is not based upon ‘desires’, but ‘practical reason’ (15).  
Nagel implies that if a person acts from sympathy, they act from the emotion 
instead of the altruistic reason, which could mean they act only due to having 
the emotion and not due to the other’s situation.52  Nagel regards emotionally 
motivated altruism as egoistically motivated,53 and argues against egoism.  
Egoism regards agents as acting upon reasons and motivations based on their 
                                                 
48 References in brackets below refer to Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1970).  
49 Alan Thomas, Thomas Nagel (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2009), viii. 
50 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
51 Thomas, Thomas Nagel, viii. 
52 Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980), 122.  
53 Neera Kapur Badhwar, ‘Altruism Versus Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy’, in Paul 
et al., Altruism, 90-117, at 92 n. 5. 
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own ‘interests and desires’ (84) only; it therefore lacks ‘direct concern for 
others’ (84-5).  Nagel rejects Kant’s claim that all interests are reducible to self-
interest but, ‘like Kant, he excludes all egotistic interests from moral 
motivation’.54  Even so, if I was ill I would rather be visited by a compassionate 
friend than a carer performing a duty as part of their job.   
 
In order to understand Nagel, it is important to be aware of how he uses the 
terms subjective and objective, which he considers to reflect a tension in human 
nature.  Nagel sees subjective and objective as ‘predicates of understanding’55 
and they apply to reasons, knowledge and understanding, but not to the aims 
of the understanding or knowledge.56  Thomas believes that the term 
‘subjective’ is fairly stable in Nagel’s work and refers to a particular person’s 
‘pre-reflective, personal commitments’,57 (‘whether theoretical or practical’).58  
‘Pre-reflective’ is not regarded as ‘unreflective’, but refers to those 
commitments which have not been critically analysed yet.59  A subjective 
reason has its content fulfilled by referring to a particular agent.60  Nagel 
describes objectivity as: 
 
a method of understanding.  It is beliefs and attitudes that are objective in the primary sense.61   
 
Objective reason is seen as a reason for everyone62 and is linked to impersonal 
detachment.63  A person attempts to look at themselves from the outside, as if 
by a neutral third person and not from their own perspective.  However, he 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 91 n. 2. 
55 Thomas, Thomas Nagel, 26. 
56 Ibid., 26, 30 and 169. 
57
 Ibid., 11. 
58 Ibid., 6. 
59 Ibid., 11. 
60 Ibid., 129. 
61 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 4. 
62 Thomas, Thomas Nagel, 129. 
63 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 9. 
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rejects ‘a false objectification’ where objectification is applied, but the reality is 
better understood with less detachment such as perspective,64 thus reducing 
distortion, but he allows for our own experiences, reflecting an influence of 
phenomenology.65   
 
In The Possibility of Altruism Nagel adopts a ‘Cartesian’ model of objectification 
which replaces ‘subjective representation’ by an objective one.66  Subjective 
reasons have to be supported by objective reasons to be tolerated.67  In The 
Possibility of Altruism Nagel wanted moral agents to act for objective reasons 
and he used objective principles to support subjective principles (96-7).  In the 
View from Nowhere, he uses a ‘Hegelian’ model of objectification which allows 
for ‘subjective representation’ to ‘be placed in a wider,...context’,68 which allows 
for differing subjective representations, as agent-relative reasons.  Therefore, 
the subjective and objective - as agent-neutral reasons - can work together 
without the objective replacing the subjective,69 as objectivity cannot 
completely provide a view of the world.70  
 
Nagel wants altruism to be based upon objective values and reasons, as 
opposed to subjective ones.  He encourages moral agents to put themselves 
into the place of the other and take an objective interest in the needs, actions 
and desires of the other, who is considered to be like the agent.  Altruistic 
agents acting for the other are to consider themselves as ‘merely one individual 
among many’ (1) and as an impersonal other, making altruism impartial.  
Objective reasons are seen to prevent self-centredness, whereas subjective 
reasons do not.  He wants subjective principles to be formed universally and 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 4. 
65 Thomas, Thomas Nagel, 5 and 235. 
66 Ibid., 12. 
67 Ibid., 135 and 167. 
68 Ibid., 12-13. 
69 Ibid., 12-13 and 135. 
70 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 5. 
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impersonally so they can apply to everyone, including the self.  There can be an 
objective reason to ensure others will survive, which is not dependent upon the 
interests of the agent doing the action but are based on objectivity (127-8).   
 
In a postscript to The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel pointed out that he had 
argued ‘only objective reasons are acceptable’, with subjective reasons being 
acceptable if derived from objective reasons (vii).  However, he has revised this 
view.  Nagel now believes that objective reasons can correspond to subjective 
ones.  He wants to ensure personal and impersonal standpoints are linked 
motivationally.  He does not think the personal has to be subordinated to the 
impersonal.  He believes subjective reasons can give an ‘independent influence’ 
in life as well as acknowledging objective reasons, as personal standpoints can 
still have power alongside the impersonal and these reasons can explain ‘the 
possibility of altruism’ (vii-viii).  Not all subjective reasons are objective since 
they may be subjective for a particular agent without being a reason for others.  
In his later book, The View from Nowhere, he admits the objective view may not 
replace the subjective view, but both the objective and subjective view could 
co-exist.  Reflection is needed to decide how to balance between impersonal 
and personal reasons and what can ‘be demanded of rational individuals’.71  
 
At times, Nagel seems to link the altruistic motive of the moral agent with the 
self-interest of the other saying:  
 
Altruistic reasons are parasitic upon self-interested ones; the circumstances in the lives 
of others which altruism requires us to consider are circumstances which those others 
already have reason to consider from a self-interested point of view.  Therefore the 
form of altruistic reasons will depend both on the form of self-interested ones, and on 
the procedure for constructing the altruistic analogue of a given self-interested reason 
(16).   
                                                 
71 Ibid., 203. 
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However, it could be argued that such reasons are the self-interests of the other 
and not of the agent.  He admits the agent can look after their own interests as 
there are some ends and objects you can pursue better for yourself than you 
can for others.  Sometimes individuals may have to pay more attention to their 
own problems and the needs of their family than those of humanity (133).  
Individuals can favour their interest if the agent-relative reason ‘exceeds’ the 
agent-neutral reason.72  The claims of others may have to compete with 
personal reasons in deciding what to do.73  
 
But Nagel downplays the part self-interest can play in altruistic behaviour.  In a 
footnote, he brushes aside the possibility of ‘the relative weight to be assigned 
to the interests of oneself and others’ (79).  He reduces the correlation between 
self-interest and altruism, claiming that ‘[a] defence of altruism in terms of self-
interest is therefore unlikely to be successful’ (79), since appeal to self-interest 
and sentiments to account for altruism are ‘superfluous’ (80).  He 
acknowledges self-interest can be a motivation for altruism (80), but this tends 
to be an internal reason and is seen as not being rational, because it is often 
dependent upon feelings.  Altruism, for Nagel, is dependent on impersonal 
objective reasons as motives for action.  Therefore, Nagel proposes that ‘*a+ny 
objective principle which demands self-reliance, self-defence, or self-
improvement will not be altruistic’ (97).  It seems as though Nagel regards all 
human beings as the same, following a rational Kantian universalisation, and 
fails to consider how individuals’s specific needs differ.  He fails to see a 
dialogue or interaction between the self and the other.  If we adopt an 
impersonalist morality, based upon impartiality and universality, which 
focuses upon generic human beings with the same agent-neutral and objective 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 175. 
73 Ibid., 175-6. 
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values, then allowing for the partial, specific self-interest, experience and 
inclination of agents can be difficult.   
 
4.3.3 Agape with Anders Nygren and Gene Outka 
 
Christian interpretations of altruism are often defined in relation to agape.  
Agape is regarded as love for the other, i.e. love for our neighbour according to 
the Protestant theologian Anders Nygren.  Nygren is explored in this section, 
even though he is criticised for his interpretation of agape.  Nygren regarded 
agape as love for our neighbour, which has a Christian basis in the love of God.  
He considered it as ‘disastrous’ that the ‘general love of humanity’, found in 
love of neighbour, has lost its religious identity by being equated with altruism 
as ‘fellow-feeling’.74  He acknowledged that notions such as altruism and 
sympathy bore ‘similarities’ to Christian love of neighbour, but he suggested 
they had differing spiritual bases, and are unconnected to Christian love.75 
 
For Nygren, self-love is connected to Eros,76 which is a type of selfish self-
interest and self-seeking.  This is regarded as sinful by agape for wanting its 
own.77  He refused to link self-love with agape, seeing self-love as perverting 
human will, and regarded it as an ‘error’ to read self-love into the gospels.78  He 
saw self-love as the basic human moral problem to be overcome by other-
regarding and self-sacrificing agape as the Christian love.  Agape as love for the 
neighbour is seen to ‘exclude’ and ‘overcome’ self-love.79  Self-love is seen as 
‘alien’ to New Testament commands to love.80  2 Corinthians 5:14f. is cited, that 
                                                 
74 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 95. 
75 Ibid., 95. 
76 Ibid., 209-10 and 216.   
77 Ibid., xiii. 
78 Ibid., 101 and 130. 
79 Ibid., 101. 
80 Ibid., 100. 
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human beings under Christ’s agape do not live to themselves but to Jesus, since 
according to Romans 15:1-3 we are not to please ourselves but our neighbour.  
 
Instead, agape is seen as coming from God and is ‘the criterion and the source of 
all that can be called Christian love’.81  Agape, as God’s love gives order to the 
world.  Nygren believed agape is surrender to God where the agent becomes 
God’s slave so only God’s will is done.82  He believes agape derived its meaning 
from ‘fellowship with God’.83  He regards agape as ‘spontaneous and unmotivated, 
uncalulating, unlimited and unconditional’.84  Nygren states: 
 
 Christian love moves in two directions, towards God and towards its neighbour; and 
in self-love it finds its chief adversary, which must be fought and conquered.  It is self-
love that alienates man from God, preventing him from sincerely giving himself up to 
God, and it is self-love that shuts up a man’s heart against his neighbour.85 
 
However, Nygren’s view of agape is too negative and can be criticised for its 
expectations of self-abnegation and self-sacrifice, where the self is lost due to 
there being no obligation to the self.  Love does not have to be seen as self-
sacrificial agape only; and an alternative exists in love as charity, as we have 
seen above in Augustine and Aquinas. 
 
In contrast with Nygren, theologian Gene Outka understands agape as a 
universal, impartial and rational love including the self, reducing the emphasis 
upon the other.86  Outka shows that altruism is usually regarded as a moral 
obligation promoting others and not the agent’s interests, whereas ethical 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 218.  Darlene Fozard Weaver agrees stating: ‘Anders Nygren regards self love as 
entirely pernicious.  He differentiates self-interested, erotic love from other-regarding, agapic 
love, correlating agape with neighbor love and eros with self love’, see Weaver, Self Love and 
Christian Ethics, 48.  
82 Nygren, Agape and Eros, viii-ix. 
83 Ibid., 67. 
84 Ibid., 91.  
85 Ibid., 217. 
86 Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972).  
252 
 
neutralism or universalism aims at all who are affected by the actions of the 
agent.  He prefers agape to involve social cooperativeness with a movement 
from self-sacrifice to harmony.  However, he suggests a mutual agape in 
personal and social relations where a communication and sharing exists 
between people or groups in an exchange.  People for Outka are ‘reciprocally 
connected’ within groups and society with a ‘struggle’ for harmony.87  He 
favours mutuality with agape as ‘equal regard’.  He sees as equal regard as 
having advantages over co-operativeness for agape, such as an emphasis upon 
egalitarianism.88  Self-love is acknowledged as part of mutual love and is 
unavoidable and is part of a person’s integrity.  He sees self-love as a basic, 
natural self-regarding act for all human beings.  For Outka a person who loves 
their neighbour is able to love themselves too.89   
 
Even so, Oukta has been criticised for being too individualistic and failing to 
connect the self to others and ignoring ‘personal identity, narrative, tradition, 
and community’.90  Equal regard is criticised for being ‘rule-based’ with an 
‘impersonal universalism’ and overlooking the psychological aspects of agape, 
including ‘empathy and affections’ relating to the special relationships of family 
and friends.91   
 
Instead, an alternative needs to be offered.  There is a need for more emphasis 
upon caritas ordinata as an ordered self-love, reflecting God’s love for us.  Self-
sacrifice or self-abnegation should not be the only expected duty within 
Christianity, and altruism, especially pure altruism, is not the only possible 
ethical relationship.  Caritas ordinata allows us to love the self and to love the 
other too while loving God, whereas altruism tends to favour love of the other 
                                                 
87 Ibid., 177. 
88 Ibid., 285. 
89 Ibid., 288. 
90 Stephen J. Pope, ‘Love in Contemporary Christian Ethics’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 23 
(1995), 167-97, at 169. 
91 Ibid., 169. 
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over love of the self, with self-interest too often being equated with selfishness 
or egoism.  However, an alternative view of altruism needs to be offered, 
which draws upon caritas ordinata to a certain extent.  However - as we shall see 
- the alternative view of altruism, as relational altruism, differs from the 
organic view involving mutuality which is set out in the next subsection.  It is 
important to have a variety of emphases upon the self and the other, without 
insisting upon a mutuality of the self and the other, since there are times when 
the self has to be independent and the other has to be independent or a certain 
degree of self-sacrifice is required. 
 
4.3.4 Mutuality 
 
As seen above, agape for Nygren is impartial, self-sacrificial action for another, 
without self-regard.  An alternative is an organic view of the relationship 
between the self and the other, which is based upon mutuality and consensus.  
Mutuality favours egalitarianism, by valuing the self and other and allowing 
them to positively care and respect each other, often with a balanced 
equilibrium.  Some feminists such as Beverly Wildung Harrison92 and Judith 
Plaskow93 favour mutuality over agape, believing it includes the self and the 
other without emphasising self-sacrifice.  Feminists are often concerned that 
women are expected to be subservient in society and instead encourage them 
to stand up for their welfare and human flourishing by acknowledging their 
dignity by caring for and respecting themselves.94  Valerie Saiving Goldstein 
believed women are pressurised to ‘devote themselves’ to others which can 
                                                 
92 Beverley Wildung Harrison, ‘The Power of Anger in the Work of Love: Christian Ethics for 
Women and Other Strangers’, in Judith Plaskow and Carol P. Christ (eds.), Weaving the Visions: 
New Patterns in Feminist Spirituality (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), 214-25. 
93 Judith Plaskow, Sex, Sin and Grace: Women’s Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Paul Tillich (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1980). 
94 Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethics, 159. 
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prevent her self-development.95  Instead of self-sacrifice, collegial altruism is 
often advocated, where the self and the other are able to mutually benefit with 
exchange or reciprocity.  On this view, the welfare of the self and the other is 
sought; not just that of the other.96  Feminists like Plaskow tend to concentrate 
upon love as caritas with an inclusion of eros, with ‘a balance or equilibrium’ of 
self-regard and other-regard with mutuality and equal regard.97  Louis Janssens 
also advocates caritas with love as equal regard; on his view we can love the 
other and the self in mutuality without self-abnegation.98    
 
However, a weakness of mutuality is that it demands an equal relationship of 
the self and the other.  It expects both parties to benefit within a transaction, by 
both giving and receiving.  Altruism within the mutual organic perspective is 
seen as expected, unavoidable and natural, with the self and the other mutually 
helping each other to develop.  Action for one is perceived as action for the 
other.  Mutualists tend not to allow the self to engage in pure, supererogatory 
altruism because such sacrifice would be considered negative for the self.  
Feminists often disapprove of pure or sacrificial altruism as detrimental to 
women and incompatible with mutuality.  However, mutuality may not be 
responsive enough to deal with the actual and specific needs of the self or the 
other.  At times self-sacrifice which cannot be reciprocated may be required, for 
example a sister may donate a kidney to her ill sister, who cannot reciprocate.  
Even so, it is imperative that women do not feel pressured to be altruistic and 
alternatives exist to prevent expected altruism from women, with women 
made aware of cultural stereotypes that lead some into altruism.  Relationalism 
as an alternative to mutually is explored below in section 4.3.5. 
                                                 
95 Valerie Saiving Goldstein, ‘The Human Situation: A Feminine View’, The Journal of Religion 40 
(1960), 100-12, at 110. 
96 Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethics, 221-2. 
97 Don S. Browning, ‘Altruism and Christian Love’, Zygon 27 (1992), 421-36, at 427. 
98 Louis Janssens, ‘Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics’, Louvain Studies 6 (1977), 207-38, at 
216-30. 
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4.3.5 An Alternative Relational Framework 
 
The moral domain does not have to be defined exclusively in terms of concern 
for the other, with an objectively rational and universal framework, nor does it 
always have to follow mutuality.  An alternative relational framework could be 
flexible, sensitive and responsive to the needs of the self and other with a 
pluralistic ontology.  It would allow for varying degrees of emphasis upon the 
self and other with pluralistic moral motives and actions, so both the self and 
other can be acknowledged together or separately, thus giving an ordered love, 
without insisting the needs of one party always take preference.  Such flexible 
responsiveness will not always be mutually egalitarian with an equally 
balanced relationship.  Sometimes a compromise may be inappropriate, and an 
imbalance may be required, with more emphasis upon the other or more 
emphasis upon the self which may involve excess or some sacrifice to satisfy 
the needs of the self or the other.  Occasionally, it is possible to see your needs 
as less important and the other’s needs as weighing more.  For example, an 
agent might act as a carer, giving her all to a person, but at other times having a 
respite and care for herself.  Aquinas was too constrained to suggest charity 
requires we are to love ourselves more than our neighbour.99  It could be 
suggested that the ‘constraint’ on Aquinas is the teaching of Jesus.  However, 
Jesus wants us to love our neighbour as we love ourselves, not to love the self 
more than the neighbour as suggested by Aquinas.  However, self-abnegation, 
selfishness or altruism will not be obligatory.  A relational framework, without 
exclusively insisting upon one type of arrangement, will allow for a variety of 
acts such as self-interest, pure altruism, supererogatory self-sacrifice and 
egalitarian mutuality with a proportional balance, dependent upon the needs 
of participants. 
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Even though the self has to be responsive to the needs of the other, a relational 
ontology allows for the separate self and appropriate self-concern, so that the 
self is not totally absorbed or lost by the other.  We can give to charity and have 
care for others, but keep some money for ourselves to care for the self, while 
being motivated to care for others.  Therefore, the other needs to consider the 
self and possibly restrict what they are asking the self to do for them, by being 
responsive to their needs and considering justice.  Both self and the other could 
be in dialogue with each other; listening to each others’ needs and priorities 
instead of assuming what they want by your own interpretation, since the self 
cannot always know what the other needs.  Many factors will determine which 
type of relationalism with the other is followed, depending upon the needs and 
priorities of participants and their circumstances.  Even though it can be 
difficult to articulate what the needs of people are at the outset as people differ 
and their needs differ, within philosophy the concepts of needs are often 
discussed.  Basic human needs can be universal and objective and usually, as a 
minimum, include oxygen, water, food, clothes, medicine and shelter which 
contribute to a person’s welfare, well-being and flourishing, leading to harm if 
they are not met.100   
 
Relationalism is not a new ethical theory for everything; sometimes a 
relationship may have to be severed, since not all relationships can be 
maintained.  But a relational framework will encourage co-operation in order 
to reach a solution with ongoing collaborative interaction, discourse and 
negotiation.  It will respond to on-going experiences with flexibility, dynamism 
and sometimes compromise by taking an interpersonal and contextual 
approach to the needs of participants.  The framework will allow for 
interdependence as well as separate individuals with particular and personal 
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 Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
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others, allowing for partiality instead of impartial impersonal others.  
Relationalism involves people whose interests may differ and therefore it may 
involve tensions within a relationship.  As relationalism is flexible, there are 
many different ways in which it can try to resolve these differences.  
Sometimes, the discourse the participants are involved in, allows them to see 
the importance of each other’s priorities and their importance, which could 
lead to compromises and concessions.  Sometimes people might have to agree 
to disagree.  At times, the relationship may have to end completely.  
Alternatively, the relationship between the two people will run alongside each 
other concurrently, but separately, such as a couple both going to a cinema 
complex, but watching separate films.  Allowance will be made for feelings 
such as compassion, sympathy and empathy as well as reason.  The rights of 
individuals need to be respected along with their freedom, autonomy, well-
being, dignity and human flourishing, but with justice and care working 
together. 
 
My relational framework is objective in form but not in content, since I am 
rejecting an objective set of rules.  It is not traditionally objective in Nagel’s 
sense, since I reject the idea of an impersonal generalised other.  However, I am 
not totally subjectivist or relativist; allowing for the individual does not 
necessarily mean relativistic allowance of anything.  My three main principles 
held in the construction of the framework are objective, general and universal: 
Firstly, you ought to be concerned with the needs of other people (this 
obligation does not depend on whether you want to be concerned with them).  
Secondly, you ought to be concerned for your own needs.  Thirdly, you ought 
to be willing to negotiate the fulfilment of both.  The relational framework 
allows for negotiation to fulfil the three objective principles to allow for 
people’s individual needs and the needs of others in a particular way.  
Therefore, I have a meta-objectivity of standards, allowing for freedom, 
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flexibility and reason from the individual by combining objectivity and 
subjectivity.  The next section explores how a relational framework can be 
applied to altruism. 
 
4.3.6 Relational Altruism 
 
Relationalism as described above can be applied to altruism.  Relational 
altruism tries to be more responsive to the specific needs and welfare of 
participants by allowing for some subjectivity, instead of making such needs fit 
to the requirements of predetermined reason.  Unlike Nagel’s impersonal and 
universal, generalised altruistic agent, who acts on impartial rational terms and 
sees him or herself as just one person among many,101 the relational altruist 
looks out for their own needs and the specific interests of the particular other.  
The ends of altruistic action will be personally derived by dialogue instead of 
being impersonally imposed, since the objectively determined ends of 
traditional altruism may not be responsive enough, applicable to or suitable to 
meet the needs of participants.   
 
My relational altruism differs to pure altruism, for my relational altruism 
allows for self-interest and concern for the other.  My relational framework is 
flexible to allow for acts of pure altruism done just for the other, but it is not 
just restricted to this.  The relational framework also allows for relational 
altruism, with various degrees of emphasis upon the self and the other, and not 
just all for the other, as with pure altruism.  The relational approach to altruism 
is premised upon the belief that motives of self-interest and altruism can co-
exist in various ways.  Relational altruism produces a spectrum of altruistic 
actions without detriment to participants, which sometimes includes 
mutuality.  We can reject the idea that only one motive of concern for the other 
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must be at work in altruistic action.  The motives can be filtered through in 
many ways by a structure of understanding, based on an intuitive level and 
psychological level about how reason and motives co-exist.  Relational altruism 
allows an agent to choose pure altruism or to coincide self-care with care for 
the other’s welfare, unlike traditional altruism where the self is often expected 
to be subordinated to the other with less moral significance.  Relational 
altruism, unlike mutuality, does not insist upon a proportionate and equal 
relationship between the self and other with no pure altruism, since relational 
altruism does not paternistically restrict pure altruism as inappropriate.  
Sometimes others will not be able to respond in a mutual way to the self who is 
acting altruistically towards them, such as a person in a persistent vegetative 
state.  Paid acts which care for the self as well as the other will be able to 
operate alongside pure unpaid altruistic acts.  
 
The other has a responsibility to the altruistic agent to consider their needs and 
dignity while they are altruistic towards them, thus preventing unnecessary 
harm or self-sacrifice.  This may mean the other performs an action for 
themselves, instead of expecting another to do it for them.  The altruistic agent 
has a responsibility to themselves to ensure they are not exploited or coerced 
into action, thus respecting their own interests.  Self-interest can be an ethical 
motive for altruism since an agent can act altruistically for another while caring 
for themselves, and self-interest does not have to cause harm to the other or 
threaten moral motivation or moral action.  After all, the other may have given 
permission or approve of the altruist’s self-interested behaviour.   
 
Altruistic concern for the other can include concern for the self, without 
detriment to the other.  The truly loving person has to take care of themselves, 
since to drive oneself to depression and suicide by overdoing altruism to the 
extent of self-neglect is morally unacceptable.  By loving ourselves, we can love 
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and act for others by being aware of our common interests as human beings 
with dignity as well as our distinct and specific needs.  We can look after our 
interests, for example feeding ourselves, because we love ourselves and not 
simply as a secondary duty performed in order to look after others, as 
suggested by Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey.102  Self-interested motivated 
actions will not be regarded as egotistical since the actions will not be 
detrimental to the other.  However, an act would be condemned as egotistical if 
the situation called for concern for the other and the self failed to acknowledge 
this, by insisting upon their own actions to the detriment of the other.  Self-
interest can include responding to the needs of others, but some altruistic acts 
will involve no self-interest.  Self-interest cannot always take precedence, as it 
would be inappropriate for a moral agent to prioritise the trivial needs of the 
self over the greater needs of another.  Both the self and the other have 
responsibilities to themselves and each other; both should be treated with 
dignity by respecting their interests and needs.   
 
Having looked at the issue of self-interest and altruism, we will now turn to the 
issue of surrogacy and the 1998 Brazier Report, which investigated payment in 
surrogacy.  The Brazier Report believed unpaid surrogacy is preferable to paid 
surrogacy since paid surrogacy is equated with baby selling.  However, if the 
self-interest of the surrogate is to be taken into consideration as an ethical 
dimension and if self-interest can operate alongside altruistic motives of 
concern for the other, paying a surrogate could be regarded as a way for the 
commissioning couple to show their gratitude to the surrogate for her 
activities, and respond to her needs.  A surrogate may regard payment as a 
way for her to benefit from the arrangement along with her family, while 
having concern for the needs of the commissioning couple and the child at the 
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same time.  As a result of this discussion we will refute concerns that paying 
surrogates involves baby selling. 
 
4.4 Attitudes to Paying Surrogates in Surrogate Motherhood 
 
4.4.1 The Brazier Report and Allowable Expenses 
 
To prevent accusations of baby selling, the Brazier Report recommended new 
statutory provisions to define and limit specific lawful payments to surrogates.  
These were to be restricted to expenses only for designated purposes, even 
though no limit was set.  It regarded allowable expenses to include:  
 
[m]aternity clothing, healthy food, domestic help, counselling fees, legal fees, life and 
disability insurance, travel to and from hospital/clinic, telephone and postal expenses, 
overnight accommodation, child care to attend hospital/clinic, medical expenses, 
ovulation and pregnancy tests, insemination and IVF costs, medicines and vitamins. 103   
 
Loss of actual earnings, but not potential earnings could also be taken into 
consideration.104  The surrogate could claim therefore for the payment of 
services provided by others involved - e.g. the counsellor who counsels her, the 
lawyer who advises her, and the medic who cares for her.  Yet, she is unable to 
claim any expenses for her time, and her service of gestation, and the use of her 
body, which she gives as her contribution to the arrangement.   
 
However, surrogates may prefer to receive a fee instead of expenses.  An 
expenses-only policy could deny surrogates ‘control and autonomy’ over how 
they spend the money they receive.105  The Brazier Report suggested that all 
                                                 
103 The Brazier Report, 5.25-5.26. 
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monies given to the surrogate be directed to specific costs, which could be 
interpreted as over burdensome.  The surrogate may express her autonomy 
more with a fee.  For example, a commissioning couple may be willing to pay 
taxi fares for a surrogate.  The surrogate may prefer to take the bus and spend 
the additional money on her existing children.  Under the expenses system the 
surrogate only receives money upon presenting receipts, which could reduce 
her autonomy and restrict how she spends the money.  The surrogate therefore 
could be denied money which her commissioning couple may be willing to 
give.  If an expenses system is not ideal, the issue whether paid surrogacy is 
baby selling will now be explored. 
 
4.4.2 Surrogacy Should Not Be Considered To Include Baby Selling  
 
Many official international governmental investigations into surrogacy have 
regarded commercial surrogacy as the selling and the buying of a child.  The 
Warnock Report suggested: ‘for all practical purposes, the child will have been 
bought for money’.106  The Australian Waller Committee in 1984 believed 
allowing payments in surrogacy would reintroduce the condemned practice of 
buying and selling children.107   
 
Much of the argumentation around the surrogate’s payment involves the 
assumption that selling and buying children is immoral, that surrogacy 
involves selling and buying children, and that, therefore, paid surrogacy is 
immoral.  Children are deemed as invaluable and therefore inappropriate to 
buy, outside the operation of markets and beyond the reach of money.  Michael 
Walzer calls these ‘blocked exchanges’, which include preventing the sale of 
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human beings, etc.108  The individual and the collective worth of human beings 
is superior to being bought and sold, which processes violate their intrinsic 
human dignity and turn them into mere products.  When a commissioning 
couple pay their surrogate a fee, it is assumed they are engaging in a business 
transaction involving the sale and purchase of a child.   
 
In order to avoid accusations of market rhetoric Margaret Radin suggests 
banning paid surrogacy.  Therefore it could operate without sale, ‘supply or 
demand pricing’ or ‘advertising and marketing, stockpiling’ or 
commodification of participants.109  Radin believes unpaid surrogacy aids 
human flourishing, but cannot operate alongside paid surrogacy, expecting the 
market framework to ‘drive out’ the unpaid version.  She maintains a ‘domino 
theory’ that if some sales are allowed then an ‘exclusive market’ for it exists.110  
Even those children who were not ‘purchased’ from surrogates will ‘realize 
that they have a definite commercial value, and that this is all their value 
amounts to’.111   
 
Many scholars believe financial remunerations in surrogacy are not for the 
gestational service provided by the surrogate, but for her to terminate, transfer 
and sell her parental and custodial rights and responsibilities to her own child 
and for the commissioning couple to buy her parental rights and custody to 
rear her child.  Scott Rae believes payment in surrogacy involves ‘the surrender 
of custody’112 and ‘purchasing the parental rights to the child’.113  A genetic 
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surrogate in particular is regarded as the child’s biological and true mother 
because she has used her own egg and is thus considered to be selling her own 
child.  Marvin Glass believes the payment in surrogacy is ‘in part property 
rights over the child’114 and ‘property is control over a person’.115  The child is 
regarded as an alienable piece of property to be disposed at the will of the 
surrogate.  Even so, it can be argued surrogacy does not always involve baby 
selling, as seen in the next section. 
 
4.4.3 Surrogacy Does Not Invariably Involve Baby Selling 
 
Radin’s refusal of paid surrogacy ignores the context surrogacy operates in.  
Radin identifies regulated markets as ‘incomplete commodification’, since 
regulation ‘expresses and fosters an important nonmarket aspect of the 
interactions between persons who buy and sell things’.116  She admits that 
‘*t]hings that are incompletely commodified do not fully exhibit the typical 
indicia of traditional property and contract’.117  Radin even hints at a relational 
justice approach with incomplete commodification (even though she does not 
see it in this way), when she says: ‘justice in such an alternative theory 
[incomplete commodification]...depends upon the appropriate relation 
between persons and things, and between the persons and other people’.118   
 
Unlike the relational approach that will be developed in chapter five of this 
thesis, Radin sees incomplete commodification as a ‘regime’.119  She admits 
such a regime could be applicable to surrogacy because of the need for 
consideration for the commissioning father’s genetic link to the baby and 
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without requiring compulsory and specific contractarian performance, if a 
surrogate changed her mind.  However, Radin rejects incomplete 
commodification because she believes paying for surrogacy commodifies 
women’s attributes as ‘fungible baby-makers’,120 leads to a domino effect of all 
women suffering by becoming commodified, disempowers poor women, and 
sells babies.  Chapter three clarified problems with commodification and this 
chapter challenges the view that surrogacy involves baby selling. 
 
Anthropologist Heléna Ragoné conducted research into surrogacy centres in 
the United States of America.121  This indicated that most surrogates do not see 
the arrangement in terms of a contract or a business transaction,122 which is 
reflected in surrogates’ motives for becoming surrogates.  This correlates to 
Lori Andrews’ suggestion that: 
 
[s]urrogacy is distinguishable from baby-selling since the resulting child is never in a 
state of insecurity.  From the moment of birth, he or she is under the care of the 
biological father and his wife, who cannot sell the child.123   
 
The child would not exist if it were not for the arrangement.  The resulting 
child is not sold or auctioned off to any willing stranger offering a higher price, 
there is no reservation price which if not reached would cancel the process.  
The issue of rights is a key point in the issue of baby selling which is explored 
below.  As seen above, it is often thought that the surrogate sells her parental 
and custody rights to the commissioning couple.  
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4.4.4 The Issue Whether Rights Language is Appropriate for Surrogacy 
 
The main debate regarding the selling of babies in surrogacy is focused upon 
the selling and buying of the surrogate’s parental and custody rights.  If the 
accusation of selling rights can be deflected then accusations of selling babies 
are reduced.  Contractarian and rights-based language – along with the legal 
stance towards surrogacy in England – are problematic when discussing the 
ethics of surrogacy.  Some women may want to alienate their parental and 
custody rights due to reasons of autonomy.  However, it is preferable to reject 
rights and contract language as inappropriate for surrogacy, with emphasis 
upon a relational alternative as proposed in chapter five.   
 
Rights language tends to be static, focused upon the individual and their needs, 
instead of a shared, dynamic, ongoing, negotiated and reflective response to 
problems caused by emotions or changed circumstances.  Alan Gewirth 
believes: ‘the agent’s right-claim, precisely because is based on his own agency-
needs, is logically prior to and independent of a community or social rules, 
except in a certain minimal sense’.124  Gewirth wants human rights to take 
priority over every other moral consideration.125  Such a belief puts rights 
before responsiveness to people’s needs and circumstances.   
 
Moral philosophers often suggest that having a moral right means you are 
‘morally entitled to something’.126  H. L. A. Hart perceived rights as involving 
‘a moral justification for limiting the freedom of another person and for 
determining how he should act’.127  Traditional rights language insists that 
                                                 
124 Alan Gewirth, ‘Rights and Virtues’, The Review of Metaphysics 38 (1985), 739-62, at 746. 
125 Ibid., 749. 
126 Joseph L. Allen, ‘A Theological Approach to Moral Rights’, Journal of Religious Ethics 2 (1974), 
119-41, at 120. 
127 H. L. A. Hart, ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’, in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 77-90, at 83. 
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rights are something you already have until you waive them.  Present 
surrogacy law regards the surrogate as the birth mother with automatic child 
parental rights.  A paid surrogate is regarded as being paid to waive, lose and 
transfer her parental and custody rights to the commissioning couple, thus 
selling her child.  There is little opportunity for custody negotiation based upon 
the emotions or genetic relationship of the commissioning couple if she wants 
to keep the child.  Another problem with a contractarian-rights framework is 
that a surrogate, who signs a contract, relinquishes her alienable rights to the 
child and is expected to honour the contract even if she changes her mind. 
 
However, not all surrogates want to gain parental or custody rights.  It could 
be seen as an essentialist and paternalistic view of motherhood, for society to 
insist women must automatically have these rights, whether she wants to or 
not.  Some women may want to decide for themselves if they want to opt in 
and acquire the custody right and then assert them, so the custody right is not 
there until she has chosen it and selected it.  If the surrogate decides not to opt 
into acquiring, having and asserting the custody right to the child then she 
cannot be accused of selling them because she has not acquired them in the first 
place.  The payments to the surrogates would be for a gestational service and 
for their time and effort involved.  If the surrogate asserts her parental right to 
be listed as the child’s natural mother on the child’s birth certificate, if the child 
is told of her existence and has a relationship with her, then she is not selling 
her parental right, but retains it.   
 
Many surrogates value parenthood and their mothering role.  Most surrogates 
receiving money benefit their families and see it as payment for a service.  
Research conducted by Ragoné shows that women who become genetic 
surrogates do so because they place a higher value on social motherhood and 
the role the commissioning mother plays; giving lesser importance to the role 
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of their own genes in the child’s make-up.128  Even though a genetic surrogate 
is linked genetically to the child, she may not regard herself as the child’s 
mother, because she values social motherhood over genetic and gestational 
motherhood, thus reducing the possibility that she is selling the child. 
 
It will be proposed in chapter five that an alternative, relational approach is 
more suitable for surrogacy, as opposed to a rights based, market-focused and 
contractarian framework.  J. L. Mackie represents a traditional advocate of a 
rights-based morality, which favours rights instead of a relational approach.  
He states: ‘[i]f one individual is sacrificed for advantages accruing to others, 
what is deplorable is the ill-treatment of this individual, the invasion of his 
rights, rather than the relational matter of the unfairness of his treatment in 
comparison with others’.129  The relational approach incorporates consideration 
of the needs of both self and other, and not just one to the detriment of another.  
The approach will have a co-operative stance and obviates rights-based 
imbalances, since the needs of each other will to be taken into consideration.   
 
If a genetic surrogate, for example, was having doubts as to whether to hand 
the child over, a relational approach would consider her bonding and 
emotions, and visitation or shared custody could be an option.  At the moment, 
the law can deny the commissioning couple parental and custody rights to the 
child.  Rights language would assert that a genetic surrogate has full rights 
over the child, being able to put it up for adoption by anyone, whereas a 
relational approach would be more open to dynamic interactive dialogue to 
cater for changes in the situation and be responsive to negotiation, needs and 
emotional desires.  A relational approach would respond to the needs of the 
                                                 
128 Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, 74. 
129 J. L. Mackie, ‘Can there be a Right-Based Moral Theory?’, in Waldron, Theories of Rights, 168-
181, at 174. 
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commissioning couple and allow them to be acknowledged as the child’s 
genetic parents and to play a part in the child’s life.  
 
However, if a genetic surrogate changes her mind and wants to keep the child, 
she can opt into and then assert her custody right to the child and in such a 
case I would argue she should not be paid, since she will have gestated and 
plans to nurture her own child.  She may be entitled to receive some 
maintenance and expenses from the commissioning father if she is very poor.  
It is similar to a painter who is given a commission to paint a picture for 
someone, who then decides she wants to keep it; she will have to return the fee 
paid at the beginning for her services.  The surrogate could be accused of 
selling the child if the commissioning couple offered her more money to hand 
the child over to them, so they could have sole custody to the child (as opposed 
to joint custody), possibly making her relinquish custody for money.  Women 
are not traditionally paid for gestating their own children when they raise them 
for themselves in society.  If a surrogate keeps the child, the surrogate has in 
effect gestated her own child and is no longer a surrogate; therefore she should 
not necessarily and automatically be paid, since surrogates could be 
interpreted as being paid for gestating others’ children and not their own.  
Another key aspect of the baby selling debate concerns the commissioning 
father, who could be regarded as buying his right to the child, which is 
explored below in 4.5. 
 
4.5 The Issue of Whether the Commissioning Father Buys His Parental and 
Custody Rights 
 
Opponents of surrogacy accuse the commissioning father of buying fatherhood 
and his parental rights when he offers money to a surrogate for her to conceive 
a child with his sperm.  If it were not for the payment of money, the genetic 
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relationship the man has to the embryo would not come to fruition in a social 
relationship, therefore the commissioning father is envisaged as paying to 
become a father.  Even when the surrogate inseminates herself with donor 
sperm (i.e. sperm from a man other than the commissioning father, who will 
not be the genetic father), the commissioning father is regarded as paying for 
the right for the surrogate to hand the child over to him.  He is seen as buying 
custodial rights, so he can assume fatherly responsibilities to the child.  If the 
commissioning father is the child’s natural genetic father, Rae believes, ‘the 
contracting father’ buys parental rights to the child even if he is biologically 
related.130  The commissioning father, to have full and permanent access to the 
child, additionally has to pay the surrogate’s husband to relinquish his rights.   
 
It is the inadequacies of English Law which lead to the supposition that a 
commissioning father is deemed to be buying his parental right when he pays a 
surrogate.  English Law treats the commissioning father, who uses a married 
surrogate, as if he were an anonymous donor, when he does not want to be 
considered in this manner.  The commissioning father, if he is genetically 
related to the child, should not have to buy his parental status to be 
acknowledged as the child’s father, since he is the child’s genetic father.131  His 
position as the child’s father is a result of the surrogate gestating his genetic 
sperm or embryo.   
 
For the surrogate’s husband not to be considered the child’s father he has to 
formally opt out of being regarded as the child’s father, instead of him not 
having the opportunity to be so regarded in the first place.  Most surrogates’ 
husbands do not want to be considered the child’s father.  The present law 
means the surrogate’s husband would be legally responsible for the social and 
                                                 
130 Rae, The Ethics of Commercial Surrogate Motherhood, 42. 
131 The Kentucky Court declared that paid surrogacy is not baby selling because ‘the natural 
father cannot buy back what is already his’, see ibid., 30.  
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financial maintenance of the child if the commissioning father rejected the 
child.  Nonetheless, there have been no reported cases of a commissioning 
father paying the husband of the surrogate in order to be regarded as the 
child’s father.   
 
If the genetic surrogate keeps the child, then the commissioning father should 
not have to pay the surrogate for the right to be regarded as the child’s father.  
This is because the surrogate is the mother of the child, she is keeping the child 
and if she were to charge the commissioning father she would be charging to 
hire the baby out.  The commissioning father is usually related to the child and 
because the surrogate has gestated and kept the child she cannot be paid for 
providing a gestational service for another.  However, a surrogate should be 
entitled to some payment; being able to claim maintenance payments from the 
father for the upkeep of the child during gestation.  The law needs to be 
changed to allow a commissioning father visitation and custody access as the 
child’s genetic father, even if the surrogate keeps the child.  However, there is a 
need for a balance between justice and the accessibility of the commissioning 
father to his own child and the family stability of the child in the family of the 
surrogate who may raise it.   
 
Usually relationalism will operate within the legal framework of the society in 
which it is found, following legal guidelines.  Relationalists will be encouraged 
to follow the law, but also to be virtuous and sensitive to each other’s needs 
which could involve them going above and beyond the minimum standards set 
for morality by the law.  Most obedient and responsible citizens will follow the 
law, but at times the law may be unethical and a person may use their 
conscience by engaging in peaceful and legal civil protest.  They will be 
encouraged to be critical of the law and call for change if the law fails to meet 
the changing needs of people or if it fails to allow for human flourishing, well-
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being and welfare, or does not protect the vulnerable.  Ideally, a legal 
framework for relationalism could be flexible and responsible, while being 
compassionate and responsive to the needs, priorities and importance of 
people as partial beings and not as universalised generic humans. 
 
It is possible that the commissioning father, even though not technically buying 
the right to be the child’s father because he is the genetic father of the child, 
may be accused of buying the right to custody if the surrogate has opted into 
acquiring custody rights.  A surrogate could feel pressured to hand the child 
over, because of demands by the commissioning father offering her money for 
him to gain exclusive custodial rights.  In such a situation, the commissioning 
father could be accused of buying custody to his child because the surrogate 
had decided to opt into acquiring the chance to gain and then assert parental 
rights.   
 
Heidi Malm, however, believes the commissioning father is not able to 
purchase the mother’s custodial right from her, even when she admits the 
father must have the custody right to achieve exclusive custody of the child.132  
Uma Narayan indicates that the fathers gain full parental rights to the child 
and are unable to resell it.133  However, if the commissioning father offered the 
surrogate money after she had opted into acquiring parental rights, to try to get 
her to waive her opted into legal rights so he could raise the child exclusively, 
then he could be accused of trying to buy them from her and bribe her by 
coercion.  Therefore, despite Malm’s views, it is possible to highlight the 
potential coercive role money could play in a father trying to gain exclusive 
custody rights, as opposed to parental rights, from a surrogate not wanting to 
                                                 
132 Heidi Malm, ‘Paid Surrogacy: Arguments and Responses’, Public Affairs Quarterly 3 (1989), 
57-66, at 62. 
133 Uma Narayan, ‘The ‚Gift‛ of a Child: Commercial Surrogacy, Gift Surrogacy, and 
Motherhood’, in Patricia Boling (ed.), Expecting Trouble: Surrogacy, Fetal Abuse and New 
Reproductive Technologies, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 177-99, at 185.  
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hand the child over.  However, if the surrogate is able to retain her custody 
rights if she keeps the child the commissioning father should be able to have 
access and be acknowledged as the child’s father on the birth certificate.  If the 
surrogate does not opt into acquiring parental and custody rights then the 
surrogate cannot be accused of selling them and the commissioning father 
cannot be accused of buying them if she did not sell them in the first instance.   
 
4.6 The Issue of Gestational Service 
 
Another major concern in paid surrogacy is whether the surrogates are being 
paid for selling a baby or for providing a gestation service, which is connected 
to the question of what their motives are in surrogacy.  This will now be 
discussed.  
 
4.6.1 Is Paid Gestational Service Payment for the Baby Alone? 
 
Opponents of paid surrogacy believe commissioning couples pay primarily for 
the child and only secondarily for the gestational service of the surrogate.  If 
the couple were interested in the services of the surrogate alone and not the 
child, then if the surrogate had a miscarriage, stillbirth or she kept the child; 
she would be paid in full.  However, most surrogates only receive their full fees 
if they hand full custody of the child over to the commissioning couple and 
receive nothing if they maintain custody of their child.  The surrogate contract 
in the Baby M case signified that the surrogate Mrs Whitehead would receive 
no fee if she miscarried before the fifth month of the pregnancy, receive $1,000 
for a miscarriage or a stillbirth after the fifth month and $10,000 for handing the 
child over to the commissioning couple shortly after the birth.134   
 
                                                 
134 George J. Annas, ‘Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale’, The Hastings Center Report 17 (1987), 
13-15, at 14. 
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The belief that the gestational surrogate becomes the mother is supported by 
the English 1985 Surrogacy Arrangements Act, which asserts that the 
surrogate, even if she is a gestational surrogate, gestating someone else’s 
embryo, gains parental rights to a child.135  The foetus being gestated by the 
surrogate is not a separate part of her, but becomes part of her identity as a 
mother, allowing her to keep the child as part of her bodily integrity and 
embodiment of the surrogate.  The idea the surrogate is considered the mother 
supports the idea that she is paid to hand over her child.  However, as 
discussed below some suggest surrogates provide a gestational service, which 
is not child selling. 
 
4.6.2 Is Paid Gestational Service Payment for the Service Alone? 
 
Gestational surrogacy usually occurs in the context of a surrogate providing a 
service of ‘embryo sitting’ the commissioning couple’s embryo, on their behalf, 
as a paid gestator.  The surrogate expresses a prior intention to hand the child 
over to them as the parents.  Research by anthropologist Ragoné indicates that 
gestational surrogates have selected to become gestational rather than genetic 
surrogates, since they place a high value on their own and others’ genetic 
motherhood.  Therefore, they do not want to be considered the child’s natural 
mother, nor do they want to be seen as giving away their own genetic child.136  
Accusations of selling the child can be lessened by the following five points.   
 
Firstly, the embryo ‘belongs’ to the commissioning couple; because they 
initiated the arrangement, they intentionally want to be regarded as the child’s 
social parents and they are the child’s natural genetic parents and could be 
seen to have an entitlement to their child.  It may sound inappropriate to 
                                                 
135 Rae, The Ethics of Commercial Surrogate Motherhood, 35. 
136 Heléna Ragoné, ‘The Gift of Life: Surrogate Motherhood, Gamete Donation and 
Constructions of Altruism’, in Rachel Cook et al. (eds.), Surrogate Motherhood: International 
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275 
 
suggest the commissioning couple have a property right in the embryo and the 
gestational surrogate has no right to the child, but this is the fault of the 
traditional rights and contract language used.  The commissioning couple do 
not want to relinquish their right as the child’s parents due to the embryo being 
gestated by another.  Presently, the commissioning couple in England have no 
automatic right of visitation or acknowledgement as the child’s genetic parents 
if a married gestational surrogate decides to keep the child, because the 
gestational surrogate as the birth mother and her husband are the child’s legal 
parents.  Only if the surrogate consents are they allowed to be acknowledged 
as the child’s parents by a Parental Order or by adoption. 
 
Gestation should not allow the gestational surrogate to gain exclusive maternal 
legal rights to the commissioning couple’s pre-existent embryo.  Custody 
disputes in gestational surrogacy could possibly be solved with the interests of 
the commissioning couple taking priority since they initiated the arrangement.  
However, the bodily integrity, emotions, embodiment and personal dignity of 
the surrogate cannot be overlooked.  The gestational surrogate may be able to 
have limited access to the child and be recognised on the child’s birth certificate 
as the child’s gestator.  If the law were changed to allow the genetic 
commissioning parents to be acknowledged as the child’s legal parents and the 
surrogate was listed as the child’s gestator, then the legal roles would be 
clarified for the child’s benefit.  Such a solution would be an example of 
‘relational justice’, since the needs of each party would be taken into 
consideration as well as the context of the arrangement.   
 
In foster care, a professional relationship of trust between the carer, the child 
and the natural parents is expected.  Foster carers could be accused of kidnap 
and abduction if they keep a child who was due to return to its birth parents.  
Similarly, teachers maintain a professional stance to the children in their care 
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and cannot simply take home the ones they have bonded to.  Such an attitude 
could also prevail in gestational surrogacy as a matter of trust between the 
surrogate, the commissioning couple and their child.   
 
Secondly, since gestational surrogates do not want to gain parental or custody 
rights, they cannot be accused of selling something which they do not regard as 
having in the first place.  The commissioning couple pay for a service and not a 
child.  The law creates the illusion of paid gestational surrogates selling ‘her’ 
parental and custody ‘rights’ instead of her gestational service.  The law insists 
that a gestational surrogate automatically gains parental and custodial rights as 
the child’s legal mother, even when she does not want them.  Such socially 
constructed behaviour undermines the surrogate’s autonomy and ignores the 
unique context of the surrogate providing gestatory services to give others 
their only chance of gestating their own embryo.  On occasions a gestational 
surrogate has been extremely distressed at having to register as the child’s birth 
mother on a birth certificate (instead of the genetic commissioning mother) and 
has been troubled by having to go through an adoption procedure to give the 
child to its genetic mother.137  Legally, surrogates are responsible for the child if 
the commissioning couple reject it, even if she has not consented to this role.  
Accusations of gestational surrogates selling children, parental and custody 
rights could be reduced by changing the law.  Instead of gaining these rights 
she could be acknowledged as a gestational service provider and not the child’s 
only mother.  Of course, child security is important, but so is the bodily 
integrity and empowerment of the surrogates who do not to be regarded as the 
child’s exclusive mother for giving birth to it.  In order to ensure the child’s 
welfare, the surrogacy agency could have strategies in place, such as approved 
foster carers on standby, in case the commissioning couple or the surrogate do 
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not want the child.  Agencies could ask commissioning couples to take out 
insurance to cover such costs. 
 
Thirdly, a gestational surrogate could reasonably expect to earn higher 
compensation for her services of gestation in comparison to a genetic surrogate, 
without baby selling.  A gestational surrogate undergoes invasive treatments 
including hormonal injections to prepare and synchronise the surrogate’s 
womb for the implantation of the commissioning couple’s embryo or embryos.  
Extra payment could be made for the inconvenience of additional hospital 
visits, for the psychological and physical stress of whether embryos will 
implant or not and for the extra time taken to ensure a pregnancy.  The 
payment from the commissioning couple could be for potential risks to her 
health and for sickness, since some jobs do not pay their employees if they are 
ill.  Some women, if they have been employed in a job for only a short time, 
may receive few maternity benefits.   
 
Fourthly, transactions involving both people and money are often made 
without the money being considered a direct exchange for the person.  
Registered child minders, nursery nurses, foster carers, wet nurses and teachers 
are paid to look after others’ children.  Likewise a surrogate could be paid for 
the time, care and nurturing she gives another’s foetus.  Judy Callman indicates 
that the National Foster Care Association in 1996 wanted foster carers to be 
paid ‘for their time, experience and skills’.138   
 
Finally, careful regulation and compulsory insurance could ensure that a 
surrogate who experiences a miscarriage or a stillbirth, through no deliberate 
fault of her own, could be awarded compensation for her services, time, and 
effort, as well as for her convalescence after the birth.  Indeed, R. Jo Kornegay 
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believes offering Mrs Whitehead only 10 percent for a stillbirth and miscarriage 
was not enough and she should have been offered more.139  Such payments 
could help to answer accusations of baby selling.  
 
4.6.3 Motives of the Surrogate Mothers 
 
An issue pertinent to the question of whether surrogacy involves baby selling 
is the motives of the surrogate.  Self-interest has already been identified as an 
ethical motive, which can co-exist with altruism, i.e. concern for the other.  
Surrogacy has been identified as not necessarily involving baby selling.  
Following from this, the possibility of a co-existence of self-interest and 
altruism within paid surrogacy and the co-existence of unpaid surrogacy 
alongside paid surrogacy will be explored.  Much of the medical and legal 
literature uses the term ‘altruism’ in an inappropriately defined manner; it uses 
the term ‘altruistic surrogacy’ to refer to situations where the surrogate is not 
paid, with little understanding of the philosophy of altruism.  Since the word 
altruism is being used in this context as an evaluative term, I prefer not to use 
it.  Therefore, I will be using the term ‘unpaid’ to describe a surrogate who acts 
as a surrogate without payment.  It is important that unpaid surrogates are not 
being threatened to become a surrogate by pressure from family or friends or 
doing it out of fear, but are motivated by altruism for the commissioning 
couple and possibly out of self-interest too.  At the moment, no specific 
research has been performed into comparing directly a paid surrogacy 
programme and an unpaid programme to analyse differences between the 
motives of participants.   
 
Surrogacy research and biographies provide some details of surrogates’ 
motives.140  It is important to look at the precise language used, within the 
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evidence, to describe the surrogates’ motives, in order to make a clear 
distinction whether money was the sole or the main motive of the surrogates.  
If money was the sole motive, this can be regarded as unfavourable since it 
adds to the commodification of the practice and reinforces surrogacy as purely 
baby selling.   
 
However, most surrogates have mixed motives for wanting to become 
surrogates, combining altruism and gift giving with financial remuneration, 
whereas others have purely altruistic reasons and act without payment.  Such a 
mixture of motives contradicts the belief that women only become surrogates 
due to financial incentives, as suggested in the Brazier Report.141  Ragoné shows 
most of the surrogates she interviewed did not have money as a sole motive.  
One surrogate commented: ‘[t]he money wasn’t enough to be pregnant for nine 
months’.142  Another stated:  
 
I’m not doing it for the money.  Take the money: that wouldn’t stop me.  It wouldn’t 
stop the majority.143   
 
Some surrogates phoned surrogacy agencies in the United States not knowing 
payment was available.  Ragoné’s surrogates admitted that money was initially 
an important consideration, but it was never a primary motivation, and its 
importance decreased over time as the pregnancy developed.144  Research by 
psychologist Philip Parker shows 89% of women required a fee, but it was 
never a sole reason, i.e. ‘never a totally sufficient reason for being a surrogate 
                                                                                                                                              
140 See: Maggie Kirkman and Linda Kirkman, My Sister’s Child: A Story of Full Surrogate 
Motherhood Between Two Sisters Using In Vitro Fertilisation (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1988), Lori B. Andrews, Between Strangers: Surrogate Mothers, Expectant Fathers, and Brave New 
Babies (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), Kim Cotton and Denise Winn, Baby Cotton: For Love 
and Money (London: Dorling Kindersley, 1985), Kirsty Stevens with Emma Dally, Surrogate 
Mother: One Woman’s Story (London: Century, 1985) and Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood.  
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mother’.145  Eric Blyth indicates 13 surrogates in his study ‘claimed that money 
was not - and should not be - the prime motivating factor’,146  though he fails to 
explain what he means by ‘prime’ motive.   
 
In Blyth’s study, 3 out of 19 surrogates admitted ‘financial motives’ were the 
‘the main or sole reason’.147  One woman stated that her motivation was 
‘financial embarrassment’ and another woman regarded surrogacy as part of a 
way out of the poverty trap to fund higher education.148  It is possible that the 
three women who admitted to financial need were more honest if this was 
truly their only motive.  However, Blyth fails to state clearly whether he 
regarded these responses as sole or main reasons, since these women could 
have had other reasons too.  For two of the other women, surrogacy was seen 
as a way of earning money alongside caring for young children.149   
 
Ragoné suggests that ‘idealised’ women are altruistic, and altruism precludes 
remuneration in surrogacy.150  However, the financial motive is usually 
combined with other motives.  Most surrogates want to benefit others, usually 
the commissioning couple.  Sometimes the surrogates combine helping the 
commissioning couple with wanting to benefit their own children and families.  
Most surrogates felt sympathy for the infertile commissioning couple and want 
to make them happy by fulfilling their needs with the gift of life by providing 
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them with a much-wanted child.151  In Ragoné’s study, most surrogates did not 
spend the money on themselves alone, but on their family as a reward.152   
 
However, just because the surrogates in Ragoné’s study tended not to spend 
money from surrogacy on themselves does not mean they were not acting self-
interestedly.  Close analysis of the surrogacy research demonstrates surrogates 
combining wanting to benefit others with self-interest.  While being surrogates 
for the commissioning couple the surrogates were at the same time able to act 
on values which were important to them and satisfy themselves.  In fact, one 
paid surrogate specifically stated she had been a selfish person in the past but 
had wanted to do something for others.153  Other self-interested reasons of the 
surrogates included, wanting to bear a child but not raise it,154 pregnancy and 
birth as ‘a source of comfort, an avenue of power’155 and compensation for a 
past abortion or adoption.156  Some surrogates wanted the experience of 
childbirth itself.157  The surrogates saw giving birth as an occupation, a vocation 
and a skill and talent as a special quality that is socially valued and should be 
rewarded monetarily as it is something not all women can do.  They value 
childbirth and see motherhood as important.158  Surrogacy for such women is a 
way ‘to express and to fulfill themselves’.159  Being a surrogate gave them a 
sense of ‘pride’ ‘self-worth’ and ‘confidence’ in themselves.160   
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In order to assess the debate as to whether payment deters altruism, I will 
explore the well-known research by Richard Titmuss into blood donation.  
Titmuss believed an exclusive unpaid system encourages altruism (4.7.1) – a 
view which has been challenged by Kenneth Arrow, but defended by Peter 
Singer (4.7.2).  However in section 4.7.3 I will suggest altruism should be freely 
chosen alongside a paid alternative, instead of directly guided by society or 
peer group pressure.  After all, it could be altruistic for an unpaid participant to 
acknowledge that another may need payment.  
 
4.7 Self-Interest and Altruism in Blood Donation  
 
4.7.1 The Consequences of Payment: Richard Titmuss and the Case for 
Altruism Only in Blood Donation 
 
Richard Titmuss, in The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, 
investigated American and British blood donation between 1965 and 1967.  He 
believed paid blood donation involves lower blood supplies, poor quality, 
wastage,161 more expense,162 and a fourfold higher risk of contracting a disease 
from contaminated blood, when compared to the British system where all 
donors are unpaid.  The poor and drug addicts donate more in paid systems, 
often hiding their addiction to receive payment.163  In the United Kingdom, 
unpaid blood donors tend to be social class I, or II - not IV or V.164  Titmuss 
feared that commercialisation deters altruistic givers, discourages fellow-
                                                 
161 According to Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy 
(London: George Alden and Unwin, 1970), blood can be wasted due to medical, technical and 
administrative mistakes and 15%-30% of blood is wasted in the United States of America 
compared with 2% in the United Kingdom, 55-6.   
162 Titmuss indicates that blood is 5-15 times administratively more expensive in the United 
States ibid., 205. 
163 Ibid., 105 and 76.   
164 Ibid., 128.  
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feeling to help strangers and increases coercion.  He rejected a combination of 
commercialisation and altruism, favouring a system of non-payment as 
encouraging ‘fellowship’ in society. 165    
 
The 1965-1967 survey into blood donation in the United States of America 
revealed six types of donors.  The percentages of each type of donor are given.  
The percentages in brackets refer to the same types of donors, but they 
participated in systems operated by commercial banks and pharmaceutical 
firms.  The non-bracketed figures relate to the USA Government-run, paid 
blood donation programme. 
1. The paid donor 29% (47%): Titmuss regarded this as impersonal and 
mechanical selling of blood at market price without being regarded as a 
gift.166     
2. The paid-induced voluntary donor 4% (3%): donors were induced to 
give by their trade unions, but were paid.   
3. The responsibility fee donor 52% (39%): blood donations are given 
instead of payment for blood the donor received in the past.  Family 
credit donors are included too, who donate to insure their family’s blood 
needs for a year.167   
4. The captive voluntary donors 5% (4%): are expected to give blood by 
their institutions, including members of the defence force and prisoners 
who have their terms reduced by donating.   
5. The fringe benefit voluntary donors 1% (0%): these have non-
monetary fringe benefits such as paid leave, longer holidays, sports 
tickets, etc.   
6. The voluntary community donor 9% (7%): these receive no monetary 
reward, but expenses only; donation is a free gift to strangers. 
                                                 
165 Ibid., 241-2. 
166 Ibid., 75-6. 
167 Ibid., 82 and 95. 
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At the time in Communist Russia, half the donors were unpaid but received 
other benefits such as time off work, extra holiday, free transport and ‘higher 
priority for housing’.168   
 
In the British survey of unpaid blood donors questions were asked to try to 
determine their motives and influences for giving blood.  However, Titmuss 
admits it was difficult to determine the respondents’ main motives and 
influences due to the vague wording of the questionnaire:  
1. Altruism (26.4%): a general desire to help people (possibly copied 
directly from the questionnaire). 
2. Gratitude for good health (1.4%). 
3. Reciprocity (9.8%): respondents believed blood donation should be a 
reciprocal process.   
4. Replacement (0.8%): donors believed they replaced a family member 
who used to donate. 
5. Awareness of a need for blood (6.4%).  
6. Duty (3.5%): donation seen as an obligation to help others from 
religious duty (16.1%) or a duty to society (83.9%). 
7. War effort (6.7%).  
8. As members of the defence services (5%): blood donated to receive 
benefits, e.g. excused drill and from external pressure to donate.   
9. Rare blood group (1.1%). 
10. Obtain some benefit (1.8%): e.g. to find out their blood group, to 
receive a health check. 
11. Personal appeal (13.2%): known individuals encouraged or 
requested donation. 
12. General appeal for donors (18%).  
                                                 
168 Ibid., 177. 
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13. Miscellaneous (5%): reasons given include to get a cup of tea and to 
support their spouse. 
14. More than one type of answer (0.9%).  
 
In Table 1 below I have compared the motives in unpaid and paid blood 
donation.  The comparison reveals that altruism is not the only motive in the 
unpaid system and even within commercially run systems in the United States 
(shown in the table in brackets) 7% of donors chose to receive no monetary 
reward, which was ignored by Titmuss.  Interestingly, some of the unpaid 
donors, like the paid donors, were motivated by self-interest, some did not see 
their giving as a gift, some were induced to give and some gave blood to 
receive a benefit.  Titmuss also failed to acknowledge inducement in the 
unpaid system.  Participation in an unpaid system may not reflect altruistic 
motives, whereas a paid donor could also have altruistic motives for the other.  
Further research is needed, to see if the two cases Peter Singer cites of the 
number of people coming forward for donation falling once payment is offered 
would occur in surrogacy too.169    
 
Motives UK Government-Run 
Unpaid Blood Donation 
Programme 
USA Government-Run, Paid 
Blood Donation Programme 
(with commercially run 
programme statistics in 
brackets) 
Benefit to self Approx 10%   1%        (0%) 
Appeal to donor               31%   0%        (0%) 
Responsibility/duty                 4% 52%      (39%) 
                                                 
169 Peter Singer (‘Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss against Arrow’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 2 [1973], 312-20, at 315) comments ‘*i+n New York, the only city to have published 
sufficient figures to indicate a trend, voluntary community donations fell from 20 percent of 
total supplies in 1956 to 1% in 1966.  The rise of commercial supplies has not been sufficient to 
compensate for the fall in unpaid donations’, referring to Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, 96.  
Singer says that in Japan since donors are now paid, 98% of blood is paid for and the shortage 
of blood is worse than in the USA, Singer, ‘Altruism and Commerce, 315. 
286 
 
Gratitude/duty               11%   0%        (0%) 
Pure Altruism               26%   9%        (7%) 
Induced                 5%   9%        (7%) 
Awareness of need               13%   0%        (0%) 
Money                 0% 29%      (47%) 
Table 1: Comparison of the Motives Involved in Blood Donation Programmes. 
 
Kenneth Arrow argues with Titmuss’ findings, suggesting there is a lack of 
evidence that frequent blood giving by commercial blood donors damages 
health or that commercial blood supplies decrease altruism.170  He believes 
blood is wasted in a commercial system, not because of payment, but because 
of a decentralised and unclear system.  Arrow also comments on the 
redistribution of wealth in paid blood donation with the rich giving money to 
the poor.  It is possible, for example, that if paid blood donation does 
encourage drug addicts to give blood, then perhaps they could be offered 
treatment instead of payment. 
 
Titmuss suggests that payment reduces freedom, believing that ‘private market 
systems in the United States and other countries...deprive men of their freedom 
to choose to give or not to give but by so doing escalate other coercive forces in 
the social system’.171  However, Titmuss failed to realise or chose to discount 
that if a society only allows for unpaid blood donation to exist without a paid 
alternative, then society is depriving people of their freedom to be paid.  By 
offering only altruism, freedoms are limited instead of increased.   
 
Improved efficiency, planning and control within a paid blood donation 
system could prevent wastage.  A set fee could be paid to donors, but with 
flexibility to offer a higher fee to encourage donation by those with a rare blood 
                                                 
170 Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Gifts and Exchanges’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), 343-62. 
171 Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, 239. 
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group or when general stock is low.  Honesty should be a virtue for donors 
whether paid or unpaid.  Sophisticated screening could detect hepatitis B and 
C, etc., and officials could wait for positive test results before paying donors, 
blacklisting those who do not match predetermined criteria.  The paid system 
does not have to be ‘mechanical, impersonal’, as suggested by Titmuss,172 but 
could be personalised so paid donors know which hospital the blood is going 
to for example, allowing for fellow-feeling.  Care needs to ensure that donors, 
whether paid or unpaid, are not coerced to participate; for example medical 
students should not be pressurised to donate blood as a course requirement. 
 
4.7.2 Motives, Altruism and Money: Peter Singer 
 
The philosopher Peter Singer tries to defend Titmuss against Arrow and 
supports unpaid blood donation only, instead of both paid and unpaid, despite 
admitting the evidence is ‘inconclusive’ whether paid systems discourage 
altruism.173  However, he believes Titmuss provides a presumption of such a 
connection.174  But Singer only quotes two examples to represent the ‘overall 
picture’ of the effect of paid blood donation upon unpaid supplies.175  He 
believes a free system ‘may strengthen feelings of community and mutual 
interdependence’,176 because altruism allows ‘bonds’ which can ‘exist between 
strangers in a community’.177  However, unpaid blood donation, unlike 
surrogacy, is an anonymous act and the donors never meet, preventing them 
from expressing their gratitude and appreciation to the donor, which could 
increase community cohesiveness.  Pure altruism is motivated by concern for 
the other only, which is not representative of mutuality or interdependence.   
                                                 
172 Ibid., 75. 
173 Singer, ‘Altruism and Commerce’, 314. 
174 Ibid., 320.  
175 Ibid., 315.  
176 Ibid., 317. 
177 Peter Singer, ‘Rights and the Market’, in Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie (eds.), 
Ethical Theory and Business (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 72-85, at 78. 
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Singer suggests acting altruistically is hard if most people are egotistical, 
stating that he finds it ‘easier to be genuinely altruistic’ if altruism is ‘expected’ 
of him.178  He cites evidence of people acting altruistically if they have 
witnessed others acting altruistically.179  ‘Titmuss’s view’, according to Singer, 
is: ‘the opportunity for altruism promotes further altruism’.180  Singer wants 
society to function based upon altruism, with people volunteering to be 
altruistic, instead of being motivated by money.  He perceives unpaid blood 
donation as ‘institutionalized generosity’.181  But if there is no choice or 
alternative to unpaid altruism, then the agent performs ‘altruism by legal 
default’.  However, an agent can have concern for the other and want her self-
interest acknowledged by receiving payment or she may have pressing needs.  
An unpaid volunteer could have ulterior motives behind her acts and perform 
her service as a mere routine without genuine concern for the other.  
Unfortunately a volunteer may just want praise, without having concern for 
others, which could lead to other copy-cat insincere acts.  A person may feel 
socially pressured to be altruistic to fit in: if being altruistic becomes the norm it 
may limit the sense of such acts being free as they are not performed by choice. 
 
However both paid and unpaid workers in charity shops can work together, 
with both of them having concern for their customers.  Singer admits that the 
80% of British donors motivated by ‘social responsibility’ for others’ needs, 
could still have acted without pay alongside a paid donation system.182  Singer 
assumes paid blood donation ‘discourage[s] altruism’, loosening social bonds 
and ‘fellow-feeling’,183 whereas unpaid donation ‘encourages altruism’ unlike a 
                                                 
178 Singer, ‘Altruism and Commerce’, 319. 
179 Ibid., 319. 
180 Ibid., 319. 
181 Singer, ‘Rights and the Market’, 76. 
182 Singer, ‘Altruism and Commerce’, 316. 
183 Ibid., 314. 
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mixed paid and unpaid system.184  However, virtuous motives can co-exist 
alongside payment; fellow-feeling could be demonstrated by the reciprocity, 
generosity and appreciation of the recipient to the donor by offering and giving 
them money.  The recipient could be extremely grateful to the donor for their 
act and want to demonstrate their gratitude by rewarding them so the donors 
can pursue their own projects.   
 
William Upton suggests that if committed blood donors were offered $10 to 
donate they would be less likely to come forward.185  Such blood donors may 
be purely altruistic and choose to do it freely, and would be offended to receive 
money regarding it as a slight on their character or motivation.  However, 
research is needed to find out if this is true.  If it were the case, to ensure 
unpaid altruists continue, it would be better for them not to be offered money 
and be kept separate from any paid schemes than to refuse to offer money to 
everyone.  It would not be purely altruistic if an altruist insisted others were 
unpaid, since they would be paternalistically imposing their values upon 
others.  Allowing payment therefore could be an altruistic act by thinking of 
the needs of the other who may need paying.   
 
4.7.3 The Co-Existence of Altruism and Payment 
 
The motives of altruism and self-interest can co-exist in a paid and unpaid 
system called a mixed economy combination or a modified price control model 
without detriment.  Titmuss believed payment drives out altruism, since, on 
his view, the two motives cannot co-exist.  Singer states, (referring to Titmuss): 
‘we must choose between the freedom of the marketplace and the freedom to 
                                                 
184 Ibid., 315, see also 317. 
185 William Edward Upton III, ‘Altruism, Attribution and Intrinsic Motivation in the 
Recruitment of Blood Donors’, Dissertation Abstracts International 34 (1973), 6260 B (at Cornell 
University, USA).  
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give altruistically’.186  Self-concern is assumed to lead to a decline in service 
quality and concern for others is expected to detract from self-concern.  
However, in the United States of America, some blood is now freely given, 
(which was not the case when Titmuss’ was writing).  Pope Pius XII, in 1960, 
admitted ‘that grave abuses could occur if a payment is demanded’ for blood 
donation but thought it was ‘going too far to declare immoral every acceptance 
or every demand of payment’. 187  He thought it ‘commendable’ for blood 
donors to refuse payment but thought it ‘not necessarily a fault to accept it’.188   
 
Much can be learnt from the world of voluntary organisations where some 
people are unpaid volunteers and others are paid professionals.  Management 
consultant Charles Handy189 acknowledges that voluntary organisations can 
treat all workers equally despite differing roles (2-3).  Voluntary organisations 
can involve co-operative team work (96-7 and 99) with a full-time paid 
professional core, paid part-time workers and unpaid flexible voluntary 
workers.  He believes volunteers should be treated differently to the 
professional core, as their loyalty, commitment and needs vary.  Handy wants 
organisations to focus upon worker’s roles (117-19).  Volunteers often want 
good, varied working conditions; fair treatment; to feel professional; and 
receive training and gain experience.  Volunteers are not slaves and should 
have some control over their work.  He criticises the abusive ‘servant 
syndrome’ where people become depressed after giving and serving too much, 
which does not help them or the other (7-8). 
 
4.8 The Co-Existence of Unpaid and Paid Surrogacy 
                                                 
186 Singer, ‘Altruism and Commerce’, 313.  
187 The Monks of Solesmes, Papal Teachings (selected and arranged): The Human Body (Boston, 
MA: The Daughters of Saint Paul, 1960), 381-2. 
188 Ibid., 381-2. 
189 The following references relate to Charles Handy, Understanding Voluntary Organizations: 
How to Make Them Function Effectively (London: Pelican Books, 1988).  
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4.8.1 Unpaid Surrogacy  
 
We now turn to address the possible co-existence of paid and unpaid 
surrogacy.  When surrogacy is debated, it is usually proposed that either 
unpaid surrogacy or commercial surrogacy should be permitted with little or 
no compromise or co-operation between these two polar views.  Various 
reasons are offered for such proposals.  The 1998 Brazier Report believed 
altruistic (unpaid) surrogacy arrangements were ‘less likely to break down’,190 
but provided no consolidatory evidence.  Unpaid surrogates are expected to be 
selfless with more virtuous motives than paid surrogates.  As altruists, 
surrogates are not expected to benefit themselves.  The assumption is that only 
unpaid surrogacy should exist as self-interest is wrong.  However, it has 
already been suggested that self-interest does not have to be conducted in an 
unethical manner, or be based upon selfishness or egotism, with no regard for 
others.   
 
Another reason why unpaid surrogacy alone is favoured is because self-
interest, in the form of payment, is considered incompatible with altruism.  
However, altruism can be motivated by self-interest and concern for the other, 
allowing payment and altruism to co-exist without one affecting the other and 
without one being seen as ethically inferior.  It must be remembered that, in 
section 4.7.1, it was demonstrated that in the commercial blood donation 
system operating in the United States of America, some altruistic acts still 
occurred.   
 
                                                 
190 The Brazier Report, 5:21. 
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Unpaid surrogacy is expected not to include baby-selling or profit making,191 
but payment does not necessarily have to be perceived as wrongful baby-
selling with commercialisation or commodification of the child or surrogate.  
Therefore, because payment is not always intrinsically wrong, payment can 
exist alongside altruism.   
 
Some feminists believe women’s feminine nature is naturally altruistic, to 
nurture and care for others.  Nel Noddings suggests that: ‘[t]he caring relation, 
in particular, requires engrossment and motivational displacement on the part of 
the one-caring and a form of responsiveness or reciprocity on the part of the 
cared-for’.192  However, the one being cared for may be unable to respond or 
reciprocate through ill health or mental incapacity.  Daniel Putman points out 
that ‘[c]aring by an agent is an act in which the person cared about is validated 
as more important than other concerns the agent might have’.193  Putman’s 
comment reflects the self-subversive approach some care perspectives take and 
echoes Sarah Hoagland’s criticism of caring as being ‘unidirectional’.194  
Putman calls for caring to be linked with virtue theory to prevent a person 
becoming a ‘one-dimensional person’ by applying practical wisdom to care in 
order to allow for a full human life, so care operates alongside other virtues.195 
 
Only having unpaid surrogacy implies paid surrogacy cannot be ethically 
motivated nor involve concern for the other.  Paid surrogacy could prevent 
stereotypes and provide opportunities to break away from cultural 
expectations that women who want to be surrogates must be purely altruistic, 
                                                 
191 Lenore Kuo, ‘The Morality of Surrogate Mothering’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 
(1989), 361-80, at 376.  
192 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 150. 
193 Daniel Putman, ‘Relational Ethics and Virtue Theory’, Metaphilosophy 22 (1991), 231-8, at 234 
and 236. 
194 Sarah Lucia Hoagland, ‘Some Concerns About Nel Noddings’ Caring’, Hypatia 5 (1990), 109-
14, at 109. 
195 Putman, ‘Relational Ethics and Virtue Theory’, 236. 
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with no payment or self-interest and with no alternative offered, for to do so is 
to reduce the scope of surrogacy for those who want to be paid or need to be 
paid.  However, it will be expected that all surrogates, regardless of whether 
they are paid or not, have deep concern for their commissioning couples.  
Surrogates can have virtuous motives and care for the commissioning couple 
and the child.   
 
4.8.2 Why Some Reject Unpaid Surrogacy 
 
The sections above answered those who support unpaid surrogacy only.  As it 
is being proposed in this chapter that paid surrogacy can operate alongside 
unpaid surrogacy, attention will now turn to question those who reject 
altruism and unpaid surrogacy.   
 
Unpaid surrogacy could be interpreted as fulfilling and perpetuating 
oppressive societal stereotypes of women, who are expected and under 
pressure to be self-sacrificing caregivers for others and are socially conditioned 
to be supererogatory and to benefit others first and not themselves as moral 
agents.  Larry Blum believes altruistic qualities of ‘weakness and 
dependency’196 become distorted in women’s relationships with others.197   
 
It is important that women be made aware of past societal expectations, 
stereotypes and inequalities which may continue to exert pressure on them (in 
the case of surrogacy, to be sacrificial and altruistic).  Likewise, they must 
realise that after reflection they can choose to be unpaid or paid surrogates 
because they want to be without fear of acting out a stereotype.  Women, 
therefore, should not be paternalistically prevented from acting altruistically.  
                                                 
196 Larry Blum et al., ‘Altruism and Women’s Oppression’, Philosophical Forum 5 (1975), 222-47, 
at 223. 
197 Ibid., 230. 
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For example, Catharine McKinnon's states, ‘[w]omen value care because men 
have valued us according to the care we give them’.198  Women should not be 
expected to be pure unpaid altruistic surrogates only; there needs to be a paid 
alternative.  But at the same time, women should be able to choose to be caring 
and altruistic, because they assert and value such behaviour for themselves - 
not simply because men have given us permission to value it.  Expected or 
pressured altruism can deter women’s autonomy, but women can choose 
altruism too.  
 
Altruistic acts are not necessarily examples of ‘weakness or dependency’.  
Women need to be educated to prevent unconscious oppression taking place 
and men need to be educated to stop oppression too.  Both have responsibility 
to ensure they treat each other with due care and respect.  Women need to 
ensure they are not treated as victims, and that others, especially their partner 
or family, do not insist on them being altruistic.  Janice Raymond suggests: 
surrogacy ‘<reinforces the gender inequality of women as a group’.  She goes 
on to say:  
 
[a]ltruistic reproductive exchanges leave intact the status of women as a breeder class.  
Women's bodies are still the raw material for other’s needs, desires, and purposes.199   
 
However, altruism for some women will be a demonstration of their self-
awareness, self-determination and freedom.  Women who have made a choice 
to be altruistic should not be denied the opportunity to be altruistic, caring or 
self-sacrificial from a fear that others might regard them as oppressed, when in 
fact they have assessed the situation and decided that they want to do it.  Not 
all women will choose to be surrogates, not all women will become unpaid 
                                                 
198 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 39. 
199 Janice G. Raymond, ‘Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman’, The 
Hastings Center Report 20 (1990), 7-11, at 11. 
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surrogates, and the actions of a few women cannot affect all women 
universally.  It is up to women to assert themselves and ensure they are not 
oppressed by their commissioning couple and to stop others assigning the 
victim role upon them.  Women are not usually raped to become surrogates 
and only women are physically capable of being surrogates.  Care needs to be 
taken with respect to the attitudes of both parties in a surrogacy arrangement 
in order to ensure that altruism does not collapse into negative domination. 
 
If paid surrogacy is allowed, then the woman who chooses to be an unpaid 
surrogate has made a conscious decision.  By contrast, legally restricting 
surrogacy to non-payment by default denies women who may prefer to be paid 
this choice.  But, socially engineered altruism or imposed altruism is not 
genuine altruism.  Such ‘altruists’ may resent their actions, consciously or 
unconsciously.  Clear guidance is needed to ensure that women make 
autonomous decisions and give informed consent by receiving clear, detailed 
information before they enter into an arrangement.  However, issues remain 
regarding an appropriate framework to accommodate the needs and self-
interests of both the surrogate and the commissioning couple, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has concentrated upon giving a positive view of self-interest and 
criticising negative accusations by various authorities that paid surrogacy 
involves baby selling.  An appraisal of the relationship between the self and the 
other was given in the work of Augustine, Aquinas and Nagel with criticism 
given of self-abnegation in agape.  Attention focused upon an ‘ordered love’ 
which allows for emphasis upon the self and the other and is reflected in a 
relational framework with relational altruism.  Such analysis lays the 
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foundation to explore paid and unpaid blood donation since self-interest does 
not necessarily drive out altruism, as implied by Titmuss and Singer.  
Consideration was given to the definitions involved in commercial surrogacy 
that a surrogate cannot be accused of ‘selling’ something if she retains it and 
cannot be accused of ‘selling’ something she did not opt into having it in the 
first place.  Likewise, a commissioning father cannot ‘buy’ his parental rights 
when he is entitled to them as the genetic father.  Payment could be for the 
time, risks and gestational service she provides, but not as a sign of her 
intrinsic worth.  It was suggested expenses could paternalistically restrict a 
surrogate’s autonomy.  Recommendations were made that a surrogate should 
be able to be reimbursed for her services just as she can claim, as expenses, the 
services of others towards her, e.g. counselling and legal services.  The use of 
rights language could be inappropriate for surrogacy, with emphasis instead 
upon the surrogate choosing to opt in, acquire, then assert rights of mothering 
if she so wished, instead of an automatic claim to motherhood, which occurs 
with traditional mothering by birth alone.  In relation to accusations of the sale 
of parental rights, it was acknowledged that if a genetic surrogate bonded to 
the child in the pregnancy and was offered money to relinquish her custody of 
the child, then she could be accused of selling her custody rights to the father if 
he tried to buy sole custody of the child.   
 
Paid surrogacy and unpaid surrogacy can operate side by side without harm 
and payment can involve a concern for the other as well as the self.  Surrogates 
who accept payment are not necessarily selfish, since they have mixed motives 
to help themselves and others and are not just motivated by financial 
incentives alone.  Freedom could be increased by allowing agents to choose 
between paid and unpaid surrogacy, especially with the two systems being 
kept separate from each other, so pure altruism can be chosen instead of 
altruism by default with governmental policy.  At the moment all surrogates 
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are expected to act altruistically and be unpaid in the UK.  However, not all 
women are naturally inclined to be altruistic.  Some women do not want to be 
altruistic and they should not be pressurised into it by societal expectations.  
Similarly, it is paternalistic to suggest all women are oppressed every time they 
are spontaneously purely altruistic or act altruistically after a deliberate choice.  
A surrogate who asks for payment may have a high self-regard.  Payment from 
the commissioning couple to the surrogate can be a reflection of their gratitude, 
gratefulness and appreciation for the surrogate as a person with self-worth and 
dignity and their desire to reciprocate to ensure they do not treat her as a 
means to an end.  However, questions remain regarding a suitably flexible and 
dynamic model to incorporate and respond to the needs of the self and the 
other - and to deal with potential conflicts between them.  These will be 
covered in the next chapter.  It is worth noting at this stage that the model will 
not be based on contractarian lines, rational choice theory, or proportionalism, 
since not all relationships involve an equal balance between the self and the 
other.   
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CHAPTER FIVE THE CONTRACT MODEL, THE ADOPTION MODEL 
AND THE RELATIONAL MODEL FOR SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
So far, the argument has proceeded in four chapters.  Chapter one explored six 
reports on surrogacy and found that most of the fears they expressed have not 
materialised, such as convenience surrogacy.  Chapter two suggested that 
motherhood is complex and multidimensional.  Chapter three proposed that 
regulated paid surrogacy could prevent commercial surrogacy, thus reducing 
commodification, exploitation and coercion.  Chapter four argued that paid 
surrogacy does not have to incorporate baby-selling and that paid and unpaid 
surrogacy can operate together.  Paid surrogates can combine self-interest and 
altruistic motives in a relational framework. 
 
This chapter explores the ethical application of three models - the contract 
model, the adoption model and a relational model - in order to manage 
surrogacy.  Firstly, after defining contract (5.2.1), the four key elements of a 
legal contract are outlined: the offer, the acceptance, consideration (payment) 
and the intention to create legal relations (5.2.2).  These key points are applied 
to surrogacy in a hypothetical surrogacy contract model (5.3) which is followed 
by its problems (5.4) and the reality of surrogacy contracts (5.5).  In reality, 
surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable for being a personal service 
contract and a domestic arrangement.   
 
The adoption model, put forward predominantly by Protestant theologian 
Scott Rae, is discussed in sections (5.6) and (5.7), where its strengths and 
weakness are assessed.  The role of the commissioning couple, the surrogate 
and child in the adoption model is discussed along with how the adoption 
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model supports gestation to determine motherhood.  Analysis is made of how 
custody is solved using Rae’s adoption model, followed by problems with the 
model.   
 
The flexible alternative offered is a relational framework and four types of 
relationalism are presented (5.8).  Relationalism is influenced by the 
personalism of Roman Catholic moral theologian Louis Janssens, who was 
influenced by other theologians and philosophers (5.9).  The personalism of 
Janssens is explored in eight points (5.10).  My own version of relationalism is 
discussed in five sections including the relational framework, the self, the self 
and the other, what my relationalism excludes and differences to Janssens, 
(5.11).  My relationalism is applied to surrogacy, focusing upon custody 
disputes, recommendations, embodiment, payment and what is excluded 
(5.12).  The chapter finishes discussing the best interests of the child, which are 
often used to settle custody disputes in surrogacy (5.13), followed by problems 
of relationalism (5.14) and, finally, the conclusion (5.15). 
 
5.2 The Basics of Contract Law 
 
The first model to be explored is the contractarian model, which is a key 
approach for the organisation of surrogacy arrangements.  Scholars in favour of 
using and enforcing a surrogacy contract include: Marjorie Shultz,1 Carmel 
Shalev,2 Lori Andrews3 and John Hill.4  Andrews wants surrogacy contracts 
                                                 
1 Marjorie Maguire Shultz, ‘Reproductive Technology and Intent-based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality’, Wisconsin Law Review 2 (1990), 297-398, at 377-8. 
2 Carmel Shalev, Birth Power: The Case for Surrogacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1989), 103-4. 
3 Lori B. Andrews, ‘Surrogate Motherhood: Should the Adoption Model Apply?’, Children’s 
Legal Rights Journal 7 (1986), 13-20, at 19.  
4 John Lawrence Hill, ‘The Case for Enforcement of the Surrogate Contract’, Politics and the Life 
Sciences 8 (1990), 147-60, at 148 and John Lawrence Hill, ‘What Does it Mean to be a ‚Parent‛? 
The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights’, New York University Law Review 66 
(1991), 353-420, at 415-16. 
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enforced, to ensure surrogates keep their promises to hand the child over to the 
commissioning couple at birth.  In order to understand surrogacy contracts we 
need to consider the key components of legal contracts in general, by looking at 
the definition of a contract and the four main contractual concepts of offer, 
acceptance, consideration (payment) and intention to create legal relations.  
Understanding the basis of legal contracts enables us to apply them to 
surrogacy in order to make a hypothetical surrogacy contract.  However, there 
are problems with a contract approach towards surrogacy.  Contracts can be a 
set, rigid,5 legalistic agreements with many restrictions and controls upon the 
agents involved, ignoring their specific needs, personal values or changing 
circumstances during the contract.  Contracts tend not to be flexible or dynamic 
enough to accommodate unexpected reactions during the contractual 
experience.  Renegotiation of contracts is seen as unsuitable and the strict terms 
and conditions are usually maintained.  However, in reality a contractarian 
approach to surrogacy is a myth in the UK: surrogacy contracts are considered 
void, since contracts are not usually applied to domestic arrangements and 
personal service contracts are not normally enforced.  Very few places uphold a 
surrogacy contract – although California, for example, enforces gestational 
surrogacy contracts. 
 
5.2.1 Definition of a Contract  
 
Traditionally, English law lacks a ‘formal definition’ of contract (3).6  Legal 
scholar Sir Guenter Treitel defines contract as:  
 
                                                 
5 Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests that: ‘*c+ontract theory is a static view: it presents a picture of 
consenting, rational adults’, (‘Feminism, Family and Community’, Dissent 29 [1982], 442-49, at 
446).  
6 The page numbers in brackets in section 5.2.1-5.2.2 refer to Ewan Mckendrick, Contract Law: 
Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed., 2010).  
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an agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognised by law.  The 
factor which distinguishes contractual from other legal obligations is that they are 
based on the agreement of the contracting parties.7   
 
A person has to have the capacity to enter into a contract, which usually 
excludes minors under 18, the mentally ill and the incapacitated such as the 
intoxicated.  The basic principles of contract law include an offer being made 
and accepted, which is backed by consideration with an intention to create 
binding legal relations (4-5).   
 
5.2.2 Four Key Parts to a Contract 
 
In order to understand how a surrogacy contract is formulated and operates, 
we need to understand the four key parts to a contract.  Traditionally the four 
main components of a contract are: the offer, the acceptance, consideration and 
intention to create legal relations.  Once we have explored these four points we 
will be able to apply them to surrogacy in order to ascertain whether surrogacy 
contracts are legally valid or void and unenforceable. 
 
(i) The Offer 
 
An offeror makes an offer of a contract to the offeree and expresses an intention 
to be legally bound to them if they accept the terms.  Offers end if cancelled, 
rejected, time has lapsed, if death occurs (44) or if the offer is ‘subject to a 
condition which then fails’.8  Contracts may involve negotiation and are made 
by an exchange of promises or by conduct.  Bilateral contracts involve an 
exchange of two promises for participants to perform their obligations.  
Unilateral contracts involve one party making a promise to another such as an 
                                                 
7 G. H. Treitel (ed. Edwin Peel), The Law of Contract (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 12th ed., 
2007), 1.  
8 Robert Duxbury, Nutshells: Contract Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 8th ed., 2009), 15.   
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offer of a reward (46).  If a counteroffer is made the offeree becomes the offeror, 
with new or varied terms from the original offer (which ends the original 
offer).9  Once an offer is accepted the parties are in a binding contract (51).  
Therefore rights, liabilities and duties are based upon the time when the 
contract was made and if broken the victim can sue and be remedied by 
damages (52).   
 
(ii) Acceptance of an Offer 
 
An acceptance is: 
 
an unconditional assent, communicated by the offeree to the offeror, to all terms of the 
offer, made with the intention of accepting.  Whether an acceptance has in fact 
occurred is ascertained objectively from the behaviour of the parties, including any 
correspondence that has passed between them.10   
 
An acceptance does not introduce ‘any new terms’.11  Courts usually 
concentrate on the objective intention behind accepting an offer and not the 
subjective intention (50).  Valid acceptance must be expressed to the offeror 
(82); silence is not acceptance (104).  In standard form contracts, if the offeror 
makes an offer using their form and the offeree accepts using their form, if the 
acceptance differs to the offer there is no contract, since offer and acceptance 
must match.  Contracts are usually performed on the terms of the last 
counteroffer.  Courts tend to allow such contracts to go ahead if performance 
has started.12  ‘Parol evidence’ prevents adding or changing the contractual 
document (297).   
 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 8. 
10 Ibid., 8.  
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Stefan Fafinski and Emily Finch, Contract Law (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2nd ed., 2010), 19. 
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(iii) Consideration 
 
All contracts involve consideration which is usually financial (254), as contracts 
often involve commercial transactions.  Unpaid contracts are not upheld 
because no money has been promised in exchange for something else (5).  
Consideration means that ‘something *of value+ must be given in return for a 
promise in order to render that promise enforceable’ (5).  Gifts are not 
enforceable, unless they are made in a deed (149).  Consideration also has to be 
sufficient but does not have to be adequate and cannot be in the past (148).  
Estoppel gives ‘legal effect to a promise that is unsupported by consideration’ 
(217) therefore a person is prevented from breaking the promise (217).  
Estoppel is an alternative to consideration and makes a promise legally 
enforceable if ‘there has been *a+ detrimental reliance upon it’ (246). 
 
(iv) The Intention to Create Legal Relations 
 
The intention to create legal relations usually occurs in commercial settings and 
does not usually occur in social and domestic relationships, thus preventing the 
creation of contracts (5 and 20), unless there is objective evidence to the 
contrary (280).  Family agreements such as domestic and social agreements are 
considered to operate without an intention to create legal obligations (274) and 
therefore the agreement is not binding.13  English law takes an objective view 
towards intention (19).  The law looks at contracts from the stance of a 
reasonable person who is the promissee and then from the position of the 
priomisor (27).  Legally it is assumed that parties intend to create legal relations 
when entering a commercial contract (274). 
 
5.3 The Principles of a Hypothetical Legal Contract Applied to Surrogacy 
                                                 
13 Duxbury, Nutshells (2009), 21. 
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Proponents of a contractarian approach to surrogacy usually want to apply the 
principles of a legal contract to surrogacy practice.  The basic idea is that a 
woman of sound mind, aged over 18, may make an offer to a commissioning 
couple to act as their surrogate, or a commissioning couple may make an offer 
to a woman to act as their surrogate.  The surrogate would receive counselling 
as part of her independent advice and to prevent mistakes with the contract.  A 
written contract would be negotiated and signed between the surrogate and 
the commissioning father, which would reflect that both parties have freely 
entered the contract, after giving informed consent, as their autonomous 
choice.  Both parties would intentionally want the contract to create legal 
relations, which would be enforceable binding promises, making the 
commissioning couple legal parents of the child.  
 
In order for the arrangement to be regarded as a contract, the commissioning 
couple would give financial consideration to the surrogate for providing a 
gestational service, as an unpaid arrangement would not be regarded as a 
contract.  However, sometimes the consideration can be nominal.  If the 
surrogate entered the contract under duress, undue influence, 
misrepresentation or a mistake then the contract could be voided.  The 
surrogate would be expected to provide a duty of care to the foetus otherwise 
the commissioning couple could sue for negligence and claim damages on 
behalf of the child.  However, if the surrogate suffered a miscarriage due to no 
fault of her own, this would be classed as a frustrating event and the 
commissioning couple may be able to reclaim some of their costs such as 
expenses of the surrogate.  If the surrogate breaches the contract by having an 
abortion without permission of the commissioning couple or wants to keep the 
child, the couple could sue for breach of contract and seek damages to reclaim 
money they spent on the surrogate.  The commissioning couple could sue the 
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surrogate for damages for mental suffering caused to them by her negligence.  
The contract would be upheld in the courts as in the interests of public policy 
for ensuring that the child goes to its intended parents.  The contract would 
determine parenthood and not the biological status.  The commissioning 
mother may try to be party to the contract through a collateral contract or by an 
amendment to The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, even though 
this currently only applies to business arrangements. 
 
5.4 Problems of a Hypothetical Contractarian Model Applied to Surrogacy 
 
Attention now turns to three problems with a hypothetical contractarian model 
for surrogacy. 
 
5.4.1 Only One Side Can Win 
 
Contractarianism is influenced by liberal atomism, which emphasises the rights 
of separate individuals.  If these rights clash and a contract is breached, the 
relationship ends and damages are paid to the claimant, with a solution often 
in favour of one person only.  For example, the positive right of the 
commissioning couple to procreate could clash with the surrogate’s inalienable 
right to motherhood, with custody going to one side only.  Contract ignores the 
surrogacy context of two mothers, thus preventing a co-operative dynamic 
solution with various emphases upon the self or the other.   
 
5.4.2 The Use of Intention in Contract 
 
The commissioning couple’s intention to procreate and rear a child fixes their 
parenthood at conception and gives them a positive claim right and entitlement 
to custody of the child for initiating the surrogacy contract.  On the contractual 
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model their intention trumps any bonding, genetic, gestational connection or 
emotional involvement on the part of the surrogate as the birth mother.  
However, the contractual model ignores the surrogate’s changing intentions 
towards the foetus.  The surrogate may have bonded to the child and may want 
to keep it despite her informed consent at the start of the contract.  Likewise, 
the couple may decide during a surrogate’s pregnancy that they no longer 
want to be parents, but the contractual model would insist that they are the 
child’s parents.  However, it may not be in the child’s best interests to be 
brought up by people who no longer want it.  In order to deal with the possible 
rare situation of no one wanting the child, perhaps surrogacy agencies could 
arrange to have foster carers on standby to look after the child or a couple 
willing to adopt in order to ensure child security.  The commissioning couple 
may be required to take out insurance to pay for such additional costs if they 
do not take the child, in order to ensure the child’s welfare. 
 
5.4.3 Informed Consent 
 
With an impartial pre-birth contract, the decision to surrender the child is fixed 
in time, a priori at the start before experiencing the contract.  Autonomous 
surrogates may give valid informed consent after receiving information to 
assess the physical and psychological risks involved such as bonding and 
possible distress at relinquishing the child.  Legal, informed consent does not 
require experience of an action.14  Despite giving informed consent to enter the 
contract, a woman may not appreciate what is involved until she has 
experienced some of the requirements of the contract.  Women may not 
experience surrogacy as they expect to when they sign the contract.  A 
surrogate, despite having had pregnancies before, would not have been 
                                                 
14 Lori B. Andrews, ‘Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists’, Law, Medicine and 
Health Care 16 (1988), 72-80, at 74-5. 
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pregnant with this particular child before and may be unprepared for her 
reactions to it, which could include bonding.   
 
5.5 The Reality of the Surrogacy Contract 
 
However, the above account of a surrogacy contract is a hypothetical model 
only.  In reality surrogacy contracts are legally void and, as completion of 
personal service contracts, unenforceable. 
 
5.5.1 Surrogacy Contracts are Void 
 
In Britain, a surrogacy contract is void at statute according to the 1985 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act, making it unenforceable and invalid, with no 
legal standing.  As such, surrogacy participants cannot sue for damages if 
contracts are breached or claim compensation for any ‘money paid or property 
transferred’,15 since the parties do not gain rights.16  Therefore, the surrogate 
can keep any money received from the commissioning couple.  Likewise, the 
surrogate cannot claim for money she is owed by the commissioning couple.  
Usually, within a contract, ‘money paid before the frustrating event is 
recoverable’ as well as expenses.17  However, because a surrogacy contract is 
void, a miscarriage cannot be classified as a frustrating event and the 
commissioning couple are unable to claim damages.  Damages for a void 
contract cannot be claimed; therefore a commissioning couple who lost a child 
due to the surrogate’s negligence would also be unable to claim expenses or 
compensation.   
 
                                                 
15 Duxbury, Nutshells (2009), 129. 
16 Robert Duxbury, Nutshells: Contract Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 4th ed., 1997), 74. 
17 Duxbury, Nutshells (2009), 156. 
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5.5.2 Surrogacy Is a Domestic Arrangement with Personal Service and Cannot 
Be Upheld  
 
Contracts are not normally applied to family or social relationships such as 
surrogacy because they are considered ‘domestic arrangements’.  The terms of 
a surrogacy contract, such as abortion waivers, behaviour modifications or 
custody rights, are unenforceable.  The right to procreate is regarded as a 
negative right and not a positive right.  The child’s legal mother is the birth 
mother and if she is married, her husband is the father, if he accepts the 
insemination.  A surrogate can legally change her mind and keep the child, but 
such cases often go to court, where custody is usually decided by the best 
interests of the child.  Therefore, as we have seen, a surrogacy contract is a 
myth in the UK courts as it is not upheld, but decided by the interests of the 
child which are regarded as paramount. 
 
Specific performance is a remedy for a breached contract ordering the 
defendant to perform contractual obligations (which can vary from the original 
contractual obligations) when damages are inadequate (930).18  Courts do not 
usually uphold the specific performance of a personal service contract (931) if 
the contract is breached,19 as performance would be regarded as ‘involuntary 
servitude’,20 ‘hardship’ (934), ‘slavery’ (935) and ‘inconvenience’ (937).  As a 
surrogacy arrangement is a personal service contract, it cannot be enforced as it 
may be too demanding or harmful for the surrogate to relinquish the child.  
Similarly, the surrogate cannot order the commissioning couple to take the 
child, leaving her to look after it as the legal mother or place it for adoption.   
 
                                                 
18 The page numbers in brackets in section 5.5.2 refer to McKendrick, Contract Law. 
19 D. J. Ll. D., ‘Contract for Personal Service’, The Modern Law Review 1 (1937), 150-2, at 151. 
20 Clifton Perry, ‘Surrogate Contracts: Contractual and Constitutional Conundrums in the Baby 
‚M‛ Case’, Journal of Legal Medicine 9 (1988), 105-22, at 112. 
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Consequently, five problems with a contractarian approach to surrogacy can be 
outlined.  Firstly, since a contract requires consideration, unpaid surrogacy 
arrangements would not be contractual, but could be subject to estoppel 
doctrines.  Secondly, proponents advocate the enforcement of surrogacy 
contracts.  However this would force a surrogate to hand the child over to the 
commissioning couple against her will and not to see it again, even if she is 
genetically related to the child or has bonded to it.  Thirdly, surrogates would 
be expected to abort the child on the commissioning couple’s demand, undergo 
any medical tests they require and give birth in the place where they stipulate.  
Fourthly, surrogates would receive a reduced fee if a miscarriage or stillbirth 
occurred.  Fifthly, all women could be expected to follow a standardised 
contract which would control her behaviour, her diet, her medication, her 
alcohol consumption and her attitude towards the child while pregnant.  There 
could be clashes between the commissioning couple’s demands and the bodily 
integrity or embodiment of the surrogate.  The commissioning couple could 
use their position of power to impose behaviour which the surrogate does not 
want to follow.  A surrogate might be banned from jogging while pregnant for 
example, even if she has jogged while pregnant previously without problems.  
Not all women are the same and it would be unrealistic for a commissioning 
couple to demand that a surrogate follows all their requirements set out in a 
contract, without negotiation, flexibility and without them considering her 
needs as an individual person.  Finally as the commissioning couple are paying 
for the surrogacy, the pregnant surrogate could be open to biased counselling 
advice from the surrogacy agency - who are financed by the commissioning 
couple’s fees - to do as they want. 
 
Attention now turns to the second model to be applied to surrogacy, the 
adoption model.  
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5.6 Introduction to the Adoption Model 
 
In contrast to a contractarian stance to surrogacy, an adoption model is now 
explored.21  Three adoption models will be briefly summarised: the ‘tender 
years’ model, the best interests of the child model, and a hybrid model 
presented by theologian Scott Rae which combines the two approaches.  All of 
these models are used to try and solve custody disputes in surrogacy, if it is 
unclear who should parent the child.  Firstly, the ‘tender years’ adoption model 
involves a court giving exclusive parental custody of the child to the surrogate, 
as the birth mother, unless she is an unfit mother.  Rosemary Tong supports 
such a decision on the grounds of the surrogate’s gestational, biological and 
psychological contribution, for having a parental relationship and for her 
commitment to bring the child to term.22  Martha Field likewise wants the 
surrogate ‘to retain custody of her child without having to prove to a court that 
she would be a better parent than the biological father’.23  In Re P (Minors)24 a 
surrogate was granted custody of her five-month-old twins because the 
children were considered to have a bond with her, despite the intellectual and 
wealthier background of the commissioning couple.  However, Frances Miller 
regards the ‘tender years’ model as ‘gender-biased discrimination’25 because it 
automatically favours the mother over the father. 
 
                                                 
21 Usually the contract and the adoption models towards surrogacy differ, but the Church of 
England document Personal Origins, views surrogacy as an adoption agreement and a contract 
(The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the Church of England, Personal 
Origins [London: Church House, 2nd ed., 1996], 53 and 59). 
22 Rosemarie Tong, ‘The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a Stand on Surrogacy 
Arrangements’, Journal of Social Philosophy 21 (1990), 40-56, at 43.  See also Rosemarie Tong, 
‘Feminist Bioethics: Toward Developing a ‚Feminist‛ Answer to the Surrogate Motherhood 
Question’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics 6 (1996), 37-52. 
23 Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues (Expanded Edition) 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), vii, see also 87-8.   
24 In Re P (Minors) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1987] 2 FLR 421. 
25 Frances H. Miller, ‘Surrogate Fatherhood?’, Boston University Law Review 70 (1990), 169-83 at 
171 n. 10, see also 169.  
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Secondly, custody can follow an adoption model where only one set of parents 
become the custodial parents, based upon the best interests of the child.  Most 
UK surrogacy cases today, in light of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act (2008), are solved with the interests of the child having ‘paramount 
consideration’.  Re L (a minor)26 involved a British commissioning couple, who 
paid an American surrogate more than reasonable expenses but were allowed 
to keep the child.  The judge, Mr Justice Hedley, believed that the needs of the 
child come first and the child’s welfare is now the court’s ‘paramount 
consideration’, since the 2010 Parental Order regulations use a welfare test.  He 
believed that in issuing a Parental Order, the child’s welfare takes priority over 
public policy considerations, unless public policy is being abused.  As will be 
seen in sections 5.11 and 5.12, I prefer greater flexibility with a variety of 
arrangements which are not necessarily based only upon the best interests of 
the child, even though these are part of the decision progress. 
 
Another adoption model put forward by American theologian Scott Rae is a 
hybrid approach which allows the surrogate or the commissioning father to 
keep their parental rights.  This is often accompanied by the presumption that 
the surrogate will be the main custodian, with visitation rights according to the 
best interests of the child (277).27  Rae is reluctant to use the ‘tender years’ 
doctrine, where the surrogate has exclusive custody based on her time and 
bonding with the child as this ‘neglects’ the commissioning father’s ‘desire to 
have a child’ (273).  Rae’s adoption model will be explored in detail due to him 
being a Christian moral theologian and will be set out in five sections.  Firstly 
his views on contract surrogacy will be given (5.7.1), secondly his views 
towards the commissioning couple, the surrogate and the child will be 
provided (5.7.2), thirdly his attitude towards motherhood will be explored, 
                                                 
26 Re L (a minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam). 
27 The page numbers in section 5.6-5.7.5 refer to Scott B. Rae, ‘Parental Rights and the Definition 
of Motherhood in Surrogate Motherhood’, Southern California Review of Law and Women’s Studies 
3 (1994), 219-77.   
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with emphasis upon gestation (5.7.3), fourthly his suggestion for how custody 
cases should be solved using an adoption model will be presented (5.7.4), and 
fifthly problems with Rae’s model in general will be put forward (5.7.5).   
 
5.7 Scott Rae’s Adoption Model of Surrogate Motherhood 
 
5.7.1 Scott Rae’s Criticism of the Contract Approach to Surrogacy 
 
Rae is critical of enforcing a contractarian approach to surrogacy, as it only 
takes the commissioning couple into consideration as the intentional parents 
with rights to the child.28  However he admits that the commissioning father, 
who is genetically related to the surrogate child, would be considered to have 
rights to associate with the child born of surrogacy (262).  However, Rae 
considers it ‘immoral’ to enforce a surrogacy contract and make a surrogate 
give up her child29 by relinquishing her parental rights.30  He suggests that 
enforcing contracts against the will of the surrogate leads to ‘pain and damage’ 
(270).  He applies family law with adoption law to all surrogacy cases instead 
of contract law while banning commercial surrogacy (276-7).  Rae regards ‘the 
right to privacy’ as supporting altruistic (i.e. unpaid) surrogacy, but not paid 
surrogacy.31   
 
5.7.2 The Commissioning Couple, the Surrogate and the Child 
 
Rae believes the natural father has rights to procreate and associate with his 
child, but without insisting the child is handed over or that the surrogate gives 
up her parental rights or right to associate with the child for his exclusive 
                                                 
28 Scott B. Rae, The Ethics of Commercial Surrogate Motherhood: Brave New Families? (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1994), 22.  
29 Ibid., 126. 
30 Ibid., 9. 
31 Ibid., 105. 
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custody (262-3).  The commissioning couple only have ‘exclusive parental 
rights when the surrogate voluntarily relinquishes her parental rights’ (264).  
Rae regards procreative rights and parental rights as separate in surrogacy 
(264).  He believes that the surrogate’s husband should be able to ‘rebut’ 
paternity and that the courts would recognise the commissioning father as ‘the 
legal father’ (224). 
 
Rae considers the surrogate to be the child’s mother as she is the gestational 
birth mother and her maternal rights are not to be ended by the surrogate 
agreement being enforced, as long as she is a fit parent and has not abandoned 
the child.32  The surrogate, as the birth mother, has a fundamental right to 
associate with and ‘develop a relationship with the child’, to raise it and decide 
its upbringing (262).  He does not think that surrogates surrender the right to 
associate with their child, but their parental rights to custody can be 
voluntarily waived (264 and 266).  Rae does not want courts to terminate a 
surrogate’s rights against her will or enforce surrogacy contracts, unless the 
surrogate abandons the child or is unfit (267).  But even though the surrogate 
has the right to associate with the child, this does not give her ‘exclusive 
custody’ according to Rae (262).  He believes that as the surrogate is the child’s 
legal mother, ‘voluntary adoption’ is the only way courts can end her parental 
rights (270).  After all, the surrogate could be a competent parent and the child 
being with her could be in the child’s best interest (272-3). 
 
Rae wants to ensure the child has a ‘stable environment’ (272) which is decided 
by the best interests of the child.  Using the best interests of the child could 
mean the child going to the commissioning couple, but he does not think it is in 
the child’s best interest to enforce a contract requiring the surrogate to 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 108. 
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relinquish her parental rights before the child’s birth.33  He is aware of the 
parties’ competing interests, but he has an ‘overriding concern’ for the best 
interests of the child (277).  Rae warns that judges, who use the best interests of 
the child in order to make value judgements, could find it difficult to make 
choices.  This is due to the scarcity of information about the parents’ home; 
judges could also ‘discriminate against the poor’ or those with alternative 
lifestyles.34  Children are not to be removed ‘from the care and custody’ of the 
legal parents unless there is a ‘sufficient cause’.35  He indicates that in the 
United States of America parents have a legal right of association and children 
also have a reciprocal right to establish a relationship with their parents (266).   
 
5.7.3 The Support for Gestation as the Determinant of Motherhood 
 
Rae acknowledges that motherhood in surrogacy can be defined by genes, 
intention and gestation (219).  Genes can give the child ‘unique characteristics 
and traits’ and an identity, especially as adoptees often want to reunite with 
their genetic parents (228).  The commissioning couple often regard themselves 
as parents of the child due to owning the genetic materials (230-1).  However, 
Rae believes genes alone cannot determine parenthood, as sperm donors for 
example have no rights to the child (231) and in Lehr v Robertson the court 
deprived parental rights to an unmarried father who had not formed a 
relationship with his child (232-3).  He regards the surrogate as the natural 
mother (221) regardless of her genetic connection (222), and because he 
believes parental rights need genes and a relationship with the child (233).   
 
Rae does not want the commissioning couple’s intent to parent to dominate 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 169. 
34 Rene R. Gilliam, ‘When a Surrogate Mother Breaks a Promise: The Inappropriateness of the 
Traditional ‚Best Interests of the Child‛ Standard’, Memphis State University Law Review 18 
(1988), 514-39, at 514 and 530, cited in Rae, ‘Parental Rights and the Definition of Motherhood 
in Surrogate Motherhood’, 274. 
35 Rae, The Ethics of Commercial Surrogate Motherhood, 108. 
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over ‘the surrogate’s psychological intention to parent’ (249), which can start 
during the pregnancy or at birth (249-50).  Rae refuses to put a mental 
conception of a child, who has not been conceived and does not objectively 
exist, before the physical gestating relationship of the surrogate with the child, 
who he believes is the only one the child has a relationship with (252-3).  He 
believes a surrogate’s changing intention, and her ‘biological connection’, and 
relationship to the child give her ‘sole maternal rights’ to associate with the 
child and to ‘share custody’ with the father, but without giving her ‘exclusive 
parental rights’ (256 and 258).  Therefore, the surrogate is able keep her 
maternal rights and retain custody of the child after its birth, before its final 
adoption (242), since ‘the law assumes that the child is hers’ (245).   
 
Rae favours gestation and childbirth as determining motherhood and maternal 
rights rather than genes, due to the biological contribution of the gestational 
mother to the child’s physical, emotional, psychological and personality 
development, as well as her ‘effort and time’ (236-7, 261).  Influenced by 
Barbara Katz Rothman believes gestation determines motherhood due to the 
bonding and the ‘physical and emotional’ relationship involved (242 and 244) 
and the ‘intense, intimate relationship’ between mother and child.36  Rae 
believes a unique relationship is formed in utero between the gestator and the 
foetus and she ‘experiences something very significant’ which the genetic 
contributor does not (246).  Rae believes the gestational mother is considered to 
have ‘a greater maternal rights claim to the child than the genetic mother’ (244).  
The commissioning mother is regarded as an ‘egg donor’ having an 
‘anticipated and potential’ bond only (244).  Rae questions ‘why the genetic 
‚parent‛ should be the mother’ without giving birth (260), since he believes 
genes are ‘not determinative of motherhood’ and intent alone ‘is not an 
adequate component of motherhood’ (261).  
                                                 
36 Ibid., 92. 
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5.7.4 How Custody is to be Solved in Scott Rae’s Adoption Model 
 
Rae does not want the law to be changed to deal with the new reproductive 
technologies (257).  Current adoption law is considered ‘appropriate and fitting 
for surrogacy’ (250), which Rae suggests will allow the surrogate a cooling off 
period of about fifteen days37 after the child’s birth in order to make up her 
mind about waiving custody (222).  Consent to adoption will therefore occur 
after the birth and the child is to stay with the surrogate until the cooling off 
period is over (271).  He admits that the application of adoption law to 
surrogacy could ‘involve more risk’ for the commissioning couple.38   
 
Rae wants surrogacy custody disputes to be solved on a ‘case by case basis’, 
with a ‘dual standard’ to decide primary custody (222 and 277).  The best 
interest of the child is used at first to see if there are differences in the parties’ 
abilities to provide a stable home, income or marriage, as one parent (or set of 
parents) may have more ability than the other, who may be unfit or have a less 
stable home (275-7).  If the best interests of the child is not determinable and 
therefore determinative, then secondly, the strength of competing parental 
claims is weighed.  This usually falls in favour of the surrogate, as the ‘primary 
caretaker’ to have primary custody (276-7), based upon ‘biological 
contribution, gestation and the bonding’ in the womb which have already 
given her maternal rights (275).  Rae favours the best interests of the child 
approach over shared custody for infants, believing it gives them stability, thus 
putting the children’s interests above the adults’ rights to associate with their 
child (274-6).  Allowing the surrogate to have custody is considered less 
disruptive for the child, even though it ignores the ‘desire’ of the 
                                                 
37 The 15-day cooling off time is part of the law in Rhode Island (cited in ibid., 160, see 167 n. 
105).  In the UK, the surrogate could keep the child up to 6 months before the commissioning 
couple can apply for a Parental Order.  
38 Ibid., 97. 
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commissioning natural father ‘to have a child’ (273).  He believes that men and 
women are not equal in their relationship to a newborn and he regards 
denying the ‘biological differences penalizes women’ who have more 
involvement with pregnancy and birth (275).    
 
Once the court has decided primary custody then visitation rights are decided 
by a best interests standard, as in divorce (277).  Rae regards it as harmful for 
children to move between parents who do not get on.  Even though parents 
have a right to associate with their children, he wants the best interests of the 
child to take priority (276), even if it means one parent is unable to exercise 
their full parental rights (275).  Rae does not think that parents are 
relinquishing their parental rights, only primary custody (277).  However, in 
one study of traditional open adoption (i.e. not involving surrogates), two sets 
of adoptive parents ignored the child’s conflicting attitudes towards them 
(instigated by the resentful birth mothers), believing the contact was 
‘advantageous’ for the children, as the children felt attached to their adoptive 
family and to the birth family,39 thus showing a greater resilience than Rae 
expects.  Rae does not consider shared custody to be in the child’s best 
interests, as newborns need ‘a stable environment’ (274).  Even though shared 
custody appears to be ‘fair to both parents’, he believes it can be harmful to the 
child and suggests that society priorities ‘the interests of children’ over adult 
rights (274-5).  However, Alfred Kadushin found that in adoptions of 150 older 
children, only 5% had problematic attachments.40  Marsha Garrison suggests 
studies indicate that continued contact with the birth parents has a positive 
effect upon the child’s ‘well-being and emotional security’, even if the contact is 
                                                 
39 Carole Smith and Janette Logan, After Adoption: Direct Contact and Relationships (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 134-5. 
40 Alfred Kadushin, Adopting Older Children (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 160, 
cited in C. Alty and S. Cameron, ‘Open Adoption – The Way Forward?’, International Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy 15 (1995), 40-58, at 52.   
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infrequent.41  Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly found that after a divorce, 
continued contact with the child by the biological parents aided the child’s 
psychological adjustment.42  Shared parenting can have positive outcomes for 
children if parents are co-operative and flexible.43 
 
5.7.5 Problems with Scott Rae and the Adoption Model 
 
Rae’s presentation of the adoption model has problems, three of which we will 
now consider. 
 
Firstly, Rae’s adoption model focuses on solving disputes according to the ‘best 
interests of the child’ standard.  However, this approach theoretically could 
mean that the child is taken away from all of the interested parties, if none of 
them satisfied the detailed criteria needed to fulfil the ‘best interests of the 
child’ standard.  Therefore, in order for the best interests of the child to work, a 
contradiction occurs since the surrogate might have to give up the child to the 
commissioning couple (275-7).  This would be enforcing the surrogacy contract, 
which Rae disapproves of,44 thus removing her right to associate with the child 
- which he claims he wants her to be able to retain (262), in favour of the child’s 
best interests (277).  However, supporters of a ‘best interests of the child’ 
approach may argue that their approach does not enforce the surrogacy 
contract, but rather enforces the child’s best interests which just happen to 
coincide with the surrogacy contract.  There is also the possibility of the 
surrogate having access rights to the child if the commissioning couple have 
                                                 
41 Marsha Garrison, ‘Why Terminate Parental Rights?’, Stanford Law Review 35 (1983), 423-96, at 
461 and 461-5. 
42 Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan Berlin Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents 
Cope with Divorce (New York: Basic Books, 1981).   
43
 Belinda Fehlberg et al. ‘Caring for Children after Parental Separation: Would Legislation for 
Shared Parenting Time Help Children?’, Family Policy Briefing 7 (2011), Department of Social 
Policy and Social Work, Oxford University, 1-16, at 13. 
44 Rae, The Ethics of Commercial Surrogate Motherhood, 126. 
319 
 
sole custody.  Even so, the access of a poorer, less educated surrogate 
compared to a richer, well educated commissioning couple could be greatly 
reduced. 
 
Rae dislikes the contract approach because he does not want the 
commissioning couple to have exclusive custody rights (262),45 but this very 
situation could result from with a best interests of the child approach if, as Rae 
believes, it is in the best interests of the child not to have shared child custody 
(274).  The ‘best interests of the child’ approach tends to focus on the needs of 
the child alone and it could be deemed in their ‘best interest’ for the child not to 
have contact with the surrogate or for it to be considerably reduced.  However, 
the child is not the only person who should be taken into consideration; the 
needs of the adults should also be considered.  The best interests of the child 
will be explored further in section 5.13. 
 
Secondly, Rae admits that genes contribute to a child’s characteristics, identity 
and physical nature, allowing them to resemble their genetic donor.  He also 
accepts that adopted children often want to connect with their genetic parents 
(228).  He confesses that genes could give parental rights to the commissioning 
couple over a gestational surrogate because they do not want to act as a donor 
or relinquish having parental rights (230), since the gametes belong to the 
commissioning couple which determine parenthood (231).  However, he does 
not want the commissioning couple to claim parenthood based upon their 
genes or intention (261).  Rae believes parental rights are a ‘combination of 
genetic contribution and a relationship with the child’ (233).  Another 
contradiction occurs since the intention and biological connection of the 
commissioning couple are ignored (261), but the changing intention of the 
surrogate to keep the child, and her gestation or genetic connection, are 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 109. 
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acknowledged (256 and 258).  He does not distinguish between genetic 
surrogacy or gestational surrogacy, where a surrogate with a genetic and a 
gestational link could be regarded as having a closer link than to a non-
genetically related commissioning mother.  Even so, Rae wants a surrogate’s 
relinquishment of parental rights to be ‘irrevocable’, thus preventing her from 
changing her mind and taking up her maternal rights again once she has 
handed the child over (271).  Such an approach could be regarded as cruel.  
Usually though courts would allow a surrogate to seek custody of the child 
even if she had handed it over.  However, an alternative solution, which is not 
readily available, would be to allow open adoption and access to the child with 
visitation for the non-custodial parent, or for joint adoption to ensure their 
parental rights are respected. 
 
Thirdly, Rae acknowledges that surrogacy arrangements determined by 
adoption law instead of contract law could become more uncertain and risky 
for the commissioning couple who may not have their rights fully protected.  
However, he believes his solution ‘offer[s] maximum protection of the rights of 
the adult*s+’ (277) while respecting the best interests of the child, without them 
becoming commodities and without surrogates being forced to relinquish their 
parental rights (277).46  He claims to want ‘legislative consideration and debate’ 
(276).  However, Rae overlooks the multidimensional aspects of motherhood in 
surrogacy.  Despite admitting that intention plays a part in surrogacy (219), he 
does not take account of the commissioning mother’s intention to associate 
with her child, especially if she is biologically related or has psychologically 
bonded to the child by having a relationship with it.  He defines motherhood 
by giving birth only.  As seen in section 5.7.3, Rae, however, prioritises 
gestation and birth as creating a ‘stronger connection’ between the mother and 
the child, since the birth mother is the only mother the child is in relationship 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 49 and 109.  
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with.47  Fathers are allowed to assert custody if they have a genetic connection 
and a relationship with the child, but he does not allow this privilege to the 
commissioning mother, who could also have a genetic connection and a 
relationship to the child in gestational surrogacy.  Rae though wants to ensure 
that the child’s best interests take priority in surrogacy (277). 
 
It must be remembered that in a gestational surrogacy the commissioning 
mother is often genetically related to the child, thus biologically contributing to 
the child’s physical and personality development, as Rae believes pregnant 
mothers do (236-7).  Rae comments that the surrogate as the gestational mother 
gives more ‘effort and time’ than the genetic mother (236); however 
commissioning mothers also put ‘effort and time’ into having their eggs 
collected and donated through IVF.  A commissioning mother could see an 
embryo and emotionally bond with it before it is implanted into the surrogate; 
after implantation she may talk to it while in the womb.  After birth, the child 
could possibly recognise her voice.  The commissioning mother planned for 
and initiated the child’s conception and birth by involving the surrogate.  She 
hands over the embryo with the expectation that it will be returned.  The 
surrogate gestates the embryo on behalf of a woman who might be ill or 
disabled and unable to carry the embryo herself.  In such a situation, the 
commissioning mother procreates and the surrogate gestates.  The 
commissioning mother is not acting as an egg donor for the surrogate to 
become a mother, but turns to surrogacy as (often) the last possible alternative 
for her to become a mother.  
 
It could be regarded as inappropriate for a surrogate to bond to a child while 
she provides a gestational service with in loco parentis status.  A teacher or 
babysitter who cares for another woman’s child would be accused of 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 99. 
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kidnapping if they bonded to a child in their care and took it home after work.  
If a commissioning mother is denied a right to associate with the child after its 
birth, this could be regarded as discriminatory against a disabled woman and 
sexist for not acknowledging her relationship to the child, when the father’s 
role is acknowledged.  My relational approach to surrogacy, outlined in section 
5.12, tries to acknowledge both the commissioning mother and the surrogate as 
having a connection to the child, allowing both some involvement and 
acknowledgement to the child on their birth certificate and on a case-by-case 
basis.  After all, Rae accepts that a social mother exists in adoption and 
fostering (219), but fails to acknowledge one in surrogacy.  He believes that his 
dual standard of deciding custody by using the best interests of the child or a 
parental claim standard will ‘offer maximum protection of the rights of the 
adult participants’ (223).  However he fails to take the commissioning mother’s 
rights to associate with or have a legal status to the child into consideration.  
Rae claims he does not want the rights of one parent to associate with their 
child enforced at the expense of another’s being unable to do so (262); however 
this is the effect of not allowing the commissioning mother to have a 
relationship to the child.  My alternative relational approach towards 
surrogacy will now be presented, which allows for a more sophisticated 
relationship with varying emphases upon the self and the other.   
 
5.8 Relationalism as an Alternative Proposal 
 
As seen earlier, surrogacy contracts are void for being personal service 
contracts, whereas the adoption model decides custody using the best interests 
of the child or a ‘tender years’ policy.  Both models have one final custody 
solution, with one legally recognised mother.  Instead an alternative - relational 
and pluralistic - solution is advocated.  This section briefly highlights secular 
relationalism, secular feminist relationalism, feminist theological relationalism 
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and theological relationalism.  Later, attention is given to the theologian Louis 
Janssens’ and my own relationalism.   
 
A relational approach is found in secular relationalism, especially in 
psychology.  The Stone Center at Wellesley College in America, highlights the 
self-in-relation with empathy, mutuality, compassion and care alongside the 
well-being of others.48  Psychoanalyst Stephen Mitchell emphasises the creation 
of meaning from interactions with others.49  Psychologist Lewis Aron regards 
relationalism as interpersonal, allowing for ‘both/and rather than either/or’.50  
Relationalism involves co-operation, interaction and inter-subjectivity in a 
dialectical ongoing process with interdependency and individuality.51  
Cohesive and differing selves can be accommodated in differing contexts,52 
including symmetrical mutuality (with equality between the self and the other) 
and asymmetrical mutuality (with differing ‘roles, functions and 
responsibilities’ between the self and the other).53  Similarity and difference can 
be acknowledged,54 while allowing for analytical objectivity and subjectivity,55 
as ‘meaning is negotiated’.56 
 
Secondly, feminist secular relationalists focus upon the importance of personal 
relations for morality and share many points with these secular psychologists.  
Virginia Held highlights a particular relationship, the mother-child, as a model 
                                                 
48 Judith V. Jordan, ‘Clarity in Connection: Empathic Knowing, Desire and Sexuality’, Work in 
Progress No. 29 (Wellesley, MA: Stone Center Working Papers Series, 1987), 1-13, at 5.  
49 Stephen A. Mitchell, Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis: An Integration (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), 4-5 and 149. 
50 Lewis Aron, A Meeting of Minds: Mutuality in Psychoanalysis (Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic 
Press, 1996), 63. 
51 Ibid., 63-4 and 67. 
52 Ibid., 74. 
53 Ibid., 98. 
54 Ibid., 150. 
55 Ibid., 261.   
56 Ibid., 263. 
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for moral relations,57 whereas Lorraine Code uses friendship.58  Alisa Carse and 
Hilde Lindemann Nelson accentuate ‘respect, concern’ and ‘flourishing’ for the 
self and the other;59 Sally Gadow, the importance of engaging responsively 
with particular others,60 and Randy Spreen Parker our dynamic ‘embodied 
dialogue’,61 allowing for an awareness of the needs, desires and values of the 
self and the other.62  Margaret Urban Walker explores the discursive ‘expressive-
collaborative conception of ethics’,63 which flexibly allows for continual revision 
and ‘improvisation’.64    
 
Thirdly, relationalism is found in the writing of some feminist theologians.  
Margaret Farley believes that concrete differing persons, their needs and 
relationships deserve respect as integral valuable beings, based on autonomy 
and relationality.65  These specify the content of moral obligation, moral action 
and attitudes such as love and care to deal with the reality of relationships.  
However, some aspects of a person are not to be respected; for example, 
cruelty.66  Other relational Christian feminists who highlight mutuality include 
Catherine Keller67 and Beverly Wildung Harrison,68 who tend to praise self-love 
                                                 
57 Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 213-4. 
58 Lorraine Code, ‘Second Persons’, in Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen (eds.), Science, Morality 
and Feminist Theory (Calgary: The University of Calgary Press, 1987), 357-82, at 369. 
59 Alisa L. Carse and Hilde Lindemann Nelson, ‘Rehabilitating Care’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 6 (1996), 19-35, at 23. 
60 Sally Gadow, ‘Aging as Death Rehearsal: The Oppressiveness of Reason’, The Journal of 
Clinical Ethics 7 (1996), 35-40, at 39-40. 
61 Randy Spreen Parker, ‘Nurses’ Stories: The Search for Relational Ethic of Care’, Advances in 
Nursing Science 13 (1990), 31-40, at 37. 
62 Ibid., 37-9. 
63 Margaret Urban Walker, ‘Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory’, Hypatia 7 (1992), 23-
38, at 32. 
64 Ibid., 33 and 28. 
65 Margaret A. Farley, ‘A Feminist Version of Respect for Persons’, in Charles E. Curran et al. 
(ed.), Feminist Ethics and the Catholic Moral Tradition (New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 164-83. 
66 Ibid., 167. 
67 Catherine Keller, From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism and Self (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
1986), 40 and 179. 
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as a positive duty and criticise sacrificial agape by supporting eros and 
mutuality.69   
 
Fourthly, male relational theologians include H. Richard Niebuhr who regards 
persons as particular, social selves involved in ‘responsive relations’ to 
particular others and embedded in and responsive to space, time and 
language.70  James Keenan regards human beings as relational who in general 
use justice for the common good, who use fidelity for specific relationships, 
and who uniquely use self-care for themselves.71  J. Kellenberger believes 
relational morality involves acting in accordance ‘with our intimate personal 
relationships’, our ‘general relationships’, and ‘the person/person 
relationship’.72  He wants us to respect and treat people as persons with worth 
and not as mere means.73   
 
Relational approaches also exist in Anglicanism and Roman Catholic social 
teaching.  In Anglicanism, for example, family life includes interaction with 
others for mutuality, support and communal services.74  Individualism is 
considered to ‘diminish’ relationships and community, as human beings are 
persons-in-community.75   
 
                                                                                                                                              
68 Beverly Wildung Harrison, ‘The Power of Anger in the Work of Love: Christian Ethics for 
Women and Other Strangers’, in Carol S. Robb (ed.), Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist 
Social Ethics (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1985), 3-21, at 17-20.  
69 Darlene Fozard Weaver, Self Love and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 47. 
70 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1978), chapters 2 and 3, at 77 for ‘responsive relations’. 
71 James F. Keenan, ‘Proposing Cardinal Virtues’, Theological Studies 56 (1995), 709-29, at 723-8. 
72 J. Kellenberger, Relationship Morality (Pennsylvania, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1995), 165. 
73 Ibid., 44.  
74 The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the Church of England, Something 
to Celebrate (London: Church House, 1995), 16. 
75 Ibid., 76. 
326 
 
The relational model I will focus on is that developed by Roman Catholic Louis 
Janssens.  He has been chosen on account of his being a distinguished 
theologian, for his interest in artificial insemination, and the intellectual 
qualities of his analysis of personalism.  Before looking at Janssens’ 
personalism in section 5.10 we will briefly look at some of its underlying 
influences. 
 
5.9 Influences upon Louis Janssens  
 
Personalism’s emphasis upon the experiential as a basis for morality developed 
from phenomenology and existentialism’s focus upon experience and 
individuals.76  Janssens was possibly influenced by Max Scheler, who criticised 
Kant for ignoring the uniqueness of each person and the human situation, 
leading to depersonalisation.77  He was also influenced by the Jewish 
philosopher Martin Buber, whose work I and Thou distinguished I-it relations 
(business-like relations) from I-Thou relations (personal human relations).  In 
the latter persons are held to exist in relationship with others and God by 
dialogue.78  Janssens was also influenced by Thomas Aquinas79 and the Roman 
Catholic document Gaudium et Spes.   
 
5.10 The Personalism of Louis Janssens  
 
Having briefly outlined the background to Janssens, we now investigate his 
personalism.  Janssens believes morality is predominately concerned with 
                                                 
76 Joseph A. Selling, ‘Introduction’, in idem. (ed.), Personalist Morals: Essays in Honor of Professor 
Louis Janssens (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1988), 1-7, at 2. 
77 Stephen Frederick Schneck, Person and Polis: Max Scheler’s Personalism as Political Theory 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 99-100.   
78 Paul Schotsmans, ‘Responsible Involvement and Conscientious Freedom: A Relational 
Approach to the Medical (R)Evolution in Ethical Perspective’, in Selling, Personalist Morals, 167-
84, at 170-1. 
79 Dolores L. Christie, Adequately Considered: An American Perspective on Louis Janssens’ 
Personalist Morals (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1990), 10.  
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‘human relationships’ and ‘well-being’.80  Personalist morality has the human 
person as its end, allowing for discussion of moral norms and ethical 
reflection.81  Personalism is a ‘revisionist’ approach, involving ‘a posteriori’ and 
‘experiential’ knowledge with a ‘proportionalist’ method.82   
 
Eight themes of Janssens’ personalism will now be summarised before being 
presented.  Firstly, Janssens’ personalism avoids static laws; it is dynamic.  
Secondly, the human person adequately considered acknowledges that equal 
and unique, but embodied human beings are made in God’s image, and engage 
in dialogue and social relations which allow progress.  Thirdly, he develops 
three additional criteria for his personalist ethics, which allow for morally good 
acts, dynamic ethics and mutual relationships.  Fourthly, personalism is a 
teleological ethic which focuses upon the agent’s motives, moral actions and 
goodness.  Fifthly, both subjective and objective criteria are highlighted, 
including collaboration.  Sixthly, he uses a hierarchy of values to solve conflicts 
between values with priority given to moral goodness.  Seventhly the 
application of his personalism to reproductive technology is given.  Finally, 
objections to personalism are outlined.   
 
Firstly, Janssens rejects a rational moral law derived from a static, 
predetermined natural law, which emphasises an impersonal morality83 with 
pre-defined ends and ‘purposes’ people are ‘expected’ to perform.84  He rejects 
the three concepts of physicalism (the moral laws in nature), an a priori 
                                                 
80 Louis Janssens, ‘Ontic Evil and Moral Evil’, Louvain Studies 4 (1972), 115-56, at 139. 
81 Selling, ‘Introduction’, 5 and Jan Jans, ‘Some Remarks on the Work of Professor Emeritus 
Louis Janssens’, in Selling, Personalist Morals, 319-28, at 322 which indicates some of the areas 
Janssens wrote on. 
82 David F. Kelly, ‘Individualism and Corporatism in a Personalist Ethic: An Analysis of Organ 
Transplants’, 147-65, in Selling, Personalist Morals, at 147. 
83 Selling, ‘Introduction’, 1; Christie, Adequately Considered, 182. 
84 Joseph A. Selling, ‘Evolution and Continuity in Conjugal Morality’, in Selling, Personalist 
Morals, 243-64, at 254. 
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approach,85 and deontology,86 thus allowing for more creativity.  Personalism 
downplays individualism and human rights to protect the common good,87 but 
does not ‘subordinat*e+ the individual to a wider corporate whole’.88   
 
Secondly, the basis of Janssens personalist ethics is the eight-fold objective 
criteria called ‘the human person adequately considered’.  This takes priority 
over ‘laws, rules, norms and prescriptions’, in morality.89  It is used to decide if 
an act is worthy of human beings and is morally good,90 in a context of 
relationships and self-fulfilment.  Firstly, ‘the human person is a subject, not an 
object’91 with dignity, conscience, freedom, responsibility92 and acts with 
intention,93 allowing for dynamism and plurality.94  Therefore persons cannot 
be exploited or used as a mere means to an end.95  Secondly, human beings are 
embodied, with a body and spirit, meaning we should take care of our health 
and bodily integrity and others’.  Thirdly, personal bodies use material things; 
since the human being is ‘a being-in-the world’.96  Fourthly, human persons are 
open, relational and in dialogue with others.97  Fifthly, persons are social and 
live in societal institutions which are to be respected, but these must be open to 
‘dynamic development’ and support human dignity.98  Sixthly, human persons 
are created in God’s image and are called to reflect that image.99  Personalism 
                                                 
85 Kelly, Individualism and Corporatism in a Personalist Ethic’, 147.  
86 Christie, Adequately Considered, 182.  
87 Kelly, Individualism and Corporatism in a Personalist Ethic’, 150. 
88 Ibid., 158. 
89 Selling, ‘Introduction’, 4. 
90 Louis Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations’, Louvain Studies 8 (1980), 3-29, 
at 14-15. 
91 Ibid., 5. 
92 Ibid., 5; see also Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (GS) (London: Catholic Truth 
Society, 1966), 16-17, 31 and 55. 
93 Louis Janssens, ‘Personalist Morals’, Louvain Studies 3 (1970), 5-16, at 7. 
94 Ibid., 10.   
95 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 5 and GS, 27. 
96 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 6 and GS, 14 and 27. 
97 Janssens, ‘Personalist Morals’, 5. 
98 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 8-9 and GS, 12 and 23-32. 
99 Christie, Adequately Considered, 39. 
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includes a duty to follow God’s will, using ‘conscience,...liberty and 
responsibility’, which give dignity to moral subjects to ‘determine moral 
obligation’.100  Human beings are called to know God, worship and glorify him, 
with ‘faith, hope and love’.101  We are to love God and our neighbour with 
‘authentic’ and ‘morally good disposition[s+’ and actions.102  Janssens 
subordinates a person’s temporal and material life to their spiritual life.103  
Seventhly, even though he acknowledges that people live in a present reality,104 
human persons are also historical beings.105  The history of human beings 
allows for moral progress, since morality reacts to ‘new economic, scientific 
and technical advancements’.106  Finally, persons are all equal, ‘shar[ing] in the 
same human nature’, but have originality too,107 since human beings are unique 
and diverse.108   
 
Thirdly, Janssens develops three additional criteria to his personalist ethic.  
Firstly, morally good acts benefit our relations to others, society, the world and 
God, while acknowledging ‘the whole person’.109  Secondly, he wants us ‘to 
serve the promotion of the human person’ with a ‘dynamic ethics’ and 
wisdom, by a love for the good and truth.110  Subjects are free, with an internal 
consciousness within, and able to transcend themselves.  Human beings have 
self awareness and can develop their self-fulfilment by choices and intention.111  
                                                 
100 Jan Jans, ‘Some Remarks on the Work of Professor Emeritus Louis Janssens’, 325.  
101 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 9 and GS, 12, 34, 36 and 48. 
102 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 15. 
103 Christie, Adequately Considered, 35. 
104 Janssens, ‘Personalist Morals’, 5. 
105 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 10. 
106 Christie, Adequately Considered, 57.  
107 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 12 and GS, 29. 
108 Janssens, ‘Personalist Morals’, 13. 
109 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 13. 
110 Ibid., 14. 
111 Christie, Adequately Considered, 55. 
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Thirdly, we live in faith, responding to God’s will and fulfilling our humanity 
in a mutual relationship with God and other human beings.112   
 
Fourthly, Janssens’ moral action involved agents with good motives intending 
a particular end of an action.  The end determines how their will selects the 
proportionate means, i.e. the action to achieve the good end.113  Personalism is 
teleological, since the consequence is part of the moral judgement along with 
the agent’s purpose, intention and end which aim for the good.114  For Janssens, 
a person’s conscience decides what is ‘of value’ and the content of moral 
norms115 which strive towards good and can be informed by objectivity.116  
Moral goodness and badness refer to an agent’s inner disposition or attitude, 
which determine the moral quality of the person.  Morally right actions have a 
value or values in their consequences which respect the human person in 
dialogue with an objective reality.117   
 
Fifthly, personalism supports universal valid moral norms reflecting human 
and Christian understandings.  These reflect each person’s ‘unique situation’ in 
their ‘concrete acts’ and their own lives.118  However, universal norms are 
regarded as limited, because originality allows for actions universal norms 
cannot express.  Personalist morality is based on objective criteria found in 
God, the self and relationships, but it acknowledges a person’s subjective 
choices towards self achievement.119  Collaboration is encouraged as part of the 
common good, with a ‘dialectical relationship between the subjective and 
objective’.120   
                                                 
112 Janssens, ‘Personalist Morals’, 10. 
113 Christie, Adequately Considered, 85, 134-6, 46-7 and 87.  
114 Ibid., 127-8.  
115 Ibid., 171.  
116 Ibid., 160, and Janssens, ‘Ontic Evil and Moral Evil’, 118-19. 
117 Christie, Adequately Considered, 170-3. 
118 Ibid., 56. 
119 Ibid., 36 and 34.   
120 Ibid., 159. 
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Sixthly, Janssens solves the conflict between values by measuring acts 
according to an objective rule of morality i.e. ‘the human person adequately 
considered’.121  He develops a personalistic hierarchy of values,122 to decide 
between subordinate or clashing values.  Priority is given firstly to higher 
values such as the ‘moral goodness of the human person’;123 secondly to the 
urgency of the value; thirdly to the chance of the value being realised; fourthly 
to long term values over short term ones; fifthly to values protecting social life; 
and finally to prudence.124  If disvalues are included in an action then a 
principle of proportionality is used to decide if an action promotes the person 
and their relationships.125   
 
Seventhly, Janssens uses personalism to examine what an intervention means 
for promoting the human beings involved and their relationships.126  Acts are to 
fit a person who has been ‘adequately considered’, which includes their 
embodiment, relationality and openness to others, the world, social groups and 
God.127  Janssens encourages creativity128 in actions.  He is open to AIH, AID 
and IVF to serve the needs of infertile married couples, but without the Church 
making ‘premature judgments’.129  He considers the well-being of participants 
and their relationships including the child, the family and society.130  With IVF 
he questions the success rate and whether people are used as a mere means to 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 175-6. 
122 Louis Janssens, ‘Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics’, Louvain Studies 6 (1977), 207-38, at 
229-30. 
123 Christie, Adequately Considered, 175. 
124 Ibid., 175-6. 
125 Louis Janssens, ‘Personalism in Moral Theology’, in Charles E. Curran (ed.), Moral Theology: 
Challenges for the Future – Essays in Honor of Richard A. McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 
1990), 94-107, at 96. 
126 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 24. 
127 Kelly, ‘Individualism and Corporatism in a Personalist Ethic’, 159. 
128 Christie, Adequately Considered, 183. 
129 Janssens, ‘Artificial Insemination’, 11. 
130 Ibid., 22-3. 
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an end.131  AID is allowed as a last resort, if the married husband is infertile, if 
both spouses approve and if they are competent to raise a child.132  It is not to 
be used by single women.  Sperm donors are to consult with their spouses 
before donating as a service to others.133  AID is not considered always 
immoral, as ‘proportionate reason...balance[s] the positive and negative 
aspects’.134  As far as I know Janssens has not written on surrogacy.  However, I 
would imagine that he would support a limited surrogacy practice for married 
couples as a creative and dynamic community service to create a family instead 
of being restricted by a rigid natural law.  As a personalist he would want to 
ensure all participants are treated well with their dignity respected and 
adequately considered.  
 
Finally, Janssens says that J. B. Metz criticises personalism for ‘concentrat[ing] 
on primary (I-Thou) relationships’, but life has ‘social, political and secondary 
relationships’.135  Janssens wants personalism to include secondary 
relationships - including technology and scientific progress.  On this view, 
personalism should be concerned with intentionality in all relationships and 
not just primary relationships.136  Janssens’ personalism would be criticised by 
traditional Roman Catholics for encouraging the breaking of the unitive and 
procreative aspects of marriage and the use of masturbation by supporting the 
use of AIH, AID and IVF.  Another criticism is that personalism centralises the 
human person and not God.  Janssens believes people are the norms, who are 
fulfilled by loving the supreme God.137   
 
5.11 Towards a New Account of a Relational Framework 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 24. 
132 Ibid., 26. 
133 Ibid., 27. 
134 Ibid., 28. 
135
 Janssens, ‘Personalist Morals’, 15. 
136 Ibid., 15. 
137 Ibid., 15-16. 
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Much can be learnt from Janssens’ personalism.  I agree with its dynamic and 
revisionist approach to natural law, allowing for freedom and creativity, 
including responsibility in relationship to the new reproductive technologies 
(NRTs).  I approve of its constructivist methodology, which uses dialogue 
within social relationships and acknowledges human experiences.  I 
acknowledge its theistic basis for giving humans dignity and for being made in 
God’s image.  I endorse the well-being of embodied human beings who have 
equality while being unique, thus preventing them being used as a mere means 
to an end.  I support the importance of morally good acts, intention, motives, 
the end of an action, as well as the importance of both subjective and objective 
stances. 
 
However, I want to propose an alternative relational framework which draws 
upon Janssens, but has differences, making it a revised personalist approach.  
My own relational approach will now be presented in five sections.  Firstly, my 
relationalism involves a framework allowing for different emphases upon the 
self and the other.  Secondly, it has a more sophisticated ontology of the self 
(and its relationship to the other).  Thirdly, I explore the relationship between 
the self and the other.  Fourthly, I outline what my relationalism excludes. 
Finally I present the respects in which my relationalism differs to Janssens’ 
personalism.  I advocate: a varied ontology, the possibility of returning to a 
pre-discourse self, the significance of emotion and reason, the acknowledgment 
of supererogatory acts and finally the importance of priorities in ongoing 
discourse which may not always reach a final end.  Later my relationalism will 
be applied to surrogacy (5.12). 
 
5.11.1 The Relational Framework 
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My relationalism is a moral framework which can be used for surrogacy.  The 
relational framework takes a personalist approach, acknowledging the 
personhood, dignity, and intrinsic worth of human beings – both the self and 
the other.  Relationalism allows for diverse personal relationships such as I-
Thou relationships and public relationships with others, without insisting upon 
one type of relationship.  The relationship does not dominate in itself, but the 
people in them and their priorities, thus allowing for separateness sometimes.   
 
Relationalism allows for certain degrees of universality, reason, rationality and 
objective impartial principles to ensure general well-being for all, thus 
preventing agent relativity like discrimination or cannibalism.  Discrimination 
is not ideal as it involves unfair treatment based on colour, sex or age for 
example to the detriment of others.  Cannibalism is not recommended, as it 
goes against the sanctity of life and the dignity of human beings, who deserve 
respect.  However, universality is limited; people are not impersonal generic 
human beings required to fit predetermined impartial requirements.  A 
universal principle might be applied in a particular way, allowing for 
reasonable partiality since people differ.   
 
A relational framework is premised upon a complex and creative relational 
process between the self and the other.  It is a constructivist theory, 
encouraging moral agents to interact with ongoing interpersonal discourse to 
negotiate meaning, outcomes and solutions, to dynamically respond to their 
past, present and future needs.  It encourages interdependence and 
collaboration in the construction of a narrative with consideration and 
understanding for each other.  The process is ongoing as experience develops, 
allowing for interpretation, deconstruction and reconstruction.  Initial 
agreements are open to revision and relationships can change and evolve.  A 
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promise made in the beginning may have an obligation as its goal, but the 
obligation in time may become inappropriate.   
 
I acknowledge a person’s identity, values, emotions, actions and nature 
throughout time, including their past, present and future interests as having 
moral significance.  People’s inclinations and needs can change during the 
course of an action, and both should try to be accommodated.  A promise made 
in the beginning may have obligation as its goal, but the obligation may not 
respond to the needs of participants as time progresses.  Instead of seeing one’s 
desires positioned eternally frozen in a neutral time scale, differences between 
the present, near future and long-term future need to be made and priorities 
questioned.   
 
My relationalism - as an alternative pluralistic framework or spectrum - allows 
for a varied ontology, with varying degrees of emphasis upon the self and the 
other.  We can have my view, your view, and a combined view - i.e. our view - 
which may or may not be a compromise.  The balance, intensity and 
relationship of the three motives of self, other, and self and other can vary: e.g. 
it can have a higher, lower, or equal emphasis upon the self and the other or 
just the self or just the other.  Some relationships will be mutual and balanced, 
with a proportionate mean of 50%/50% upon the self and the other.  However, 
mutuality may be unwanted by the participants and could downplay altruism, 
supererogatory actions, agape and self-sacrifice.   
 
Relationalism encourages a plurality of ethical views, actions and motives and 
not just one solution.  Within a relational framework, different types of 
discourse ethics exist, leading to different ethical outcomes to accommodate 
differences between the self and the other.  The type of relationship and the 
amount of emphasis between the self and the other differs according to the 
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importance and priority of the value of the act for participants.  Value can be 
seen as existing prior to the relational context.  The requirements and demands 
of the relationship vary according to many factors.  Factors include: ongoing 
and new needs, interests, expectations, circumstances, responsibilities, 
intentions, embodiment, nature, feelings, relationships, goals, beliefs, 
experience, personal history and well-being of the self and other, etc.  
Reflection is also given to significance of the time before, during and after the 
experience.  Relationalism tries to respond sensitively, flexibly and 
dynamically to these factors according to the context and the particular 
priorities, which can produce different conclusions of right and wrong.  
Fairness can be decided by discourse, with or without agreement, but aims to 
reject unfair positions.  Relationalism is flexible and responsive to the specific 
needs and different interests of both women and men to prevent oppression, 
but allowances for gender difference must be ethical and appropriate. 
 
5.11.2 The Self in Relationalism 
 
Relationalism tries to ensure self-participation in the relationship.  The well-
being of the self matters, as ethics should not just be about the other.  Therefore 
self-preservation can be sought.  Self-love and self-respect allow the self to 
have self-worth and integrity, which help them and others to acknowledge and 
understand their unique, partial self and prioritise what is important to them 
such as their values, interests, needs, concerns and emotions.  
 
My relationalism acknowledges that the self and its self-identity exist prior to 
entering a discourse with another.  The self then chooses to become part of the 
relational interaction with the other and responds to the needs of the other, but 
without being lost or assimilated by the other.  The self could choose to leave 
the relationship, since not all relationships can be maintained and they may try 
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to revert back to the historical self prior to the interaction.  The self is an 
ongoing creation reshaping its identity, with the ability to decide how much to 
change.  The self can decide how much they are influenced by the other and by 
the discourse.  Self-identity is not totally dependent upon the relationships the 
self is in.  The self, as a separate independent autonomous individual, can take 
a different stance to the other.    
 
5.11.3 The Self and the Other in Relationalism 
 
Relationalism is not just about the self; it accords importance to the relationship 
between the self and the other.  Relationalism tries to solve issues relationally 
by taking the needs of both self and other into consideration together, but 
sometimes individuals need separation.  Both need to treat each other with 
dignity by respecting each other’s needs with sensitivity and emotional insight.  
Responsibility to the self and to the other can be combined in a relational 
framework.  There may be times when it is acceptable to favour the self over 
others.  The other may need to recognise the importance of the needs of the self 
and the priorities of values.  The self, however, should not impose its own 
values, priorities, views and interests upon the other without discussion.  Love 
of the self does not have to be the same as the love for the other, as suggested 
by Plato.138   
 
The self can be integrated in a relationship as a self-in-relation.  The self and 
other become connected through discourse with each other, gaining a relational 
identity which can change as the discourse develops.  Sometimes a joint 
perspective of the self and other is more appropriate with interdependence and 
amalgamation between the self and the other.  People can act together in 
fellowship, allowing both to help each other.  There can be a co-existence and 
                                                 
138 David O. Brink, ‘Self-Love and Altruism’, Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997), 122-57, at 128. 
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mixture of moral motives, actions and view, which require an awareness of the 
context of the relationship.  It encourages attention to the social and cultural 
context of the relationship between the self and other.   
 
The self, other and the community can be responsive to each other.  People can 
help each other to flourish and to achieve their own ends within the 
community, thus allowing the community to flourish too.  Communal relations 
matter, as long as the self is not lost.  The self can be influenced by the other 
and the other by the self, creating social relations, but the self can decide not to 
be influenced by these.  Sometimes compromise or harmony may be impossible 
as there could be a conflict of loyalty which cannot be resolved one way or the 
other.  Therefore, each person may have to be acknowledged as an 
independent and separate individual during disagreement and agreement 
sometimes.   
 
5.11.4 What My Relationalism Excludes 
 
We now consider five ways in which my relationalism differs from other 
ethical theories and views of the self and other: (1) it rejects the self of 
liberalism; (2) it is not completely communitarian; (3) impartial discourse is not 
compulsory; (4) impersonal justice is not mandatory; and (5) people are not 
disembodied.139   
 
Firstly, even though relationalism supports the opportunity for individualism, 
it does not support the liberal conception of the self as an atomistic rational 
maxmiser (homo economicus).  Here, the self only co-operates and enters into a 
relationship or contract with others for its own rational gain, thus treating 
others instrumentally.  Hobbes believed people are egotistical and obey a 
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contract out of self-interest and only pretend to have a genuine concern for the 
other when they co-operate, thus hiding their selfishness.140  Rational economic 
man is not to be seen as the ideal approach within a competitive market setting.  
Such individuals tend to act as isolated, independent and self-sufficient 
individuals in order to gain their own self-interest and goals.  Agents want to 
do the minimum for the other in order to co-operate with them, but expect to 
get as much as possible out of the situation for the sake of utility maximisation.   
 
Autonomy, which is traditionally favoured, should not always be the key main 
principle, as it places too much upon self-determination and self-sufficiency, 
leading to a self-dependent approach.  Liberalism tends to ignore others and 
the significance of the community, encouraging people to make decisions on 
their own as a sign of their individual privacy.  Self-interest and self-regard do 
matter, along with virtues such as honesty, but these should be contrasted with 
a competitive narcissism, egotism or selfishness, since reason and care need to 
operate alongside each other.  Similarly, a property model with its exclusive 
rights of ownership and privacy, which prevent others from participation, is 
not ideal.  Relationalism wants both the self and the other to be taken into 
consideration.  It is important that the interaction between the self and the 
other is not based upon a predetermined agenda, unable to respond to the 
specific and differing needs of those involved.  Relationalism therefore is not 
based upon an objectively universalised contractarian framework for all to 
follow.   
 
Secondly, relationalism is not communitarianism, which is based 
predominantly upon social relations, social roles and social order as the self 
could be lost.  It will not advocate that the moral claim of the other can be put 
                                                 
140 Margaret Moore, ‘Gauthier’s Contractarian Morality’, in David Boucher and Paul Kelly 
(eds.), The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls (London: Routledge, 1994), 211-25, at 214. 
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on the same level of the self by reason, as suggested by Colin Grant,141 as this 
fails to take the priorities and needs of the moral agents involved.  The self and 
the other differ and the self and their particular needs and interests should not 
be regarded as the same as those of the other.  In performing acts for the other, 
the self can be motivated by their own concerns for the other and by the needs 
of the other too; not just by the requirements of the other or reason.  
Relationalism agrees with the emphasis in communicative ethics where agents 
are regarded as a concrete self and not as mere ‘juridical agents’.142  Unlike 
Kantian ethics therefore, relationalism is not dependent upon the 
administration of universalised moral laws by its moral agents, as this can fail 
to deal with the specific needs and contexts of particular agents.  Relationalism 
also differs from an African view which favours a communal orientation 
towards interpersonal relationships as opposed to self-welfare.  In African 
thought, the individual self is only acknowledged for being ‘part of a social 
order’, since ‘*w+hatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group 
and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual’.143  In 
[m]y relationalism the bonds between the self and the other are not considered 
to be as ‘inescapable’, as suggested by Sharon Farmer.144  Relationalism rejects 
the view that identity is only formed by interacting with others, as developed 
by Hegel, or that self-consciousness exists by being recognised by another’s 
self-consciousness.  Hegel believed self identity is determined by the other’s 
views of me.145  Marx and Hegel rejected individuals having ‘a pre-social 
                                                 
141 Colin Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
115. 
142 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary 
Ethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 60. 
143 Sandra Harding, ‘The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities: Challenges 
for Feminist Theory’, in Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (eds.), Women and Moral Theory 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), 296-315, at 302 n. 22-3. 
144 Sharon A. Farmer, ‘Introduction’, in Paula M. Cooey et al. (eds.), Embodied Love: Sensuality 
and Relationship as Feminist Values (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1987), 1-13, at 12.   
145 Niels Thomassen Communicative Ethics in Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 
60 referring to the master and slave in Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).   
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existence’ or self-identity being established before ‘social interaction’.146  Unlike 
discourse ethics, the self in relationalism is not wholly constructed by discourse 
or social relationships.  Similarly, relationalism does not adopt a postmodernist 
view of the self which involves the death of the subject as seen in Foucault who 
deconstructed the self by the death of the author and dissolution of the 
subject.147  There is a danger that self identity and a pre-discourse self can be 
lost with postmodernism, since the self is not seen as existing outside of the 
discourse.   
 
My relationalism believes in a pre-existent self who is a separate individual, 
existing before entering the discourse with the other, which the self can try to 
revert back to.  The self and self-identity exist prior to entering a discourse with 
another, but then becomes part of the interaction with the other.  The self can 
contribute to the discourse, but the self may be able to decide sometimes how 
far they want to be influenced by the other and by the discourse.  Instead of 
contributing to the discourse, the self may be able to decide sometimes to come 
out of the relationship completely or partially in certain contexts.  Sometimes a 
relationship may be unsustainable, and the self may try to revert back to the 
historical self prior to the interaction.  However, it needs to be acknowledged 
that in reality, the self may find it hard to detach itself from a particular 
embedded relationship, such as marriage or a parent-child relationship, as 
relationships can have a profound impact upon the self.  Even if a person does 
physically leave a relationship they could still be psychologically affected by it.   
 
                                                 
146 David Boucher and Paul Kelly, ‘The Social Contract and its Critics: An Overview’, in idem. 
The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, 1-34, at 24. 
147 Foucault at first thought the modern self was over, but later focused on the ethics of the self.  
Derrida regards the self as ‘indispensable’, and claims not to destroy the subject but situate it, 
because both experience and discourse need a subject with emphasis upon the origins and 
functions of the subject.  See Jung Park, Contractarian Liberal Ethics and the Theory of Rational 
Choice (New York: P. Lang, 1992), 219. 
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The self is involved in an ongoing creation reshaping their identity, but they 
can sometimes decide how much they want to change.  The identity of the self 
is not totally dependent upon the relationship it is in, since the self can be part 
of a relationship without being totally integrated into it.  Therefore, the self can 
be part of the relationship with the other, but may be able to separate from it 
too sometimes, as an independent autonomous individual, but without the 
atomistic individualism and disembodiment of the self in liberalism.  The self 
and the other are two separate individuals and the self may have to take a 
different stance to those they are engaging with.  The self therefore, does not 
just know itself by ‘interactive relationships’ as suggested by Christine 
Koggel.148  I reject social constructivism if morality is regarded as a social 
construct only, with social institutions taking priority over the individual.  I 
disagree with E. J. Bond who says: ‘*it+ is not a matter of the world conforming 
to discourse, it is a matter of discourse conforming to the world’.149 
 
Self-identity is important as well as an inter-connected self.  Even though the 
self has to be responsive to the needs of the other, it does not mean that the self 
should be lost or assimilated by the other’s needs, by the community, by 
universalism or by mutuality, as they will need their privacy too, thus 
contrasting with communitarianism or social constructivism.  In contrast to 
Mullett who said that feminist actions should be collective and not 
individualistic,150 the needs of the self can stand independent of the needs of 
the other, the relationship with the other and of social interaction.  There can be 
some independence to allow for a separate and autonomous self, but this will 
not be a requirement.  Care will be made to ensure that the needs of the 
individual are acknowledged and that the self is not emptied of their particular 
                                                 
148 Christine Koggel, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1997), 128. 
149 E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 152 n. 44. 
150 Shelia Mullett ‘Shifting Moral Perspectives’ in Rosemarie Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics 
(California, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1993), 165-169, at 166. 
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concerns.  Moral solutions should be able to acknowledge the particularities of 
the self and the other. 
 
In relationalism, the interaction between the self and the other is not based 
upon a prearranged static agenda or relations, unresponsive and unchanging 
to the specific and differing needs of those involved.  Instead, of treating 
people impersonally as generic human beings who are all to be treated in the 
same manner, relationalism regards human beings as unique and special, 
allowing for specific partial treatment.  Aristotle’s good man therefore needs to 
be redefined from being someone who extends the same relationship he has 
towards himself to his friend.151  Relationalism tries to respond to the specific 
ongoing needs, interests and priorities of the self and other, but without 
making them fit predetermined requirements of reason.  Relationalism differs 
from a predetermined, rationalistic and universal agenda based upon closed 
non-interactive and impartial existence between the self and other.  A pre-
existing agenda may not continue to cater for the needs or situation of those 
involved, therefore flexibility is needed to cater for new needs. 
 
Relationalism therefore, differs to a communicative ethic which favours 
mutuality and reciprocity as the norm.152  Relationalism does not just offer 
mutuality or a proportionalist solution.  Mutuality should not be performed 
just to satisfy requirements of a feminist care ethic for example or just to 
achieve a pre-existing agenda of an Aristotelian mean.  These are options, but 
when we are dealing with specific people, we have to be aware of their needs 
and a mutual or a proportionate and balanced solution may not be adequate.  
Therefore relationalism is not just based upon universal principles which we all 
                                                 
151 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1166a30-b2 in Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean 
Ethics trans. J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, revised ed., 1976), 294.  These are 
sentiments echoed by Joseph Butler in sermon 11: ‘Love of neighbour then has just the same 
[emphasis added] respect to, is no more distinct from self-love’.  See Joseph Bulter, Fifteen 
Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (London: W. Botham, 1729), 215. 
152 Benhabib, Situating the Self, 60. 
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have in common as suggested by Seyla Benhabib ‘the communicative ethicist 
asks: what principles of action can we all recognize or agree to as being valid if 
we engage in practical discourse or a mutual search for justification?’153  The 
equality of moral subjects cannot always be guaranteed because people differ.  
The self should not be absorbed by the community, by universalism or 
mutuality.  However, it needs to be acknowledged that sometimes mutuality 
might be the best solution for the needs, interests and priorities of the self and 
the other.  Relationalism involves a flexible framework which does not focus 
exclusively upon one ethical concept such as mutuality all the time, but takes 
the people involved into consideration. 
 
Thirdly, even though relationalism supports discourse ethics, it does not 
support the modernist view Jürgen Habermas has towards discourse which 
expects the self to be emptied of its individuality.  Habermas focuses upon 
rationality, consensus, deontology and a universal discourse ethic,154 with an 
impartial judging process ‘... it establishes a procedure based on 
presuppositions and designed to guarantee the impartiality of the process of 
judging’.155  Relationalism does not insist upon agreement or consensus which 
is favoured by Benhabib and Habermas, since relationalism acknowledges that 
we can agree to disagree and it allows for a plurality of views.  Likewise, 
relationalism does not support a dualistic approach with false oppositions 
between the private or the public world.  It is not the case of a person putting 
forward one view and someone else trying to defeat it with either one position 
or another.  Sometimes disagreement may be the favoured option.  At times, it 
may not be possible even for those involved in the discourse to ‘reach an 
understanding’ 156 as the relationship might have to end.  People exist in 
                                                 
153 Benhabib, Situating the Self, 28. 
154 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action trans. Christian Lenhardt 
and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 120-2. 
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personal relationships such as I-Thou relationships as well as more public 
relationships with others.  The type of relationship, and its requirements and 
demands, will vary.  However, the people and their priorities can take 
precedence over the relationship, thus allowing for separateness sometimes. 
 
Relationalism is not an objectively universalised contract.  It rejects a neutral, 
objective universalism as an all encompassing impersonal principle to guide all 
action.  The interaction between the self and the other is not a static 
predetermined agenda aiming at a fixed end.  Reasoning does not always have 
to be exclusively impartial, but can take the specific and differing needs of 
agents into consideration.  Making individual allowances does not have to lead 
to relativism as thought by Hegel.157  Instead, relationalism wants to focus on 
partiality instead of impartiality as a way to gain solutions.  It does not focus 
upon fixed, unchanging criteria with static meaning or following a 
predetermined static role which aims at a fixed end.   
 
Fourthly, justice is usually considered owed to others and is often impartially, 
universally and impersonally applied.  Relationalism rejects impersonalism 
and impartiality within ethics by avoiding impersonal justice, rules or 
regulations with a gender neutrality or a generalised account of self and other 
as devoid of opinion.  The emphasis in relationalism is not upon deontological, 
abstract principles which primarily emphasise rights or duty in a 
depersonalised ethic.  People are not to be objectified, standardised or treated 
as indifferent within an anonymous relationship.  People are not to be treated 
impartially as hypothetical, universalised generalised others, losing their 
identity in an indiscriminate impersonal relationship as in liberalism.  It does 
not advocate a neutral, objective universalism as an all encompassing principle.  
Universality has its limits as people are not all impersonal generic humans 
                                                 
157 Carol MacMillan, Women, Reason and Nature: Some Philosophical Problems with Feminism 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1982), 19. 
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required to fit into predetermined impartial requirements and work towards a 
common interest.  Relationalism does not ignore relationships, in order to have 
total rationality, equality or egalitarianism.  It rejects Kantian universal 
obligation and a universal reasoning of a situation, since reasoning does not 
have to be impartial, but can take the needs of the agents into consideration.  
Therefore, the personal positions of participants in relationalism are known 
and not hidden, as in Rawls, behind a veil of ignorance.  Self-interest is not 
dependent upon universal acceptance distanced and impersonal reasoned 
principles as the guiding factor to decide what to do.   
 
Even though relationalism does not work with an ‘objective rational’ set of 
rules, it allows for some objectivity.  Relationalism acknowledges that there can 
be shared common objective values which may be the same for everyone.  
Some universalism, objectivity, rationality and impartiality is needed for social 
justice to prevent harm to the common good by nepotism or favouritism, thus 
preventing a judge letting off a relative for murder, for example.  A relational 
justice tries to respond to the particular needs and relationships of the self and 
other by discourse.  Relationalism encourages interdependency between justice 
and care by providing various emphases upon justice and care.  We can have 
caring which is just, also caring justice, as well as only justice or only care to 
respond to the needs of the self, the other and society.   
 
Finally, a relational embodiment is not a universalised, impartial and objective 
disembodiment found in contracts, as bodies differ.  It rejects liberalism, which 
tends to focus upon that which is abstract, universal and impartial by assuming 
that men and women are equal.  Liberalism often expects women to be treated 
in the same manner as men and to do the same actions as men.  However, 
women, even though they are similar to men, do differ and allowances need to 
be made for this.  For example a female fire fighter should carry equipment 
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suitable to her body weight and not have to match those of the men in order to 
prevent exhaustion.  Liberalism also tends to take a dualistic or an essentialist 
approach by seeing the mind and body as separate or disembodied.  
Relationalism discards a neoclassical view which is based upon a male 
viewpoint and male values, even though it claims to be androcentric.  
Relationalism therefore rejects a Cartesian dualism which regards our minds as 
separate to our bodies with a disembodied universal self based on reason.  
Such a view is not advocated, as the mind and the body both matter and 
interact with each other.  As embodied persons, some allowances can be made 
for nature, biology and the body as considering factors along with rationality.   
We are linked to our sexed bodies, but without having to follow essentialism or 
biological determinism, as biology is not destiny.  However, relationalism will 
not be based entirely upon an essentialistic feminine maternal ethic either or 
upon a social role model such as friendship, as espoused by Lorraine Code.158  
The danger with such models is that they lead to biological determinism, 
stereotypes or a sexist bias so that one sex is automatically privileged over 
another.  Even so, as embodied persons, some allowances can be made for our 
natural biological bodies such as some inclinations and emotions.  We can 
demonstrate bodily integrity by choosing whether to transcend or not our 
biological urges such as our natural involuntary bodily inclinations by using 
our mind, freedom, reason and emotions.  We are not just material bodies, but 
emotional embodied souls within a social context and a constructive discourse, 
which can allow for our own interpretations of our nature and changes to our 
body.  Reason and emotion can both be used to decide how to react towards 
the body.  However, a universalised, impartial and objective embodiment is 
not suggested as people are unique and can take different views towards their 
bodies such as women do towards bonding in pregnancy, since not all 
women’s bodies are the same.  Even so, relationalism will allow for those who 
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 Lorraine Code, ‘Second Persons’, in Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen (eds.), Science, Morality 
and Feminist Theory (Calgary: The University of Calgary Press, 1987), 357-82. 
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want to follow a natural law stance but without insisting upon it all the time, 
since we need to allow for difference, deconstruction, particularity and 
personal qualities. 
 
5.11.5 How My Relationalism Differs to Louis Janssens’ Personalism 
 
Janssens develops a personalist morality based upon people and their human 
flourishing.  My relationalism adopts some of Janssens’ personalist approach, 
but differs in five ways: firstly by its ontology; secondly by allowing for self-
separation and permitting relationships to end; thirdly for including emotion; 
fourthly for having more sensitivity between the self and other; and finally 
theologically, in that I prefer an ongoing end within morality and not a final 
one without necessarily proportionate means. 
 
Firstly, Janssens’ ontology involves mutuality between the self and the other 
because God’s love means ‘our love of neighbour aspires to mutuality’.159  
Janssens’ methodology involves ‘a delicate balance between and among the 
various elements in the human relational system’.160  However, mutual 
relationships usually are proportional; in other words, they are symmetrical 
with an equally balanced reciprocal relationship.  My relationalism allows but 
does not require mutuality, since it may be inappropriate for the needs of the 
participants and lead to lost self-identity in cases where asymmetry may be 
required instead. 
 
Secondly, Janssens regards human beings as relational and dynamic social 
beings who co-exist, co-operate and co-participate, since the individual and the 
social ‘interdepend’,161 and human beings never function alone.162  He 
                                                 
159 Janssens, ‘Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethic’, 227.   
160 Christie, Adequately Considered, 59-60. 
161 Kelly, ‘Individualism and Corporatism in a Personalist Ethic’, 148 and 160. 
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prioritises the common good over ‘private welfare’, ‘personal perfection’ and 
relations to others.163  However, morality is not just derived from a social 
context, as individual interests, emotions and needs matter; these are not 
always defined by relationships with others.  Sometimes the emphasis may be 
all upon the self, or all upon the other.  Self-interests matter and should not 
always have to be sacrificed for the sake of a social relationship.  What is best for 
one person may not involve others.  My relationalism does not always 
prioritise the common good over agent welfare.  Even though the self can be a 
social self by being in relation with others, and is part of the community, the 
self may need some separation for self-development or self-perfection.  My 
relationalism acknowledges that relationships cannot always be maintained as 
the people involved take priority, not maintaining the relationship for the sake 
of it.  Some relationships end due to harm, injustice or disagreements.  Such a 
view contrasts with Kellenberger who regards relationship morality as 
including ‘moral failure’ when a relationship is violated.164   
 
Thirdly, Janssens does not focus upon emotional intuitionism and an intuitive 
insight.  My relationalism encourages participants to analyse their and others’ 
feelings, using reason and discourse to judge their appropriateness and priority 
which could lead to compromises and allowances.  Reason can guide emotions, 
allowing for rationality in emotion and emotion in rationality; but within a 
social context, some feelings may be inappropriate.   
 
Fourthly, Janssens calls for the self to want the perfection of the other.165  
However, just because A wants B’s perfection, does not mean that A should try 
to perfect B, as trying to achieve it is a different matter.  A may try to bring 
about the perfection of B in a way that suits A and not B.  It could be too 
                                                                                                                                              
162 Christie, Adequately Considered, 60.  
163 Louis Janssens, ‘Time and Space in Morals’, in Selling, Personalist Morals, 9-22, at 15. 
164 Kellenberger, Relationship Morality, 2. 
165 Christie, Adequately Considered, 60-1. 
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demanding for the self to perfect the other, leading to sacrifice of the self’s basic 
needs.  Altruism is possible but not compulsory, as it could become a 
supererogatory act involving too much sacrifice.  The other should consider if 
their request for altruism is appropriate as it could be more caring to do it 
themselves.  Likewise the self should consider whether its offer of altruism is 
truly wanted, but it might still be needed.  Altruism can include self-care, since 
the well-being of the self and the other both matter.  
 
Fifthly, as a Roman Catholic, Janssens uses Roman Catholic moral theology, 
particularly the notions of proportionalism166 and conscience.167  However, my 
relationalism is a constructive ethic involving an ongoing interaction between 
the self and the other.  Unlike Janssens, it does not necessarily insist upon a 
final end or specific conclusion which one agent selects and works towards.  
Discourse allows changing solutions to meet the needs and interests of 
participants.  My relational framework is not limited to a proportional response 
to deal with the specific concerns, needs and interests of particular people, as 
they could agree proportionalism is inappropriate.  An imbalance or a 
disproportion between the means and the end could be required instead of a 
predetermined proportional approach.  The means chosen are likely to involve 
negotiation as a process instead of a way to achieve a particular set end.  But at 
other times, with different people, proportionalism could be appropriate.  Care 
is needed in the formation and influence of conscience, so it does not become 
subjective or relative or lead to inappropriate actions caused by mental illness.  
Agents can reflect using a discourse with others. 
 
5.12 My Relationalism Applied to Surrogate Motherhood 
 
                                                 
166 Ibid., 172. 
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351 
 
Having set out my relational view, it is now applied to surrogacy, focusing 
upon custody disputes, recommendations, embodiment, payment and what 
my relationalism towards surrogacy excludes. 
 
5.12.1 My Relationalism Applied To Surrogacy Custody Disputes  
 
Relationalism has a varied ontology.  It encourages compassion towards the 
needs of the self and other to prevent harm.  It respects the flourishing and 
dignity of each particular person, but their values, priorities, relationships, 
commitments and roles differ.  Relational surrogacy custody solutions are 
diverse and negotiated case by case.  Outcomes could be dynamic, co-operative 
and flexible, with ongoing interpersonal dialogue.  It allows a variety of 
involvement between the surrogate and the commissioning couple, therefore 
accommodating different types of motherhood.  The importance, significance 
and priority to be given to procreation, genes, intention, gestation, social 
relationship, emotions and bonding can be discussed before, during and after 
the pregnancy to accommodate the needs, interests and welfare of all 
participants.  Custody does not always have to be based upon one aspect only.  
Solutions include one main parent and the other having access.  Sometimes 
joint custody involves both sharing legal parenting and decision making with 
varying degrees of involvement.  Sometimes just one party could have custody 
without visitation from the other.  Rarely, all parties could be unfit, with no one 
having custody or visitation.  Ideally a parent would have limited supervised 
access to the child with a mediator, to maintain contact. 
 
Priority for custody would be given to childless commissioning couples, who 
use surrogacy as their last resort to procreate, instead of gestational surrogates 
who provide a gestational service and already have children.  A gestational 
surrogate gestates a borrowed embryo procreated by another which is 
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implanted into her.  She should not automatically gain exclusive parental rights 
over the commissioning couple, as they do not consider they have transferred 
ownership of the embryo to her.  The commissioning couple will not want to 
relinquish their relationship to the foetus - which exists by intention, genetic 
connection, action towards the foetus, by feeling it move, talking to it, and 
buying things for it, etc.  The physical and emotional relationship of the 
surrogate to the child is recognised, but within the social context of surrogacy 
as a collaborative reproductive act.  Gestational surrogates can be 
acknowledged as the child’s gestator upon the child’s birth certificate and may 
be allowed to visit the child occasionally and be kept informed of the child, 
with full custody going to the commissioning couple.  If the commissioning 
couple leave the surrogacy arrangement then perhaps they should be fined to 
cover the costs of the surrogate possibly placing the child for adoption.  A 
genetic surrogate could have joint custody with the commissioning couple, 
based upon her genetic connection and emotional relationship to the child.  The 
commissioning mother, as a social mother, could be recognised without having 
to adopt the child, so the surrogate is able to play a role in the child’s life and if 
the commissioning couple divorced the commissioning mother would be able 
to visit.   
 
5.12.2 Recommendations 
 
Guidelines could include careful selection and screening of the surrogate and 
the commissioning couple, who get to know each other before the pregnancy to 
ensure both would be happy to be involved in the child’s life.  The husband of 
the surrogate should not be seen as the exclusive legal father as influenced by 
the AID laws.  A new birth certificate could be issued, allowing the birth 
mother, the genetic mother and the social mother to be listed as well as the 
genetic and social father.  Instead of the child automatically going to the birth 
353 
 
mother or to the commissioning couple in a surrogacy dispute, the state could 
look after the child by using a temporary foster carer, before deciding who is 
going to have main custody of the child to prevent presumption of the case and 
to decide custody fairly.  Ongoing research is important to assess the ethical 
outcomes of surrogacy - such as the effect upon the child and how the child is 
progressing.  Further recommendations are made in the main conclusion to the 
thesis. 
 
5.12.3 A Relational Approach to Embodiment in Surrogacy 
 
A relational approach to surrogacy acknowledges surrogacy occurs in a context 
of an interdependent relationship between the surrogate and the infertile 
commissioning couple.  Discussions and negotiations need to occur regarding 
pregnancy management including abortion, medical testing, and custody 
before, during and after the relationship with independent counselling to 
prevent coercion.  Each surrogacy arrangement is unique, with different but 
common guidelines, allowing for flexibility in light of ongoing changing 
experiences and emotions.  It is reasonable to expect the surrogate to modify 
her behaviour, her privacy and bodily integrity during the pregnancy over 
concern for the child and the commissioning couple – for example her actions 
towards drinking or sport.  However, the surrogate can expect some privacy 
rights and autonomy such as having an abortion if her life is at risk, but most 
major decisions need to be discussed and negotiated.   
 
5.12.4 A Relational Approach to Payment in Surrogacy 
 
Payment in a relational framework can represent a reciprocal gift of gratitude 
by the commissioning couple as a sign of their gratefulness to the surrogate for 
her services.  The surrogate could accept payment from a commissioning 
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couple not just to further her own self-interest, but also to develop altruism in 
both of them.  Brenda Baker regards unpaid surrogacy arrangements as 
expressing ‘benevolence’ and ‘reciprocal personal interaction’,168 ‘mutual 
understanding and generosity’, an interpersonal relationship with ‘mutual 
liking and sympathy’,169 in a ‘mutually beneficial helping relationship’.170  
However, these values can be expressed in paid non-commercialised surrogacy 
too.  Both paid and unpaid surrogacy should co-exist, but without the 
commissioning couple acting as consumers or the child as a commodified 
product.  The commissioning couple are not to exploit or treat the surrogate as 
a mere means to an end.   
 
5.12.5 What Relationalism Does Not Involve when Applied to Surrogacy 
 
A relational approach towards surrogacy rejects the disembodied self of 
liberalism, which is regarded as alienating.  Relationalism does not expect 
women to behave and react in the same way as neutralised and depersonalised 
participants as in liberalism.  Nor is relationalism a universal, impersonal 
practice focusing upon exclusive ownership of the child as property.  It does 
not insist upon one custody solution, rejecting the views of: firstly, gestational 
embodiment (as the surrogate gestates and does not procreate and the social 
context of surrogacy matters including the commissioning mother); secondly, 
contractual intention of the commissioning couple (as the changing emotions of 
the embodied surrogate matter); or thirdly the best interest of the child (as the 
basic needs and interests of the adults to associate with the child matter).  
These three models take an absolutist and inflexible stance towards custody, 
failing to accommodate the needs of the other and their changing views 
towards the child.   
                                                 
168 Brenda M. Baker, ‘A Case for Permitting Altruistic Surrogacy’, Hypatia 11 (1996), 34-48, at 34. 
169 Ibid., 41. 
170 Ibid., 42. 
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5.13 The Best Interests of the Child 
 
The ‘best interests of the child’ model is used by courts to solve surrogacy 
custody disputes by deciding primary custody and visitation.  It takes the 
child’s future into consideration, the ability of the parties to ‘provide for the 
child’, their ‘physical, mental and emotional health’ and characters.171  The 
criteria used can produce different results.  Firstly, a court may prioritise the 
genetic relationship of the commissioning couple to the child, along with their 
intention to raise it and their bonding to the child, thus terminating the 
surrogate’s parental rights in order to provide stability with one set of parents.  
Secondly, a court may prioritise the surrogate’s close gestational relationship as 
the child’s primary care taker and psychological parent, following a ‘tender 
years’ policy.  However, the commissioning mother could lack a legal 
connection to the child, which may be detrimental if she and the 
commissioning father divorce.  Thirdly, a court may award joint custody to the 
surrogate and the commissioning couple or one party could have primary 
custody and the other visitation rights of varying frequency.  Fourthly, a court 
could decide that it is not in the best interests of the child to be raised by either 
the surrogate or the commissioning couple but rather a wealthier, better 
educated, healthier childless couple who wish to adopt a child.   
 
A relational view towards surrogacy custody disputes would not necessarily 
use the best interests of the child only, as this may prevent someone having 
access to the child on the basis of education, finance, marital status or 
gestational connection.  The needs and priorities of all participants would be 
considered, allowing for a variety of emphases upon the surrogate, the 
commissioning couple and the child, taking the significance of the relationships 
                                                 
171 Denise E. Lascarides, ‘A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts’, 
Hofstra Law Review 25 (1997), 1221-59, at 1251. 
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into consideration.  Ideally both the surrogate and the commissioning couple 
should have access to the child.  The needs of the child are very important - 
and are to be protected - but the needs of the adults matter too and using a 
‘best’ interest approach could ignore the basic needs of the adults.  If one of the 
parties is considered unfit to have full custody, then instead of being denied 
visitation totally, they could be given restricted and supervised access to the 
child through a mediator to protect their parental rights, unless they are 
dangerous to the child.  In cases of danger the parental relationship would be 
ended, on this relational view. 
 
5.14 Problems of a Relational Framework  
 
Having explored a relational response to the best interests of the child solution, 
possible problems of a relational framework are now considered.  Participants 
may find the emphasis upon a variety of interdependent custody solutions 
difficult.  The commissioning couple may be unwilling to share the child with 
the surrogate, valuing their privacy in wanting to create a nuclear family - 
especially if they have different class and religious backgrounds.  Likewise, a 
surrogate may fear the commissioning couple will prevent her seeing the child.  
Visitation rights in surrogacy custody disputes may not be in a child’s best 
interests if the parents are uncooperative.172  Ongoing research is needed to 
investigate the short and long-term effects of various custody solutions upon 
participants.   
 
However, a relational approach with its open access allows the surrogate to see 
the child occasionally and for the child to meet her, thus allowing them to 
know a part of their identity and not to fantasise about her.  Barbara Cohen 
reports a surrogate who found relinquishing the child ‘the hardest thing’ she 
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had done and ‘was the saddest goodbye’.173  The child may suffer greatly if 
they find out accidentally that they were born of a genetic surrogacy 
arrangement and may want to meet their genetic parent(s) and feel isolated if 
they cannot.  
 
Marcia Westkott is critical of relational theories which emphasise care, 
empathy and relationality over individual achievements and autonomy, which 
could mean an expectation that women care for men’s requirements.  She 
warns that relationalism could lead to ‘subservience’ and oppression for 
women.174  However, the relationalism advocated here is not a unidirectional 
care ethic but one that can include mutuality and reciprocity with an individual 
self without atomism.  It tries sensitively to accommodate as many of the needs 
and interests of participants as it can.   
 
5.15 Conclusion  
 
The needs of all participants in surrogacy matter, not just the surrogate and the 
child.  Genetic fathers denied access to the child could ‘suffer from feelings of 
regret and self-betrayal similar to those that surrogate mothers could feel’.175  
The difficulty with a contractarian approach is that it ignores the 
commissioning mother, the emotional experiences of the surrogate and the 
need of the child to know its biological gestator.  If the contract fails, then the 
surrogate is often able to claim full legal custody in the United Kingdom.  
Under the adoption model, the commissioning mother may not be given the 
opportunity to have any legal recognition, as the surrogate is usually given 
parental rights alongside the commissioning father.  A relational model of 
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surrogate motherhood understands that surrogacy occurs in a complex social 
context and includes the hopes of the commissioning couple for a child, the 
possibly changing emotions of an embodied surrogate, and a child.  As 
relationalism is an interactive interdependent model, it provides for a variety 
of pluralistic solutions based upon the importance of the priorities for those 
involved.  A gestational surrogate who gestates another’s embryo could 
therefore still be involved in the child’s life but possibly to a lesser extent than a 
genetic commissioning mother who has the intention, genetic connection and a 
psychological relationship to the child.  In distinction from the proceedings of 
the American gestational surrogacy case Johnson v Calvert, the gestational 
surrogate should not be ignored, but acknowledged as a gestational mother 
and allowed to play some role in the child’s life, so the child can know her.  A 
relational model of surrogacy - with its dialogue and interdependence - will 
offer the flexibility to deal with the multidimensional determination of 
motherhood by intention, and by the status of genes, gestation and a social 
relationship.  It will also acknowledge that paid surrogacy can be a reciprocal 
act of generosity between those who want to give life and those who want to 
receive life. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to develop a relational framework for surrogate 
motherhood within the context of Christian ethics.  As seen in chapter one, the 
Church has traditionally unanimously condemned surrogacy, whether paid or 
unpaid.  Little distinction has been made between gestational surrogacy and 
genetic surrogacy.  However, the thesis has tried to address some of the key 
ethical issues of paid surrogacy, namely motherhood, commodification, 
exploitation, coercion, baby selling and reduction of altruism.  An alternative 
relational framework was suggested to the contractarian and adoption models, 
including the best interests of the child approach.  Relationalism incorporates a 
spectrum to accommodate a sophisticated ontology, with varying emphases 
upon the needs of the self and the other.  It does not always insist upon an 
objective proportionate mean or mutuality, but responds to the needs of the 
particular self and other by analysing the priority and importance of the act for 
them.  With regards to paid surrogacy, acknowledgement was made that in 
custody disputes a best interests of the child solution tends to focus upon the 
needs of the child only.  A relational approach aims to acknowledge the needs 
of all moral agents and by the use of discourse and negotiation to allow for a 
resolution involving all, possibly with various emphases upon the self and the 
other.  Therefore, relationalism acknowledges the time and effort of a 
gestational surrogate, and regards payment as a way of acknowledging her 
dignity and self-worth, but without commercialisation, to avoid 
commodification, exploitation and coercion.  The aim of this conclusion is to 
see how a relational approach towards surrogacy could work in practice.  The 
appendix suggests areas for future research. 
 
In an ideal world surrogacy would not exist.  Every married couple who 
wanted to have children would be able to do so without difficulty.  However, 
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many Christian couples may want to have children but experience infertility 
problems.  A commissioning mother may have been born without a womb, 
possibly suffering repeated miscarriages, having a hysterectomy due to cancer, 
or be unable to produce eggs, etc.  Some Christians will welcome gestational 
surrogacy as an opportunity for a Christian woman to demonstrate Christian 
service to her fellow Christians by becoming a surrogate.  Gestational 
surrogacy, especially if using the embryo of the commissioning couple, could 
be regarded as enhancing their marriage by using their gametes, so the child is 
of their flesh, reflecting the unitive bond of the couple.  Gestational surrogates 
would gestate the embryo of the married couple and therefore would not be 
procreating themselves.  Some commissioning couples may be unable to use 
their own gametes to procreate an embryo and therefore may want to use a 
gestational surrogate to ‘save’ a ‘spare embryo’ from destruction, especially if 
they believe life starts at conception.  In such a case, another couple undergoing 
IVF may have a ‘spare embryo’ from treatment which they are unable to 
implant into the wife and instead of destroying it may be willing to donate it to 
be used for gestational surrogacy.   
 
Some Christians will have no problem with the deliberate creation of an 
embryo from donated gametes to be used in gestational surrogacy.  The created 
embryo may use the egg of the commissioning wife with donor sperm or use a 
donated egg with the sperm of the commissioning father.  Alternatively the 
embryo may be created using a donated sperm with a donated egg.  It is 
important to think of the child born from donated gametes and for them to 
have as much information about the donor(s), so the donors are acknowledged 
and for them to have the opportunity to meet their genetic parent(s).  A 
relational approach would tend to favour using both or one of the genetic 
gametes of the commissioning couple, as they are connected to the child as a 
natural parent would be.  However, due to the risks of pregnancy for the 
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surrogate, perhaps a commissioning couple unable to use one of their own 
gametes should think about adopting a child instead of deliberately creating 
one who they are not related to.  Even so, not all commissioning couples are 
suitable for adoption and the needs of a child up for adoption may not be met 
by an infertile commissioning couple.  The needs of the child matter, the child 
could be disabled, have emotional needs, be older and therefore the 
commissioning couple may not be suitable to adopt such a child because they 
are unable to meet the particular needs of a child requiring adoption.  A 
commissioning couple therefore may be unsuitable for adoption, but suitable 
for surrogacy and the infertile commissioning couple should have the 
opportunity to procreate.  It is in the interests of the child for the 
commissioning couple to undergo a Criminal Record Bureau Check to prevent 
a paedophile (heterosexual or homosexual) from having a child. 
 
Relationalism acknowledges the importance of wanting a child by the 
commissioning couple and the positive role the surrogate can play in the life of 
the child by being acknowledged as the child’s gestator.  In order for 
gestational surrogacy to be used to ‘rescue’ ‘spare embryos’ or involve the 
deliberate creation of the child by donated gametes, the Human Fertilisation 
Act 2008 and its 2010 Parental Orders Act will have to be changed to allow for 
commissioning couples with no genetic link to the child to be able to apply for 
a Parental Order.  At the moment one of the commissioning couples has to be 
genetically related to the child to be able to apply for a genetic order.  Such an 
approach would allow for consistency within surrogacy.   
 
Traditionally those who apply to use a gestational surrogate tend to be infertile 
married couples.  Many Christians will vary in their responses to who can use a 
surrogate, with many wanting to limit access to married infertile couples in 
order to mimic traditional procreation occurring between married couples in 
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Christianity.  Some Christians therefore will not want surrogacy to be used by 
single people regardless of their age or medical circumstances.  At the moment 
single people are unable to apply for a surrogacy Parental Order under the law 
in the UK.  Traditionally Christianity has supported procreation within 
marriage only.  Likewise, many Christians will not want unmarried couples 
requesting surrogacy, whereas more liberal Christians will approve surrogacy 
for unmarried couples as long as they are living in a stable and committed 
relationship as if they were married.  Reflecting a possible traditional and 
natural law stance to surrogacy, some more traditional Christians will 
disapprove of surrogacy being used by couples who are unable to have 
children due to the age of the mother or if they already have children and do 
not want to undergo another pregnancy.  However, others may take a more 
responsive approach and try to be caring towards the needs of the 
commissioning mother, acknowledging that she may through no fault of her 
own need a surrogate due to meeting her husband late in life.  Such a 
commissioning mother may not want to risk childbirth especially if she has an 
underlying medical condition which could harm herself or the child if she 
underwent a pregnancy.  However, many Christians would probably reject 
convenience surrogacy where a woman who is capable of giving birth chooses 
to use a surrogate because she does not wish to lose her figure.  Even so, from 
the literature I have read, there have been no instances of convenience 
surrogacy in the UK.  However, there could be extreme circumstances where a 
surrogate might be appropriate as long as she was treated well, such as a newly 
married athlete of a certain age wanting to prepare for her last Olympics 
instead of undergoing pregnancy.  A relational approach would be very 
concerned at the way in which the surrogate is treated in surrogacy and 
therefore would tend not to support long-distance international arrangements, 
especially if the participants did not meet.  Likewise, relational surrogacy 
would not support ‘closed’ surrogacy programmes where the surrogate and 
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the commissioning couple did not meet during the pregnancy, with the child 
handed over through an intermediary.  Such ‘closed’ programmes go against 
the values of relationalism - including openness, discourse and negotiation.   
 
In recent years, gestational surrogacy has started to become used by 
homosexuals as a way to have children.  Some Christians will be opposed to 
surrogacy being used by gay men believing that it is unnatural, as two men are 
unable to procreate.  This objection is often based upon opposition to 
homosexuality per se.  Some may be concerned that women acting as surrogates 
for a homosexual commissioning couple are being used as a mere means to an 
end to provide the men with a ‘toy’ to pretend being a real family.  They may 
be concerned that the children are being deliberately deprived of a mother.  
Such Christians are more likely to be conservative rather than liberal.  
Conservative Christians will interpret particular verses of the Bible such as 
Romans 1:26-7 as avoiding unnatural relations to condemn homosexuality.  
These Christians will not want to encourage homosexuality, not seeing it as 
part of God’s ordained natural purpose for creation.  Likewise, such Christians 
are opposed to the former Labour Government’s rejection of exempting 
Christian adoption agencies from allowing homosexuals to adopt children. 
 
Other more liberal Christians may take a more favourable stance towards 
homosexuality, using verses such as Galatians 3:28 which focus upon 
differences being lost in Christ.  Liberal Christians tend to accept homosexual 
relationships as long as they are loving, stable and committed, believing that 
they can be a reflection of a person’s faith and not a hindrance.  Proponents 
tend to support gay civil ceremonies, calling for the Church to recognise gay 
marriage and the ordination of gay priests.  They are likely to support the use 
of surrogacy as a creative and dynamic way to overcome prejudice and barriers 
so that gay men can become parents.  Surrogacy in such a case would be seen 
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as creating life and an opportunity for a child to be socialised by two 
Christians, thus spreading the Kingdom of God.  Using a willing surrogate to 
create a family for homosexual couples would be considered part of the rights 
of the homosexual community to procreate and found a family, arguing that 
such rights are supported by the United Nations Declaration on the Family.  
Supporters of homosexual families would agree with the research by Susan 
Golombok which found that children in such families received supportive 
parenting.1  Indeed, the 2008 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act does 
not now insist upon a father for a child in the creation of families from the new 
reproductive technologies, but calls for supportive parenting.   
 
A relational approach to surrogacy will acknowledge the importance of 
Christians being able to make their own choices towards the use of gestational 
surrogacy for homosexuals.  It will try to take a non-judgemental approach, 
acknowledging that some homosexuals - even though they live together - may 
choose not to engage in homosexual relations on the advice of their priest or 
church.  Relationalism will also acknowledge the importance of the use of 
conscience in deciding whether to use a surrogate for the creation of families.  
Even though some Christians will condemn the practice, they should not hate 
or make life difficult for those who do decide to use it, but pray for, support 
and help them.  If a surrogate did decide to act for a homosexual couple, then 
hopefully the couple would ensure that the surrogate was acknowledged in the 
child’s life by being listed on the child’s birth certificate, ensuring the child 
knew of its surrogate birth, and allowing the surrogate to visit, especially if she 
acted as a genetic surrogate.  A relational surrogacy approach to homosexual 
surrogacy would disapprove of cases where the surrogate is unknown to the 
couple or to the child and if she was unable to be acknowledged in the child’s 
                                                 
1 Susan Golombok and Shirlene Badger, ‘Children Raised in Mother-headed Families from 
Infancy: A Follow-up of Children of Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers, at Early 
Adulthood’, Human Reproduction 25 (2010), 150-7, at 150 and 154-5. 
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life.  Churches may in the future decide to create special liturgies for surrogacy, 
for heterosexual families and possibly even homosexual families, especially in 
the Christening of the child, possibly thanking God for the involvement of the 
surrogate as his handmaiden in creating new life.  The surrogate could be 
acknowledged as a godparent or, if she did not want to be a godparent, prayers 
said for her thanking her for role as a gestator.   
 
Relationalism towards gestational surrogacy therefore aims to ensure that the 
welfare and dignity of the participants are respected, while encouraging 
discourse and negotiation if problems occur.  Using a relational framework will 
try to solve problems by taking the needs of each other into consideration, 
especially the priorities and importance of the act for them.  A married couple 
undergoing a divorce, for example, who had previously undergone fertility 
treatment, may find that they had one frozen embryo left, which was due for 
destruction after meeting its storage limit.  In order for the wife to experience 
her only chance of being a genetic mother she may need to use a gestational 
surrogate to give life to the embryo.  In such a case, relationalism would 
encourage the positive procreative needs of the wife over the negative rights of 
the husband not to become a father if he changed his mind and did not want 
the child to be gestated.  Relationalism would highlight the importance and 
priority of the act for the woman, especially if the husband is able to procreate 
again later.   
 
Some women will prefer to be gestational surrogates over genetic surrogacy 
because they are not procreating and they are not handing over a child who is 
related to them.  However, some women will prefer to be genetic surrogates, 
believing that the practice is safer and easier, regarding the social 
commissioning mother as the real mother.  A gestational surrogate has to 
undergo medical treatment so that her fertility cycle is synchronised with that 
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of the commissioning mother.  A relational approach to surrogacy prefers 
gestational surrogacy which uses the gametes of the commissioning couple so 
that the surrogate does not procreate and so that the child comes from their 
marital union.  Alternatively, if gestational surrogacy using one of the gametes 
of the commissioning couple cannot be used then a ‘spare embryo’ is preferable 
or an embryo created using donated gametes.  However, genetic surrogacy 
(when the surrogate contributes her own egg) does allow for the child and the 
commissioning couple to personally know who the birth mother is and for her 
to be acknowledged.   
 
Gestational surrogacy using a deliberately created embryo from anonymous 
donors may be easier for the surrogate to distance herself from, as she is not 
genetically related to the child and could be easier for her to relinquish.  Some 
may argue that the child could suffer not knowing its genetic heritage and be 
confused about having five parents.  Even so, the commissioning couple could 
still provide a loving and caring home for the child, carefully explaining its 
origin at a later date.  At least with gestational surrogacy, the surrogate does 
not have to face relinquishing a child which is genetically related to her or 
handing over a child which may have features similar to her own children.   
 
A relational approach to surrogacy will regard genetic surrogacy as a 
supererogatory act to be performed if gestational surrogacy using the embryo 
of the commissioning couple or a spare embryo cannot be used.  Even though 
genetic surrogacy allows a commissioning father to procreate, the act needs to 
be seen from the surrogate’s perspective who may find it difficult to relinquish 
the child or if she experiences bonding to the child.  More allowances can be 
made for the genetic surrogate to keep the child especially if she is genetically 
related to it, allowing for partial justice instead of the impartial justice of a 
contractarian approach which would insist that she hand the child over.  A 
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relational approach would want to acknowledge the surrogate’s emotions 
during the surrogacy, especially at the end when she is expected to hand the 
child over.  Hopefully all participants will have discussed how to deal with 
potential custody problems regarding relinquishment before and during the 
arrangement.  Using a relational framework would aim to acknowledge the 
significance and importance of the act for those involved.  A gestational 
surrogate who already has children, and who has gestated the last remaining 
embryo of a commissioning couple to which they are genetically related, would 
probably be more likely to be expected to hand the child over, with limited 
visitation rights, as a reflection of her emotion or bonding to the child.  
However a genetic surrogate who had gestated an embryo which was made 
using her egg with the sperm of an anonymous donor would more than likely 
have greater access to the child.  Even so, the emotions of the commissioning 
couple should not be overlooked, as they can bond to an embryo, especially by 
seeing the foetus during an ultra-sound.  A relational approach towards 
custody disputes would not just be based upon the genetic connection, but the 
significance of the child for those involved, whether they have children or not, 
the degree and type of the emotional attachment, their suitability for parenting, 
as well as the needs of the child.  Unlike a best interests of the child approach, 
custody will not just be based upon the child’s best interests alone, but also 
upon the needs of the adults to be able to associate with their child.   
 
A relational approach towards surrogacy would encourage negotiation and 
discourse before the arrangement was made.  Therefore the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple could discuss issues - such as pregnancy management, 
screening for Down’s syndrome, abortion, the behaviour of the surrogate 
during the pregnancy, how and where the birth will take place - all before 
starting the surrogacy.  The surrogate should be able to have the final decision 
regarding the abortion of the child, especially if her life was at risk and she 
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should not be made to have an abortion against her will.  A surrogate who was 
opposed to abortion should not work with a commissioning couple who expect 
an abortion if the child is severely disabled.  The commissioning couple have a 
responsibility to the child and they cannot expect the surrogate to bring up the 
child if they reject it due to it being disabled.  If the couple choose to place the 
child up for adoption once the child is born, then they could be fined in order 
to pay the costs the state has to find in order to ensure that the child is adopted 
successfully.  Alternatively, all commissioning couples could be asked to pay 
insurance in addition to life insurance for the surrogate, which would be paid 
to the state if they decided to reject the child.   
 
One possible solution to ensure that surrogacy ran smoothly would be for 
Britain to have a dedicated NHS phone line or centre which could deal with all 
surrogacy issues such as the psychological screening of surrogates and 
information giving, since some of the legal information provided by some of 
the surrogacy agencies has sometimes been inaccurate.  Even though it is 
debatable whether the professionalization of surrogacy is needed by the setting 
up of a surrogacy trade union, care for the surrogates is very important.  
Women need to be able to receive independent counselling and legal advice so 
they can make informed decisions with valid consent before entering the 
practice.  As surrogacy agencies are funded by commissioning couples and 
their counsellors are the same ones who advise the commissioning couple, 
there is a danger that the advice and counselling given to surrogates may not 
be impartial or responsive to their needs.  It is important to have standards 
within surrogacy so that women pretending to act as surrogates cannot deceive 
commissioning couples for money and then just keep the child, which could 
even be the natural child of the surrogate and her husband.  Having a national 
centre could advise professionals dealing with surrogacy such as lawyers, 
courts, social workers, nurses, midwives, doctors, hospital consultants, hospital 
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chaplains, birth registrars, priests, academics, etc.  Such a centre may build up 
trust with those using surrogacy and engage in research regarding for example 
the psychological bonding in gestational surrogates compared to genetic 
surrogates.   
 
The centre could ensure that a national data-base of information is built up 
regarding surrogacy case law, especially regarding international agreements 
and within Europe concerning the national identity of children born of 
surrogacy.2  There is a need for the international community to develop a 
coherent surrogacy policy, to prevent reproductive tourism, where 
commissioning couples travel thousands of miles to find a surrogate.  In May 
2011 a child born to a surrogate in India with a German commissioning couple 
was unable to claim German citizenship, even though the commissioning 
couple were named as the parents on the child’s birth certificate and despite 
German nationality being given if one of the parents is genetically related to 
the child.  The difficulty lies in that German law regards the child’s legal father 
to be the husband of the surrogate.3  A similar situation stands in the UK where 
the husband of the surrogate is the legal father of the child born of the 
surrogate, unless he states that he disapproves of his wife being a surrogate.  
The husband of the surrogate, through no decision of his own, is legally forced 
to take on responsibility for the child and be listed as the child’s father on the 
birth certificate whether he wants to or not.  Such an approach can be seen as 
unethical.  Even though the surrogate’s husband is married to the surrogate 
and she has given birth to the child, it needs to remembered that it is a 
surrogacy arrangement.  At the moment the surrogate’s husband is 
                                                 
2 Lawyer Natalie Gamble calls for legal clarity in ‘Crossing Borders for Surrogacy: The 
Problems for Families and Policymakers’, BioNews 609 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_95089.asp?dinfo=hSpNi1N06LhoAfyRTYWFwxXX (assessed 
1 June 2011). 
3 N. Satkunarajah, ‘Surrogate Child Denied German Passport’, BioNews 606 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_94158.asp?dinfo=hSpNi1N06LhoAfyRTYWFwxXX (assessed 
10 May 2011). 
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automatically regarded as the child’s father and he has to disapprove of his 
wife’s actions in order not to be considered the father which is not very 
supportive of his wife.  Most husbands of the surrogate probably do not want 
to be regarded as the child’s father, especially as it denies the fatherhood of the 
commissioning father, who is often genetically related to the child.  There 
needs to be a way in which the husband of the surrogate can distance himself 
from being the child’s father, without having to disapprove of his wife’s 
actions.  The law could be changed so that he is no longer required to register 
as the child’s father.   
 
By having more detailed birth certificates, greater clarity could be achieved 
regarding the identity of those involved in surrogacy.  The birth certificate of a 
child born through surrogacy could include the names of the gestator, the 
genetic mother, the genetic father, the social father and the social mother.  In 
some cases the same person will fulfil each role, but such a detailed birth 
certificate would help the child to be able to trace those who played a part in 
the creation of their life and in their upbringing.  Another possible function for 
a national surrogacy centre could be to ensure that payment in surrogacy does 
not become too excessive and to ensure that paid surrogacy occurs without 
commodification, exploitation or coercion.   
 
Since surrogacy has not gone away, and in light of the recent legislative 
changes regarding the reproductive technologies, perhaps it is time the 
churches explored surrogacy again.  Some Christians will disapprove of third 
parties donating their gametes, but others may approve of a gestational 
surrogate gestating the embryo of the commissioning couple, even though the 
conception of the embryo did not occur by sexual intercourse.  Even so, some 
members of the Church of England in the document Personal Origins 
acknowledge that using donated gametes can be a good and can help to 
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strengthen the relational marriage bond by positively affirming the family by 
focusing upon the social context of love and care for the children, since 
artificial insemination by donor (AID) can help the lack of a natural good of the 
marriage (50-1)4 without adultery (57).  Personal Origins calls for truthfulness 
about genetic origins (57).  Gamete donation is seen as similar to adoption, 
since the parents are not genetically related and they ‘accept the child 
voluntarily’ (50).  Therefore, AID is given approval, due to reflection on 
tradition, knowledge and experience, even though AID was previously rejected 
in 1948 by the Archbishop’s Committee (4, 51 and 57).  However, some 
Christians will be concerned at a genetic surrogate procreating and handing 
her genetic child over to the couple.  If a relational model is used, instead of a 
contractarian model, then the needs of the surrogate, the commissioning couple 
and the child will be taken into consideration.  Surrogacy can be operated in an 
open and honest manner, without involving sexual intercourse or the 
unnecessary destruction of embryos, but respecting their dignity, while 
providing opportunities for families to be created.  After all, another Church of 
England document on the family published in 1995, Something to Celebrate, 
admits that there can be ‘seeds for creative thought and practice able to move 
people towards patterns of nurture, co-operative and interdependence which 
are more life-enhancing and open to the spirit’.5  Something to Celebrate believes: 
 
Family values are usually used to sum up all that is good, commendable and 
traditional about human relationships between people within the same family.  
However, a more helpful and more inclusive term would be ‘relational’ values because 
family values are essentially healthy relationship values, such as trust, fidelity, 
honesty, truthfulness, commitment, continuity, compassion, self-sacrifice, forbearance, 
kindness, generosity, sharing respect, understanding, loyalty, co-operation, solidarity.6 
                                                 
4 References refer to pages in The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the 
Church of England, Personal Origins (London: Church House, 2nd edition, 1996). 
5 The Board for Social Responsibility of the General Synod of the Church of England, Something 
to Celebrate (London: Church House, 1995), 90.   
6 Ibid., 121. 
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Perhaps a relational approach to surrogacy could make surrogacy acceptable 
for some Christians and give hope to others of having a family. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
 
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
The Practice 
 
 Are surrogates paid the same amount if there is a miscarriage, abortion 
or stillbirth? 
 Are surrogates paid monthly, in a lump sum, or a set fee? 
 How much and for what are surrogates paid? 
 Is there any evidence of market practices in surrogacy, e.g. 
advertisements, bulk purchase, special offers or end of season sales? 
 Do surrogacy payments change over the pregnancy? 
 Is clear information given to the surrogate concerning screening, 
consent, legal advice, counselling, caesarean section, abortion, place of 
birth, birth method? 
 Do any of the parties involved believe that there should be a set fee for 
the surrogate? 
 For what are the surrogates and the commissioning couples screened? 
 
The Surrogate 
 
 Does money affect and compromise the consent, autonomy, freedom, 
bargaining power, rights, privacy, bodily integrity, empowerment and 
personhood of the surrogate in the arrangement?  Are the surrogates 
under pressure to conform to the requirements of the commissioning 
couple due to money being paid? 
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 Do the surrogates consider the emotional side or just the money when 
they make their decisions? 
 Do surrogates hide disease, smoking, drugs, alcohol, diet, exercise and 
self-care in order to be accepted for payment? 
 Are surrogates with certain characteristics - e.g. a high IQ and beauty -
paid more? 
 Do the surrogates feel that they are selling their parental or custody 
rights or selling a child? 
 Does the involvement of money change the surrogate’s perception of 
motherhood or their attitude to their other children?  
 Do the surrogates feel that their dignity and self-esteem is lowered 
before, during or after the event?   
 Do the surrogates feel coerced, induced, exploited, alienated, used or 
commodified by their commissioning couple and their offer of money? 
 Are there problems with expenses, for example reduced autonomy? Do 
expenses coerce? 
 Do the surrogates perceive their actions as a service? 
 How does money affect the motives of the surrogate and her attitude to 
the child? 
 How do the surrogates react to the money paid and how do they explain 
the money to others? 
 What is the societal reaction to the surrogate?  For example, 
commodification of all women? 
 What proportion of surrogates do not accept money for their services? 
 
The Commissioning Couple 
 
375 
 
 Are any commissioning couples prevented from adopting the child due 
to having paid the surrogate? 
 Do the commissioning fathers see it as buying parental rights or custody 
rights and do they see surrogacy as selling these? 
 Why do the commissioning couple want to pay?  Is it for reasons of 
reward, gratitude, reciprocity or mixed reciprocity? 
 
The Commissioning Couple and the Surrogate 
 
 Do the commissioning couple commodify the surrogate by asking for 
specific genetic and social traits, for example IQ, health and other 
characteristics?  Would they be willing to pay more? 
 Do commissioning couples expect to have rights over the surrogate’s 
body? 
 Do the commissioning couples treat the surrogate mother as a 
commodity i.e. as a mere means to an end, or with dignity?  Do they 
respect her rights or are they eroded? 
 Do the commissioning couples treat the surrogate mother with 
contempt, as an object (e.g. oven) and treat surrogacy as a business 
transaction?  Is it demeaning and dehumanising? 
 What is the power relation between the surrogate and the 
commissioning couple?  Is it contract biased or relational?  Do paying 
couples expect the surrogates to do as they say? 
 Do commissioning couples not paying the surrogate give more of their 
time? 
 Do the surrogates feel pressurised to hand the child over because they 
are paid? 
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The Child and the Surrogate and the Commissioning Couple 
 
 Are some embryos considered more valuable than others?  For example 
are certain characteristics paid more, are handicapped embryos less 
expensive?  Are twins more expensive?  
 Are the children treated without dignity or intrinsic worth - i.e. what is 
the attitude of the surrogate to the foetus? 
 Is the child commodified by the surrogate and the commissioning 
couple - i.e. treated as a product?  What is their attitude to it? 
 
The Child 
 
 Do the children have low self-esteem?  Is there evidence that they have 
higher levels of insecurity?   
 Are the children commodified by the process? 
 Do the children of surrogates fear that they will be sold if they do not 
behave?  
 Is there resentment at abandonment towards the surrogate and 
generally?   
 What are they told by others about the surrogacy practice?   
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